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Abstract 
The policy and practice of media regulation in China is quickly evolving to cope with the 
regulatory challenges presented by the rapid development and convergence of new media 
technology. These challenges include the increasing economic power of international and 
private stakeholders within this space, as well as the constantly evolving uses of highly 
converged media. Online games are a central part of this evolving dynamic, which is 
characterized by strong tensions between producers and operators, government regulators, 
and users of online games. This research explores the changing dynamic of online games 
regulation in China as it responds to the forces of internationalization and privatization. It also 
seeks to identify critical issues for policy development in China that are raised by the new and 
innovative ways that this media is being used. It draws from and contributes to scholarship 
from a number of disciplines, but primarily approaches the research from a media studies and 
area studies perspective.  
The thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter I begins with a discussion of emerging 
practice in online games and its wider policy implications. This is followed by a literature review 
and an explanation of the methodological approach, which included: case study methodology, 
participant observation, and key informant Interviews with policy, legal, and game industry 
experts in China. The core research is then presented in three chapters. Chapter II is a detailed 
contextual narrative that describes China’s online games policy and places it in historical 
perspective. Chapter III is an exploratory analysis of key institutions, stakeholder interests, 
and interactions that shape practical regulation of online games in China. Chapter IV presents 
a focused analysis and discussion of the gold farming case. The thesis concludes with a 
summary and discussion of research contributions in Chapter V. The final discussion highlights 
how the thesis contributes to knowledge in three key areas: new media in China, policy studies 
of China, and media convergence.  
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Chapter I: Introduction and Methodology 
Introduction and Background 
Over the last two decades, there has been a significant shift in the nature of communications 
media. The internet has increasingly become a platform for widespread human communication 
and interaction, creating communities and connecting people across national boundaries. One 
increasingly significant forum for such activity is provided by online games. 
Computer games have evolved from their original single or double-player format into 
a complex medium that connects hundreds of millions of people around the world2 over the 
internet. They have transcended traditional definitions of games to become complex, 
sometimes persistent environments that in many ways mimic real life. Once the recreational 
activity of a marginal population, these games have become widely popular: a 2014 report 
from one international market research firm indicates that forty percent of internet users 
worldwide play games online (yStats). China has the largest number of internet users in the 
world, and 368 million people, or fifty-eight point two percent of them, play online games 
(CNNIC, 34th Statistical Report).  
Online games often involve high levels of interaction and cooperation among players, 
who can participate from any internet-connected modern computer. Some of the most popular 
online games are Massively Multiplayer Online games, or MMOs. MMOs provide an extremely 
effective form of communication and medium for social engagement. They converge 
communication capacities available in the wider internet and take them a step further: a single 
game often combines the social networking capacity of Facebook, the persistence of instant 
chat programs and the voice connection capabilities of Skype, along with visual representation 
of place, avatar embodiment, team co-operation, and economic activity. The simultaneous 
channels of communication regularly used in MMO environments place them at the forefront 
of a trend toward media convergence.  
The term "media convergence" describes a trend in the global media landscape 
toward increased integration of media technologies, products, and services3. This integration 
                                                     
2 According to a report by games market research company Spilgames, over 1.2 billion people played 
online games globally in 2013 (Takahashi 2013).  
3 This definition applies common interpretations of the term (described in Dwyer, 2 and Flew, 1) to the 
phenomena directly observed in the research. For a fuller explanation of the wider phenomenon of media 




is performed at three levels: at the corporate level, through multimedia ownership and 
company conglomeration; at the user level, through simultaneous consumption, and at the 
platform level, where hardware and software are consolidated into a single platform or planned 
user experience. In the case of online games, media convergence takes place at all three 
levels. They are platforms of consolidated hardware and software; they are commonly owned 
by companies that offer many media products and services; and they are commonly used 
along with complementary hardware and software. Online games, and MMOs in particular are 
examples of highly converged media. 
The highly connected nature of online games creates opportunities for domestic and 
international social and economic interaction on a massive scale. Today, online games offer 
the same opportunities for economic and social interaction as the rest of the internet: people 
can connect with friends, create communities, and make real money. New and innovative ways 
of using these opportunities are constantly emerging, creating space for a wide range of 
human activity. 
Emerging practices within MMOs raise a number of issues that are cause for 
regulatory concern from both domestic and international regulatory bodies and stakeholders. 
Real economic exchange takes place in MMOs, and provides opportunities for both economic 
development and for criminal activity. This activity is not formally regulated or tracked by 
anyone but the game companies themselves. One prevailing example of this is the domestic 
and international trade of virtual currency, goods, and services through online games.  
As MMOs have gained popularity, their users have found ways to exchange game-
issued items and services for real currency, in a practice known as Real-Money Trade, or 
"RMT". This term describes both the sale of game items between players, and the direct sale 
of game items to players by companies. Over the last fifteen years, an entire industry known 
as "gold farming" has emerged that is based around the practice of player-to-player RMT. 
"Gold farming" refers to the systematic accumulation of MMO-issued assets, and is commonly 
used to describe the RMT industry that has emerged around the player-to-player sale of game-
issued assets.4 This research uses the term to refer to the RMT industry, where third-party 
entrepreneurs or organizations sell "farmed" assets for real currency.5 A recent report from the 
World Bank estimates that virtual goods and services traded in online games account for multi-
billions of dollars in real world currency (Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist). The technical and commercial 
                                                     
4 The term can also be used to describe asset-hoarding behaviour by players that may not result in 
exchange with real currency.  




infrastructure used to conduct this exchange allows this trade to circumvent the established 
infrastructures that are designed to regulate domestic and international economic trade.  
National governments and international governing bodies are increasingly recognizing 
that, with both advantages and drawbacks, activity in online games has tangible and powerful 
impact on the real world and real economies. Advantages have been recognized in reports 
published recently by the OECD and the European Commission, who have recognized the 
potential for social interaction in online games to positively impact education, empowerment 
and social inclusion (OECD; Stewart et al.). The United States Government Accountability 
Office has also recognized potential for collection of tax revenue from the emerging industry 
of virtual goods trade (1), and has recently issued guidance on its treatment for income tax 
purposes (Internal Revenue Service). Governing regulators have additionally recognized the 
potential for emerging activity in online games to facilitate criminal operations. Regulators from 
Australia (Pearce), the United States (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs), and the European Union (European Central Bank) have recognized the potential for 
money laundering activity to thrive in online games, and recent reports expressing concern 
about this issue have also been released by the European Central Bank and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  
 While regulators are beginning to understand the power of this new medium, 
developing ways to effectively regulate it is extremely difficult. The private and often 
international nature of the medium, as well as the commercial and technical infrastructure that 
underpins the industry, raise critical issues for policy development. Governments and 
governing bodies are just beginning to identify some of these critical issues, some of which 
are highlighted in the reports described above. Regulatory development in this area is likely to 
become more significant as the activity that takes place in MMOs extends beyond the gaming 
demographic to affect the wider internet community.  
 China's regulators have taken a leading role in the efforts to understand and regulate 
online games and their innovative use. As host to the world’s largest number of internet users 
(CNNIC, The 34th Statistical Report) and largest population of MMO gamers (CNNIC, The 26th 
Statistical Report; Newzoo, “Infographic: the Chinese Games Market”), governing bodies and 
stakeholders in China are among the first to encounter many of the issues for policy 
development that are raised by emerging practices in MMOs and other new media. The 
country was among the first to see court cases about virtual property theft (Chew 3), and has 
begun to develop policies that target user activity in online games. While China's policy in this 
area represents some of the first global efforts to regulate online games and the activity that 
takes place within them, the relevant policy and regulatory infrastructure is still at an early 




becoming familiar with and adapting to the challenges of this new technology and its emerging 
uses. Understanding this policy dynamic and the critical issues for policy development that it 
is facing can help the international community to understand the country's policy priorities in 
this area. It can also facilitate international cooperation as China and other nations look to 
balance the opportunities for growth with the potential for criminal activity and negative social 
impact that the evolving uses of online games and converged media present.  
Literature Review   
This exploration included extensive research on topics from a variety of disciplines. 
Scholarship reviewed for the project includes publications in the following fields: economics 
and economic development, game studies, law, management, media and communications, 
politics, and policy. Both English-language and Chinese-language scholarship and sources 
have been examined, both for reference and analysis. This section reviews the sources and 
scholarship consulted for this research. 
While this project draws from and contributes to knowledge in a number of fields, it 
primarily builds knowledge in three areas. The research builds understanding about new 
media in China, about media convergence, and about policy studies of China. The literature 
review below outlines how these fields have evolved in recent years and highlights how this 
project fits into and builds on existing scholarship in these areas. It describes how this research 
uses established knowledge and qualitative research methodologies to explore how the 
evolving regulation, technology, and uses of online games in China are changing media and 
regulatory landscapes both in China and globally.  
Chinese Media Scholarship 
Frameworks for Discussion 
Much mainstream scholarship on media ethics to date has operated within an ethic 
shaped by the geopolitical and cultural mores of juddNorth America and Western Europe 
(Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin 324). The origins of this ethic have been traced to 
Enlightenment philosophy (Freedman and Shafer 143; Siebert and Schramm 3) and the ‘liberal 
worldview’, which Nerone notes has been shaped by the philosophical and political 
atmospheres of the so-called “western world” (Nerone 6-7, 17). This paradigm has been 
extremely influential on mainstream media scholarship; the foundational Four Theories of the 




role in facilitating civil engagement further established its ties with democracy6. Discussion of 
media ethics in Europe and North America has been shaped by this dominant ethic as 
scholars, journalists, and international organizations continue to frame their research within 
“western” geopolitical and philosophical traditions7. This liberal framework has served as a 
foundation for conceptualization of China's media in a variety of disciplines.  
Early scholarship on Chinese media worked within what Haiqing Yu refers to as the 
'Cold War framework' (2011, 68). This framework 'viewed Chinese mass media as solely the 
propaganda tool and ideological apparatus of the Communist Party, or Chinese newspaper 
readers and television audiences as passive Mao-indoctrinated masses' (68). These 
‘functionalist’ explanations (70), most influentially Schramm's 'Soviet Communist' theory 
(1956) and, later, Altschull's Marxist model (1995), were popular among Chinese media 
scholars for several decades8. Although from 1949 to 1978, these models may have been 
useful for scholars outside of China to conceive of a highly inaccessible media system9, they 
promoted a simplistic view of the interaction between the Chinese state and China's society10, 
and considered only political factors as shaping influences on Chinese media.  
After the open-door policy of 1978, scholars began to realize that these early political 
models failed to describe what they saw (C. Huang 447). In addition to increased access for 
foreign scholarship and fieldwork, the 1978 policy changes resulted in what Scotton and 
Hachten call 'an unprecedented boom in media development' that was characterized by a 
loosening of state media control (21). In response to this, a new political explanation was 
popularized that understood China's media to be in a state of "transition" from the former 
Communist media system 11  to a more open, democratic media system (Sparks 9). This 
                                                     
6 The tie between Habermas and democratic theory is noted by Thomas McCarthy in the introduction to 
his 1991 translation of Habermas' 1963 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (xii). 
7 Winfield, Mizuno & Beaudoin (324) note this trend in American journalistic discussion before 2000. 
International (and recent) examples include Meyer (2011), Belsey (1998), and Ingenhoff and Koelling 
(2012). This framework has also defined the political agenda of international organizations such as 
UNESCO, as highlighted by Freedman and Schafer (136).  
8 For an explanation of these models and their influence, see C. Huang.  
9 From the founding of the PRC in 1949 until the post-Mao open-door policy of 1978, China was highly 
inaccessible to outside scholars. Keane notes that this trend has continued until recently (81). Yu notes 
that this lack of access to fieldwork data perpetuated use of the Cold War framework in Chinese media 
studies (68). 
10 Zheng problematizes this simplistic approach in his 2008 Technological Empowerment (11) 





interpretation marked the beginning of what has been termed the ‘modernization approach’ 
(Himelboim & Limor 73) to media research on China. Himelboim and Limor describe this 
approach: 'scholars posit developmental communication as an engine of change from 
“traditional” to “modern” society, as technology and Western values diffuse toward the 
developing world’ (73). This perspective exerted a significant shaping influence on post-Mao 
scholarship on Chinese media (Sparks 9).  
 Since the media commercialization that followed the Deng reforms of the 90s, political 
discussion of China’s media ethic has gained complexity (Yu 68), however liberal normative 
interpretation maintains a strong presence in academic debate. In her historical overview of 
the field, Haiqing Yu describes these newer studies of Chinese media: 'they have ranged from 
the optimistic (focusing on the uptakes in media marketisation and globalisation and their 
democratic potential) to the pessimistic (focusing on media censorship and control, and the 
continued power-money hegemony)' (69). Yu's description highlights the endurance of liberal 
normative interpretation; optimism and pessimism align with the achievement or lack thereof 
of democratization in both media and politics. While political and value-laden interpretations 
of China's media ethic continue to occupy space in international discussions 12, a parallel 
discussion that recognizes its weaknesses has gained significant academic ground (Hong 89).  
Attempts to depart from the simplistic assumptions of early ‘democracy-centred 
approaches’ (Hong 89) and perspectives have emerged from a variety of disciplines, most 
decisively, perhaps, with the 2000 publication of Curran and Park’s De-Westernizing Media 
Studies (Keane 2011, 83). Other studies have taken a comparative approach to highlight the 
need for contextual understanding of China’s media. In Hallin and Mancini's 2012 Comparing 
Media Systems beyond the Western World, the editors note the importance of understanding 
unique political and historical contexts when comparing media systems, and Zhao examines 
what insight the Chinese context can bring to comparative media studies (Y. Zhao 2012). 
Himelboim & Limor, Freedman & Shafer, and Winfield et al. have also emphasized the 
importance of contextual understanding to studies on China's media. In some cases, studies 
have sought to provide this context, with varying degrees of success. These contextual 
elaborations vary widely in academic approach and perspective. Some scholars have offered 
interpretation of China's historical and philosophical context (particularly Confucianism and 
collectivism) to expand on existing political conceptualizations (Q. Cao 2011; Fu & Tsui 2003) 
or to explain the unique nature of China's media ethic (Winfield et al. 2003). These 
interpretations tend to be normative, rather than evidence-based, however, and their 
conclusions and assumptions therefore tend to be highly speculative and of limited analytical 
                                                     




use. More successful contextual insight has been contributed from Chinese area studies, 
whose systematic historical elucidation13 has been acclaimed for meticulous methodology and 
concrete evidence (Hong 92). Although Hong notes that at times the area studies approach is 
framed within a wider theoretical discourse, she emphasizes that its primary strength and 
focus consists of microscopic analysis and contextualization (92). Micro analysis has seen 
some success in escaping the bonds of the liberal framework, however it provides limited 
insight toward the wider relationships between stakeholders and institutions that shape the 
production, consumption, and regulation of China’s media. A variety of disciplines have 
contributed new approaches and models for macro analysis14, however to date no single 
approach has garnered widespread support. The most widespread support for future 
investigation seems to lie in ecological conceptualizations of China’s media (Keane 2011, 84; 
H. Yu 2011, 64) as well as a combination of interdisciplinary perspective and collection of solid 
empirical field data (Hong 94).  
New Media Scholarship 
 English-language scholarship on new media in China fits well into the theoretical 
trajectory of wider academic literature on Chinese media. The modernization and transition 
theory characteristic of English-language scholarship on older forms of Chinese media found 
renewed life in the political internet discourse of the nineteen nineties. Technology determinists 
anticipated that the internet would be a catalyst for China’s long-anticipated transition toward 
democracy (Deibert 143; Lagerkvist 2005, 120). This ‘democracy optimism’ (Chadwick 58-9), 
was contrasted by a counter-argument that gained popularity following the success of state 
control of the internet in China; 'democracy-pessimism' (Chadwick 58-9) argued that internet 
technology would not change politics, but rather serve as a perpetuating instrument of 
authoritarian regimes (eg., Hachigian 2002, 41; Jiang 2010; Qiu 2000, 1). This debate focused 
early new media scholarship on the democratizing capacity and potential of the internet and 
shaped much scholarship on new media in China (Leibold 1023; Qiu 2000, 2).  
 The tendency toward division of scholarship along the lines of democracy-centred 
optimism and pessimism (H. Yu 2011, 69) has extended into the realm of new media; optimism 
can be observed in the trend toward research on civil society and social activism as it is 
facilitated by new technology (eg., Tai 2006; Yang 2009; Li 2010; Liu & McCormick 2011; Tang 
& Sampson 2012; Weber 2011) while pessimism is manifested in the continued centrality of 
state censorship to academic discussion (eg., A. Chan 2007; Feng & Guo, 2012; M. Jiang 
                                                     
13 For an overview of major authors that have published in this field, see Hong, 92. 




2010; Hachigian 2002; Harwit & Clark 2001; Hu 2011; Stockmann & Gallagher 2011; Zhao 
2004). Despite the sustained influence of the censorship-freedom framework, the last decade 
of new media scholarship has seen an increase in acknowledgment of the complex nature of 
China's media system. 
 On the level of macroanalysis, scholars have worked to increase the complexity of the 
state-versus-society ‘paradigm of information control and resistance’ (Leibold, 1023) by 
proposing new models for conceptualizing China’s media that include multiple actors and 
complex relationships between them. Some of these models maintain a political focus, 
increasing the complexity of early conceptualizations to explain the continued legitimization of 
authoritarian rule in the age of new media. These include: Min Jiang’s “Authoritarian 
Informationalism” (2010), Stockmann and Gallagher’s “Authoritarian Resilience” (2010), Lin's 
"Three-Dimensional State-Media Regime" (2007), and Sparks’ “Elite Continuity" (2008). 
Others aim more at systemic understanding (eg., Lee, He & Huang 2007; Y. Zheng 2008; J. 
Zhao 2008 & 2009) and include a wide variety of actors and relationships in their analyses. 
The recent academic work accounts for the variety of possibilities presented by new media 
technology; that it can be used at cross-purposes by a variety of interest groups, and that its 
future depends on a variety of factors (Brady 2009; Shirk 2007; Qiu 2005; Wang 2010; J. Zhao 
2008; Y. Zheng 2008). Increasingly, micro-level empirical research is informing these studies. 
While macro level academic understanding of China’s media system and media ethic has 
generated new models and systemic conceptualizations, micro level research has highlighted 
the complexity and multiplicity of the stakeholders and the ways in which they interact.  
Media Convergence 
Media convergence in China has resulted in new ways of participating, producing, and 
regulating media. As these changes have taken place, scholars have demonstrated an 
increasing interest in case-informed research that encourages more complex consideration of 
the most commonly identified macro-components of China's media sector: "society" "state" 
and "market"15. Academic understanding of "society" is significantly enhanced by research on 
public activism, participation, roles, identities, and communities (Yang 2007; Hockx 2005; Yu; 
Weber 2011; Wang 2009) as well as the effects of access to technology (Qiu; Guo & Chen, 
2011). The multiplicity and variation of interests that comprise the Chinese "state" as a media 
regulator have also been acknowledged by micro-level research. Zheng Yongnian 
(“Technological Empowerment”) explicitly disaggregates competing interests that vary along 
                                                     
15The term "market" is somewhat problematic in that it is used in different ways by different authors; 
because of this, it has become an aggregative term which may include: the market economy, the 




with jurisdictions and levels of government, while Liebman (2005), Tong (2010), and Qiu 
(2005) refute the idea of a “centralized media control” in their examination of local regulatory 
implementation and the relationship between the media, public opinion, and the legal system. 
The complexities of the market influence on various stakeholders within China’s media system 
have been addressed by a number of scholars (eg, R. Bai 2012; Brady 2006 & 2008; Lee, He 
& Huang 2007; Scotton & Hachten 2010; Winfield & Peng; X. Xin 2008; Y. Zhao 1998). 
However, the complexity of market influence increases as technology provides increased 
opportunities for economic interaction. Qiu (2009) and Guo & Cheng (2011) have addressed 
the economic and spatial stratification associated with access or lack of access to this 
technology, while other scholars have explored new aspects of market influence, such as 
Real-Money Trade and virtual economics. These new forms of economic interaction have 
been investigated in relation to their potential legal and development implications (Huhh 2008; 
Heeks 2008; Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist 2011) as well as their cultural impact (Arnason 2008; 
Nakamura 2010). The above researchers have emphasized the multiplicity and complexity of 
actors involved in China’s media. Another line of scholarship highlights the importance of 
historical and cultural aspects of new media.  
 An increasing body of research explores the historical and cultural contexts of new 
media in China. Golub and Lingley (2010) and Jiang (2010) provide normative historical and 
cultural explanations; the former interprets internet addiction discourse in China as a cultural 
construct related to Qing-dynasty fear of foreign influence and opium addiction, while the latter 
notes elements of Confucianism in China’s approach to internet regulation. Zheng engages in 
detailed historical comparative analysis, exploring the Qing dynasty regulation of telegraphy 
in order to illuminate modern approaches to regulation of the internet. Cultural 
contextualization of new media has included exploration of cultural perceptions of various 
forms of internet use (Golub & Lingley; Liu 2009) as well as observation of, and investigation 
into, China-specific new media phenomena. Recent scholarship explores forms of media 
production and participation that have evolved along with media convergence. These include: 
Hockx's 2005 research into Chinese web literature, the research of Lindtner et al. into China's 
internet cafe culture and mega-guilds (2010), Zhang and Fung’s research on the 
commercialization of guilds, Ge Jin's 2007 documentation of the gold farming phenomenon, 
and Chew's  2012 research on China-specific forms of play in MMOGs (Presentation at the 
VWRN inaugural conference). Other China-specific new media phenomena relate to 
innovative use of new media in a heavily regulated environment. This is a subject of growing 
research, and is reflected in the academic discussions of digital self-expression versus self-
regulation (Weber & Jia, 2007; Zhang 2012), and the discussions about the symbolic language 
of censorship-driven online parody or e gao (Esarey 2005 & Qiang 2011; Meng 2011; Gong & 
Yang, 2010). Increasingly, spatial context is discussed as an important aspect of new media 




geography and urban planning have come into play as discussion focuses on differences in 
technology experience and access in urban versus rural environments (Puel & Fernandez, 
2012; Li & Ranieri, 2013; Zhao, 2008), the spatial aspects of the online gaming and the virtual 
world (Nardi; Liu, 2009), and the internet as a transnational space (Yang 2003; Chen 2006).  
The usefulness of the macro level models that have been proposed to date is limited; 
there is no single analytical model that has been acknowledged as widely useful. Additionally, 
much of the macro level analysis to date is rooted in the political economy research tradition 
that, according to Keane, 'has aligned itself with the grand narratives of democratisation and 
freedom of speech' (Keane, 83). What can be determined from the macro-level literature is a 
general categorization of actors that comprise China's media system. The state, society, the 
market, and the media itself constitute the primary stakeholders in a multitude of 
conceptualizations. 
Scholarship on Chinese media reveals some consensus on major actors that 
comprise and factors that influence the shape of China's media ethic. The state, society, and 
the media itself are most commonly identified as macro level stakeholders whose actions work 
to shape practice. These actors are prevalent in scholarship that focuses on public opinion 
and civil society in Chinese media (eg., Lagerkvist 2005 & 2011; Tai 2006; Weber 2011; G. 
Yang 2003), mechanisms of state control over Chinese media (eg., Deibert 2002; Esarey 
2005; Hachigian 2002; Harwit & Clark 2001; Kalathil & Boas; Ström and Ernkvist 2008), and 
the media's negotiation role between the state and society (R. Bai; Q. Cao 2011; Lee, He, & 
Huang 2007; Keane 2001; Haiqing Yu 2011; Zhang 2011). Major factors that can influence 
the balance of power between these stakeholders have also been indicated. For example, 
technological development and the market economy are consistently discussed in terms of 
their capacities to change the power balance in China’s media system (eg., Cartier, Castells 
and Qiu 2005; Esarey 2007; Gong & Yang 2010; Hachigian 2001; Lagerkvist 2005; Leibold 
2011; Lin 2007; Qing & McCormick 2011; Qiu & Zhou 2005; Qiu 2010; Zhao J. 2008; Zheng 
2005; 2008). Chinese media scholarship also identifies some key mechanisms of practice that 
characterize China’s media regulation. Among government stakeholders, selective 
enforcement of policy (Shambaugh, 27) and prioritization of private or local interests over 
those of a central authority have been highlighted (Keane 2001, 10; Qiu & Zhou 2005, 262-3, 
Lagerkvist 2012, 2640; Weber, 26). Among media stakeholders, the process of balance and 
negotiation between the interests of government and public stakeholders has been 
emphasized (eg., R. Bai 2012; Q. Cao 2011; Lee, He & Huang 2007; Keane 2001; Lagerkvist 
2012; Yu 2011; L. Zhang 2011). Mechanisms of regulatory practice identified in Chinese 
society relate to circumvention and challenges for implementation. These include innovative 




Lagerkvist 2012; Qiu & Zhou 2005), and direct challenges to regulation through activism (de 
Burgh et al. 2012; Lagerkvist 2005; Weber 2011; G. Yang 2003). 
 Microanalysis has begun to provide invaluable insight into the relationships and 
mechanisms of practice so often discussed in macro-level studies that are shaping modern 
media practice and emerging media culture. Empirical data collection allows for application of 
rigorous methodology, and as a result many scholars favour this approach. However, in order 
to work toward a systemic understanding of China's media ecology, macro analysis is also 
necessary. Recent scholarship suggests that systemic understanding be reached through a 
combination of micro and macro analysis (Keane 2011, 81; Hong 2011, 94; H. Yu 2011, 70). 
In her 2011 reflection on the field, Haiqing Yu describes this approach to be part of a promising 
new conceptual framework: 
The turn-of-the century new paradigm recognises media as culture and practice. It 
pays attention to localised practices without losing sight of media across a whole 
range of situations and contexts...it recognises the mutual articulation and constitution 
of the state and the market...it allows one to approach macro-issues at a politico-socio-
cultural level from a micro-analysis approach, while paying attention to the spatial, 
temporal and relational embeddedness of particular media practices (70). 
The trend toward evidence-based research and micro analysis in the scholarship on China's 
media landscape allows scholars to shed light on China's media production, consumption, its 
regulation by engaging directly with the actors and processes that comprise it. This 
engagement has increased academic acknowledgement of the complexity and unique nature 
of Chinese media, however much more research is needed before widespread consensus can 
be reached about macro level implications.  
 Overall, the Chinese media literature reviewed above points to a number of areas 
where new research can contribute to knowledge about new media in China. The recent 
scholarship on Chinese media calls for future investigations in the field to maintain awareness 
of both the complex realities of everyday practice and the wider contexts that surround and 
shape them (Keane 2011, H. Yu 2011, J. Hong 2011). It underlines the potential for empirical 
research, microscopic analysis, and local-level knowledge of cases to contribute to broader, 
ecological understandings of China's media system. It also emphasizes the importance of 
contextualizing micro level research, by recognizing that empirical data and local phenomena 
are embedded within complex and unique technical, social and political contexts.  
The investigative approach to this research builds on these suggestions from the 
Chinese media scholarship. The investigation focuses on understanding everyday practice, 
using micro-level research to build understanding of how online games regulation in China 
actually works. It also emphasizes context, and describes the unique historical, political, policy, 




based on micro-level research and analysis, which includes: key informant interviews, 
participant observation, autoethnographic reflection, case-based research, textual analysis of 
policy documents, and analysis of a variety of other documentary and archival sources 
(including Securities Exchange Commission filings by China’s foreign-listed online games 
companies). This microanalysis is also used to inform a macro-level perspective: the 
exploratory analysis in Chapter III uses the micro-level data collected throughout the research 
to build a broader, more systemic understanding of the relationships between key actors in 
China’s online games regulation. This research approach builds on suggestions from recent 
scholars about ways to address current gaps in the field of new media studies of China. The 
literature review above points to a need for broad understanding of how new media in China 
is being used, regulated, and produced, that is based on and informed by reliable, micro-level 
data. The combination of case-level insight and detailed data collection with broad scale 
exploratory analysis of major stakeholder institutions, interests, and interactions, is one of the 
major ways that this research advances knowledge about new media in China. By applying 
this approach to studying the under-researched new medium of online games, the research 
makes an important contribution to knowledge about new media in China. 
This close analysis also contributes to knowledge about the policy and practice of 
China’s new media regulation. As the literature review above demonstrates, there is a close 
relationship between Chinese media and the political and policy contexts that surround it. 
Scholarship about new media in China therefore often overlaps to some degree with policy 
scholarship in this area. In this research, relevant policy scholarship includes literature from a 
variety of academic disciplines, including: policy studies of China, Chinese politics, law, 
economics, economic development studies, sociology, and communications, among others. 
The next section reviews the academic literature most relevant to the study of China’s online 
games policy and implementation. The review begins with an overview of literature about 
China’s technology policy and its historical development over the last hundred years.  
Policy Scholarship 
History of technology policy in China 
The scholarship allows recent changes in technology and policy to be interpreted in 
light of what is known to date about China’s technology policy as it has developed over the 
last century. This scholarship provides an overview of the approaches to new media policy 
development and implementation that the CCP have taken over the last hundred years. By 
exploring the challenges raised by new media technology and media convergence in the past, 
the research provides essential historical context for a close examination of the policy context 
that surrounds online games. The author uses the historical information from this literature to 
build the following overall argument: while the policy challenges raised by online games and 




develops, media converges, and users innovate mean that the regulatory responses that have 
worked in the past are no longer able to cope with the size and nature of the emerging 
challenges.  
Literature that provides important historical context to China’s technology policy 
includes a number of authors. Huang and Yu’s 1997 Broadcasting and Politics elucidates the 
relationship between radio and television technology and the political landscape of early 
modern China. Zheng Yongnian’s Technological Empowerment is a general exploration of 
internet policy in China and the dynamics between society and the state. Zhou Yongming 
offers historical perspective on China’s internet policy in Historicizing Online Politics, 
comparing recent policy approaches to those that followed the introduction of telegraphy in 
the late Qing dynasty. Xing Fan’s Communications and Information in China provides a 
detailed account of state responses to regulatory challenges that emerged along with the 
decentralization of telecommunications and the popularization of internet use in China. The 
literature on technology policy in China also sheds light on the history of institutional change 
that has accompanied technological development. The above texts engage in direct 
discussion of the political and historical context of China’s technology, and in the policy 
strategies that surround it. Chapter II draws on heavily on this research to explain the historical 
context for online games policy in China. This topic overlaps to some extent with scholarship 
on internet regulation in China, such as: Keane (2001); Barmé  (1999); Kim & Douai (2012); 
Harwit (2001); Esarey & Qiang (2011); Lagerkvist (2005); Deibert (2002); H. Hu (2011); Weber 
& Jia (2007); L. Cao (2007), Hachigian (2001;2002), Shirk (2007), and Palfrey (2010). This 
second group of texts describes regulatory strategies that form part of China’s new media 
landscape, and also informs this research. 
Political Science and Policy Studies  
This project was informed by existing knowledge about China’s political structures and 
processes of policy development and implementation. Bureaucratic structures, key actors and 
interests, and mechanisms of interaction often serve as the analytical focus of policy research 
on China from the perspective of political science. Lieberthal & Oksenberg (1988), Shambaugh 
(2007), and Law & Pan, for example, all identify these aspects of governance as key factors 
in their research on China’s policy negotiation. Shambaugh uses similar categories to guide 
his analysis of China's propaganda system; the roles of key individuals and institutions are 
explored within a larger framework of Scope, Structures, and Processes. Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg structure their seminal analysis of Policy Making in China according to 'Leaders, 
Structures and Processes'(1). The research in Chapter III draws on this analytical approach 
as an effective way to examine key factors and relationships that affect policy development 




regulatory practice is determined for online games. Political science scholarship16 typically 
focuses on the roles of these structures, stakeholder interests, and processes within the realm 
of government as factors in policy outcomes. However, this research seeks to build 
understanding of the relationships between all the key stakeholders involved in negotiation of 
regulatory practice in China’s online games industry.  
The importance of media producers and users in negotiating policy outcomes is 
identified in this research and has been highlighted in recent scholarship on new media 
regulation in China17. Therefore, while the analytical approach taken in Chapter III draws on 
the analytical approaches from political science, this research adjusts the government-centred 
perspective on policy analysis that is typical to political science literature. The exploratory 
analysis in Chapter III begins by considering this government stakeholder category, but moves 
on to examine the essential roles of producers and users in determining regulatory practice.  
Law, Business, and Development 
  Scholarship from law, business management and economic development literature 
also plays an important contributing role to the research. Business and economics scholarship 
such as Wang & Judge (2012); Mattlin (2007); Chang et al. (2005); Sun & Tong (2003); Bai et 
al. (2008); Fan et al. (2005) discuss the history and structures of China's State-Owned 
Enterprises and the political and economic impacts of their partial privatization. More recent 
topics such as the history and structure of variable interest entities in China, as well as 
examination of their legal uncertainty, rely on publications from law journals, such as Lee 
(2013), Tring (2012), and Schindelheim (2012), as well as a number of publications that extend 
outside academia. 
Online Games Policy: English-language Scholarship 
There is very little English-language academic literature that directly discusses the 
policy of online games in China. There are a few exceptions:  Qiu & Zhou (2005), Ernkvist & 
Ström (2008) and Cao & Downing (2008) have contributed initial description and analysis that 
points to a complex policy landscape with multiple actors and conflicting government priorities. 
Qiu and Zhou lay the foundation for this discussion by highlighting the negotiative process of 
policy implementation in internet cafes, as well as the importance of local decision-making and 
individual priorities among government officials. Ernkvist and Ström note the relevance of this 
negotiation of interests to online games policy (102), but focus instead on three aspects of 
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China's online games policy that they identify as important: technonationalism18, information 
control, and pragmatic nationalism/social fear. Ernkvist and Ström claim to take a "middle 
ground" approach to understanding China's online games policy implementation; they situate 
their perspective between an understanding of extensive top-down influence in policy decision-
making, as in some previous scholarship about China's internet policy (102), and an 
understanding where policy implementation consists primarily of negotiating fragmented 
interests (as in Qiu & Zhou 2005). Ernkvist and Ström describe a policy environment led by 
three overarching "policy fields" that are reshaped and transformed as trial-and-error 
implementation takes place (102). As the authors consider these three aspects of China's 
online games policy and the wider context of institutions and stakeholders, they identify a 
number of important regulatory texts and actors, institutional stakeholders, and key interests, 
while acknowledging that these interests may conflict at times and interfere with 
implementation.  
 Ernkvist and Ström describe China's technonationalism as an 'aim initially to increase 
the competitiveness of domestic companies in specific fields in the large domestic Chinese 
market and thereby provide a growth environment for subsequent competition in the world 
market' (103). Cao and Downing also highlight this element of China's online games policy 
development. They describe the industry's growth and focus on the reliance of domestic 
companies on foreign technology and financial resources to achieve success, while noting that 
the policy environment tends to protect domestic companies at the cost of the interests and 
profits of foreign companies (518). Unlike Ernkvist and Ström, Cao and Downing avoid 
investigation of institutional policy stakeholders; explicitly ignoring all but central government 
interests, they instead focus on highlighting important tensions that shape policy development. 
Among these tensions, they identify the state and the market as 'the two major defining forces 
that shape China's video game industry' (522).  
 Both sets of authors of these early investigations arrive at common conclusions 
regarding the online games policy environment in China. First, there is consensus that certain 
elements of policy texts reflect central government interests. These include social interests, 
such as: minimizing negative social impact through content control, controlling the participation 
of minors, and mandating real-name identification. They also include economic interests, such 
as: promotion of domestic creation of approved content, and development of policy that is 
economically advantageous to domestic companies. Both sets of authors identify these 
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interests as indicative of central goals. They also observe a potential conflict between these 
interests, observing that the promotion of economic development may erode state ability to 
control information and vice versa.  
 While Qiu and Zhou discuss the regulation of internet cafes rather than online games 
specifically, they describe an essential element of regulatory practice in the Chinese context: 
the critical role that local and individual interests play in shaping policy implementation. This 
aspect of online games policy is acknowledged in the investigations by Cao and Downing and 
Ernkvist and Ström, but is not explored in detail. While these later texts do not thoroughly 
explore the central-local decision-making dynamic highlighted by Qiu and Zhou, they do 
highlight the importance of tensions between divergent interests both within and outside state 
mechanisms in determining both policy development and policy implementation. Both sets of 
authors acknowledge that the tension between "state" and "market" extends into and is 
influenced by actors and interests outside the state. They point in particular to the profit-
oriented interests of the games industry, and how they may align with government initiatives 
to encourage development of the industry, but also may conflict with the state's proscriptive 
guidelines that aim to control and manage how online games are used. While the dynamic is 
not explored in detail, all three texts additionally observe that the tensions that shape online 
games policy development and practice extend not only into the games industry, but into the 
realm of the game players themselves.  
Online Games Policy: Chinese-language Scholarship 
 The texts by Qiu & Zhou, Ernkvist & Ström, and Cao and Downing discussed above 
are the only major English-language texts that directly discuss the dynamics of policy 
development and implementation regarding online games in China. Chinese-language 
scholarship in this area is more prolific than its English-language counterpart; from 2005 
onward, a body of work on China's online games policy has emerged that spans a number of 
disciplinary perspectives. Economics (Shen & Kong 2005; Liang & Song 2005; Shu 2012; 
Zhang 2013), Business (Liu 2011; Lu 2010; He 2007; Cai et al. 2013), and Law (Shou et al. 
2005; Ma 2008) are some of the most productive disciplines in this area, however academic 
contributions to online games policy research have also emerged from: Sociology (Shen 2007; 
Sun 2012), Psychology (He et al. 2008), Medicine (Zeng, Huang & Zou), Media and 
Communications (Yan 2011), and Education (Liu & Zhou 2013; Huang, 2013). This 




works toward achieving the online games industry's "healthy development" (健康发展)19. 
There are two sides to the concept of "Healthy development" explored in the literature: the 
healthy development of the industry, and the healthy development of the online games players. 
The Chinese-language literature on online games policy in China generally focuses on one of 
these two interpretations. 
 Among mainland Chinese authors, research objectives tend to centre around 
contributions and improvements to online games policy development. Author interest in these 
goals ranges from explicit interest, evidenced through involvement in government-driven 
policy research projects or through explicit articulation, to implicit indication through research 
focus and objectives. Examples of explicit indication include Shou et al. and He Sichao. Shou 
et al. explicitly presents itself as part of two separate government policy research projects (1), 
while He Sichao explicitly outlines his research as an analysis "from the perspective of 
government" (从政府的角度) (3). Other authors work to inform and improve national policy 
more implicitly, representing policy-oriented research objectives and conclusions. Liu 
Xiaoxiao's 2011 work exemplifies this: the paper sets out to analyze the Strengths, 
Opportunities, Weaknesses, and Threats (SWOT) of China's online games policy and 
concludes with a section on 'countermeasures and suggestions' (对策和建议 ) aimed at 
policymakers (59). This structure can also be observed in Shen & Kong (2005). The authors 
declare in their abstract that analyzing the effects of policy by focusing on the behavior of the 
parties involved is the only way to produce effective policy suggestions (79); the authors' 
analysis is concluded with explicit advice for policy development (82). Much of the secondary 
scholarship mirrors this structure. 
 A number of themes emerge repeatedly throughout Chinese-language scholarship 
from mainland China. These roughly fall into one of the two aspects of the online games 
industry's "healthy development": economic or social. Economic themes addressed explore 
challenges to continued economic growth in this sector, with a particular focus on growing 
domestic online games companies. Some of the most frequently highlighted challenges 
include: a lack of sufficient domestic access to research and development capital (compared 
to international companies), and a related gap in technology and talent (Liang & Song, 55; Liu 
Yan, 98-9; Liu Xiaoxiao, 57); monopolistic competition characterizing the domestic market (Liu 
Xiaoxiao, 57; Liang & Song, 55; Shu, 48); and the need for diversification of domestic game 
content (He Sichao; Shu Chang; Liu Xiaoxiao; Gao & Yuan). There is also a suggestion that 
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intellectual property rights protection is essential to the continued health of the industry; this is 
often connected with descriptions of private servers, plug-ins, and illicit virtual goods trade as 
detrimental forces to industry growth (Shen & Kong, 82; Liu Yan, 102; Liu Xiaoxiao, 59; Shu, 
49). While many publications maintain a specialized focus on either the economic or the social 
"health" of the online games industry, most papers acknowledge that both areas must be 
addressed by policymakers (eg., Shou et al.; He 2007; Li Lu 2010; Liu Xiaoxiao 2011; Liu Yan 
2011; Shen & Kong 2005; Gao & Yuan 2013).  
 Social aspects of "healthy development" addressed in the literature highlight 
challenges faced by policymakers as they develop policies to protect the users of online 
games. These tend to focus on one of two primary issues: the protection of young people from 
the health risks of "internet addiction", and the legal establishment of virtual property rights. 
Health risks to young people are often the focus of work emerging from sociology, psychology, 
medicine, and education (eg., Sun 2012; Shen, Li 2007; Zeng et al. 2012; Liu & Zhou 2013), 
but also frequently form part of wider scholarship. Clinically-oriented scholarship, such as 
research by Sun (2012), Shen (2007), & Zeng et al. (2012), tends to inform policy development 
by identifying the mechanisms of, and contributing factors to, "internet addiction"20 (网络成瘾) 
cause by online games. Other scholars focus on challenges to policy development and 
implementation in this area. Shou et al. critique the content review process for online games 
in China and how initial efforts to form a classification system to rate games was unable to 
harmonize with international classification standards21 (139). Shen & Kong (79), Liu & Zhou 
(31), and He (35) describe the exploitation, of loopholes in policy designed to protect young 
people from unhealthy game play. The authors describe exploitation of these loopholes by 
both the game players and game companies under current policy measures, using them to 
argue for policy improvement in this area.  
 Another common theme that falls into social "healthy development" of the online 
games industry is the right of game players to ownership of virtual property. Most of the 
academic literature in this area supports the definition of virtual property as the private property 
of game players, and highlights problems that currently prevent users from fully exercising 
these rights. Luo & Zhu (2006) and Liu (2011) highlight problems that emerge from a lack of 
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in games and the intended age of audience members. In the United States and Canada, the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board, a non-profit self-regulatory body, rates all video games 




explicit legal framework for virtual property; Yu and Sun (2010) identify ways that the existing 
legal framework can be used to establish the virtual property rights of players; Ma Yide (2013) 
asserts that virtual property rights are granted under civil rights law, but highlights problems 
with inheritance of virtual property within the existing framework. A related issue that is 
highlighted in Shen and Kong as well as Li (2010), is the fact that online game players are 
increasingly using online games as a source of revenue. Both authors view this as a social 
problem; Shen and Kong reason that professional-type players become obsessed with game 
play (79), while Li asserts that such behavior has fostered a negative social image of the 
industry (1). 
 Underlying the themes addressed above are two fundamental assumptions that are 
rarely thoroughly considered or questioned in the body of work. The first assumption is that 
the online games industry is important to the health of the national economy, and therefore its 
growth should be encouraged. This is explicitly asserted in many publications but evidenced 
with little more than descriptions of market size (eg, Liu Yan; Liu Xiaoxiao). The second 
foundational assumption is that online games cause "serious social problems" that must be 
addressed as the industry develops. Most academic work that directly analyzes online games 
policy works to balance these contrasting policy priorities, without questioning or considering 
their validity. These assumptions and their resulting policy priorities echo official interpretations 
of the opportunities and threats introduced to China by internet-based media. A 2004 
document issued by the CCP Central Office and the State Council articulates this in terms of 
new media use by minors:  
 The rapid development of the internet and other new media has opened new avenues 
for the education and entertainment of minors. At the same time, decadent and 
backward culture and harmful information is also spread through the internet, 
corrupting the minds of minors  
互联网等新兴媒体的快速发展，给未成年人学习和娱乐开辟了新的渠道。与此同时 ，
腐朽落后文化和有害信息也通过网络传播，腐蚀未成年人的心灵 Section 1, Article 2.  
Both the economic and social aspects of "healthy development" are outlined as policy goals 
in the recent policy texts that relate to online games. These will be explored in the exploratory 
analysis of Chapter III.  
 While the above scholarship discusses a variety of themes and offers a number of 
disciplinary perspectives, there is a near-ubiquitous consensus among authors that China's 
policy framework for online games is underdeveloped. Some observations find fault with the 
institutional set-up itself; a commonly noted systemic difficulty is the cumbersome involvement 




a setback in policy development, noting that the multiple jurisdictional claims complicate the 
process of industry-specific policy creation (2). This problem is further elaborated in recent 
publications, as authors draw attention to emerging problems in the regulatory landscape. Liu, 
He, and Liu & Zhou note the duplication of responsibilities between agencies (Liu Yan, 100-
101; He, 30; Liu & Zhou, 31) and their potential negative impact on industry growth. Li, Ye, 
and Liu & Zhou take this a step further still, explaining how this jurisdictional overlap allows 
individual government departments to abuse their positions, developing policies in their own 
interests of control and power, rather than the interests of industrial growth (Li 2010, 1; Ye, 
2010; Liu & Zhou, 31). Liu & Zhou have also observed systemic issues that lie outside 
institutional overlap and conflict. First, they argue that regulators do not account for the needs 
of young people, and advocate a switch in policy development focus from blanket prohibition 
to rights protection (32). The authors also argue that some regulators are unfamiliar with the 
nature of online games technology, drawing attention to recent policies that they feel 
demonstrate this regulator knowledge gap (31).  
 Observations on the inefficacies of China's online games policy are often 
accompanied by recommendations for its improvement and reform. These generally highlight 
key areas for policy development and review based on the research analysis. They include 
recommendations for restructuring the policy framework itself, and for encouraging economic 
and social "healthy development". Key suggestions for improving the policy framework include: 
integration of policy into a coherent regulatory system (Shen & Kong, 82); complete 
transformation of the institutional framework for online games policy (Liu & Zhou 32); 
clarification of departmental responsibilities among regulators (Li Lu, 11); strengthening 
research in this area (Li Lu, 33), acceleration of policy development and refinement (Shen & 
Kong, 82), and examination of foreign online games policy regimes in order to inform China's 
policy development (Shou et al., Liu Yan, 18; Li Lu 2010; Zhang 2013). More specific 
recommendations for improving economic and social health of the online games industry 
include: reduction of market access barriers in order to increase competition (Liang & Song, 
55; ); reduction of homogeneity of domestic games content (Gao & Yuan, 13; Li Lu 2010, 35; 
Liang & Song, 57; Liu Xiaoxiao 59; He; Shu); increased participation in the international games 
market (Liang & Song, 55; Zhang Yan, 160); accounting for the interests of young players in 
policy development (Shen & Kong; Liu & Zhou 32); development of online games with positive 
content (Gao & Yuan, 13); developing and categorizing games according to age suitability 
(Shou et al.; Gao & Yuan), and focusing on policy that guides toward healthy play habits 
instead of blanket prohibition and negative media attention (Liu & Zhou 2013; Gao & Yuan 
2013).  
 While domestic Chinese-language scholarship presents a unique focus on informing 




industry, it also parallels the observations of English-language scholarship on the subject, 
recognizing that policy effects are determined by a variety of actors and interests. This body 
of scholarship also observes the pursuit of self-interest by actors both within and outside 
regulating bodies. Key actors and interests external to government regulators that are 
idenitifed by Chinese-language scholars in this area include the profit-centred interests of the 
online games industry, and the social and economic interests of game players. Shen & Kong 
(79) and Liu & Zhou (31), for example, note that successful policy development must consider 
and account for these external interests; these authors identify and describe the impact that 
they can have on policy compliance. Chinese-language scholarship about online games policy 
additionally acknowledges a variety of actors and interests among government regulators 
themselves. Li, Ye, and Liu & Zhou, for example, all point out that conflict and competition 
dynamics among these interests interfere with the online game industry's "healthy 
development" (Li 2010, 1; Ye, 2010; Liu & Zhou, 31).  
 Authors of both English-language and Chinese-language investigations observe that 
a substantial research gap exists in China’s online games policy research. Cao and Downing 
note that 'despite their cultural and social significance, rapid growth and widespread appeal in 
China, video games – unlike traditional media – have received scant attention from 
international communication researchers' (515). Ernkvist and Ström equally observe a gap in 
academic work on 'how national governmental policies and regulations affect the online game 
industry' (98). They further note that this gap is remarkable in light of the prolific scholarship 
on related media such as the internet and other entertainment industries (98). Chinese-
language researchers support these observations. While there is significantly more 
scholarship that directly investigates online games policy in China, Chinese-language 
researchers have also remarked on the lack of scholarship in this field. Authors such as Li Lu 
(2010) assert this explicitly: 'Currently, there is not much research about the online games 
regulatory regime' (目前对于网络游戏产业监管体制的研究还不是很多) (Li Lu, 2). This paucity 
in research on online games and their related policy in China persists to date.  
This project works to build knowledge in this nascent field by compiling and analysing 
information from a variety of sources. These include both academic enquiry from related fields, 
and a variety of non-academic sources. The paucity of academic literature on China’s online 
games policy does not mean that this topic is not discussed at all outside the texts reviewed 
above. There are in fact many texts that discuss important elements of China’s online games 
policy and the dynamics that characterize the negotiation of competing stakeholder interests. 
However, these discussions take place in a variety of tangential contexts, spanning multiple 
academic disciplines and extending into non-academic or borderline academic media. The 
non-academic sources that have contributed to the current research are fully reviewed in the 




New Media Technology and Convergence  
While there has been some general scholarship about media convergence and new 
media in China, there has been very little detailed study of the innovative uses of new media 
in China that have accompanied media convergence. Part of the purpose of this research was 
to build scholarship in this nascent field. Chapter IV works to build knowledge about these 
practices by studying the gold farming case in particular. The chapter closely examines the 
practice of gold farming and its embedded relationship with the technology, business, and 
politics of media convergence in China. This case study provides detailed descriptions of how 
gold farming interacts with the technology of online games, the international corporate 
structures and supply chains that operate in China’s new media sector, and the regulators that 
interact with the industry on the ground level. The chapter works to build knowledge not only 
about an emerging practice that is under-researched, but to provide case-informed insight on 
the new regulatory challenges that are raised by emerging uses of highly converged media 
and the new opportunities for economic activity that they offer.  
Some of the more general literature on media convergence and new media in China 
has been reviewed in the section on Chinese media above. Additional academic literature that 
has been consulted for the case study primarily falls into two categories: scholarship about 
games, and scholarship about Real-Money Trade, virtual economies, and gold farming in 
particular. The next section reviews this literature in detail, beginning with work about the 
history of video games. This scholarship provides background information about the evolution 
of video game and online games technology that builds understanding of the technological 
context that has given rise to the gold farming practice and other forms of user innovation.   
History of Video Games 
The historical overview in Chapter IV outlines the history of the development of online 
games based on information from a variety of sources. These include: written accounts and 
timelines published by laboratories and individuals involved in the early development of online 
games (eg, Bartle 2010; Brookhaven National Laboratory) secondary overviews of video game 
history, such as Wolf (2012), and specialized accounts of specific aspects of video game 
history. The Internet Society features an independent overview of the early history of the 
internet and a useful timeline written by Bruce Sterling; Sam Shahrani's 2006 investigation of 
PLATO games provides key information about some of the first multi-user games; 
thegameconsole.com offers specialized expertise on console history. The history of modern 
online games draws on early ethnographic research by Castronova (2003), and legal research 




Emerging Uses of Converged Media: Gold Farming and Real-Money Trade 
Academic research on the subject of RMT and gold farming is still at a nascent stage; 
detailed descriptions are scarce, there is a lack of consensus on essential definitions and 
terminology22, and very little primary field research has been done. Until recently, existing 
primary research on gold farming has consisted of: a very few preliminary real-world 
interviews, such as those Ge Jin posted on Youtube in 2006 and 2010, anecdotal reports of 
participant observation in the virtual world, such as those recorded and published by Dibbell 
and Steinkuehler, and a limited number of survey results or forum content analysis related to 
the gold farming, as in Nick Yee's early work on his now-archived Daedalus Project blog. In 
2010, a Games Developer Conference interview with Jared Psigoda, a gold farm supplier, 
made an additional contribution to primary data on the gold farming industry (Professional 
Chinese Gold Farmer Tells All). Secondary sources of information about gold farming are far 
easier to come by. This information spans a variety of media, levels of formality, and levels of 
academic rigour. It includes: widespread media coverage, as in Dibbell 2007, Barboza, and 
Vincent; forums and blogs that feature academic discussion, such as the Terra Nova blogs 
(see Castronova 2006), and the Virtual Economics Research Network; academic working 
papers and portions of academic articles, as in Castronova 2001, Galarneau, Nakamura, and 
Steinkuehler 2006; and more recently, systematic research summaries on the topic, as in 
Nardi (2010), Heeks and in Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist. 
Information on the gold farming case in this research draws from a combination of 
first-hand author knowledge, as well as reports and informative articles written by both 
individuals and organizations that have interests in this area. A full review of non-academic 
data sources can be found in the Methodology section of this chapter. Academic scholarship 
that contributes to the gold farming case study in this research is reviewed below. 
In recent years, scholars with an interest in gold farming and Real-Money Trade have 
increasingly moved from informal discussion of gold farming on academic blogs to formal 
engagement in and publication of systematic research. Some of this research has examined 
the cultural aspects of the gold farming industry: Nakamura explores the subject of in-game 
racism against Chinese gold farmers, while Nardi & Kow use the case of gold farming to 
examine how discursive knowledge is constructed in digital media and to question its role in 
informing academic knowledge. These last authors highlight the lack of actual data about the 
gold farming industry and practice, in comparison to what is thought to be known.  
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Other authors have worked to compile data and current estimates about the gold 
farming practice in an effort to highlight important directions for future research in this area. In 
2008, Richard Heeks published a comprehensive analysis of existing gold farming research. 
This summarized known facts and best estimates about the industry and compiled the results 
of dispersed and informal academic discussions on blogs with information from existing 
primary sources. It also highlighted a glaring lack of reliable primary data about the industry. 
Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist took the next step in research in this area in 2011, with a publication 
for the World Bank on Real-Money Trade and virtual economies.  
The Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy presents a detailed analysis of the global 
virtual economy that seeks to segment and define its key components. One of these segments 
is that of third-party gaming services, or gold farming. Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist introduce new 
primary data on the gold farming industry and engage in systematic secondary analysis, which 
provides previously unreported details about the mechanics of the industry. They use value 
chain analysis to identify important actors, highlight differences in bargaining powers, and 
signal development opportunities (2). The authors also inform their analysis with expert 
interviews; they consult with 'corporate managers involved with various areas of the virtual 
economy as well as scholars and journalists who have investigated virtual economic 
phenomena first-hand.' to provide first-hand knowledge of the research (2). The authors note 
that these informants consist largely of experts from developed countries 'with first-hand 
knowledge of activities in the developing world' (2) citing difficulties in obtaining interviews with 
informants from developing countries. In particular, they indicate difficulty receiving 
commentary on virtual goods trade from regulators and policymakers involved (2). The final 
methodological approach taken by Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist is an assessment of market size 
based on a combination of: critical analysis of estimates from secondary literature and 
informants, and consumer-side assessment using figures from the China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC), the Korea Creative Content Agency, and the International Data 
Corporation, among others. The reported data and new analysis generally corroborates the 
previously held consensus about the industry and its function, including details about the 
location of the most ‘typical’ retailer for virtual currency (China) and the significant size of the 
industry. Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist's Knowledge Map represents the most recent, rigorous, and 
comprehensive research that has been conducted on the gold farming industry to date. This 
research relies heavily on the information compiled in the Knowledge Map report to inform the 
analysis.  
This study also draws heavily on one study in particular, conducted by the current 
author. In Arnason (2008), the author of this research conducted a study on the cultural 
perceptions of the gold farming practice among elite-level game players of World of Warcraft. 




game. In the following year, the author became a participant-observer. As an existing member 
of the community of elite level players, the author gained access to a number of elite-level 
players of World of Warcraft and conducted key informant interviews with prominent members 
of the community about their first-hand experiences with gold farmers and the gold farming 
practice. The interview data from the 2008 research is the only academic literature that has 
recorded the first-hand experiences with and perceptions of gold farming, from the perspective 
of game players themselves. The interviews record the experiences and observations of these 
players just after Blizzard released The Burning Crusade, the first expansion pack for World 
of Warcraft. The author uses data from this earlier research to inform the gold farming case 
study in Chapter IV. 
Information about the gold farming industry from Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist is 
supplemented in the current research by the author's own fieldwork in three ways. One 
resource drawn on for this chapter is described above: a set of interviews about the gold 
farming practice conducted by the researcher in 2007 and 2008 with elite-level players in 
World of Warcraft. These key informant interviews provide basic information from expert 
players about the mechanics of gold farming. They also shed light on the relationships 
between gold farmers, developers, and the wider gaming community. The interview data 
informs the categorization and analysis of key stakeholders and interests involved in the gold 
farming industry. A second contribution or primary research to the current analysis is the 
author's extensive experience as a participant observer in World of Warcraft.  Seven years of 
continuous play, including two years played at an elite level, allowed the researcher to observe 
gold farming in World of Warcraft as it has evolved since the game's release in 2004, and to 
interact directly as part of the gold farming value chain. This experience as a complete 
observer and a participant-observer has helped to guide the identification of key actors in the 
gold farming industry and to provide a detailed description of gold farming from a first-hand 
consumer perspective. Key informant interviews with regulators, industry members and 
scholars provide a third source of supplemental information about the gold farming industry 
that helps to fill the knowledge gap identified by Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist23. 
Summary 
 The literature review highlights the need for Chinese media research that works 
toward building ecological understanding of China's media landscape through empirical 
investigation and contextual understanding. This research takes a first step toward addressing 
this knowledge gap, combining microanalysis with macro level perspective on the actors, 
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interrelationships and power hierarchies that shape policy and practice in this space. By 
shedding light on the broader ecology of regulatory practice for China's online games, this 
research contributes case-specific knowledge about wider forces that are affecting China's 
media sector more generally: increasing internationalization, privatization, and convergence 
of media in China. These intersect in China's online games industry, and are further 
concentrated in the gold farming practice. This research sheds light on how these forces are 
impacting China's dynamic of media regulation, and identifies critical policy issues that are 
raised by these changes.  
Each chapter draws on literature relevant to a variety of disciplines and include both 
English-language and Chinese-language literature. Chapter II explores the historical and 
current policy context of the gold farming industry, and draws on an expansive set of literature 
from: politics, law, media and communications, economics, development, and sociology, 
among others. Chapter III draws on ideas and research from the fields of business and 
management in addition to the economics and economic development. Chapter IV draws 
primarily on this latter economic scholarship, as well as scholarship from law, education, and 
sociology, in order to investigate and describe the industrial practice of Real-Money Trade and 
gold farming.  
 In his 2006 study of Internet Politics, Andrew Chadwick declares: 'It is impossible and 
unwise to approach this subject wearing disciplinary blinders. Debates about the political 
properties of technology are inherently cross-disciplinary' (36). This research found that the 
investigation of policy and practice surrounding online games in China also required a cross-
disciplinary approach. This is reflected in the expansive set of literature that informs the 
research, as well as the variety of methodological approaches and analytical tools employed 
in the investigation.  
Methodology 
The author did not strictly adhere to a single methodological framework for this 
research, and instead drew on a variety of established methodological approaches according 
to their suitability for each type of enquiry. Overall, the project took a case study approach to 
research, and used this approach with a variety of investigative tools often used in qualitative 
research. Primarily, the tools in this investigation consisted of participant observation, 
autoethnography, and key informant interviews. The contextual narratives and exploratory 
analysis in Chapters II and III drew on this fieldwork, as well as the analysis of a wide range 
of documentary and archival sources. This section explains the key methodological 
approaches used in this research, reviews their advantages and limitations, and explains how 




academic data sources used for the analysis are also reviewed in this section, and additional 
analytical approaches used in the research are described.   
Case Study 
While the entire project did not adhere to a strict methodological framework, overall, 
the research can be considered a case study of the gold farming practice. In their 2008 
Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice 
Researchers, Baxter and Jack define the qualitative case study as:  
An approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context 
using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through 
one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood (544). 
This research conforms to the case study approach as it is defined by Baxter and Jack. The 
research explores the case from a variety of perspectives, engaging in deep investigation of 
the gold farming practice and its related technical, economic, legal, and political contexts. 
Generally, the contexts examined focus on contemporary conditions, however some historical 
conditions are also considered.   
While this research aligns with the general case study definition described above, it 
does not adhere strictly to a single methodological approach. The approach shares a number 
of characteristics with some of the primary case study methodologies, such as those outlined 
by Yin (1994; 2014), and Stake (1995). Like Yin's "exploratory" case study, this investigation 
explores a subject about which little is known (21-2, 1994; Baxter & Jack, 548). In contrast to 
Yin's methodology, however, the exploration does not outline specific criteria by which it will 
be judged successful. This research also shares some characteristics with Stake's 
"instrumental" case study design, in that the case 'plays a supportive role, facilitating our 
understanding of something else' (Baxter & Jack, 549); one of the motivations for the research 
is based on the hope that examining the gold farming case and its surrounding policy dynamic 
in China may facilitate more general understanding of the regulatory issues raised by similar 
innovative uses of converged technologies.  
The current research instead takes a more flexible approach to case study 
methodology. The author did not begin, as stipulated in the methodologies outlined by Yin and 
Stake, with a conceptual framework and 'prior development of theoretical propositions' to guide 
the research (2014, 17). This exploration was instead approached with significant prior 
background knowledge on many of the issues involved, but with minimal hypotheses and a 




This lack of initial framework allowed the author to conduct the exploration according 
to the emerging demands of the evolving events. Donatella della Porta describes this flexibility 
as "interpretivist". Della Porta states that 'interpretivists...build up the research question in the 
course of the research and are prepared to modify the design while the research is in progress. 
There is thus no clear time distinction between the research design and its implementation, as 
they are interlinked with continuous feedbacks' (29). She goes on to describe how interpretive 
approaches apply to case studies specifically: 'Interpretive analyses keep a holistic focus, 
emphasizing cases...as complex entities and stressing the importance of context. Concepts 
are orientative and can be improved during the research' (30). Chapters II and III employ this 
more flexible approach to analysis of micro-level data, as the iterative process makes it 
suitably flexible for exploratory research. 
In order to shed light on the regulatory dynamic that surrounds online games in China, 
and to illuminate some of the ways that this dynamic is changing, the case study engages 
deeply with the technical, economic, legal, and political contexts of the gold farming practice. 
The gold farming practice is deeply embedded in these contexts, and it is therefore important 
to understand these contexts in order to understand how gold farming and other innovative 
uses of converged media can raise regulatory challenges for China and the international 
community. This research also works to enhance understanding about the regulatory dynamic 
in China that surrounds online games and its new uses. The investigation therefore also 
examines the gold farming case in order to identify and understand the relationships between 
the institutional structures and stakeholder interests, and how they interact to shape policy 
development and regulatory practice.  
This project therefore begins with a broad contextual narrative about China’s online 
games policy and an exploratory analysis of the practical implementation of China’s online 
games regulation. Chapter II focuses on the policy environment, compiling and analysing 
information from a variety of sources to construct a detailed description of and historical 
background for the policy environment for online games in China. Chapter III is an exploratory 
analysis of the regulatory dynamic for online games in China. It draws from micro-level data 
collected from documentary and archival sources, as well as key informant interviews from 
experts and practitioners. The final chapter is a focused case study on the gold farming 
practice that highlights some of the major ways that new media technologies and their 
emerging uses are changing the existing regulatory dynamic.  
This case study is an exploration that describes and investigates a new phenomenon 
and its contexts. It seeks to shed light on the regulatory implications of gold farming and other 
innovative uses of highly converged technology, and to inform understanding of the ecology 




investigation does work to uncover information that may be generalizable, this research takes 
a case-oriented approach to interpreting the case study results. Della Porta’s description of 
this approach reflects the interpretive approach taken in this case: 'In a case-oriented 
approach...an in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases provides the basis for 
generalizations that are temporarily limited to the cases studied and whose wider relevance 
should be controlled through further research' (206).   
The case study provides an effective way to combine empirical investigation with a 
wider understanding of a complex whole. It also allows for data collection from a variety of 
sources and the use of a variety analytical tools, adjustable according to the needs of the case. 
The case-oriented approach was particularly well-suited to this research, because a case 
study engages in empirical investigation that draws on multiple types of data. The 
phenomenon generates a variety of data sets among the various stakeholders, and by using 
a case study approach, all of the data sets can be interpreted as part of a larger whole.  
Case Selection 
 The gold farming case is useful because it highlights the complexity of converged 
media use in China. It also concentrates some of the major policy concerns that have been 
discussed in the existing literature, and that are currently being discussed by national 
governments and international regulatory bodies. The concerns expressed to date focus on 
taxation of virtual property sales (Castronova 2003, 12) and international money laundering 
through virtual currency. However, while these are important issues that will likely require 
policy responses in the coming years, the gold farming practice raises other issues that must 
be discussed and addressed before policy development can take place. In part, this research 
seeks to identify what these are by exploring this case. However, the choice of this case was 
also based on the author's preliminary awareness of policy concerns raised by the practice. 
This awareness is rooted in observations made by the author during participant observation 
as a player in World of Warcraft, as well as the results of research conducted in 2008.  
  In 2003, Castronova pointed out some of the potential legal issues surrounding virtual 
economies. He noted that 'virtual worlds seem to exist as separate political entities...and this 
raises new constitutional issues...to what Earth nation do assets in virtual worlds belong? The 
answer is none, at the moment' (11-12). He observed that in the absence of legal intervention 
and policies developed by national governments, game companies were able to act as de 
facto financial regulators. Referring specifically to the legal context of the United States, 
Castronova noted that every game company reserves the right to change anything in the game 
at any time without consulting the game players, and noted the potential for negative economic 
impact in the real world: 'avatars can have their real market value destroyed overnight, without 




in 2008. The results of the author’s 2008 research pointed to a specific case where these 
issues were observable.  
 In a 2008 research project, the author investigated player perceptions about critical 
issues related to gold farming and player perceptions of the practice. The respondents, elite 
level MMO players in World of Warcraft, described how Blizzard, an American game company, 
had made changes to the game conditions that sought to deliberately reduce the profitability 
of gold farming activity when the company released an expansion to the game that flooded its 
virtual economy with currency. The sudden influx of game currency negatively affected its 
value in the real world, because the play time required to accumulate large amounts of 
currency had been reduced. The gold farming industry was widely understood to be primarily 
based in China24, where, according to Ung-gi Yoon, the legality of Real-Money Trade (RMT) 
was unclear (50). The company controlling the value of game currency was based in the United 
States, where RMT consisted of contract violation according to US law. The location of the 
hardware where gold farming took place was unclear but had the potential to be in any of the 
countries where Blizzard offered services25. This activity raised a number of questions in the 
author's mind about the gold farming practice and its national and international legal context.  
What are the regulatory implications of this case, both for the international community 
and in particular for China? What can this case tell us about China's policy priorities for online 
games regulation in general and for the new ways it is being used? What do we know already 
about China's policy priorities for new media and how might this help to understand this case? 
What other innovative practices are taking place in online games that might be relevant to 
policy development in this area? What is the policy development approach that China's 
regulators are taking with regards to the gold farming industry? Who are the primary Chinese 
regulators relevant to this industry and what are their primary interests with regards to policy 
development? What other stakeholders might be involved and how might they affect policy 
development in this area? What kind of interrelationships between stakeholders shape the 
current policy environment, and how are they defined by institutional structures? What are the 
critical issues for policy development in this area for China, and the international community? 
These issues centred around questions of private versus government regulatory power, 
determination of regulatory jurisdictions, gaps in existing regulatory infrastructure, and the 
potential need for international cooperation to accommodate new technologies and their 
                                                     
24 See Arnason 2008; Heeks 2008 
25 Players could log onto game platforms with hardware that was situated in a variety of world locations. 
These were divided roughly according to the area of the world they were placed, and included: the 




evolving uses. The gold farming practice seemed to focus, in a single industry, an emerging 
set of policy issues raised by the innovative activity on converged media platforms in general. 
It was therefore selected as a useful case to focus the exploration in this research. 
Data Sources  
The case study uses a number of data types as sources of information and employs 
a variety of analytical tools. Chapters II and III integrate information from many types of data 
sources into narratives of contextual exploration. These include: the author’s personal 
experience as a complete participant in the World of Warcraft gaming community, participant 
observation, documentation, and archival records.  
 Documentation, as described by Yin, in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 
can include a variety of documentary sources related to the case. Yin describes several types 
of documentary data that are used in this research: "'Formal studies or evaluations of the same 
"site" under study' , 'Agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written 
reports of events', 'Letters, memoranda, and other communiqués' and 'Articles appearing in 
the mass media' (81). This case study draws on a large body of existing scholarship that 
focuses both specifically on the practice of gold farming and on numerous related subjects 
that are explored as part of the relevant context to the case. Some of these are published in 
journals, but many expert investigations consulted during the research have been published 
in the context of government and non-governmental organizations, as well as commercial 
settings. Government-issued documents analysed in this research primarily consist of a variety 
of regulations that are relevant to the case and are issued by a wide variety of government 
agencies 26 . Relevant documents issued by non-governmental organizations that were 
consulted for this research include studies conducted by independent research groups like the 
Open Net Initiative and Human Rights in China.  
 The newness of the gold farming practice and of China's online games policy as 
subjects of scholarship means that much of the available scholarly writing has not yet found 
its way into formal academic settings. As a result, the existing scholarship referred to 
throughout the project was found in a variety of formats and contexts. The following section 
outlines the specific sources used, and explains how they contribute to the research. The 
academic research that is treated as scholarship for this project includes research from some 
informal academic settings, such as: working papers, articles and discussions from academic 
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blogs. At times, academic research overlapped with research conducted in a commercial 
setting. For example, many legal experts that write about online games policy in China provide 
expert perspective and detailed descriptions of the legal environment in memos published on 
the websites of legal firms. Corporate research conducted by professional market research 
firms represents another area of overlap between academic research and the documentation 
of relevant companies. This research was extremely useful for data about China's online 
games industry, and generally contained data unavailable from strictly academic literature.  
Non-Academic Data Sources  
Blogs & Online Magazines: Individual, Academic, Corporate 
 Outside of the scholarship described in the literature review, many of the most relevant 
texts are non-academic in nature or exist on the borders of academia. The most current and 
in-depth information about online games policy in China, for example, can be found on expert 
blogs or is announced in China’s official news media. Expert blogs offer a combination of both 
primary and secondary resources. Some offer first-hand commentary and reporting on court 
rulings and major policy changes as they happen. Bridge IP Law Commentary and the 
personal blog of Shanghai economist Ruan Yifeng exemplify this type of contribution; PRC 
lawyer You (2012;2013) has published commentary on the potential impact of certain 
regulatory changes, while Ruan (2012) has compiled a wealth of relevant Chinese-language 
resources and provided commentary on a significant court ruling involving gold farming. Other 
individual expert blogs consulted for this research include Digicha as well as the newsletter 
Sinocism by Beijing-based internet entrepreneur Bill Bishop. Bishop's publications are popular 
among the international community for their thorough take on emerging issues in China 
(Harris; Mckenzie; Schwankert) and contain a wealth of observation and commentary about 
online games regulation. Information consulted for this research also references technical 
blogs, such as that run by William Long (龙威廉), which relates to internet access in China.  
Public memos and informal blog publications from legal experts have also made 
important contributions to the research in Chapter II. These generally consist of English-
language memos and blog articles released by law firms connected to China's online games 
industry designed to showcase firm expertise in a given area to current and prospective 
clientele. These documents contribute significantly to the research by providing valuable 
summaries that describe complex parts of the online games policy landscape, and that 
highlight important current issues that characterize the online games policy environment. 
Examples include those provided by King & Wood Mallesons (Wang, Hwang, & Qiu, 2010), 
The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski (2010) and O'Melveny and Myers (Roberts, 2011). In 
addition to the professionally-targeted memos, the commentary, observations and predictions 
found in blog articles published by law firms active in this space have also served as rich 




original commentary and expert translation, such as that in Morrison and Foerster's China 
Update (2009).  
Industry Magazines and News Outlets 
 Online newspapers and magazines represent another valuable resource for 
information regarding China's online games industry and policy. While some of these, such as 
the China Media Project, are associated with a specific academic institution, most lie either 
outside or on the borders of academia. Industry magazines that span a variety of topics are 
consulted for this research. These publications contribute valuable data from corporate 
research reports 27 , as well as perspectives on various aspects of China's online games 
industry that highlight key points of tension between international industry and policymakers. 
Publications that cater to the online games player community, such as Mmosite and Kotaku 
contain valuable primary descriptions of player activity (Mmosite) and major industry 
developments (Alexander). Technical and business-oriented magazine publications contribute 
first-hand reports and analyses of industry developments, market information, legal 
developments, emerging practices, and important tensions that have emerged in the 
international community in relation to China's online games policy. Technical magazines 
consulted include: Games Industry International (Handrahan), TechNewsWorld, Techcruch, 
Techradar, Gamasutra, and Wired. Business magazines consulted include: California CPA 
Magazine (Dauberman 2008), DataMonitor, Forbes.com (Flannery 2012), SeekingAlpha.com 
(Su 2012), and The Wall Street Journal. Commentary and reports on China's online game 
policy and the issues that surround it also occur in area-focused media, such as 
ChinaTechNews and Tea Leaf Nation. While ChinaTechNews is written by and for business 
professionals, Tea Leaf Nation lies on the borders of academia along with Legal and expert 
blogs; the latter magazine is a corporate publication founded and staffed by academics. Each 
of the above-mentioned publications report and offer different perspectives on emerging 
issues in China's online games policy landscape. They contribute primary source information 
on the tensions, impacts, and developments that occur in this field.  
 Mainstream media publications both inside and outside China also contribute both 
primary and secondary information to this research. Media institutions outside China at times 
gain privileged access to individual stakeholders that allows them to exclusively report 
important primary information. Large publications also often consult professional political 
analysts or secure interviews with key informants, offering primary analysis of key events and 
emerging issues. This means that for an investigation of the policy field in China, articles from 
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news media can both contain valuable exclusive and new information, and convey external 
perceptions of China's online games policy landscape. The Guardian and The New York Times 
exemplify useful resources under this category that have been consulted for this project. 
Articles related to gold farming and its practice in China (Davis 2009; Halliday 2011), stories 
that highlight major issues surrounding online games policy in China (Vincent 2011), and 
reports on relevant political and legal developments (Barboza 2009; 2012; Wong 2012) have 
been particularly useful.  
 While mainstream media outside China informs the investigation of this field with 
external reports and analyses, the news media in China (both English-language and Chinese-
language) serves as a vital source of internal information regarding China's online games 
policy. China's national media outlets are often used by stakeholders in government to convey 
information to the public; announcements regarding major institutional or policy changes, 
policy goals, and important government decisions are often transmitted through these official 
media channels28. Given that China's government operation and policy development process 
is largely opaque, these announcements are often the only publicly available sources of this 
information and as such constitute valuable primary sources. Online games policy in China is 
at an early stage of development, and is therefore constantly evolving. As such, news media 
announcements regarding institutional, staffing, and policy changes, as well as policy goals 
and decisions made at all levels of government are frequent. This research makes use of a 
large number of official news media articles in order to assemble information regarding the 
current state of policy development for online games and emerging practice in China. National 
news outlets, such as Xinhua and Xinhuanet, are consulted extensively to determine the most 
recent state of institutional development. It is also consulted in order to identify key individuals 
and policy-issuing institutions involved in this field. As the primary means of communication 
between the central government and the public, Xinhuanet is additionally used as a source of 
information regarding the interests of central government stakeholders surrounding online 
games29. China Daily and People's Daily are also used as trusted sources of publicly-issued 
government information.  
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 Media outlets less directly controlled by the state are also consulted for this research. 
Magazines such as Caijing 财经 (Finance and Economics) and Caixin Online 财新网 (New 
Finance) and industry-oriented websites such as Techweb contribute news and commentary 
on economic and social dynamics of China's online games industry. Video-sharing and other 
interactive platform websites, such as Tudou.com, Youku.com, and YY.com are used to 
access primary sources such as the "War on internet addiction" and to observe other evidence 
of innovative practice in China's online games.  
Government Statistics 
One of the most important non-academic data sources used in this research is the 
annual statistical reports on China’s internet industries and related user engagement. These 
are issued by the China Internet Network Information Centre 中国互联网络信息中心 
[zhongguo hulian wangluo xinxi zhongxin] (CNNIC). The CNNIC is China's Domain Name 
System registrar. It is a center for internet-related policy research that is closely associated 
with the China Academy of Sciences as well as the primary government agencies and State-
Owned Enterprises responsible for China's internet infrastructure. The CNNIC releases an 
annual Statistical Report on Internet Development that provides information about the internet 
and the online games market in China. Data from this report is commonly referenced by 
secondary sources and news media in discussion about China's online games market and 
functionality, and is used by Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist in the assessment of the market size for 
third-party gaming services.  
 The above outline of consulted sources reflects an investigation that pieces together 
information from a number of tangential academic fields and a wide variety of non-academic 
sources. In part, this reflects the nascent state of secondary literature about online games and 
their policy in China: the technology is still recent, its use is still evolving, and academics are 
just beginning to awaken to the research potential of the new medium. It also, however, reflects 
the opacity of China's legal landscape.  
Policy Texts 
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of online games policy texts that have 
emerged from regulatory bodies of varied rank and power in China's bureaucratic structure. 
Each of these texts conveys its own, sometimes conflicting, set of guidelines for regulatory 
practice. However, the extent to which any individual policy text will define actual practice is 
extremely uncertain. This is because, in China, rather than representing a final policy 
consensus among regulators, the texts themselves serve as a vehicle for policy negotiation. 
They reflect a balancing of multiple political, institutional, and economic interests. As Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg observe in their seminal Policy Making in China, policies 'are not necessarily 




of a leader or faction to advance power and principle' (4). They observe instead that policy 
outcomes tend to reflect bargains struck between governing agencies at a variety of 
hierarchical levels; these outcomes represent, the authors assert, an attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting 'organizational missions, ethos, structure, and resource allocations of the ministries 
involved' (4). There have been efforts to increase the transparency of policy development in 
recent years (Zhao), and as a result, it is possible to find the full text of many important policy 
documents on the websites of their issuing departments. However, there is no publicly 
available central database of legal documents, and relevant and potentially relevant 
documentation must be gathered from disparate sources.  
An overall picture of policy and policy development processes is difficult to construct, 
given the lack of transparency in official information about China's policy landscape. What is 
known about policy and policy development in a given area must therefore be constructed 
from one or some combination of the following range of sources: publicly issued policy texts 
published by government agencies; reports or interviews with politicians in official news media; 
documents publicly issued by private companies; information available on official government 
websites; direct interviews with politicians; secondary reports by academics with access to 
privileged information; and secondary analysis based on what is known about the structures, 
policies, and processes of China's government structure. This research has reviewed major 
policy texts relevant to online games policy and its emerging practice, in order to identify and 
understand the primary (and sometimes conflicting) missions and ethos that shape policy 
negotiation in this space. The policy texts examined are either sourced from the websites of 
their issuing government agencies, or, where necessary, official news media websites where 
they are sometimes published in full. 
Publicly available documents published by private companies also contribute 
considerable inside information to this research. Many of China's online games companies are 
publicly listed on foreign stock exchanges, and are required by law to document shareholder 
risks. For publicly listed Chinese companies, potential changes in the domestic legal 
landscape poses significant risk to foreign shareholders. As a result, the documentation that 
details this risk 30  provides clear lists of relevant Chinese regulation. These have been 
consulted for this research.    
 Other examples of non-academic research that forms part of existing scholarship 
include: recent work on China's bureaucratic structures, published by the United States 
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Congressional Research service; analyses of internet filtering in China conducted by the Open 
Net Initiative; and memos published on the websites of specialized law firms that summarize 
certain aspects of the legal environment that surrounds China's online games policy. Some 
documents published by professional market research firms are also included in this category; 
statistics about the global gaming market in the introduction, for example, were provided by 
German market research firm Ystats.   
 Documents whose information is synthesized in the chapter investigations also 
include: official announcements and news articles from both English-language and Chinese-
language media outlets, official communiqués, and written reports of events. Events reported 
often consisted of new policy announcements or staff appointment changes, relevant court 
decisions, and the innovative behaviour of users. News articles and descriptions of events 
drew from a number of sources, but generally were identified to be discursive texts around an 
original event. For example, news releases by media outlets closely controlled by the Chinese 
government, such as Xinhua News and the People's Daily, report key facts about structural 
changes in government institutions and include relevant commentary about the meaning of 
these changes by key government spokespeople. This event would also have other 
documents written from different perspectives, and these were also often consulted. For 
example, a variety of perspectives on China's online games policy landscape were often 
published in response to new developments that occurred over the course of this research. 
New policies or structural changes garnered responses from many stakeholders: law firms, 
international media outlets, blogs by experts or individuals with particular interest in this area, 
game-specialized news websites or discussion forums, and online games users both inside 
and outside China, using game-based media and discussion forums to report or express 
opinions on certain events.  
Other Methodological Tools 
The author drew on a variety of established methodological approaches in the course 
of this research. The research began with an examination of key issues and questions that 
arose during the author’s participation in online game play. As a participating member of an 
elite-level gaming community from the 2004 release of World of Warcraft to the release of the 
game’s first expansion pack in 2007, the author noticed key events that raised research 
interest and set out to study the cultural perceptions of gold farming among elite-level game 
players of World of Warcraft. This resulted in a year of participant observation including 
interviews with elite-level game players about their first-hand experiences with the gold farming 
industry and their knowledge about how the practice works in the game setting. Data from this 




project31. This new set of questions led the researcher to identify key cases for closer study 
that seemed to focus some of the major issues being examined. Gold farming practice 
functioned as a key event for initial research. As the author’s continued participant observation 
helped to refine and focus nature of the issues, gold farming became the primary case study 
for this project.  
To study this case, the author worked to establish what is known about the industry 
and the way it is practiced from the existing academic literature, and to synthesize further 
information from relevant resources and primary investigation. The primary investigative 
methods used for this were participant observation and autoethnography.  
Participant Observation 
Participant observation is a commonly used methodology in case studies and is a core 
methodological approach to ethnographic fieldwork. Scholars of ethnographic methods have 
described the participant observation as ‘establishing a place in some natural setting on a 
relatively long-term basis in order to investigate, experience, and represent the social life and 
social processes that occur in that setting’ (Emerson et al., 352). One of the method’s key 
features, as described by sociologist Danny L. Jorgensen, is ‘a logic and process of inquiry 
that is open-ended, flexible, opportunistic, and requires constant redefinition of what is 
problematic, based on facts gathered in concrete settings of human existence’ (Jorgensen 15). 
As a participant-observer, a researcher participates in a specific community in order to ‘gain 
access to otherwise inaccessible dimensions of human life and experience’ (Jorgensen 15). 
Through direct observation and experience, which is sometimes complemented by other forms 
of enquiry, for example interviews and document review, the researcher collects and interprets 
data. This data is recognized to be especially useful for exploration and description of new 
phenomena (Jorgensen 16), making it a particularly useful methodological tool for exploring 
the nascent field of China’s online games regulation and the emerging uses of new media 
technology.  
Most researchers of online games cite participant observation as a necessary step for 
any academic endeavouring to conduct research on this platform. This type of immersion has 
become a common approach to virtual worlds research (see Heeks 2010; Nardi 2008; 
Steinkuehler 2006). The primary reason for this is the steep learning curve for new players 
that must be overcome before they are able to use the technology and navigate the culture of 
a game with ease. Castronova has described this experience: ‘I suddenly feel like a stranger 
in a very foreign culture. I become afraid of breaking some taboo, of making a fool of myself’ 
                                                     




(2001, 2). Participant observation offers a way around this barrier that provides the researcher 
with access to communities of online game players that can be difficult to obtain as an outsider. 
Williams describes the reasoning behind this: ‘scholars skipping this crucial participant 
observation step will ask the wrong questions in surveys, miss obvious explanations, and 
make incorrect assumptions about outcomes’ (2010, 3).  
To date, no one has set a standard for the amount of participant-observation required 
to avoid these limitations. The time typically afforded this step of research is often insufficient 
to fully experience and understand the more advanced social and technical nuances of a 
Massively Multiplayer Online Game (see, for example, Humphreys 168). Steinkuehler 
describes the importance of such an understanding to producing effective research:  
Games are designed experiences and, as such, their study requires understanding 
not just the formal rule systems designed into them but also the full range of human 
practices through which players actively inhabit their worlds and render them 
meaningful (2006 199).  
This level of understanding takes more time and social investment in the virtual world to 
achieve than many researchers can devote. Even after months of participation, certain types 
of game play and player communities may remain inaccessible to researchers, who are often 
unable to commit many hours per day to this type of fieldwork. This represents an entry barrier 
for academics interested in researching communities and practices that operate in online 
games: in order to begin basic research in this medium, the researcher requires a high level 
of initial familiarity with the technology and the culture of online games.  
 The author of this research was able to gain insider knowledge about the gold farming 
practice through direct observation in virtual worlds as a game player participant, and through 
key informant interviews with elite-level players of online games. Access to these players as 
a researcher was only possible through the trust and social capital gained through full 
participation in the community. This is because the communities of experienced players in 
World of Warcraft at the time typically had no respect for casual players and often held 
particular contempt for the academic establishment. This was likely related to the early trends 
in games research that focused on the antisocial impact of game play: this was seen by some 
players as part of a negative social stigma associated with being a gamer (Williams, 2010, 4). 
Approaching these networks as an outside researcher was therefore not a viable option: there 
would be a significant element of what Shah calls ‘social intrusion’ (2004 565) that could 
negatively affect research outcomes. The participant observation conducted in 2007 was 
conducted on game servers in the United States, where the researcher was able to capitalize 
on the social capital and familiarity gained as a complete participant. Future research on gold 




In his discussion of participant observation in The Handbook of Ethnography, H. 
Russell Bernard remarks on the importance of insider status. He states: ‘unless you are a full 
participant in the culture you’re studying, being a participant observer makes you a freak’ 
(270). For this research, the author’s two years of experience as a complete participant offered 
distinct advantages when switching to the role of participant observer. First, as an existing 
member of a community of high-level players of the game, the researcher was able to 
successfully navigate the language and culture of the target community. This secured the 
researcher’s reputation as an insider and was instrumental in gaining the trust of respondents 
when conducting the key informant interviews.  
In this research, the author’s time spent as a participant observer provided access to 
an in-game community with substantial first-hand experience with gold farmers and the ways 
the practice worked in the game. The period of participant observation began with an intense 
year-long time commitment in 2007 and 2008, and consisted of active game play as well as 
key informant interviews. As the research progressed, the participant observation consisted of 
maintaining an active presence in the field. This was done through periodic game play and 
ongoing communication with members of the community. The time commitment required for 
these later stages of participant observation was considerably less than it was in the first year: 
after establishing a reputation as an insider and a researcher, members of the community 
were available for periodic consultation. 
There are several important advantages to using participant observation as a 
methodological approach that made it particularly suitable for this research. It is useful to 
explore new phenomena and contexts about which little is known (Jorgensen 3). It also 
provides a rigorous methodology for the collection and interpretation of micro-level data that 
tends to result in high validity. Bernard describes this advantage in the Handbook of 
Ethnography:  
Participant observation gives you an intuitive understanding of what’s going on in a 
culture and allows you to speak with confidence about the meaning of data. Participant 
observation lets you make strong statements about cultural facts you’ve collected. It 
extends both the internal and the external validity of what you learn from interviewing 
and watching people. In short, participant observation helps you understand the 
meaning of your observations (266). 
For this project, the method of participant observation allowed the author to draw on first-hand 
experience to guide the process of analysis. Having cultivated a familiarity with and 
understanding of online games and the gold farming practice through this method allowed the 
author to interpret and analyse data with confidence supported by intuitive guidelines informed 




Another advantage of participant observation is its usefulness for investigating 
phenomena under two conditions that are identified by Jorgensen: first, when a phenomenon 
is ‘somehow obscured from the view of outsiders’; secondly, when ‘there are important 
differences between the views of insiders as opposed to outsiders’ (Jorgensen, 4). As a “grey-
market” industry that mostly takes place outside of public view, the gold farming industry is 
typically obscured from the view of the general public. The only place where the workers 
themselves are visible to the public is in the games themselves, where workers can often be 
seen engaging in anomalous play styles or advertising their services. Given this in-game 
location of gold farming’s publicly visible activity and direct access to workers in the industry, 
game players tend to have a lot more direct interaction and experience observing gold farming 
workers than those that do not play games. This experience is an important difference between 
insiders and outsiders of the gaming community that increases with more time spent in a given 
game. The author observed this disparity in knowledge and experience among game players 
and used this knowledge to identify respondents that could provide insider perspectives and 
report their experiences with this new practice. By seeking out multiple respondents and 
triangulating their reports with data from other scholars and direct observation, the author was 
able to collect multiple indicators about the mechanics of gold farming. As Jorgenson notes, 
the collection of multiple indicators is an essential part of the data gathering process in 
participant observations (20-21).  
A final advantage of participant observation is noted by Jorgensen, who remarks, 
‘Though especially useful for exploratory and descriptive research purposes, participant 
observation results in generalizations useful for forming new theories as well as testing existing 
ones’ (16). Although this research did not aim to form new theories, it does aim to build macro-
level understanding based on micro-level data gathered throughout the research. Participant 
observation provided key micro-level data that was used in the exploratory analysis of the 
interrelationships between key stakeholders in China’s online games sector. The method had 
also made the author intuitively aware of key tensions between the major stakeholder groups 
that she had observed in the case of gold farming. The exploratory analysis examined these 
tensions in detail.   
There are two key risks inherent in the methodology of participant observation that are 
often noted by scholars. The first is the potential for reactivity, or, as Bernard describes it: 
‘people changing their behaviour when they know that they are being studied’ (265). In order 
to mitigate this risk, it is important for the participant observer to fully enter the community 
being studied, as much as possible. Bernard describes how this works, stating ‘As you become 
less and less of a curiosity, people take less and less interest in your comings and goings. 
They go about their business and let you do such bizarre things as conduct interviews’ (265-




the risk of reactivity. The second key risk of this methodology was problematized by Denzin & 
Lincoln at the end of the twentieth century, as part of a wider critique of classic ethnographic 
research. Allen-Collinson describes this critique as follows:  
It was raised to analytic attention that the representation of [lived experiences of 
studied cultures and social groups] was formed to a great extent by the text crafted by 
the researcher. The researcher’s own voice rather than those of her or his participants 
often came to the fore, while couched in a neutral, objective, third-person style (286-
7).    
In order to mitigate against this, the current research takes two approaches. First, 
collection of interview data used the key informant interview process, which allows the 
interview subjects to guide the discussion32. Full transcripts of the interviews were presented 
alongside the researcher’s analysis in Arnason (2008), allowing readers to access the first-
hand accounts of participants directly. Secondly, in the case study chapter, the research draws 
on autoethnographic research methods. This takes the form of a field note excerpt that is 
based on focused recollection of the researcher’s lived experience as a consumer of virtual 
currency.   
Autoethnography 
 Autoethnography is a method of qualitative research and a form of ethnographic 
research that has emerged in response to critiques about pretences of objectivity in classic 
ethnographic research.  Denzin has described this development, noting: ‘Autoethnography 
inserted itself in the picture when it was understood that all ethnographers reflexively (or 
unreflexively) write themselves into their ethnographies. The ethnographer’s writing self 
cannot not be present, there is no objective space outside the text’ (126). Autoethnography 
recognizes that the researcher is part of the research and embraces the ethnographer’s 
interconnectedness with the field of study (Allen-Collinson 283). As Anderson and Glass-Coffin 
observe, a cornerstone to autoethnographic inquiry as it is understood today is the description 
outlined by Reed-Danahay in 1997: ‘self-narrative that places the self within a social context. 
It is both a method and a text’ (qtd. In Anderson & Glass-Coffin)’. The visibility of the “self” in 
autoethnographic writing has become a key distinguishing feature of the method (71).  
Another key feature of autoethnography is that it connects the research process with 
the process of representing it in text. As a result, this method tends to yield thick narrative 
                                                     




descriptions of social contexts or phenomena that allow the subject and object of research to 
interact. Ellis describes the process as follows: 
As an autoethnographer, I am both the author and focus of the story, the one who tells 
and the one who experiences, the observer and the observed…I am the person at the 
intersection of the personal and the cultural, thinking and observing as an 
ethnographer and writing and describing as a storyteller (Ellis, 13). 
In this research, the autoethnographic method is used in a limited way. The case study 
in Chapter IV uses the method to produce informative data about the gold farming practice 
based on focused recollection of the author’s lived experience in the gold farming industry. 
The method’s use in this case consisted of the author’s focused recollection of the experience, 
and construction of a descriptive narrative from the first-person perspective. This is presented 
in the form of excerpt-style field notes. The goal of this autoethnographic enquiry was to 
document the experience of buying virtual currency, to explore the phenomenon of gold 
farming from the perspective of its relationship with the user, and to convey insider information 
about how the process works that was not available in the existing scholarship. 
The use of this method has several advantages and potential limitations. One 
advantage of using autoethnography to collect and present this data is that, as part of a 
broader participant-observation methodology, it is likely to yield high validity because it is 
based on first-hand experience. Another advantage is that it yields thick descriptive narratives 
that can offer critical perspective on research experience as a participant observer. Allen-
Collinson observes that this critical perspective can help the researcher to directly link ‘the 
micro level with the macro cultural and structural levels in exciting ways’ (282). This potential 
to facilitate broader understanding of the interrelationships between the self and the macro-
level actors and processes at work aligned with the goals of this case study. The ethnographic 
perspective and analysis are brought to bear on the author’s personal experience offered an 
opportunity and a method for recording and analysing the author’s participant observation 
experience. Criticisms of autoethnography highlight the potential for autoethnographic 
research to focus too much on the “self” and engage in what Allen-Collinson describes as 
‘”navel-gazing” forms of autobiography’ (282). The limited use of autoethnography in this 
research, and its focus on exploring the experience of a specific novel phenomenon (the case 
of gold farming) mitigates against this risk.  
 
Contextual Narrative 
Chapters II and III of this research consist of contextual narratives. These initial 




regulatory environment. This contextual understanding provides a basis for meaningful 
discussion of the case study in Chapter IV. In order to construct these exploratory contextual 
narratives, the author drew on a variety of tools to guide data collection, interpretation, and 
analysis. Exploration of case examples that seemed to focus the issues being explored guided 
the initial investigation. The author’s examination of case examples led to key documentary 
and archival sources and highlighted relevant areas of scholarship. Analysis of these sources 
used varied approaches, including historical and descriptive analysis, comparative content 
analysis and critical discourse analysis, among others. These are described below.   
Although this research draws on the data collected during the author’s initial time 
spent as a participant and participant observer in Blizzard’s World of Warcraft, the current 
research began with data collection that centred around the examination of case examples 
that seemed to focus the key issues being explored. Case examples in Chapter II investigate 
events that represent regulatory challenges in order to shed light on how they form, and what 
tensions are involved. The cases examined include new phenomena such as the innovative 
uses of online games including protests using game media, and a high-profile jurisdictional 
conflict that highlights a key way that media convergence raises regulatory challenges. 
The research in Chapter II contains a significant historical component. Existing 
literature that discusses new media policy in China since the advent of radio is consulted in 
order to provide a detailed description and historical perspective on the current policy dynamic 
that surrounds online games. This contemporary history of China’s online games policy is 
complemented by a comparative content analysis. This forms part of this historical exploration, 
identifying and comparing the language and priorities of policy documents for traditional media 
and for online games. The case study in Chapter IV also contains a historical component. The 
Chapter begins by synthesizing the history of the technology where the gold farming practice 
takes place.  
 The analysis in Chapter II constructs a contextual narrative of the policy environment 
that surrounds China's online games regulation. The chapter consists primarily of descriptive 
analysis that spans a number of disciplines and draws on an expansive set of documentary 
and archival sources. Chapter III also engages in thorough contextual descriptions. These are 
focused on key aspects of the regulatory dynamic. These contextual narratives identify and 
describe some of the key structures, interests, and interactions that affect regulatory 
outcomes. The chapter uses these contextual narratives to gain a broader perspective on how 
policy outcomes are negotiated in this space.  
 The macro-level perspective that the exploratory analysis in Chapter III builds begins 
by exploring the key tensions between major stakeholder groups. The analysis first examines 




major ways that they interact to create and negotiate these tensions. The exploratory analysis 
examines these same elements for each major stakeholder category.  
The contextual narratives in Chapter III also describe key ways that the regulatory 
dynamic has changed in recent years. For this, a form of time-series analysis is used that 
observes changes in specific data sets: the current data of specific units, such as the structural 
organization of government agencies and the individuals appointed to key positions within 
these agencies, are compared with snapshots of the same date from the recent past.  
 Archival sources complement the use of documentary sources in the course of this 
research and are primarily consulted for key statistical data and included in the contextual 
narratives of the first chapters. The specific archival sources used consist primarily of survey 
data and organizational records. The research relies on survey data about China's internet 
market conducted by corporate research firms, as well as by agencies in the Chinese 
government. The annual Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (中国互联网络
发展状况统计报告) [Zhōngguó hùlián wǎngluò fāzhǎn zhuàngkuàng tǒngjì bàogào] released 
by the China Internet Network Information Center ( 中国互联网络信息中心 )(CNNIC) 
[Zhōngguó hùlián wǎngluò xìnxī zhōngxīn], for example, provides essential information on 
China's internet and the market shares of industries such as online games, based on 
government data and surveys. Corporate market research such as that released by Ystats 
complements this research with relevant global statistics. Organizational records are also 
important sources that were consulted in the course of the research and in particular contribute 
to the research in Chapter IV. The organizational records of staff and institutions on Chinese 
government websites were consulted in the Chapter IV analysis, however this information was 
often outdated and contained partial information. It was therefore supplemented by 
announcements of staff appointments in official news media, and with independent externally 
compiled lists by scholars. The China Vitae database and the China Directory 2013 published 
by Radiopress provided useful external information on individuals and the concurrent positions 
held in different organizations. Corporate filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of the United States informed much of the analysis of Variable Interest Entity structures in 
Chapter IV. These contributed to the identification of important policies that affect China's 
online games industry, and information that facilitated structural analysis of individual 
companies.   
 By using both documentary and archival sources of data, the narratives in the first 
chapters offer a perspective that spans multiple disciplines and benefits from data 
triangulation. For example, the research identifies officials that currently occupy key positions 
in relevant government agencies by consulting a combination of: official media 




resources curated by specialist scholars, and an annual external analysis published by 
Radiopress Japan. No single source was able to provide a complete up-to-date list of relevant 
officials, due to the quickly evolving nature of the regulation of online games. However, by 
comparing and contrasting data from all of these sources, many uncertainties were resolved, 
gaps in knowledge were highlighted, and new data from very recent announcements was 
added. This convergence and triangulation of data is stipulated by Yin to be one of the defining 
elements of case study research (2014, 17). Stake also highlights triangulation as an important 
feature of high quality case research. He notes that while triangulation can help to confirm the 
validity of data by consulting multiple sources for the repeatability of observations, a significant 
part of its value to research is its ability to 'clarify meaning' by 'identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen' (241). The variety of archival and documentary sources consulted 
in this research provides varied perspectives on the phenomena described. For example, 
academic scholarship, official Chinese news media and news media outside of China, expert 
blog commentary, corporate documents, and commercial research each provide a unique 
perspective on the issues under observation and study.  
 The approaches to gathering and interpreting the data from these documents vary 
depending on the goal of the particular analysis. Overall, the methodological approach draws 
from concepts rooted in critical discourse analysis, although it does not specifically use 
discourse analysis as a prescriptive methodology. In particular, the analysis in this research 
does not focus on linguistic expressions of power, but rather uses texts to identify the interests 
of certain actors. The analysis works to identify power relationships between key actors, and 
document analysis forms part of this effort. This understanding of the documentation and 
archival sources within the context of the structural power hierarchies aligns with basic 
concepts of critical discourse analysis, as described by Wodak and Meyer in Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis. Specific ways that the current research is informed by critical 
discourse analysis concepts consist of the interpretation of discursive texts within their 
underlying power hierarchies, the focus on historical context, and the wide variety of methods 
drawn on in the research. The interpretation of discursive texts in terms of the power 
relationships they represent draws from Norman Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational Approach 
(DRA) to critical discourse analysis (CDA), which focuses on expressions of power within and 
among discursive texts. The analysis of discourse surrounding user protest and the analysis 
of policy discourse in cases of conflict between regulators demonstrate the implementation of 
this conceptual approach to analysis. The emphasis throughout the research on historical 
context, on the other hand, aligns with Ruth Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to 
CDA (Wodak and Meyer 26, 93). The approach to data gathering also draws from approaches 
to critical discourse analysis as described by Wodak and Meyer. The authors state: 'it is a 
matter of finding indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, 




advocates 'methodical triangulation by using multimethodical designs on the basis of a variety 
of empirical data as well as background information' (31). The variety of methods used to 
gather and analyze data in this research work toward such triangulation.  
Key Informant Interviews 
 All the chapters in this thesis are informed by two sets of key informant interviews. 
The first set was conducted in 2008 during the author’s time as a participant observer, and the 
second set was conducted for the current research project in 2011. This form of interview is a 
method of gathering data from the experts or ‘elite’ in a particular field. For the purposes of 
this investigation, respondents were chosen based on their ability to contribute expertise in 
technology, policy, and regulatory practice relevant to new media and online games in China. 
The research sought a variety of perspectives and therefore chose participants with a wide 
range of experience and expertise. These consisted of expert researchers and industry 
members based in three major cities: Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing. Each city was 
chosen based on its likelihood of yielding informants that would maximize the study’s variety 
of perspectives. Hong Kong was deemed likely to produce expert informants with little to no 
direct involvement with China’s online games policy environment. Shanghai offered the most 
variety in researcher perspectives, but was most productive in locating informants with 
experience in the online games industry. Beijing was selected due the availability of informants 
that were directly involved in policy development and implementation. The details of the roles 
and titles of the respondents have been redacted for anonymity, however general information 
about respondent backgrounds is outlined below. Interviews were conducted in Chinese and 
English. 
 Although the professional backgrounds and titles of respondents varied greatly, they 
generally fell into three categories: research, law, and business. Within each category, the role 
and expertise of each respondent varied greatly. Seven of the respondents had research 
backgrounds. Their expertise included: user behaviour in China’s online games, China’s online 
games policy, virtual worlds and multimedia technologies in China, media regulation in China, 
international law in China, and cultural industries in China.  
Respondent Background 
The respondent expert on user behaviour had substantial field experience as a 
participant observer and had conducted informal, unpublished interviews with gold farming 
workers. Two respondent researchers had first-hand experience as part of the regulatory 
regime for online games in China, as well as China’s cultural industries. One was an official 
as well as a researcher, working as a member of the content review committee for imported 
games for the Ministry of Culture. Another worked for the China Academy of Sciences as part 




technologies in China had first-hand experience developing new and highly converged 
technologies. The informant expert on international law in China was also an expert in Chinese 
trade law and information technology law; this respondent had substantial research experience 
on the emerging legal issues surrounding new technologies, China, and the international 
community. Another researcher respondent is a prominent scholar in the field of Chinese 
media studies.  
 Four interview respondents had expertise in law based on first-hand experience as 
legal counsel for online games companies in China. Three of these respondents were in the 
People’s Republic of China-certified lawyers. All of them had first-hand experience as in-house 
legal counsel in some of China’s biggest online games companies33, and were either still 
operating as in-house counsel or were consulting to game companies at the time of interview.  
 Two respondents were industry experts. One was a software developer for one of the 
biggest online game companies in China. Respondent backgrounds from this category 
included first-hand experience with the everyday practice of gold farming regulation in China, 
and executive-level experience managing an international games company.  
The variety in respondent expertise, experience, and location allowed the research to 
collect data based on a variety of different first-hand experiences, and provided the research 
with different perspectives on the relevant critical issues. Respondents provided a wealth of 
information about the current state of online games policy and practice that both complements 
and adds insight to the preliminary research. Responses primarily focused on the challenges 
of practical regulation for online games, given the newness of the technology as well as the 
number of competing interests in this space. The information and perspectives offered by 
respondents varied widely along with the respondents’ areas of expertise. Informants with 
industry backgrounds provided first-hand knowledge about how game companies negotiate 
tensions with regulators and users on a day-to-day basis. This group also facilitated the 
author’s access to corporate research about regulator interests and decision-making in this 
space. Informants with research backgrounds came from a diverse set of disciplines and 
contributed information based on their research perspectives and experience. In general, 
respondents from this category provided expert knowledge about the technology, policy, and 
emerging practice of online games in China. Contributions from this group include information 
about recent technological developments, relevant policy texts and details of user behaviour 
that complemented the preliminary research. The responses from researchers also added 
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insight about some of the negotiation dynamics between key stakeholders in China’s online 
games regulation. Informants with policy expertise contributed first-hand knowledge about the 
politics of the policy development process, and provided insight about the priorities and 
perspectives of some of the key decision-makers in this area.  
Interview Structure  
 The interviews were semi-structured: a list of interview questions provided a 
framework for discussion of key issues, which varied according to respondent background34. 
The structure outlined questions in three key areas:  
1. The current state of online games policy and practice 
This section sought to elicit knowledge that could deepen understanding of 
the policy and practice of online games regulation in China. Questions in this section 
elicited information about the current online games regulatory landscape and the 
policy development process. It additionally sought informant perceptions about 
important areas for policy development.  
2. Issues relevant to emerging practice  
The interviews then focused on emerging practice, specifically real-money 
trade, gold farming, and the virtual economy. This section sought to identify 
respondent perceptions about critical issues relevant to these topics, including the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of virtual economic activity.   
3. Directions for policy development 
The final section asked questions about current and future directions for policy 
development related to online games and emerging practice. These questions sought 
respondent perceptions about key domestic and international issues in the areas, the 
current and potential policy responses to these issues, and China’s general interests 
in relevant policy development. 
The questions were designed to elicit as much open-ended response as possible in order to 
take advantage of the expertise of the respondents. Therefore, many of the responses led into 
topics that were not directly responding to the specific question, but that were highly relevant 
to the research objective. This is reflected in the analytical approach, which focuses on the 
key areas of information highlighted as important in the preliminary research, rather than direct 
response to interview questions.  
                                                     




The first topic in the interviews sought to gain insight and guidance based on the 
expertise and first-hand experience of the respondents. Responses to questions about this 
topic provided valuable information about the policy environment and the regulatory dynamic 
that is included in in Chapters II and III. The final two topics in the interview structure sought 
respondent perspectives on the gold farming case and the critical issues that surround it. The 
case study in Chapter IV contrasts the author’s perspective on the gold farming case with 
respondent perspectives on these topics.   
Advantages and Limitations 
 Key informant interviews differ from standardized interviews in that the methodology 
deliberately tries to allow the expert in the field to guide the interview toward issues of 
importance. As Lewis Anthony Dexter has observed, in standardized interviewing “the 
investigator defines the question and the problem; he is only looking for answers within the 
bounds set by his presuppositions” (5). The elite interviewer instead must let the interviewee 
define the question and the problem, taking advantage of the inherent value that exists in their 
guidance. This allows the researcher to learn from and draw upon the extensive knowledge 
typically possessed by elite interviewees, encouraging the respondent to define what is 
relevant or significant to the subject. The method that allows such respondent-based guidance 
of the interview involves a flexible interview structure and open-ended questions. The 
researcher must have a basic interview protocol and a clear idea of the issues they wish to 
cover, but the agenda must remain flexible in order to allow for probing follow-up questions 
and the exploration of unexpected issues that may arise (Ware and Sánchez-Jankowski). 
 Key benefits of conducting elite interviews are that they are flexible and adaptable to 
different situations. Additionally, they are not shaped by the researcher’s beliefs and allow the 
interviewee, and not the researcher, to define what is important (Richards). This methodology 
is expected to enhance the background research, case study, and discursive text analysis by 
providing an opportunity for triangulation of results.  
 Elite interviews, though beneficial in many ways, are also subject to limitations. One 
of these involves concerns over the validity and reliability of open-ended questioning. Dexter 
demonstrates such concern when he suggests that “inferences drawn from the interviews…be 
subjected to some sort of independent criticism, or, preferably, vigorous test” (13). In this 
study, such concern is not as relevant as it might be, because the research primarily seeks 
the perceptions of the elite informants for analysis rather than any universal truth or fact. 
However, it is also important for the interviewer to acknowledge the potential for respondent 
bias or untruth and to attempt to balance this with supplemental research. In this case, 
supplementary research included two years of preliminary investigation based on 




of follow-up research. The triangulation of methods and data sources within the case study 
ensures that significant supplemental research is undertaken. It also ensures triangulation of 
perspectives on the case and its critical issues. The use of key informant interviews as a 
source of data ensures that the research includes a variety of expert perspectives as well as 
those of the author. While this contributes to the rigour of the project, it does not eliminate the 
potential limitations of this research. The overall benefits and limitations of this research are 
discussed in more detail below.  
Advantages  
 Case study methodology offers advantages that suit the exploratory purposes of this 
research. As Yin notes,  
The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex 
social phenomena. In brief, the case study allows an investigation to focus on a "case" 
and retain a holistic and real-world perspective - such as in studying individual life 
cycles, small group behavior, organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood 
change, school performance, international relations, and the maturation of industries 
(2014, 4).  
The gold farming practice is a complex phenomenon that exists at an intersection of a number 
of rapidly changing contexts. These include: New media policy in china and its wider political 
landscape; China’s increasingly international and privatized new media sector; increasing user 
innovation; and corporate, technological, and user-level media convergence. Exploring this 
practice using a case study approach illuminates these contexts and allows the research to 
explore how they are changing.  
The case study methodology facilitates understanding of complex situations that are 
subject to a number of different variables, and is therefore a suitable choice for the current 
exploratory research. Outside of its ability to facilitate understanding of complex phenomena, 
case study research approaches also offer other advantages that benefit the current research. 
First, the approach both allows for and encourages the use of a wide variety of data sources 
and methodologies. This benefits this research due to the complexity of the case and the fact 
that it exists at the intersection of a number of fields of disciplinary inquiry. It is also beneficial 
because what is known about the case exists in widely dispersed documentation, archival 
sources, and scholarship. The case study allows for the various sources of data to be brought 
together into a single descriptive narrative. This is particularly useful because it allows the 
author to incorporate other methodologies and sources of data.  
 The research benefits from a number of other advantages facilitated by the case 
study's ability to incorporate many kinds of data. The research synthesizes information from 
the initial documentary and archival research with participant observation and key informant 




descriptive narratives, and the benefit of multiple perspectives on the case. The researcher's 
previous key informant interviews with elite level players from World of Warcraft pointed to 
critical issues that merited further investigation, and these served as useful initial guides for 
data collection and informed the construction of the descriptive framework for the first chapter. 
The author's experience living in China also informed initial data collection efforts, as the 
author approached the project with an established first-hand familiarity with the practicalities 
of internet use in China. The researcher's participant observation experience as a gold farming 
customer and as an online games player meant that auto-ethnographic accounts and first-
hand knowledge could fill some of the gaps when describing the technicalities of gold farming 
and the online games environment. Finally, the key informant interviews allowed the research 
to benefit from multiple perspectives on the case. This had the benefit of augmenting the 
descriptive aspects with the data based on the first-hand experience of experts. The interviews 
also allowed the research to include the perceptions of key informants about what they thought 
the critical issues for policy development were, for China and the international community, in 
light of the gold farming case. Obtaining the perceptions of key informants and practitioners 
about the critical issues raised by the case allows the research to mitigate to some extent 
against the researcher's interpretive bias. This allows the researcher to triangulate participant 
perspectives on the case with the researchers' own analysis. Wodak and Meyer suggest the 
use of this approach in critical discourse analysis increases the rigour of inquiry: 
 Triangulation among different types of data, participants' definition of relevance, and 
problem-based analysis to establish the significance of the sites of engagement and 
mediated actions under investigation are suited to bring the analyses back to 
participants: to uncover divergences and contradictions between one's own analysis 
of the mediated actions one is studying and those of participants (31).    
Wodak and Meyer warn, however, that this cannot eliminate the inevitable bias of the research. 
They state that research 'must itself be examined as potentially embedding the beliefs and 
ideologies of the analysts and therefore guiding the analysis towards the analysts' 
preconceptions' (32). This strong potential for researcher bias is one of the most widely noted 
limitations of case study research.  
Limitations 
 This research has been conducted by a single researcher, and the analysis and 
results are therefore subject to researcher bias. In order to counteract this limitation, some 
scholars suggest employing multiple researchers to code data during the analysis process 
(Baxter and Jack, 556; Yin 2003, 92). The use of multiple researchers was not possible in this 
case due to the nature of the project as well as the degree of specialization of background 




investigator's perspective with those of key informants; interview results were used as a guide 
to the final two years of documentary and archival research. This influenced the final selection 
of issues and emphasis for investigation and for presentation in the descriptive narratives. The 
incorporation of different perspectives helps to maximize academic rigour in this case, 
however it does not fully eliminate the embedded bias of the researcher. The inevitability of 
this bias means that, as Yin notes, a case study researcher 'must work hard to report all 
evidence fairly' (2014, 20). Merriam suggests that 'both the readers of case studies and the 
authors themselves need to be aware of biases that can affect the final product' (12). Flyvbjerg, 
Merriam, and Yin argue that this limitation is one that applies generally to many methodologies. 
Yin notes:  
What is often forgotten is that bias also can enter into the conduct of experiments and 
the use of other research methods, such as designing questionnaires for surveys, or 
in conducting historical research. The problems are not different, but in case study 
research, they may occur more frequently and demand greater attention (2014, 20).  
Given the exploratory nature of this research project, researcher bias does not present an 
especially grave problem. There are no propositions that must be validated, no theories to be 
tested, and the research does not seek to build grand theories. The results are primarily 
descriptive and do not seek to ascertain an objective truth, but to investigate a single case and 
its contexts.  
 Other commonly discussed limitations of case studies are framed within its potential 
for scientific contribution. Yin, Stake, Merriam, and Flybjerg outline typical criticisms, which 
include lack of rigour and generalizability (Yin 2014, 19-21). Case studies are often seen to 
lack academic rigour because the research process is often highly intuitive and not systematic 
(Flyvbjerg, Yin). Yin, and Baxter and Jack, suggest several ways to ensure academic rigour in 
case study research. These include: systematic collection and management of data, clarity in 
planning the research design, and the triangulation of data sources, methods, and 
perspectives (Yin 1994 19, 92; Baxter and Jack, 556). This research employed a database to 
help organize the collection and management of data. The collection of data began with a 
detailed framework for investigation based on the key issues of concern that motivated the 
research. This included a detailed plan to find key informants with a variety perspectives, 
based on their occupation and location. Triangulation was also a key element of the research 
(Yin 19,92).  
 The generalizability of case studies is commonly discussed as a potential limitation of 
case research. This critique is generally related to case studies that seek to test or build theory, 
and is therefore not highly relevant to this case-oriented exploration. Flyvbjerg asserts that the 
critique of case study generalizability is in fact based on undervaluation of context-specific 




generalized theories from the case, the project does view the case as an exemplary 
demonstration of new uses of converged technology. The project proceeds with the belief, 
therefore, that the deep contextual exploration of gold farming can point to more generally 
applicable critical issues for policy development and can provide descriptive information about 
contexts where other cases occur. The value of studying this case is therefore seen as both 
intrinsic and instrumental, according to Stake's definitions of the terms (237). The case is 
intrinsically valuable because it is a new phenomenon that has not been researched. The case 
is instrumentally valuable in that the contexts explored and the critical policy issues highlighted 
are likely to have applicability beyond the case itself. The gold farming case results in this 






Chapter II: Policy 
History, Challenges, and Recent Developments in 
China's Online Games Policy Environment  
As China works to develop policy to govern new and converged media and the new ways they 
are used, the country's regulating authorities face major challenges. Many of the challenges 
currently faced are not new to the CCP, and historical government response may inform 
understanding of current and potential future government approaches to policy development 
in the face of similar challenges. In order to investigate the challenges for policy development 
in China raised by emerging practice in online games, it is therefore important to examine 
China's current new media policy development and the historical and political contexts that 
have shaped it. This chapter examines the context of new media policy development in China 
in three parts. The first part examines historical approaches to new media policy development, 
following the trajectory of the internet's precursor technology and its related politics in China. 
The second section builds on this understanding, exploring major regulatory challenges 
relevant to policy development for online games and their emerging practice. Understanding 
these challenges and the tensions that surround them is essential to understanding new media 
policy and practice in China.  
History of Policy Development 
 In order to examine the current policy environment in China that surrounds online 
games and their emerging uses, it is important first to understand the historical context in which 
it operates. While online games and their emerging practice raise significant challenges for 
policy development, these challenges are not always new; as new media technology has 
rapidly been adopted into widespread use in China over the last century, China's policymakers 
have dealt with a number of associated regulatory challenges, and have adapted and 
developed the country's regulatory framework to suit each new technology. This section 
examines China's historical approach to new media policy development in order to shed light 
on the relationship between China's government and new media technology that has evolved 
over the last century. It also points out historical approaches to policy development in this area 
that may influence policy development in the face of similar challenges raised by the new 
technology of online games.  
The section briefly outlines the development trajectory of the internet’s precursor 
technology and its related politics in China, beginning with a discussion of radio and television 
broadcasting development in the years leading up to and during the establishment of the 




details key technological and political developments in the lead-up to the introduction and 
establishment of the internet in China. A final section discusses the development and diffusion 
of the internet in China, providing an account of key policy developments relevant to the online 
gaming industry.   
New Media Policy in Pre-Reform China  
Pre-Mao: Radio Broadcasting and Political Power 
 Radio broadcasting emerged in China during the late Republican period. From its first 
introduction by foreign interests in 1923 to its eventual role as the voice of the CCP government 
in the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the technology has been 
proactively developed and exploited by various contenders for political control, such as foreign 
governments (ie. Britain, Italy, the United States of America, France and Japan), warlords, the 
Chinese National Party (CNP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These are examined 
in the following section. 
Radio broadcasting in China emerged amidst a tumultuous political background; 
commonly known as ‘the warlord period’ (1916-1928), this era was defined by intense military 
and political power struggles 35  that followed the collapse of dynastic rule (Sheridan in 
Fairbank, 284). At the time of collapse, a significant and affluent foreign presence had been 
established in China, having flourished under the favorable economic conditions conceded 
them in the late Qing era (Bickers, 4). The first radio station, ‘Radio Corporation of China’, was 
owned and established by an American in 1923 (Huang and Yu, 2). This particular station was 
shortlived36, but was followed by the establishment of many other foreign radio stations along 
China’s East coast (2). Chinese-run radio broadcasting was first developed and implemented 
by warlords in the North (1926), with some privately run stations opening in Shanghai in 1927. 
Huang and Yu state that the influence of these initial forays into radio broadcasting was limited; 
with under twenty stations in operation and poor transmission technology, audience sizes were 
restricted and information dissemination through this medium ineffective (2).  
In the years between 1927 and 1949, China’s political conflict intensified further; the 
chaotic power struggles of the warlord period gave way to civil war between the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (CNP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Huang and Yu, 2). 
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For a detailed account of this history and a comparison between rural and urban experience, 
see Sheridan in Fairbank, 1983. 
36 This station was shut down by the Northern Warlords government (1912-1927) (Huang and 




According to Huang and Yu, this conflict played a key role in the adoption and development of 
radio broadcasting technology in China, beginning in 1928 with the CNP’s establishment and 
immediate politicization of the Central Broadcasting Station (2). Having announced the 
station’s intended use ‘to air any important decisions, propaganda programs and 
proclamations’ (2), the Nationalist party established radio broadcasting as an essential political 
tool. In the following years, the CNP established radio stations in almost all major cities in 
China, cementing the technology’s role as a mouthpiece of the Chinese Nationalist 
government (2). Although the CCP similarly valued media control and believed in its political 
role (Gan, 40), the CCP lagged significantly behind the Nationalists in technological prowess; 
thus it was not until 1940 that the CCP managed to establish its first radio station37 (2).  
After the 1940 establishment of the CCP’s ‘Yunnan New China Radio Station’, the 
development and dissemination of radio broadcasting technology was officially designated a 
CCP priority (Huang and Yu, 2). Huang and Yu attribute this prioritization of media technology 
development to Mao Zedong’s strong belief in media’s essential political role; ‘to him,’ they 
observe, ‘whatever the form of journalism, it needed to serve the politics of the Communist 
Party’ (2). The media policy and usage under the direction of Mao after the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949 supports this claim; obtaining radio transmitters and loudspeakers became 
an official mandate for public institutions in 1950 (3), and continued to flourish as an essential 
political tool. Although the centrality of media within Mao’s political ideology was certainly a 
driving factor for the expedited development and dissemination of broadcasting technology, it 
was not the only reason for it; CCP ideology placed significant emphasis on the essential role 
of scientific and technological development in establishing China as a successful nation-state. 
In his 2008 Technological Empowerment, Zheng Yongnian traces this ideology back to the 
May Fourth Movement. He observes:  
Despite the controversies within the May Fourth Movement, all parts of the movement 
seemed to have established a semi-religious belief that science and technology must 
be an integral part of China’s nation-state building. This is particularly reflected in the 
CCP’s efforts in linking “scientism” to “socialism” to establish the so-called “scientific 
socialism” (kexue shehui zhuyi) as the backbone of its ideology (2). 
The significant attention to technological development and control of radio broadcasting under 
Mao was equally reflected in the CCP’s approach to television broadcasting. 
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New Media under Mao: centralization, state sponsorship, and television 
 The development of television technology in China was a government-driven process. 
By the time the PRC was established in 1949, television had been widely available in the 
United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union for over a decade (Huang and Yu 3); 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in mainland China was lagging behind. 
The PRC needed to assert itself as a strong and capable nation both in a global context as 
well as locally, relative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s newly established Taiwan (3)38. The Marxist 
concept of ‘scientific socialism’ (Z. Yang 205) had become the ‘pillar of the communist system’ 
under Mao (Y. Zheng 23) and this was reflected in various initiatives toward industrialization. 
The government’s efforts to develop the television industry in the PRC is a prime example of 
this. Television development in the PRC CCP began in 1953 with the sending of 
representatives abroad to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to study television technology 
(4). Development of this industry became a political mandate in 1955 when Zhou Enlai 
endorsed its part in the ‘Five-Year Culture and Education Plan’ (1953-1957) (4). Experiments 
in broadcasting began 1956, after the return of two of the students that had studied television 
abroad. In 1957, a delegation was sent to the Soviet Union and East Germany ‘to seek 
technical aid in running television stations’ (4). Political pressure to expedite the launch of the 
PRC’s first broadcasting station was increasing; Taiwan was scheduled to launch a 
broadcasting station in 1958 and stations in the PRC weren’t expected to launch until 1959 
(4). Additional pressure came from Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign, a political imperative 
and mass mobilization toward expedited industrialization of the PRC (4). The significant 
political implications of television broadcasting success made it a key part of this process 
(Huang and Yu, 4; Y. Zheng, 23). In May of 1958, the ‘Beijing TV Station’ began to broadcast39 
(Huang and Yu, 4).  
 Continued pressure to develop the television broadcasting industry meant that thirty-
six television stations were in operation by the end of 196040 (Huang and Yu, 4). In 1961, 
however, in response to severe famine and national economic disaster, an austerity policy 
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(3). Science and technology was therefore an extremely important area for the CCP to excel; 
as Zheng Yongnian points out, the Nationalists had already demonstrated significant success 
in the development of science and technology, having founded the central research institute 
Academic Sinica in 1928, the science-focused Peiping Academy in 1929, and initiated the 
New Life Movement in the 1930s that ‘attempted to establish and spread a scientific way of 
life in China’ (Y. Zheng, 22). 
39 Despite this expedited development, the introduction of television in China lagged behind 
Taiwan by more than a year (Huang and Yu, 4). 




was introduced that saw thirty-one of the thirty-six TV stations shut down (4). Although some 
briefly resumed operation with economic improvement in the late sixties, by the 1966 Cultural 
Revolution sparked a complete halt in development of the industry; by 1967 only two stations 
remained in operation. Broadcasting resumed in 1969 and continued to grow. By 1973, the 
number of TV stations in operation had reached thirty-two, but, as Huang and Yu observe, the 
number of receiver sets was still problematic; in 1975, only 170 000 TV sets were produced in 
China (5).  
Television programming under Mao was consistent with his philosophy that media 
should serve politics; the main tasks of television broadcasting under Mao were declared in 
1959 to be ‘political propaganda, education and cultural enrichment’ (Huang and Yu, 3). 
Content restrictions increased during the Cultural Revolution, with broadcasting stations 
‘under the tight control of the Maoists’ (5) eliminating all culture and entertainment-oriented 
programming except for eight ‘revolutionary model operas’41 (5). Even such “entertainment” 
programs served political ends; arguing that they were intrinsically part of China’s development 
strategy, Ellen Judd points out that their ‘value [was] primarily expressed in terms of efficacy 
in promoting increased production and social change, and less so in terms of cultural 
enrichment’ (1). Such strict control and purposing of mass media was a state 42 -funded 
endeavour that limited the success of television as a mass medium; in 1978, China only had 
approximately 3 million television sets for its population of 800 million (Huang and Yu, 11). It 
wasn’t until the reforms brought in by Deng Xiaoping that the process of commercialization 
sparked further economic growth.  
Post-Mao Media Policy: economic decentralization and media commercialization 
 After Mao’s death in 1976, the leaders of post-Mao China confronted a state that 
‘seemed to have been undermined seriously by waves of political movements during Mao’s 
time…politically, it was no longer able to provide a stable order…in economic terms, it failed 
to deliver goods to the people’ (Y. Zheng, 24). Deng Xiaoping assumed leadership in 1978 
and began to address these inherited challenges through aggressive economic reforms 
(Brady, 2; de Burgh, 62; Y. Zheng, 23). What Chien refers to as an ‘asymmetric 
decentralisation’ (71) ensued; that is to say economic decentralization was embraced, while 
political decentralization was not; the political legitimacy of the centralized CCP was 
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form of amateur theatre during the Cultural Revolution (Huang and Yu, 5).  
42 The terms ‘state’ and ‘government’ in this work are used in keeping with Cao and Downing, 




preserved43 while economic reforms provided greater fiscal (and therefore decision-making) 
autonomy to local governments. Consistent with Maoist views, science and technology was 
seen as essential to nation building and social progress under Deng (Zheng, 25). The primary 
difference in Deng’s approach was that, in his interpretation, scientific and technological 
development were facilitators for the economic development he saw as essential to social 
progress and modernization of the PRC (Zheng, 25). Deng’s approach to media policy reflects 
this view; commercialization, media openness, and technological progress was encouraged 
(Brady, 2; de Burgh, 63), while ‘the government was careful to introduce controls to limit any 
potential negative impact from these new influences’ (Brady, 2).  
During this period a series of research institutes emerged, spear-headed by key 
reformist party members (including Deng) in order to carry out empirical research for policy 
development (Tanner, “Changing Windows”, 560). These “think tanks” of second-generation 
party leaders were not the first research institutes of the CCP; Murray Tanner connects their 
emergence to the “first-generation” research institutes of the early era of the CCP under Mao 
(560). The “second-generation” research institutes were ‘ad-hoc think tanks personally 
patronized by individual leaders’ (Tanner 560). Tanner suggests that commercialization has 
allowed for the more recent emergence of a “third generation” of research institutes; these, he 
asserts, are less constrained than their predecessors, but may consequentially exert less 
influence in policy development (563). That said, these think tanks are regularly consulted and 
used as sources of information for key policy-makers in the CCP (Tanner 571). 
Media policy under Deng Xiaoping loosened the strict control that prescribed Cultural 
Revolution journalistic content. Cuts in government media subsidies required media outlets to 
make market-friendly content adjustments in order to become self-sufficient. Amid this relative 
freedom, media in the 1980s produced ‘critical coverage and journalism of a quantity and 
breadth that had never before been seen in Communist China’ (de Burgh 63). Newspaper 
titles grew, the television industry expanded (Huang and Yu, 4) and the government began to 
invest heavily in the construction of telecommunications infrastructure (X. Fan, 10). This is not 
to say, of course, that there were no media restrictions. Although official media policy in the 
1980s ‘treated the media as a whole homogenous unit’, (Lin, 11) offering general guidelines 
rather than detailed instructions, state reactions to political reform movements involving the 
media were addressed directly; they included three anti-reform ideological campaigns and a 
series of media shut-downs that came to a head during the student protests of 1989 (Lin, 11). 
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however, as Zheng Yongnian reports, it was interpreted by the leadership in terms of economic 
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Lin describes this form of media control as a ‘single-dimensional state-media regime’ (15) 
wherein the state directly controlled the media. This began to change in the 90s as the 
successful commercialization of media organizations introduced third-party institutional 
stakeholders in the state-media relationship, including the market (ie. advertisers and 
consumers) and the court. 
PRC leaders after Deng have continued the technonationalist 44  development 
approaches of Mao and Deng, embracing ‘scientific and technological development as one of 
the pillars of the country’s sustainable economic growth’ (Y. Zheng, 24). The significant 
government investment in and promotion of telecommunications infrastructure in the 1990s 
reflects this. Under Deng, the state invested an annual average of 250-300 million US dollars 
in telecommunications, resulting in a net industry growth of 13-14%; by the mid-90s this had 
significantly increased (X. Fan, 11), with Tan et al. reporting annual growth rates of 30-50% 
per year (1). A program for the Informatization of the National Economy (INE) was introduced 
in the 90s, and Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, explicitly marked information technology as 
‘crucial to China’s sustained development in the future’ (Jiang in Y. Zheng, 26). The 
government drove development of the ICT industry in China45, but in the late 90s, ‘released 
entrepreneurial ventures in the telecommunications industry from direct government control, 
leaving it to the market mechanism’ (138). The development of telecommunications 
infrastructure and related enterprises was exceedingly successful; the number of mobile 
telephone subscribers increased from 1 million in 1994 to 206 million in 2002 (Zheng, 29); the 
PRC first connected to the internet in 1994 (Lagerkvist 2005), and by 2010 had the largest 
number of internet users in the world (CNNIC, The 26th Statistical Report). Widespread 
availability of internet access in China produced massive economic benefits, becoming ‘an 
important source of economic growth’ and creating ‘significant opportunities for 
entrepreneurship’ (Y. Zheng, 31). These developments, of course, brought with them 
significant challenges to media regulation in the PRC. The next section explores how China's 
policymakers have responded to the challenges raised by the introduction of the internet and 
related media technologies.  
  
                                                     
44  Technonationalism, as Zheng Yongnian defines it, is:  ‘the notion that technology is 
fundamental to both national security and economic prosperity, that a nation’s development 
policy must have explicit strategic underpinnings, and that technology must be indigenized at 
all costs and diffused system wide’ (Zheng, 23). 
45  Major initiatives towards this end include the 1983 National Strategic Plan of General 
Development of Science and Technology, the 1986 “863” program or State High-Tech 




New Media Policy in the Reform Era and Beyond 
Internet Regulation and Telecoms 
China’s general approach to internet regulation consists of: ‘Developing it actively, 
strengthening its management, seeking advantages and avoiding harmfulness, making it 
serve our purpose’ (CCP qtd. In Y. Zhou, 138). In this, the CCP ideological approach to internet 
policy development is consistent with past approaches to new media policy development over 
the course of the PRC; government-driven growth for (political or economic) benefits is 
combined with tight control and mitigation of any effects that conflict with government interests. 
This media control and mitigation takes places, as Zhou Yongming observes, on three levels: 
infrastructure, service, and content (142).  Infrastructure is controlled through ownership; 
government agencies retain ownership of all the major networks, and, according to regulations 
established in 2000, any joint ventures in telecommunications infrastructure must be at least 
51% owned by a Chinese partner (142-3). At this infrastructural level, it is also possible (and 
common) for certain websites to be made domestically inaccessible46. On the service level, 
regulation addresses licensing requirements for Internet service providers (ISPs), detailing 
‘what services are permitted, and what is not, as regards BBS, news publishing by websites, 
and Internet café operations’ (Y. Zheng, 143). Content-level regulations mandate the vigilance 
of website and forum operators and promote self-censorship 47  of internet consumers; 
operators are instructed to remove and report ‘inadmissable content’ and to record information 
such as time, date, user account number and domain name that might identify the offending 
agent (143). Although this three-tiered strategy for regulation of the internet has allowed the 
CCP to maintain a certain degree of control over what has proven to be a complex and 
dynamic medium, the trend toward fragmentation demonstrated among and amid China’s 
regulatory agencies presents significant challenges to the state’s long-term ability to effectively 
control and regulate the internet.  
The trend toward fragmentation amid and among China’s internet-related governing 
agencies has taken several forms. First, the reform-era decentralization and 
commercialization of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a pluralization and 
privatization of government agencies, creating more stakeholders in this sector. Additionally, 
media convergence facilitated by the internet has meant that an increasing number of 
governing agencies claim regulatory rights over certain aspects of the internet. As the internet 
                                                     
46 For more information on the technical levels of control, see Deibert, 2001. 
47 Internet users or ‘netizens’ (CNNIC 2010) have been required to register with the China 
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) and accept their guidelines since 1997, making 




has continued to grow in both economic and political significance, such interest in regulatory 
participation has been expressed by a number of China’s governing agencies (Zheng, 54). A 
third form of fragmentation occurs vertically between local and central levels of regulatory 
agencies (Yang, 457). The reform-era decentralization policies increased the economic and 
decision-making autonomy of local levels of government, increasing disconnection between 
central and local levels of single organizations. An examination of the decentralization of the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), examined in the case example below, 
effectively illustrates these three types of fragmentation, which continue to characterize new 
media policy development in relation to converged media and online games.  
Case Example: the decentralization of the MPT 
Before the reform era, all telecommunications were owned and operated by the MPT under 
the State Council (Zheng, 50). Zheng remarks that even within this centralized administration, 
a vertical fragmentation between local and central policy had already taken shape (51). In the 
mid-1980s, under Deng’s leadership and Zhao Ziyang’s premiership, the State Council began 
the commercialization of the telecommunications sector; Post and Telecom Enterprises 
(PTEs) were allowed to keep some of their profits, which in turn increased their autonomy (51). 
With increased independence of these local elements the top level of the MPT could focus 
more on general industry planning and performance. Amid this differentiation of responsibility 
levels, Zheng observes that ‘a vertically organized hierarchy emerged as the administrative 
structure of China’s telecommunications’ (51). The vertical structure was as depicted in Figure 





Fig. 1.0 Source: Author’s compilation from data in Zheng 2008 
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Under a second wave of structural reforms in 1988, the MPT began to lose some of its 
jurisdictional power. Several departments under its jurisdiction were granted separate status48 
and new agencies, such as the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT)49 and the 
Directorate General of Posts (DGP) were introduced under the MPT ‘to incorporate business 
enterprise functions’ (51). The commercial value of data transmission had been recognized by 
other sectors of government, and the MPT was under pressure to release its monopoly on the 
telecommunications industry (X. Fan, 12). The MPT lost its monopoly in 1993, when the China 
United Telecommunications Corporation (Jitong and later Unicom), backed by other 
ministries50 and in particular the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), was granted a telecom 
license. The DGT became China Telecom but was still under the jurisdiction of the MPT. Its 
primary telecommunications competitor was under several other ministries, which reduced the 
MPT’s jurisdictional power and fragmented regulation by introducing other 
telecommunications stakeholders within the government (ie. the ministries controlling Unicom) 
(52). Zheng describes the difficulties this posed for internet regulation: ‘the regulatory function 
of the MPT was weakened further. It was not able to intervene effectively in the domains 
managed by other ministries, which were at the same administration rank as the MPT in 
China’s bureaucratic hierarchy’ (52).  
The regulatory difficulty that emerged along with the decentralization of the 
telecommunications sector was first addressed with interim committees in 1994 and 1996, and 
finally by an institutional convergence under the new Ministry of Information Industry (MII) in 
1998 (Zheng, 52). The convergence included: the MPT, the MEI, and the Network Department 
of the former Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MORFT) (53). The MII became ‘the 
autonomous regulator for telecom’ and was expected to offer impartial regulation that would 
allow for fairer competition between China Telecom (formerly of the MPT) and China Unicom 
(formerly of the MEI) (53). Although this addressed the fragmentation issues in regulation of 
the telecommunications infrastructure, the internet represents not only the transmission of data 
on telecommunications networks, but also a highly converged medium with a variety of content 
that traditionally has fallen under the jurisdiction of other ministries, and therefore continues to 
raise policy development issues related to jurisdictional overlap.  
                                                     
48 These were the departments of manufacturing, construction, and purchasing (Zheng, 51). 
49 The DGT was corporatized and became China Telecom in 1995 (Zheng, 51). 
50 These ministries were: the Ministry of Electronic Industry, the Ministry of Railways, the 




 The converged nature of internet technology has presented challenges to China’s 
efforts to control and regulate the medium; previously established sectors for media regulation 
catered toward older media such as print, radio and television, with ‘different government 
agencies separately regulate[d] publishing, telecommunication, broadcasting, and information 
product manufacturing’ (Tan, 262). In order to address the difficulty of the media convergence 
embodied by the internet, media regulation has required institutional convergence of 
regulatory agencies in the Chinese government (Tan, 262; Zheng, 52); the convergence of the 
MPT, MEI and network department of the MORFT into the MII in 1998 and MII’s further 
convergence with the State Council Information Office (SCIO), the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense, and the State Tobacco Monopoly Bureau into 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) in 2008 are key examples of this. 
Despite this restructuring and institutional convergence, however, the continued trend of media 
convergence facilitated by the internet, has far outpaced the ability of the government in China 
to accommodate it with effective regulation. Today’s process for internet-related policy-making 
and implementation in China involves a number of government agencies and stakeholders at 
different levels of government. 
 Another significant challenge to China’s long-term management and control of the 
internet is user innovation. This includes innovative work-arounds to infrastructure-level state 
control of the internet51 (see, for example, Boyd 2004; Brown 2010), as well as innovative uses 
of internet technology that have developed and continue to develop at a much faster rate than 
regulation. The technical convergence of media promotes such innovation; new combinations 
of communications technology are constantly overlapping, stretching or breaking the 
jurisdictional boundaries of China’s regulatory bodies. The online gaming industry is a prime 
example of this; online games combine the use of multiple technologies (ie. internet, voice 
communication, three-dimensional animated environments, broadcasting) with constantly 
evolving innovative uses (ie. social networking, gambling, virtual economic activity). From a 
perspective of regulation and control, this presents a daunting task that has achieved limited 
success to date.  
Online Games Policy  
General Approach 
  China’s approach to online gaming policy development has continued the trends 
established in the reform era; economic development of this new media industry has been 
                                                     
51 Examples of these include the establishment and use of VPN services, proxy services, and 
secure tunneling. For a detailed explanation of this technology, see (Henderson 1998; SSH; 




promoted, while regulation and control has remained a clear priority (Wilson & Segal, 886; Y. 
Zhou 141). Growth of the online games industry in China has been explosive; following a 
similar growth trajectory to that of the country’s broadband industry (Chung & Yuan, 2009), 
the introductory wave of success generated an online games market of $149 million US dollars 
by the end of 2002 (Cao & Downing, 519). This number tripled in 2004 (519) and by 2010, 
China boasted the largest online games market in the world, responsible for one-third of the 
global revenue in this sector (Yan, 2010). Cao and Downing attribute this high growth rate to 
three factors: the progress of telecommunications infrastructure (the authors include internet 
cafés in this category), the recurring revenue of subscription-based business models52, and 
the appeal of online social interaction to a socially isolated younger generation (518). Ren cites 
the absence of console game popularity53 in the Chinese market as a leading factor (2). 
Although all of these factors no doubt contributed to the market’s growth rate, policy initiatives 
aimed at promoting industry growth have also played an important role.  
From an economic perspective, China’s policy approach to the online gaming industry 
has promoted industry growth while protecting domestic economic interests. In 2003, 
promotion of the industry was officially prioritized in the country, its addition to the 1986 ‘863’ 
national science and technology development program providing significant tax incentives for 
growth (Xinhua, “China Promotes”; Cao & Downing 525). While policy efforts have promoted 
growth, they have also protected domestic interests in China’s online games industry (Chung 
& Yuan 2009). Perhaps the most successful of these has been the mandate that prevents 
foreign investors from operating their own online games in China (Wang et al.; Ström and 
Ernkvist, 647). This mandate is indicated by at least four separate documents: the Catalog for 
the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (外商投资产业指导目录) (amended 2007) and 
the Catalog of Industries in Which Foreign Investment Is Prohibited (禁止外商投资产业目录) 
(2007) issued by the Ministry of Commerce place online game operation under a prohibited 
sector for foreign investment, while a further two 54  ‘explicitly prohibit foreign entities and 
                                                     
52 Cao and Downing state ‘online games are based on subscription, with recurring revenue’ 
(518). Although recurring revenue is likely a factor and subscriptions may have been vital in 
the initial stages of industry development, it is important to note that the predominant business 
model for online games in China since 2006 is free-to-play with an item-based pricing model 
(Ren, 2010).  
53 According to Ren, the absence of console game players in China is related to the fact that 
major console companies such as Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft, have avoided entering the 
Chinese market due to piracy issues (2). 
54The first is a 2005 document released by the MoC, SARFT, GAPP, the PRC National 
Development and Reform Commission, and MOFCOM, entitled Opinions on the Introduction 




individuals from establishing and operating any Internet Cultural Operation Entities to engage 
in online games operational activities directly or through de facto control’ (Wang et al., 2010). 
Based on the categorization of online games as ‘Internet Cultural Products’ in the Ministry of 
Culture’s 2003 Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet Culture (互联网文化管理暂
行规定),  Wang et al. note that ‘the establishment of Internet Cultural Operation Entities is 
necessary for both online game development and online game operation although these are 
distinctly different businesses’. This means not only that foreign games must be operated by 
a Chinese partner, but that foreign investors are equally limited in their participation in the 
domestic games development industry (Wang et al.). These economic restrictions insulate 
China’s online games industry from foreign influence, in theory ensuring domestic control at 
an infrastructural level. This is consistent with China’s initial approach to internet control; by 
ensuring domestic ownership at the level of infrastructure, China works to accomplish the 
online games equivalent of what Diebert calls ‘territorializing’ its computer networks (147)55. In 
keeping with its three-tiered approach to internet control and regulation, China has also taken 
a three-tiered approach to online game regulation. The economic restrictions described above 
are aimed at root-level control of the industry through ownership. In addition to this first tier of 
regulation, China has focused on access-point restrictions and content control in its policy 
development approach to online games.  
There are two types of access points for online games in China: internet cafes and 
home computers. Access point restrictions either regulate the operation of internet cafes, or 
the operation of online game operators56. Regulatory initiatives targeting these access points 
have focused on protecting minors (Qiu & Zhou, 273) and promoting public health. Major 
initiatives include: the Notice on Protecting Physical and Mental Well-being of Minors and 
Implementing Online Game Anti-addiction System (关于保护未成年人身心健康实施网络游戏
                                                     
Decree No.13 (a 2009 document released by the GAPP, the State Copyright Administration, 
and the National Anti-Piracy and Pornography Working Group Office). 
55 This is not to say that foreign games are unwelcome; in 2009, imported games accounted 
for almost forty percent of the 2009 online games market in China (Wang et al.). Until GAPP’s 
‘Decree No. 13’ of 2009 explicitly forbidding these arrangements, ‘a series of operating, 
technical service, and share pledge or call option agreements to address domestic ownership 
requirements and other restrictions on foreign investment’ were tolerated (Mackenzie et al.). 
It remains unclear to what extent GAPP’s prohibition will affect the established business 
practice.  
56 Even for home computer access, online games in China are operated on servers owned by 
companies that are not necessarily the game developers. These operators (some of the 
biggest including, for example, Shanda, NetEase and The9), can control user access to their 




防沉迷系统的通知)57 (2007), the Green Dam Youth Escort58 (2009), and more recently, the 
Parents’ Guardian Project for Minors Playing Online Games59 (2011). Content control of online 
games in China has also been demonstrated to be a policy priority; legislated explicitly in 
Chapters three and four of the Ministry of Culture's Interim Provisions on the Administration of 
Internet Culture (互联网文化管理暂行规定 ), it is also regulated indirectly by licensing 
regulations regarding content approval for imported games60, as well as approval for any 
content alteration in games that have already received approval 61 . While on one hand 
regulation has been developed to control against disruptive or offensive content, there has 
also been significant government support toward the development of domestic "healthy" 
content. A June 2011 report by Caixin.com indicates the payment of heavy government 
subsidies to domestic online game operators (iChinastock.com) including Perfect World, a 
company well-known for its focus on innovation and self-developed games (Kshetri 168). A 
recent Telegraph article directly links these tax breaks to development of domestic content; a 
source from Shanda Games, it reports, has indicated that Shanda's development of Learning 
from Lei Feng, a game gifted by the company to the Chinese Communist Youth League for its 
85th anniversary (Jiang 2013, 19), was directly linked to tax breaks for the company (Moore).   
Shanda's Learning from Lei Feng forms part of a category of games in China called 
"patriotic" or "red" games. Eric Jou of Kotaku.com describes them as follows: 
Characteristically a red game usually takes place from the World War II era to the 
Korean  War. There are very few that are based on the modern era. The player usually 
takes control of a cadre in the Chinese army; said character would never be seen 
                                                     
57 This initiative mandated that all online game operators implement a “fatigue” system for 
minors. The system requires players to log in with their government-issued identity number in 
order to identify whether or not they are under 18. For minors, the software quickly diminishes 
a player’s time credits or in-game currency after three hours of play, forcing them to log off 
after five (China Daily, 2007). 
58 This was a failed initiative that was abandoned after massive user protest. The Green Dam 
Youth Escort was a piece of software mandated to be installed on every new computer 
manufactured in China. It would monitor use of the internet and online games (Mackinnon, 
2009).  
59 A 2011 project aimed at improving the real identification system (China Daily, 2011). 
60 Such as, for example, the Ministry of Culture's 2009 Announcement on Regulating 
Applications for Content Censorship for Imported Online Games (文化部关于规范进口网络游
戏产品内容审查申报工作的公告). 





bleeding or dying. In fact, in red games the character can never lose, especially to 
American and Japanese forces. The Japanese are often times painted as villains in 
red games, especially ones that deal with World War II (2012). 
A number of these games have been developed in recent years. Some of the most 
widely  known include a military game associated with the People's Liberation Army entitled 
Glorious Mission (Xu Qinduo), and Defending Diaoyu Island by ZQ Games62 (Moore, 2013). 
The government-subsidized development of "red" games as "healthy" online games content 
both encourages the economic development of the online games industry in China and works 
to minimize the negative impact that online games are perceived to have on China's youth. 
One interview respondent for this research offered additional perspective on the association 
between “healthy” game content and a “red” theme: the respondent perceived the 
development of "red games" to represent a CCP effort to differentiate itself from Western 
culture and the capitalist and corporatist values that pervade the games industry. The 
informant explained: 'The CCP currently is not able to reproduce a new kind of culture which 
is much different from Western culture, from revolution culture...So they cannot, they can only 
develop such Red games'. The pursuit of economic growth and the prioritization of social 
responsibility in the policy making initiatives that relate to online games indicate that China's 
approach to online games policy development is consistent with the priorities demonstrated in 
new media policy development as it has been adopted in China over the last century.  
Historical Precedent and Online Games Regulation 
Policy Texts 
While there are key priorities demonstrated by the policy initiatives and documents 
that comprise China's online games regulation, the development of policy in this area lacks 
coherence and therefore cannot really be understood as a single, co-ordinated approach. 
Appendix I presents a compilation of major existing policy texts that are relevant to online 
games and their emerging practice. A review of this list reveals that policy documents have 
been released by Central Party organs, by organizations at the State Council level, and by 
departments and organizations subordinate to the State Council. A few of these policy 
documents are not issued by government at all; they represent self-regulatory declarations 
issued by industry members.  
                                                     
62 ZQ Games, a subsidiary of PowerNet known as Shenzhen ZQ Game, is associated with the 




Government-issued policy texts63 relevant to online games vary in type and generally 
fall into three categories: High-level documents issued by the National People's Congress or 
the Central Committee, and lower level administrative regulations issued by the State Council 
and its subordinate organizations. Central government policies tend to take the form of 
"decisions" or statutes that indicate a general direction for regulatory development. A recent 
example of this is the December 2012 NPC Standing Committee’s Decision on Strengthening 
Network Information Protection (全国人大常委会关于加强网络信息保护的决定). The State 
Council and its subordinate ministries and organizations issue supporting regulation that, in 
theory, "implements" and "interprets" the regulatory directions signalled by the central 
government authority. In Rosenberg's 2001 description of China's legislative process, he 
observes that these administrative 'are generally either detailed rules for implementing laws 
or experimental rules where there are no governing laws' (242). Administrative regulations 
issued by the State Council that pertain to online games contain clear but general instructions 
for regulating the space. Examples of these include the State Council's Measures for 
Managing Internet Information Services (互联网信息服务管理办法), issued in the year 2000, 
and its recently revised version issued in 2012 by the State Council Internet Information Office. 
While these policy texts affect and include online games, they are designed as more general 
instructions for the regulation of a number of different industries. In contrast to these high-level 
texts, policies developed below the State Council level have been specifically designed for 
regulation of online games. In the absence of higher-level policy on the subject, departments 
have been free to develop policy that reflects their own interests in the space64. As a result, 
there is a high degree of inconsistency among policy texts issued at and below the ministerial 
level of government. There has been a proliferation of these texts in recent years, which fall 
into several categories. Texts explicitly labelled as regulations include: "provisions" (规定), 
"regulations" (条例), and "measures" (办法). They are often issued as "interim" or "draft" 
versions (Zhao), and may be posted on an official website for public comment. "Interim" (暂行
) or "draft" (稿) status does not necessarily prevent a document from functioning as a fully 
promulgated regulation; the 2010 Interim Measures on the Administration of Online Games (
网络游戏管理暂行办法), for example, was reported by China-specialist legal professionals as 
a document that provides clarification of jurisdictional responsibilities, regulates operating 
activities of online games operators, and stipulates liabilities related to illegal activities (Han 
                                                     
63 Self-regulatory texts and their role in China's online games policy will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
64 This approach to policy development of online games has been noted in the Chinese-




Kun Law Offices, 12-13; Introduction to the Interim Measures for the Administration of Online 
Games). It is unclear whether the Interim Measures or other relevant policies with similarly 
transient titles will ever reach full promulgation. It is possible that they may not; the 2012 draft 
Provisions for the Management of Internet Publishing Services (网络出版服务管理规定) were 
released as a Revised Draft, however no further policy was promulgated prior to the 
convergence of its issuing organization, the General Administration for Press and Publication, 
(GAPP) with the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Outside the 
explicitly described Regulations, Provisions, and Measures, other policies developed at or 
under the State Council level are not definitively described as regulations. However, they do 
seem to serve a similar function; "opinions" (意见) and "notices"(通知) have been responsible 
for a number of policy texts designed to regulate activity relevant to online games. Examples 
include: the 2005 Ministry Opinions on the Development and Management of Online Games(
部关于网络游戏发展和管理的若干意见) issued by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of 
Information Industry, and the June 2009 The Notice on Strengthening Administration of Virtual 
Currency in Online Games (关于加强网络游戏虚拟货币管理工作通知) issued by the Ministry 
of Culture and the Ministry of Commerce. There is no clear link between this typology of State 
Council policy documents and potential enforcement practice.  
Outside of the document categories described above, there are also documents 
issued internally that are not available for viewing by the general public. One respondent 
reported that they had seen such a document released by the State Council in response to 
the jurisdictional conflict that arose in 2009. This document, Document No. 24, was reported 
to contain detailed instructions for all relevant ministerial stakeholders about how the 
development and implementation of online games regulation would take place. 
 The above section has shown that new media technology in China has been deeply 
connected with politics over the last hundred years. Despite distinct political contexts, some 
key characteristics of the policy development approach to these technologies of radio, 
television, telecoms and internet-based media have remained consistent throughout this 
period. Governing stakeholders have actively supported the development of new media 
technology by investing heavily in these industries; the development of radio, television, 
telecoms, internet, and online games has been prioritized and supported with significant 
financial subsidy. Closely linked to the support for technological development has been the 
long-standing belief of the CCP that media is an essential political tool. This was explicitly 
established in relation to pre-digital media such as radio and television. The belief has been 
reflected more implicitly in the policy and development initiatives related to new media since 
the advent of the internet. The section has shown that these encourage economic growth, and, 




Army, work to disseminate political messages. Policymakers have also worked to mitigate 
against perceived negative impacts of new media technologies. This has been reflected in the 
heavy regulation on the levels of infrastructure, service, and content that has been developed 
along with new media in China. While key characteristics of China's new media policy have 
been historically consistent on the broader structural levels described above, similarities can 
also be observed between the regulatory priorities expressed in the content of the policy texts. 
The next section demonstrates this by comparing the regulatory goals articulated in key policy 
documents designed to regulate traditional media and online games. The following is a 
comparative content analysis between the Chinese Journalists Code of Professional Ethics (
中国新闻工作者职业道德准则) (Hereafter the Journalists Code) and several recently issued 
texts that form part of the current policy environment for online games. 
Comparative Content Analysis: Priorities Expressed in Policy Texts for 
Traditional Media and Online Games 
 Established regulatory practice for traditional media is increasingly important as a 
reference for converged media policy development; recent policy texts have adapted these 
practices to the regulation of online games. The Journalists' Code is a CCP-issued document 
that is designed to guide the regulation of traditional media outlets, and is issued by the All-
China Journalists' Association, an organization with close links to the Central Propaganda 
Department (Brady 2005, 63). This document conveys government-held perceptions of the 
role of media in China that shape regulation in the traditional media sector. While the version 
reviewed in this section is from 2009, the document itself represents a revision of an older 
document that forms part of traditional media regulation in the CCP65. The following analysis 
demonstrates how policy priorities conveyed in this document are similar to those expressed 
in the more recently issued documents that outline policy for online games. Due to the variety 
of government agencies that are involved in online games policy development, the documents 
chosen for comparison with the Journalists' Code have been issued by different government 
organizations. The comparison of these documents also reveals differing emphasis on policy 
priorities by policy-issuing institutions under the State Council. This demonstrates how policy 
texts that regulate online games in China can conflict with each other, and points to the fact 
that policy documents do not reflect an agreed consensus of policy makers, but rather serve 
                                                     
65 There have been a number of official guidelines for journalists in modern China, however in 
1991 the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA) became the issuing party ("Guidelines 
Regarding the 1997 and the 2009 version of the Chinese Journalists Professional Code of 
Ethics"). The ACJA is a quasi-governmental organization; it is classified as non-government, 
however receives fiduciary support from the state and is listed as part of the national 
administration (“Structure of the State”). Chinaculture.org describes the ACJA as a social 




as a vehicle for governing stakeholders to pursue policy interests. The following section 
summarizes the centrally-issued Journalists Code in order to help develop understanding of 
central interests in media regulation and facilitate comparison to online games policy texts.  
Summary: Chinese Journalists Code of Professional Ethics (中国新闻工作者职业道德准则 ) 
The Journalists' Code begins conventionally, by establishing that Chinese journalism 
is 'an important part of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics' [中国特色社会主义
事业的重要组成部分]. Journalists are both described as heir to, and charged with carrying 
forward, the 'Party's fine tradition of journalism' [党的新闻工作优良传统]. The document then 
begins to describe the specific responsibilities of Chinese journalists in the form of seven 
articles.  
The first article declares that journalists must 'serve the people wholeheartedly' [全心
全意为人民服务]. This is followed by a list of expected loyalties that consist of the Party, the 
motherland, and the people, in that order. Journalists are charged with serving as a link 
between the party/state and the masses: 'to play the role of a bridging link between the party, 
the government, and the masses' [发挥党和政府联系人民群众的桥梁纽带作用]. The 
specific sub-items of this article charge journalists with reporting on government activities, 
eliciting the interest of the masses in news reports, and fostering correct public opinion through 
appropriate praise and criticism.  
Article 2 further emphasizes guidance of public opinion and highlights the role of 
positive propaganda in accomplishing this. The sub-items focus on prioritizing economic and 
scientific development while paying attention to social responsibility by managing public 
opinion and promoting 'harmonious society'  [和谐社会]. While maintaining the focus on 
positivity and dealing "properly" with an emergency, the journalists are urged in the final sub-
item to strive for public transparency as well as timely and objective reporting.  
The third article of the Journalists Code stresses upholding truth, accuracy and 
objectivity in news reports. Sub-items prohibit exaggeration and re-printing of untruthful news, 
and promotes thorough investigation and verification of facts.  Journalists are encouraged to 
assume responsibility for any errors in news reports and engage in prompt apologies in order 
to 'eliminate harmful effects' [消除不良影响].  
Article 4 advises journalists on maintaining a 'good style of work ' [优良作风]. This 
addresses issues of journalist expertise, diligence, and morality. The sub-items specify 
strengthening a sense of responsibility, not receiving illegitimate payment, respecting 




The fifth article espouses reform and innovation to be accomplished through a 
balancing the guidance of public opinion and following of the law with innovative ideas and 
adjusting to the times. Sub-item one stresses the need to research new forms of 
communication, to set discussion agendas, and to 'guide actions according to circumstances' 
[善于因势利导]. It also urges journalists to 'constantly improve the ability to lead public opinion 
and disseminate propaganda' [不断提高舆论引导能力和传播能力]. Sub-item two demands: 
conscientious research on the skill of dissemination [认真研究传播艺术], the 'use of modern 
means of dissemination' [利用现代传播手段 ], and use of the audience to develop 
understanding. Furthermore, this sub-item prioritizes increasing the influence and likeability of 
news coverage. The third sub-item specifically addresses the use of new technology, stating 
that journalists must: 'be adept at using new vehicles [for communication]' [善于利用新载体], 
'new techniques for gathering information, releasing news, increasing timeliness, and 
expanding coverage' [新技术收集信息、发布新闻，提高时效性，扩大覆盖面].  
Article 6 highlights compliance with the law and adherence to the journalistic 
guidelines of the Party, as well as protecting national interests and keeping state secrets. Sub-
items address the publicity guidelines regarding ethnic minorities, privacy and slander 
guidelines for the subjects of news reports, and the responsibility of journalists toward the 
mental and physical health of vulnerable sectors of society. They additionally stipulate that 
journalists must respect the administration of justice, being sure not to express prejudicial 
guilty conviction through report or commentary. The final sub-item addresses news reports 
that involve foreign affairs or foreign nationals; journalists are instructed to comply with China's 
foreign policy and accession to international treaties.  
The final article of the Journalists Code elaborates on the international engagement 
mandates for Chinese journalists. The general direction to journalists is as follows: 'promote 
collaboration and exchange with international colleagues' [促进国际新闻同行的交流与合作], 
'cultivate the vision of the world and international perspective' [培养世界眼光和国际视野], and 
'build a bridge of communication between China and the world' [搭建中国与世界交流沟通的桥
梁 ]. Sub-items discuss the specifics of international engagement. Journalists are told to 
maintain a positive international image, disseminate Chinese culture throughout the world, 
report on the economic and social development and national culture of other countries, and 
actively participate in the organization of international exchange and co-operation with foreign 
media. The item finishes with instructions toward positive international engagement: 'enhance 
understanding, deepen friendship, work toward the harmonious world of mutual prosperity to 





Analysis of Policy Priorities: the Journalists' Code and Online Games Policy Texts   
 The Journalists' Code reflects some key government priorities and interests that can 
be found in the policy texts for new media and online games. First, the government builds a 
concept of journalism that frames it as part of the government, rather than separate from it. 
This perception is first conveyed by the statement that journalism is part of the socialist cause, 
and is further evidenced by article 1, which frames journalism as a position of public service. 
The article states that the first duty of journalists is to 'Serve the people wholeheartedly' [ 全心
全意为人民服务], however the first required loyalty is to the Party. While a simply stated goal 
of serving the people could be interpreted as evidence of an institution that works outside of 
the government on behalf of the people, the stipulated primacy of Party loyalty over loyalty to 
the people conveys instead that journalists are serving the people on behalf of the Party66. 
This conceptual placement of journalism within the government framework provides a 
theoretical foundation for the expectation of information management and control that 
characterizes the rest of the text: expectations encompass not only the dissemination of 
information (Articles 1, 2, 5, 7) but also the management of public opinion (Articles 1, 2, 4, 5), 
the caretaking of physical and mental well-being of the people (Articles 1, 2, 4, 6), and the 
safeguarding of national unity, prosperity and security (Articles 6, 7). A similar approach to 
media conceptualization and delegation of responsibility to media workers has been used as 
the policy framework in some of the online games policy texts.  
 The responsibilities ascribed to journalists in the Journalists Code convey information 
about government priorities and methodologies for information control and management that 
can also be found in some of the policy texts for online games. According to this document, 
journalist responsibilities include influencing public opinion and maintaining public focus on 
"healthy" subject matter. Journalists are told to elicit interest in their medium (Article 1), to set 
the agenda for discussion (Article 5) and to criticize that which goes against public interest 
(Article 1).  In order to maintain this control and ability to elicit public interest, the text further 
mandates familiarity with new forms of communication (Article 5) and the use of crowd 
knowledge to develop understanding (Article 5). This may reflect awareness of the rapid 
development of media technology and the associated increase in opportunity for 
                                                     
66 This interpretation is supported by secondary sources; Brady (2005) and Hu (2005) both 
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with the "Fourth Estate" role expected by liberal democratic standards of media ethics. She 
notes: 'Rather than a Fourth Estate...with implications of the media having powers 
independent of the government to critique government policy and issues, propaganda theorists 
prefer the term the "Fourth Governmental Branch" (di sige bumen). This means that the media 





communication beyond the reach of current management efforts. While these ascribed 
responsibilities indicate strong prioritization of government influence and control over public 
opinion, the final article of the Journalists Code suggests significant concern with international 
engagement; the article instructs journalists to actively disseminate knowledge about Chinese 
culture and to develop international exchange and co-operation.  
 The policy priorities and conceptualizations of media ethics expressed in the 
Journalists' Code are similar to those outlined in the regulatory texts relevant to online games 
in China. For example, the 2010 Interim Measures instructs online game operators to protect 
minors, public health, and social benefits, and charges operators with safeguarding state 
secrets along with trade secrets and user information (Section 1 Article 4; Section 4 Article 
28). Despite the pervasive presence, in online games policy texts, of this concern with the 
protection of the public, minors, and the state, documents issued by different agencies tend to 
vary in emphasis. Some focus on framing new media within the socialist media 
conceptualizations of the Journalists' Code, whereas others express interest in the "healthy 
development" of internet industries without explicit reference to the socialist cause. The Public 
Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry (Public Pledge) 
, and the GAPP's December 2012 Management Requirements for Internet Publishers 
(Management Requirements) exemplify the first category; they apply the Journalists' Code 
framework to online games. Other relevant texts, such as the MOC's Interim Measures on the 
Administration of Online Games (Interim Measures) and the State Council Internet Information 
Office's 2012 revised Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (Measures), apply 
the Journalists' Code framework more loosely. The following examples explain how these 
differences are manifested. 
 Application of the Journalists' Code framework within the ISC Public Pledge and the 
GAPP's revised Management Requirements is evident in their use of language that explicitly 
links internet industries (ie. online games) to the socialist cause. It can also be observed in the 
direct attempt by GAPP to apply journalist licensing requirements to online games operators 
and developers. The Public Pledge places itself (and the internet industries it represents) 
within broader national and socialist goals in Chapter 2, Article 6:   
'In promoting the development of professional ethics of the Internet sector, the state 
laws, regulations and policies governing the development and administration of the 
Internet shall be observed consistent with and to carry forward the rich cultural 
tradition of the Chinese  nation and the moral code of socialist spiritual civilization'. 
GAPP's new Management Requirements include similar rhetoric, requiring in article 3 that 




socialism' (坚持为人民服务、为社会主义服务的方向). This text additionally defines online 
games as "internet publishing services" (Section 1, Article 1.1) and identifies them as subject 
to the certification requirements currently applied to journalists (Chapter 2, Article 9). The MOC 
Interim Measures does not emphasize the socialist cause or subject online games companies 
to journalist certification requirements, but works to establish a framework for pursuing many 
of the same policy interests expressed in the Journalists' Code. This framework, like the 
Journalists' Code, outlines government hierarchy and allocates media responsibility; it 
establishes a clear order of online game management by various levels and sectors of 
government (Section 1, Article 3), and allocates social responsibilities to online game 
operators. While this framework for media regulation shares many characteristics of that 
employed in the Journalists' Code, this conceptualization of media responsibility and 
government hierarchy is significantly more relaxed; game operators are not explicitly assigned 
a role in the socialist cause, nor are they described as heir to any Party traditions. This leaves 
room for a significant difference in perspective between the government and the online games 
companies and may affect government approach to future conceptualization and/or 
compliance of online games operators.   
 The Journalists Code offers some insight regarding central government stakeholder 
interests in and approaches to new media policy development. Its conceptualization of 
journalism as an organ of government rather than a separate industry and/or institution 
provides a reference point for the Party's current and potential future conceptualizations of 
new and emerging forms of media. Although this conceptualization continues to shape the 
legislative framework in some of the policy for new media (including online games), other 
policy documents, such as The Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Games 
reflect a looser application of it. This model may not be effective long term as media 
convergence and transnationality confuse the boundaries of national jurisdiction. While some 
policy texts do not explicitly describe online game operators as part of the socialist cause, they 
do ascribe them with responsibilities that coincide with some of the primary responsibilities 
assigned to journalists in the Journalists Code. These include: protection of the public's 
physical and mental health, guidance of public opinion toward maximized social stability, and 
protection of national secrets. The dominant presence of these concerns in these official policy 
texts reflects a consistent government interest in these areas.  
 Policy texts surrounding the online games industry continue to represent the 




introduction of at least two major policy texts67 whose existence may question the validity of 
the jurisdictional authority asserted by the Ministry of Culture in the 2010 Interim Measures. 
The June 2012 Measures for Managing Internet Information Service  reflects the involvement 
of a higher-ranking office (the newly-created State Council Internet Information Office (SCIIO)) 
in the regulation of online games, but leaves continued room for jurisdictional confusion and 
competition between the MOC and GAPP. The document specifies roles for the MPS and MIIT 
(article 3), however it assumes knowledge of the responsibilities of other ministries responsible 
for content and licensing; these are grouped together as "relevant responsible departments" [
有关主管部门] (article 9, section 2) and "departments responsible for internet information 
content"  [互联网信息内容主管部门] (article 3). In December 2012, GAPP issued a policy text 
which directly contested the authority of the MOC, and even that of the SCIIO. The Provisions 
for the Management of Internet Publishing Services (Revised Draft)  (网络出版服务管理规定 (
修订征求意见稿))) define online games as "internet publishing services" [网络出版服务] 
(chapter 1, section 1, article 1) and thereby claim that their operating companies are subject 
to journalistic training requirements (article 44). In a comparison between these and the 2012 
SCIIO regulation, PRC lawyer You Yunting describes the GAPP text as 'essentially beyond 
any lawful authorization, and...in fact contrary to rules previously issued by the State Council' 
(2012). The inconsistency of interests reflected in these recent policy texts indicates a 
continued lack of regulatory clarity and internal consistency in the regulatory process. It 
additionally indicates that the texts, as expressions of the interests of their issuing parties, are 
instrumental in the negotiation of new media regulation.  
Privatization 
 The section above has shown that China's new media policy environment is 
connected to historical precedent, on a broad scale, in the overarching policy development 
priorities demonstrated over time, and at a micro level, in the content of policy texts. The history 
of new media policy development described in this first section has also demonstrated that the 
economic and political climate have been important factors in the changes to China's media 
regulation over time. The historical contextualization of China's new media policy concludes 
with a case description that demonstrates some of the recent impacts of economic and political 
change.  
 In recent years, the commercialization of China's media sector has meant that private 
stakeholders are increasingly active and influential. Partial privatization of Chinese media 
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organizations has allowed them to raise capital through investment while maintaining 
controlling ownership of the company, if necessary68. This has created opportunities for some 
individuals to pursue their interests in media policy through ownership and investment. As the 
research explores in Chapter IV, individuals and private interests wield a significant amount of 
power in China's online games industry. The case of Hu Shuli provides an example from 
traditional media that demonstrates how private ownership adds complexity to the regulatory 
dynamic in China's media sector in a context of partial privatization. This provides a valuable 
contextual foundation for understanding the changing power dynamics that have accompanied 
the complete privatization of China's online games industry. 
Case example: Hu Shuli 
 In 2009, diverging interests were reported to have emerged between the two original 
founders of Caijing magazine, Hu Shuli and Wang Boming. Hu Shuli was Chief Editor of the 
magazine, renowned for her ability to work on the edge of regulatory boundaries; Wang 
Boming leads the publicly owned Hong Kong listed company that owns the magazine69. In 
2009, Caijing had become extremely profitable for SEEC Media Group, accounting for forty-
seven percent of revenue in 2009 (Hu Yinan, China Daily). According to information given to 
the Wall Street Journal, Hu felt the magazine lacked both financial and moral support from its 
SEEC owners, who demonstrated increasing interference with her editorial independence and 
failed to 'back [the magazine] in battles with authorities over its coverage of ethnic riots in 
Xinjiang'  (Johnson and Canaves). Reports indicate that there was a general push by the 
SEEC for the magazine to avoid coverage of controversial political and social topics and 
instead concentrate more strictly on finance and economics (Johnson and Canaves). 
According to China Daily, Hu was working to resolve the conflict by pressuring SEEC to give 
up controlling ownership to outside investors (Hu Yinan, 2009). The final outcome of the 
dispute was the resignation of Hu Shuli along with a large number of senior staff, all of whom 
were promptly replaced by the SEEC (China Daily, Hu, 2009). Hu and her colleagues 
succeeded in a subsequent establishment of a new magazine that would support their 
interests. 
 In this case, Hu Shuli's individual interest tended toward deliberate steps toward media 
reform (Qian, 2009) through operation at the edge of regulatory boundaries (Johnson and 
Canaves). This interest was shared by a number of other individuals, including not only the 
colleagues that resigned with her, but other members of the journalistic community in China 
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(Qian, 2009). By contrast, the institutional interests of the SEEC media group tended to avoid 
content that risked negative regulatory attention. The final outcome of the negotiations 
between Hu's interest in pursuing media reform, and the institution's interest in avoiding 
controversial risk, was a separation of interests between institutions. In order for Hu and her 
colleagues to continue to operate in their own interests, it was necessary to exert influence 
over institutional interests through ownership.  While the case of Hu's resignation from Caijing 
demonstrates some potential for influential individuals to garner support and create new 
institutions, it also demonstrates the relative dominance of institutional rather than individual 
stakeholder interests in China's media landscape. It additionally demonstrates the diversity of 
stakeholders and interests that may be involved in China's independently owned media 
organizations and points to the increasing complexity of institutional stakeholders and their 
ownership. This serves as a valuable reference point for understanding the complex variety of 
stakeholders and interests that characterize China's completely privatized online games 
industry, and demonstrates the power that individual actors can wield through ownership in 
the context of a privatized media sector. The power dynamic between individuals and 
institutions is playing an increasingly important role in China's online games policy 
development. This dynamic will be explored in the next chapter, in the section on Variable 
Interest Entities. An example of this dynamic is also discussed in Chapter V, in the case of 
Alibaba and Ma Yun.  
The research has highlighted key regulatory challenges that have been raised by new 
media technologies and political reform in China over the last century. It has also explored the 
policy development responses to these challenges over time. Key challenges raised by the 
decentralization and commercialization of new media in the reform era included pluralization 
and fragmentation of government interests. These resulted in jurisdictional confusion and 
competition between government stakeholders that was resolved with changes to the 
institutional regulatory framework. Institutional convergence has been a useful strategy for 
dealing with the challenges of media convergence in the past, however media convergence 
has outpaced institutional reform and raised additional challenges in recent years. 
Jurisdictional confusion and conflict continue to challenge policy development surrounding 
online games and their emerging practice. Policy implementation challenges continue to be 
raised by the fragmentation of interests among government stakeholders, however new and 
increasingly converged media have been accompanied by new implementation challenges. 
The increased ability of consumers to participate in media production and their greater 
familiarity with the new technologies relative to policymakers means that users and user 
innovation have become increasingly important factors that impact successful policy 
implementation and development. Technological development has outpaced the evolution of 
policy in this area, and as a result there is significant legal confusion that surrounds not only 




section reviews some major regulatory challenges currently faced by China's policy makers 
as they look to develop future policy to regulate online games and their emerging practice.   
Regulatory Challenges 
Policy Implementation  
While regulation of China’s online games industry demonstrates priorities that are 
consistent with other internet-related regulation, it has also encountered similar difficulties with 
policy implementation. Disconnection between central regulation and local policy 
implementation has been noted as a common theme in China’s internet cafes, with regards to 
both café licensing and user compliance (Qiu & Zhou, 2005; Y. Zhou, 142-5). It is also 
important to note that implementation difficulties related to game operators is also an issue; 
compliance is far from certain, particularly when said compliance conflicts with their economic 
interests. Game operator-introduced workarounds to the ‘fatigue’ system provide a prime 
example of this70 (Lou; Martinsen), and a quick search confirms these workarounds are still 
widely available.  
Another regulatory difficulty surrounding the online gaming industry in China relates 
to the emergent nature of the regulation itself.  
Legal Confusion 
With the increasing speed of technological development, there lacks a comprehensive 
legal framework for online game regulation. This leaves significant room for legal confusion 
surrounding online game activity. Development of appropriate regulation for new technology 
requires a certain level of law-maker familiarity with it; areas that require regulation must not 
only be identified, but emergent uses and activity must be understood by the regulators. The 
two key informants directly involved in regulating online games identified this as a barrier to 
effective policy development: they reported that high-level decision-makers in China generally 
lacked familiarity with game technology (R8; R9). To date, online games regulation has 
developed to the point where areas for regulatory concern have been expressed and interim 
policies established, however most of these policies apply to game operation and licensing 
and neglect to regulate activity that takes place within the games themselves. Examples 
include online protests, gold farming, and other forms of real-money trade. In his Virtual 
Justice: the new laws of online worlds, Lastowka notes this lack of regulatory attention as a 
global phenomenon; ‘No governments, at this time, are taking a comprehensive approach to 
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the regulation of virtual worlds71’ (70). He explains that ‘Despite their contemporary popularity, 
the technology is still too young and unfamiliar to most lawmakers. As a result…courts and 
other legal authorities…are tasked with applying existing laws to virtual worlds’ (70-1). One 
area where this is particularly evident and has been contested in courts (Lastowka 2010), 
surrounds the issue of virtual property in online games. The real-world value of virtual property 
has been a subject for much legal debate in China and is surrounded by conflicting views (see 
Beijing Review 46). Areas for legal concern include: the potential effect of virtual currency 
usage on the value of the rmb (Smalera), and the potential for criminal exploitation of the 
currency within the new medium such as money laundering and online gambling (Chen 2007; 
Fowler and Qing; Martinsen).  
Respondents that had worked as legal counsel for game companies described 
significant legal concerns about the confusion over virtual property ownership. One respondent 
noted:  
If a user actually has an ownership interest in any item that exists within your game, 
then you would technically need to keep that game going. But that just doesn’t work 
from a commercial perspective, you have to be able to shut down a game if it’s not 
profitable. You can’t keep running these servers to keep somebody’s property 
interests alive. So I’m sure that every operator out there has gotta take the same 
position (R5). 
Taking this position, the informant explained,  involved implementing End User 
License Agreements (EULAs) that stipulate that all virtual property belongs to the game 
company (R4, R5). Respondent 4 remarked that this does not hold up well to PRC law, but 
that lawyers include it in EULAs anyway in order to protect the game companies.  
Another contributing factor to legal confusion is the unofficial circulation of policy texts 
that with unclear legal status. One interview respondent that worked as an industry developer 
indicated the existence of a policy text that explicitly protects the virtual property rights of game 
players in China (R11). The policy document is entitled the People’s Republic of China 
Virtual Property Protection Law (Draft) (中华人民共和国虚拟财产保护法(草案)). It can be 
viewed online, however it is not associated with the website of a specific institution. Its official 
legal status remains unclear. Respondent 8, an informant that worked in policy development 
in this area, did not explicitly name the document but reported that China’s law was in the 
process of being amended to provide users with a legal basis to prosecute the theft of virtual 
assets.  Should this document gain official status, it would likely facilitate the growth of China's 
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online games virtual property trade. One factor that exacerbates the regulatory confusion 
about online games is the jurisdictional competition among regulatory agencies in the Chinese 
government.   
Jurisdictional competition 
 In addition to difficulties with policy implementation and legal confusion, the 
governmental fragmentation and jurisdictional competition that emerged with the growth of the 
internet industry in China has emerged in full force for online gaming.  
The explosive growth of the online games industry 72  in China has generated 
significant interest among both foreign and domestic investors. Amid this overwhelming 
growth, significant competition has emerged among governing agencies in China to claim 
regulatory jurisdiction over the industry. A particularly public conflict between the Ministry of 
Culture (MOC) and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) has caused 
significant confusion among industry players.  
Case example: 2009 World of Warcraft Suspension  
Vivendi Games73 entered the Chinese market in 2004, when it licensed the Chinese 
company China The9 Interactive to operate World of Warcraft, the flagship game of its 
subsidiary Blizzard (Pilarowski 2009). The partnership with The9 continued until 2009, when 
Blizzard’s license was to expire; Blizzard announced a switch in partnership from The9 to the 
company NetEase. Lack of regulatory clarity meant that Blizzard was not advised it would 
need to apply for approval, and it wasn’t until the Ministry of Culture released its 
Announcement on Regulating Applications for Content Censorship for Imported Online Games 
(文化部关于规范进口网络游戏产品内容审查申报工作的公告), eight days after Blizzard’s 
announcement, that the situation became problematic. The Announcement indicated that the 
MOC needed to approve any significant changes in the nature of business operation (which 
included Blizzard’s). One month later, GAPP issued an announcement that its approval was 
also required for such a change (Pilarowski). Additional complications arose when The9 sued 
Blizzard for the change in partnership. In 2008, Kou Xiaowei (寇晓伟), then director of the 
technology and digital publishing bureau at the GAPP, had indicated that in case of a dispute 
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users take up online gaming through mobile devices (Business Insider).  
73 In 2008, Vivendi Games merged with Activision, forming the company Activision Blizzard 




between a foreign and a Chinese game company, ‘GAPP will suspend the approval process 
for all games from the foreign company until the disputes are settled to the satisfaction of the 
Chinese company’ (in Pilarowski). The9 launched 4 lawsuits against Blizzard in 2009, 
significantly delaying the approval process and contributing to the game’s suspension of 
service on June 6, 2009. The GAPP further exacerbated this process by announcing an 
investigation into the Blizzard-Netease joint venture, which GAPP indicated may violate 
regulation (Pilarowski). Pilarowski points out that the market access restrictions that this joint 
venture would violate in fact seem to violate China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) 
obligations74. Citing an August 2009 decision regarding market access disputes in the audio-
visual industry, Pilarowski speculates that these obligations may cause the market access 
restrictions in the online gaming industry to loosen. The Ministry of Culture responded to these 
measures by ‘criticising GAPP’s “surly interference”’ in the regulation process (Web2Asia). On 
June 3, 2010, the Interim Measures on the Administration of Online Games (网络游戏管理暂
行办法) offered gsome clarification on the jurisdictional issues between the MOC and GAPP. 
The Ministry of Culture was designated the applicable authority in online gaming activity, while 
the GAPP was still involved in the regulation and content review process.   
By its own account, the Interim Measures on the Administration of Online Games is 
only an interim set of measures, indicating that further development is not only necessary but 
in progress. The regulations regarding online games outlined in the Interim Measures cover a 
range of aspects of the industry, including restrictions on virtual currency and involving 
(presumably for this reason) both the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Finance. The 
Interim Measures establish restrictions for game developers, game operators, and individual 
users. Key concerns conveyed in this document include: public health concerns, content 
concerns, and concerns over the use of virtual currency. Many of the regulations within this 
document are aspirational and unenforceable under current conditions of infrastructure, 
technology, and business. Among the most ambitious of regulations are the real name 
registration policy75 (on which the restriction of play of minors depends) and the restriction on 
use and exchange of virtual currency to in-game only. Currently, the effectiveness of the real 
name registration system for online games depends on the compliance and ubiquity of officially 
licensed internet cafés, a situation which has not reflected reality, although there has been 
marked improved in recent years (HRIC, Zhou 141). Effective implementation of the real-name 
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registration system also depends on the technical capacity and compliance of the online game 
operators, as well as the compliance and honesty of individual users. Wang et al. indicate that 
there is little incentive for the operators to implement the required technical measures, and 
that individual users “may just use another person's identification certificate, fabricate 
information, or even login to overseas online game servers via proxy IPs”. The overwhelming 
size and speed of the online game industry’s growth in China has far outpaced the ability of 
state interests to develop relevant policies, let alone firm systems of control with which to 
enforce them.   
Innovative Practice and Use  
The concerns conveyed by the Chinese government in the Interim Provisions 
regulation document but scratch the surface of the regulatory issues raised by online gaming 
technology and activity. Public health concerns, concerns over game content, and concerns 
over the use of virtual currency all reflect readily visible issues that have drawn public concern. 
The potential negative health effects of game play have been much publicized in the Chinese 
media; stories of death, including suicide and even murder are associated with alleged 
‘internet addiction’ (wangluo chengyin (网络成瘾 )) (Golub and Lingley 60-61). Content 
concerns have also been a source of public attention in China (China Daily 2010b). Virtual 
currency has equally gained attention in China, both for its potential to threaten the local 
currency and for its facilitation of online gambling activity (Ewing). Issues that have gained less 
public attention are just as pertinent to online game-related policy development in China. 
Lesser-known ways that online games are used in practice challenge existing media policies 
and open new space for economic development that may be beneficial to China’s economy. 
Specific cases of practices that challenge existing regulation include in-game protesting (such 
as the April 2010 anti-bot protest in Aion76) and the practice of ‘gold farming’. "Gold farmers", 
key actors in Real-Money Trade (RMT) typically operate on foreign servers. They are thereby 
able to circumvent the domestic restrictions on virtual currency trade and use, conducting their 
accumulation of virtual assets abroad for later sale to international clients. For example, 
outside of China, it is often legal for virtual currency issuers to also operate as a trading 
platform for virtual assets. Blizzard's real-money auction house in Diablo III, active from 2012 
to 2014, was a high profile example of this. Gold farming workers operating on foreign servers 
are also able to circumvent all technical restrictions enforced by China’s domestic game 
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operators, such as those that relate to accessibility and those that restrict use of specific key 
words in online conversations.  
Many of the policy issues raised by these evolving uses of online game technology 
exist within a context of conflicting interests and institutions both domestically and 
internationally. Literature in the business, information technology, and virtual worlds studies 
fields reflects widespread opinion that the media convergence offered by online games is but 
a step toward what will eventually become a more ubiquitous and interoperable virtual world. 
Dr. Yesha Sivan, professor of software engineering and researcher of virtual worlds, likens our 
current versus potential use of virtual worlds to our pre-browser use of the internet. He states: 
I maintain that real virtual worlds will, eventually, offer a paradigm shift. What we see 
now with Second Life, World of Warcraft, Club Penguin and more than 100 other 
worlds, is just the beginning. In comparison to the Internet age, we are at the “Gopher” 
stage (Gopher was a prebrowser method to view hyperlinked data) (8). 
As media continues to converge, allowing wider access, further communication 
decentralization, and faster economic and social transactions, the ways in which we use this 
media will continue to challenge established policies and continue to outrun and outflank the 
current processes of policy development. China’s approach to regulation of converged media 
is not only important to domestic development, as various conflicting interests and institutions 
vie for control, but is important to international development, as transactions continue to 
transcend national boundaries and private interests challenge international agreements and 
regulations.  
Case Example: Online Protest 
One example of the way in which innovative use of online games is directly challenging 
existing policy is illustrated by a 2010 ‘machinima’77 video entitled War of Internet Addiction (
网瘾战争). In 2009, World of Warcraft players in China used this technique to create a film 
which directly challenges and objects to the state regulation of online games. The seven-part 
film, available on both Tudou and Youtube, positions World of Warcraft players (or ‘Azeroth 
Citizens’) as victims engaged in an epic battle against a personified ‘Green Dam’78 monster 
                                                     
77  ‘Machinima’ is, according to machinima.org, ‘filmmaking within a real-time, 3D virtual 
environment, often using 3D video-game technologies’. An unofficial definition of machinima 
might call it using video game animation and video capturing to create a film. 
78  This is an unveiled reference to a piece of software called the Green Dam that was 
scheduled to be mandatory installation on every new computer in China beginning on July 1, 




using weapons of ‘harmony’ to destroy them. The video is more than just a protest against the 
suspension of World of Warcraft; internet censorship in general is attacked and an incitation 
toward action expressly conveyed. In part 7 at 7 minutes 17 seconds, the storyline falters as 
a voice speaks expressly to the audience:  
All the World of Warcraft players watching this video right now, I am Kan Nimei. Please 
raise your hand, I need your help. I know, when they closed Youtube, you said nothing, 
because you are not a Youtuber. When they closed Twitter, you said nothing, because 
you are not a Twitterer. When they killed Fanfou, you said nothing, because you are 
not a member. Now, they are coming for World of Warcraft…There is nothing we can 
do to save the game we love. But you could at least raise your hand. Lend me your 
voice, your strength, through this nationwide LAN. For our soul’s home, speak out with 
me, “We are World of Warcraft Players!” Are all of you numb and apathetic already? 
(War of Internet Addiction). 
The Green Dam monster is seen to prepare a death blow entitled “Harmony electric shock”. 
The players then respond in text to Kan: ‘We are afraid to speak, because even if we speak 
up, they would ignore us or quote us out of context…We are used to it…silence. But silence 
doesn’t mean obedience’ (War of Internet Addiction). The video ends with the souls of the 
players in Azeroth coming together to form a bomb-like weapon that destroys the Green Dam 
monster. This video is clearly explicitly challenging the government restrictions, not only on 
online games, but on the wider internet. As a machinima film, it combines online game 
technology with other communications technology on the internet to distribute an explicit 
political message. It has not yet been removed from Tudou despite its popularity; it won first 
prize at the 2010 Tudou film festival. It is clear that use of these media is pushing boundaries 
and that policies will have to be developed that account for and adjust to this type of innovative 
activity. While this example demonstrates in-game protest against existing real-world 
regulators, real-life protests against the virtual “law” of game companies has also been 
reported. Respondent 1 reported research on violent user protests at game company offices.  
The next chapter further investigates the relationships between key stakeholder 
interests in policy development for online games in order to shed light on the ways that 
emerging practice is challenging further development of policy in this space. The chapter 
works to understand the major stakeholders identified in this chapter in the context of the 
institutions and structures that frame them, and considers the primary ways in which 
                                                     
computers. In June 2009, however, the MIIT made the software's installation optional (Cui, 




interaction that affects policy development takes place. Understanding how current policy is 
negotiated around online games establishes a basis for understanding the way emerging 





Chapter III: Practice 
Structures, Interests, Interactions  
The consequence of regulation is not determined by technical configuration 
or a single set of regulatory objectives. Rather, it results from the interplay 
between a wide variety of actors, their goals, and the materialization of these 
goals in administrative, commercial, and technological configurations, a 
feature that characterizes China’s internet regulation as a whole (Qiu & Zhou, 
2005, 262). 
Exploration of the technical and regulatory environments surrounding MMOGs and RMT in 
China has revealed a complex, quickly evolving new media landscape comprised of an ever-
increasing number of national and international stakeholders. Major policy texts relevant to 
China's online gaming and real-money trade have been examined and contrasted with the 
challenges of policy development and implementation. The examination revealed a gap 
between policy documents and regulatory practice; policy texts were used to express the 
interests of their issuing parties, however the documents themselves failed to account for the 
competing jurisdictional interests and implementation difficulties that shape actual practice.  
The examination of regulatory challenges raised by emerging practice in online games 
has indicated a fragmentation of interests within government, among policymaking institutions 
(as in the World of Warcraft suspension case example), and between state, provincial, city 
and county levels of government (Qiu and Zhou 7). It has additionally highlighted challenges 
raised by the increasing influence of other stakeholders with competing interests, in particular 
media operators and users 79 . The negotiation of interests between and within these 
stakeholder groups seems to account for a significant part of the evident gap between policy 
and practice. Regulatory practice, then, is a result not of proscriptive policy texts but of the 
balancing of divergent stakeholder interests.  
Examples from the previous chapter have signalled some of the key stakeholders and 
interests in the regulation of China's online games 80 . The chapter also analysed the 
                                                     
79 See the Regulatory Challenges section of Chapter II and the Case Study in Chapter IV for 
examples. 
80 The case of jurisdictional dispute pointed to the strong involvement of the Ministry of Culture 
and the General Administration of Press and Publication; the machinima policy protest 




stakeholders and interests relevant to gold farming in detail. The exact nature of the 
relationships between these emerging stakeholders, however, is difficult to determine. It is not 
described in the policy texts, it has not been well-documented by third parties, and case-level 
analysis provides limited insight about the underlying dynamic of policy negotiation. A fuller 
understanding of this dynamic requires a deeper examination of stakeholder interests and the 
structures and institutions that frame them. The chapter works to develop understanding of 
the major stakeholder interests and how they are balanced to determine regulatory practice 
for online games in China. This begins with a review of the primary tensions that have been 
observed between stakeholders and the interactions that express them. This is followed by an 
exploratory analysis that considers the structural context, major stakeholder interests, and 
modes of interaction that take place within and between each stakeholder category.  
Tensions 
As emerging practice involving online game environments pushes the boundaries of 
existing regulation, strong tensions between and among China's government regulators, 
media operators & producers, and public users can be observed. For example, online protests 
that directly challenge new regulation indicate tension between public and government 
stakeholders. The machinima video "War of Internet Addiction" (网瘾战争) by the Oil Tiger 
Machinima Team discussed in the regulatory challenge section exemplifies this; the user-
made video explicitly challenges government restrictions on online games, as well as the wider 
internet. Another example of stakeholder tensions can be found in the ownership structures of 
online games companies. Chinese online games operators that are listed on foreign stock 
exchanges regularly and deliberately circumvent government restrictions that limit foreign 
ownership in pursuit of foreign capital81. This creates tension between government regulators 
and media producers as they negotiate a balance between the economic benefit of foreign 
capital and the reduction of domestic control of the companies. There is also strong tension 
that exists between the public users and media producers. This emerges, for example, when 
users feel treated unfairly by a game company; cases of virtual theft that appear in court are 
often the result of tensions between users and media companies that have gone unresolved82.  
                                                     
circumvention measures taken by online games companies indicated that the profit-oriented 
interests of private companies are a factor in determining policy implementation.   
81 See Bai and Zeng for a detailed description of this process. 
82 An example of this was a 2003 user lawsuit against the makers of a game called "Red 
Moon". Li sued the game developers for the return of his virtual property that had been stolen 




Tensions exist not only between government, media, and public stakeholder groups 
but also occur between sub-level stakeholders within each group. Within the government 
stakeholder group, tensions emerge between government agencies as they each pursue their 
interests in regulating online games. The 2009 suspension of World of Warcraft, for example, 
resulted from jurisdictional tensions between the Ministry of Culture and the General 
Administration of Press and Publication. Within the Media stakeholder group, tension can 
occur between foreign game developers and Chinese game operators if a foreign developer 
with lucrative content decides to switch local partners. This happened when Blizzard chose to 
license World of Warcraft to NetEase rather than The9; in the face of potential related profit 
loss, The9 launched lawsuits against Blizzard, claiming property loss compensation and 
commercial defamation 2009 (ChinaTechNews.com). Tensions also regularly arise between 
sub-level stakeholders in the public, for example when the play styles of recreational and 
professional players conflict83. The tensions between and within stakeholder groups that are 
signalled by the examples in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 emerge through the actions and interactions 
of stakeholders as they each pursue their interests in online games regulation. A visualization 
of these tensions draws attention to the interrelationships between these groups. The tensions 
are depicted in Figures 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below.  
 
                                                     
83 The author's 2008 research on tensions between recreational players and gold farming 





Figure 3.1 Source: Author 
 




A broader perspective on the observed interactions highlights the interrelationships that exist 
between stakeholders. A visualization of these interrelationships are depicted below, in Figure 
3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Source: Author 
Figure 3.3 represents the different types of interactions that have been observed in 
case examples to take place between regulators, producers, and users of converged media84. 
Interactions take place both among stakeholder groups within each category, as well as 
between stakeholder groups in different macro-level categories 85 . They can take place, 
therefore, on many levels, and between many smaller-scale stakeholder interests.  
The diagram in Figure 3.3 above provides a visualization of the stakeholder 
relationships observed in the previous chapter. This provides a useful framework for 
                                                     
 
 




understanding the relationships between these major stakeholder groups that define practice 
of converged media regulation in China. Within this framework, micro level information and 
case examples can be understood within the broader relationships that define the context of 
converged media regulation in China. The exploratory analysis works to build on this broader 
relational understanding by exploring the key internal structures, stakeholder interests, and 
interactions that are involved in the regulation of online games.  
External Factors 
The actors and interactions described above are impacted by many external factors. 
Secondary literature, for example, has highlighted technological development and the market 
economy as important external factors that affect media regulation in China86. In recent years, 
as China has increased its involvement in the international political community, the 
international political climate has become increasingly important to the development and 
implementation of media regulation; demonstrative examples of this include: the relaxation of 
media controls that occurred in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics under the pressure 
of the international community87 (Spencer), as well as the effect of the 2009 World Trade 
Organization ruling against China’s restrictions on the import of audio-visual products88. The 
diagram in Figure 3.4 demonstrates that these external factors can affect the major 
stakeholders and their interactions between major stakeholders. The diagram is presented 
below.  
                                                     
86 See the New Media Scholarship section of the literature review in Chapter I.  
87 This was followed by a subsequent tightening of media restrictions in the year following the 
Olympics; between September 2008 and July 2009, access to sites such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Youtube was blocked in response to riots in Xinjiang (Wauters 2009; author’s first-hand 
experience). These sites are still inaccessible from China (Open Net Initiative 2012).  
88 For a full account of the dispute and its effect on China’s media regulation, see the summary 




Figure 3.4 Source: Author 
The relational understanding of key actors and external influences that shape the 
practice of China’s online games regulation (depicted in Figure 3.4) is used to guide the 
exploratory analysis in this chapter. The analysis will begin with a brief overview of the 
literature and analytical approach, and is then divided into three major parts. Each of these 
parts focuses on one of the major stakeholder groups described above: regulators, producers, 
and users of online games. Each group is explored in turn. 
The exploration proceeds according to the format described below. First, the relevant 
structural context of each stakeholder group is explained. This is undertaken in order to 
understand the institutional relationships and hierarchies that affect policy outcomes. 
Secondly, the primary interests of the major stakeholders within each group are examined in 
order to highlight some key points where divergent interests must be negotiated. Thirdly, the 
research explores some of the ways that key stakeholders interact to negotiate divergent 
interests. Case examples are used to illuminate some of the most important ways that interests 





Exploratory Analysis: Structures, Interests, & 
Interactions of Stakeholder Groups 
Government Regulators  
The bureaucratic context for online games is still evolving within the existing structures 
of China's media regulation. Therefore, a focused examination of the evolving structures, 
stakeholders, and interactions that shape new media regulatory practice in China must first 
establish understanding of the existing structural context and regulatory mechanisms in place. 
This section begins with an overview of the major political institutions responsible for media 
regulation in general, and moves toward a more specific focus on the key institutions, interests 
and interactions that shape regulatory practice related to online games.  
Institutional Structures 
General Media Regulation 
Policy development and decision-making for media regulation in China begins at the 
highest levels of government: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP is the highest 
ranking governing institution in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is supported by four 
institutional "pillars" that officially comprise China's government: the State Council, the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA), the National People's Congress (NPC), and the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (Lawrence & Martin, 2013, 3). High level 
decision-making and legislative power is concentrated in the CCP, while implementation-level 
decision-making and executive power is controlled by the State Council. The PLA is 
responsible for Military operations, and while in theory the NPC and the CPPCC occupy 
significant roles in decision-making and policy development, their actual roles are considered 
by analysts to be largely ceremonial in nature89. Lawrence and Martin's depiction of the 
relationship between the CCP and its pillar organizations is as follows:  
                                                     
89 This contrast between theoretical and practical power for the NPC and the CPPCC is 
highlighted by Lawrence and Martin in their 2013 report for the US Congressional Research 





Figure 3.5 Source: Lawrence & Martin, 2013 
These institutions are nominally separate, however there is substantial institutional and 
personal overlap between them. Most significantly, the CCP overlaps significantly with all of 
its supporting organizations; this overlap represents the structural and personal mechanisms 
through which the CCP maintains influence and exerts decision-making power throughout 
government bodies. The structural organization of media regulation in China consists of a 
variety of agencies and sub-organizations that are embedded within these macro level political 
structures. 
Among the CCP and its pillar organizations, the primary decision-making institutions 
responsible for media regulation are the CCP and the State Council 90 . An additional 
institutional category also plays a significant role in regulating this sector; government-
administered social organizations91 link policy stakeholders in government with public and 
private interests. They fall under the administration of the State Council but also regularly 
                                                     
90 While the PLA does not directly participate in mainstream media regulation, it maintains its 
own system of publication and distribution that runs parallel to that administered by the State 
(Shambaugh 45). 
91Another common term for this institutional category is, as in Lawrence & Martin 2013, 
"Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations" or GONGOs (38). In order to 
remain inclusive of social organizations with varying degrees of autonomous practice, this 
research follows Saich (“Negotiating the State”) in using the literal translation of the Chinese 




include Party stakeholders. The nature of the relationship between these stakeholders is 
complex and dynamic; while formal requirements for all public organizations to register with 
the government reflects their traditional "top down" administration, Lieberthal highlights that 
'the realities are far less uniform' (200). On a macro level, these three institutional categories 
serve as the structural context for media regulation in China.  The relationship between them 
can be visualized as follows in Figure 3.6:  
 
Figure 3.6 Source: Author 
Figure 3.6 reflects both the overlap and the relative political hierarchy of these institutions. 
Within the macro level structures of Party, State, and Social Organizations, a complex set of 
substructures and interactions define the landscape of regulation and decision-making that 
surrounds media regulation in China. The internal organization of the CCP is highly secretive; 
what is known about the structure for media regulation within the CCP has been painstakingly 
compiled by scholars like Shambaugh and Brady from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources that include interviews (Shambaugh) and limited access internal publications (Brady). 
The following brief summary of the internal structures of CCP media organization is based on 
these investigations but accounts for recent leadership changes after the 18th Party Congress.  
At the highest levels, the regulatory structure for China's media is closely linked to the 
centre of political power: the CCP Central Committee and its elite subcommittees. These 




Politburo Standing Committee. The following is a brief summary of the relationships (official 
and actual) between these institutions and their members.   
In Lawrence and Martin (2013), the 'National Level Communist Party Hierarchy' is illustrated 
as a pyramidal structure that ranges from the 2,270-member National People's Congress on 
the bottom (as the largest organization with the least power), to the seven-member Politburo 
Standing Committee at the top, representing the Party's smallest yet 'most powerful decision-
making body' (20). This is illustrated below in Figure 3.7:  
 
Figure 3.7 Source: Lawrence & Martin, 2013, 20 
This inverse relationship between institutional size and power runs contrary to that outlined by 
theory, and according to Lieberthal, characterizes CCP organization at 'each territorial level' 
(173). Lieberthal describes the National Party Congress as an example: 'In theory, the Party 
Congress is the highest organ of authority, but in fact its large size and infrequent meetings 
make it a vehicle for announcing and legitimating some major decisions rather than for 
initiating and deciding important policies' (174). The CCP Central Committee also serves a 
predominantly ceremonial purpose, however its limited functionality as a conglomerate 
contrasts with the significant power held by its individual members; all Central Committee 
members concurrently occupy key leadership positions in China's governing institutions (174). 
Within the CCP Central Committee, major decision-making and practical administration occurs 
in smaller elite sub-groups, the most powerful of which are the twenty-five member Politburo 
and the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. The Politburo is comprised of what 
Lieberthal terms 'the top power elite' (175), however he notes that membership is 'not itself a 




making (Lawrence & Martin, 21). By contrast, the frequently convened Politburo Standing 
Committee is the centre of decision-making power in China; members, ranked one through 
seven, are each responsible for different areas of policy and government, and hold concurrent 
leadership positions at other levels of government that reflect these responsibilities, both within 
and outside the CCP structure92. The Politburo and its Standing Committee are supported by 
the seven-member Central Committee Secretariat, whose primary function is to co-ordinate 
the implementation of decisions made by the Politburo Standing Committee and to administer 
organizations directly under the Central Committee. The diagram in Figure 3.8 illustrates the 
decision-making hierarchy of the Central Committee and its elite subgroups:  
 
Fig. 3.8 Source: Author's depiction of data in Lieberthal and Lawrence & Martin (2013). 
The Politburo Standing Committee represents the highest level of decision-making for 
media regulation in China. Fifth-ranked member Liu Yunshan (刘云山) is responsible for the 
overall supervision of "Propaganda and Ideology" (Wong 2012), a sphere of governance which 
                                                     
92 Examples from the 18th Party Congress include: General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平), who 
is both General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, PBSC 
member Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声) who is also the head of the CPCC, PBSC member Zhang 
Dejiang (张德江), who is also the Chairman of the National People's Congress, and PBSC 
member Zhang Gaoli (张高丽), who simultaneously holds the position of Vice Premier of the 




includes: media, culture, public health, education and social science (Lieberthal, 175; 
Shambaugh 28). Supervision of this expansive sector is accomplished through China's 
Propaganda system or xitong, a 'sprawling bureaucratic establishment extending into virtually 
every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China' 
(Shambaugh, 27). The propaganda system is connected to the Politburo Standing Committee 
through organizations called Central Leading Groups (Brady, Shambaugh). Central leading 
groups are bureaucratically situated under the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, 
however in practice they serve as a platform for liaison between policy decision-makers on the 
Standing Committee and key officials from pertinent bureaucratic bodies (Lieberthal, 217; 
Shambaugh, 31). The Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideological Work [中央宣传
思想领导小组] (CLGPIW), the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization 
[中央精神文明建设指导委员会] (CGCBSC), and the External Propaganda Leading Group [中
央对外宣传小组] (EPLG) are the primary Central Leading Groups involved in co-ordinating 
media regulation through China's propaganda system, with the CLGPIW at the highest level. 
There is significant overlap and co-ordination between these groups, which is often 
accomplished through concurrent positions held by an elite individual. Shambaugh observes 
that this "triple-hatting" allows officials to 'personify...institutional linkage' (32). Liu Yunshan is 
a prime example of this practice. He forms a single personal connection that bridges several 
officially disparate organizations, including the Politburo Standing Committee, the Central 
Committee Secretariat, and the CGCBSC93 (Wang Ya, 2013). These high-level organizations, 
led by Politburo Standing Committee Liu Yunshan, connect with the administrative CCP 
Propaganda Department (CCPPD)94  through the Central Committee Secretariat; both Liu 
Yunshan and CCPPD director Liu Qibao (刘奇葆 ) serve as two of the seven-member 
organization.  
The diagrams below illustrate how Central Leading Groups form connections between 
high level Party structures and the Central Propaganda Department. Figure 3.9 illustrates the 
institutional overlap formed by Central Leading Groups through the appointment of key 
individuals to multiple positions. These include positions in the leading groups themselves, as 
well as other institutions in the Party-State infrastructure.  
                                                     
93 According to Shambaugh, the CGCBSC runs parallel to and overlaps with the CLGPIW, 
although its responsibilities relate to education and youth work rather than administration of 
the Propaganda system as a whole (33). 
94  The official English translation of this department changed to the Central Publicity 
Department in 1997. As Shambaugh notes, the original Chinese term has not changed, and 





Fig. 3.9 Source: Author 
Note: Institutional overlap in Fig. 4.9 indicates shared staff 
 
Figure 3.10 demonstrates how the appointment of key individuals to concurrent 
positions connects the institutions depicted in Figure 3.9. Figure 3.10 uses the multiple 
positions held by Liu Yunshan and Liu Qibao to demonstrate the connections between high 
level Party infrastructure and the Central Propaganda Department. Detailed explanations of 
lower-level concurrently held positions relevant to online games are provided later in the 






Fig. 3.10 Source: Author's visualization of data in Shambaugh (2007) and information from 
 Japan's RadioPress China Directory2013 
Figure 3.10 indicates key individual-level connections between the CCPPD and the Politburo 
Standing Committee, through concurrent position holding in the Politburo Secretariat and key 
Central organizations. Confirmed positions in Figure 3.10 are accurate as of the 18th Party 
Congress. This figure also depicts the unconfirmed leadership positions of the CLGPIW; while 
it has not been officially confirmed, Liu Yunshan is also likely to hold current leadership of the 
CLGPIW, while CCPPD leader Liu Qibao is likely to operate as deputy leader of this group. 
This assumption extrapolates from recent convention, which indicates that this position is held 
by the Standing Committee member in charge of Propaganda and Ideology, while its deputy 
leadership is held by the Minister of the Propaganda Department (Shambaugh, 31).  
While the Propaganda Leading Group (CLGPIW), the Leading Group for Spiritual 
Civilization (CGCBSC), and the Central Committee Secretariat serve to link the Politburo 
Standing Committee decision-makers with the Propaganda Department (CCPPD), 
implementation of these decisions throughout China's media system is organized and 
supervised by the vast and pervasive regulatory structure of the CCPPD itself. The CCPPD is 
the primary CCP agency responsible for media regulation, supervision, and information 
dissemination in the PRC, and assumes a leading role over the entire propaganda system 
(Brady, 10; Shambaugh, 33). The External Propaganda Leading Group and the General 




administered separately (by the External Propaganda Leading Group and the PLA General 
Political Department, respectively), and are under the guidance, rather than leadership95, of 
the CCPPD (Brady, 11). Despite this organizational difference, Shambaugh (30) and Brady 
(2005: 60; 2009, 27) note close working relationships between the PLA General Political 
Department, the Foreign Propaganda Department, and the CCPPD. The External Propaganda 
Office operates both as the External Propaganda Office under the CCP and as the State 
Council Information Office (SCIO): the two terms refer to a single organizational body with two 
names (一个机构，两个牌子) (Brady, 13). Officially, the SCIO is the authority for external 
propaganda, while internal propaganda is the responsibility of the CCPPD. In practice, as 
Shambaugh reports, this boundary has blurred significantly along with technological 
development and increased international communication.  
Both the CCPPD and the SCIO/EPLG are involved in regulating various aspects of 
the internet and of news content that is seen both inside and outside of China (Brady, 13; 
Shambaugh, 30). Individual appointments have been part of the increased overlap between 
the CPPPD and the SCIO/EPLG in recent years, as exemplified by Central Committee 
member Wang Chen (王晨). Wang Chen was appointed Director of the SCIO/EPLG in 2008, 
and was assigned a concurrent position as deputy director of the Propaganda Department in 
the same year (China Vitae). He continued to hold his positions in both the Propaganda 
Department and State Council during the organizational reshuffling of 2011; while maintaining 
his position as Deputy Director of the Propaganda department, Wang Chen was appointed to 
direct the newly formed Internet Office of the State Council (SIIO). The positions in this new 
organization, the SCIO, and the CCPPD that were concurrently held by Wang Chen 
maintained a strong connection between all three as the new SIIO was being established. 
Wang Chen was replaced as Director of the SCIO and of the SIIO in 2013, however both 
offices remain connected to the CCPPD through concurrently held positions. These are 
discussed in further detail in the regulator interactions section of this chapter.  
Below the level of the CCPPD, the Propaganda system consists of a complex 
bureaucratic structure whose influence extends into a number of organizations throughout the 
government, public and private sectors (Brady, 10-11; Shambaugh 56). Information about the 
organizational structure of the CPPPD is not publicly available, and is therefore not precisely 
                                                     




known. However, some foreign assessments of its central structure do exist; Japan's annual 
China Directory describes the central structure of the CCPPD96.  
Below the central level, the CCPPD structure includes provincial and local level 
Propaganda Departments and Spiritual Civilization offices 97 , as well as a 'network of 
propaganda cadres and offices installed in Party committees and branches at all levels of 
organizations in both the State bureaucracy, as well as Chinese and foreign-run enterprises 
with CCP cells' (Brady, 10). Sectors where the CCPPD maintain a presence include: the PLA 
propaganda system, the State-administered sectors relevant to propaganda and ideology98, 
and Social organizations99 (Brady, 17). This pervasive structural presence allows the CCPPD 
to perform its responsibilities of guidance and leadership 100 of the sectors for which it is 
responsible. Some key mechanisms through which this is accomplished include the 
distribution of key publications, and compulsory regular meetings through which central 
directives are communicated at local levels101. The CCPPD is also able to exert influence 
through its power to appoint and dismiss all senior officials in the education, media, and cultural 
sectors102  (Brady, 16); the potential for removal from a prominent position, among other 
                                                     
96 See China Directory 2013 for a recent outline of this structure. 
97 For a complete list of local and provincial level responsibilities, see Brady, 24. 
98 These include: culture, education, health, media, science, sport, and technology (Brady, 11; 
Lieberthal, 222).  
99 All people's organizations must register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which is led by the 
CCPPD (Brady, 11). This includes: social organizations (社会团体), private non-enterprise 
organizations (民办非企业单位), foundations (基金会), and representative offices of overseas 
organizations (境外分支代表机构) (Chinanpo.gov.cn). 
100 The CCPPD roles are categorized into "leadership" and "guidance"; leadership consists of 
direct supervision and management, while guidance implies a supervisory role over 
administrative functions performed by the State. In reality, these official distinctions may be 
blurred; Brady notes, for example, that ' many provincial and local level leaders are in charge 
of propaganda work (a Party matter) within their area in addition to their government titles 
(State-oriented activities)' (21).  
101 This has been particularly noted as common practice in the media sector; Brady reports 
that compulsory "update meetings" (通气会) are regularly held between senior officials in the 
CCPPD News department and senior leaders in the media sector in order to communicate 
policy directives. She additionally observes that distribution of key CCPPD publications such 
as Internal Report (内部通讯) play an essential role in communicating 'politically appropriate 
phraseology' (19).  
102 The nomenklatura system grants this right to the Party. Lieberthal explains: 'The 
nomenklatura consists of lists of leading positions over which party units exercise the power 
of appointment and dismissal, lists of reserve candidates for those positions, and rules 




possible punishment (see Shambaugh 29), encourages conservative decision-making at 
these levels.  
Converged Media Regulation 
Several State-administered offices that are involved in converged media regulation 
fall under the close leadership of the CCPPD and play particularly strong roles in the 
propaganda system. These are: the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 
the Ministry of Culture (MOC), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), 
and the State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television 
(SGAPPRFT). The MIIT has assumed the former responsibilities of the Ministry of Information 
Industry (Section 1, Article 4, document No. 72, MIIT); it is therefore responsible for the 
technical aspects of electronic communications (Shambaugh, 40), and is also involved in 
overall planning and development of the ICT industry, and development and co-ordination of 
relevant policies (Section 1, Article 1, document No. 72). The Ministry of Culture is responsible 
for cultural activities and products, which can include 'everything from ten pin bowling, to 
fashion contests, magazine and book selling, karaoke bars, cafes, tea shops, art exhibitions, 
art tuition, and any other culture-related enterprise' (Brady 17). In recent years, its 
responsibilities have extended to the import of audio-visual products and to online games 
(Shambaugh, 41; King & Wood) and the regulation of virtual currency (The Notice on 
Strengthening Administration of Virtual Currency in Online Games   (关于加强网络游戏虚拟货
币管理工作通知))103. Together with the SAIC, the MOC is also responsible for advertising 
(Brady 17). The SAIC is also partially responsible for the regulation of virtual currency (Interim 
Measures on Administration of Internet Commodity Trading and Related Services (网络商品
交易及有关服务行为管理暂行办法). The State General Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television is the recent result of a merger between the General Administration 
of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television 
(SARFT) that took place in March of 2013 (Zhu; Li & Liu). Prior to the merger, GAPP was 
responsible for publishing licenses for print-related media and the licensing and training of 
journalists, although its scope seemed to be widening to include most information on the 
internet as well (You); the SARFT was responsible for the regulation of all radio, film and 
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importance in China fall under the CCP's nomenklatura-even many..."elected" offices' (234). 
103 This notice was jointly issued with the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce is 
not listed by secondary sources (ie. Brady 2009; Shambaugh 2007) as an institution under the 




television and the supervision of relevant national networks (Brady, 17). Both institutions were 
under the close leadership of the CCPPD.  
The institutional network of the CCPPD serves as a backbone structure for media 
regulation that links into the lower level regulatory structures of the State Council and social 
organizations, operating through the structures and mechanisms described above. Little is 
directly known about the nature of the relationship between the CCPPD and the lower level 
institutions involved in converged media, however some of the institutions that officially fall 
under its leadership have released policy texts, indicating regulatory interest in the space. 
These include: the Ministry of Culture (MOC), the General Administration of Press and 
Publication (GAPP), the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), and the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)104. Figure 4.11 below shows these 
institutions in their structural context, prior to the recent structural change105:  
 
Figure 3.11 Source: Author 
                                                     
104 See Appendix I for full list of Institutions and policy texts.  




Social organizations provide another connection between the CCPPD and online 
games regulators. These institutions fall under the leadership of the Propaganda Department, 
and according to Brady, over half of the membership of such organizations is accounted for 
by CCPPD representatives (2005, 63). A complete understanding of how these organizations 
are involved in the governing of online games is difficult to build from the limited evidence 
available, however there is some evidence that they are used to facilitate communication 
between government and media stakeholders. The Internet Association of China (ISOC)106 
and the Game Industry Branch of the China Software Industry Association (CGIA) are the 
primary social organizations that facilitate online games governance. There is some evidence 
that the Sichuan branch of the Chinese Consumers' Association are also involved107. The 
nature of their involvement will be explored in the section on government interactions. 
Two respondents that worked as in-house legal counsel for large game companies in 
China identified particular departments within the governing agencies for online games as the 
primary departments responsible for regulating online games. The MPS police were reported 
to be involved in enforcement activities, however a dedicated enforcement team for online 
games that operates under the Cultural Market Department of the MOC was also identified. 
One respondent legal expert identified a single department within the MIIT as responsible for 
matters related to internet activity. The internal departments and enforcement teams for the 
agencies discussed are listed below:  
1) Ministry of Culture (MOC) 
 The Cultural Market Department 
 The Cultural Market Comprehensive Law Enforcement Unit  
(文化市场综合执法大队)  
2) Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
 The Police  
3) The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology  (MIIT) 
 The Office of Informatization (R6) 
 
The Court System 
The institutions of the CCPPD are an integral part of the structural framework of online 
games policy in China, however they are not the only important institutions involved. Ministerial 
level stakeholders that operate under the administration of the State Council may operate with 
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107  This evidence is the involvement of the Sichuan Consumers' Association in granting 
compensation to a Mr. Zhao in response to his complaints about virtual property theft, as 




different degrees of autonomy from the CCPPD. It has therefore been important to outline how 
the Propaganda Department connects with the State Council apparatus, in order both to 
highlight its influence and to leave room for understanding how autonomy can develop within 
this apparatus, both at local levels of government and under the influence of other powerful 
state institutions. It is also essential to account for the structural context of the courts. As the 
research explains in Chapter IV, a lack of comprehensive legal framework for regulating online 
games has means that many of the initial decisions about online games and their emerging 
practice are taking place in the courts. The court system is therefore an important aspect of 
the institutional context where online games regulation is being negotiated.  
The courts operate within a separate institutional framework that runs parallel to that 
of the State Council108. Like the State Council, the court system officially falls under the 
administration of the National People's Congress (Rosenberg, 229), however in reality it is 
supervised directly by the CCP through the Central Commission of Politics and Law (Lawrence 
& Martin, 8). The structures of the courts mirror those of the State Council: the system is 
centralized with courts established at national, provincial, city, and township levels, as well as 
at levels of limited jurisdiction (Rosenberg, 248). According to Rosenberg's description, the 
local city level courts and below have the courts of first instance and are referred to as the 
Primary People's Courts; large cities are People's Intermediate Courts and can function as 
appellate courts; the Provincial High People's Courts and Supreme People's Court refer to 
courts at the provincial and national levels (247).  
The cases of virtual property law have generally taken place at the low end of this 
spectrum, at the level of Primary People's Courts and appellate People's Intermediate Courts. 
Examples include Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology Development Co., and the 
conviction of Yan Yifan in 2006. Both cases began at the primary court level and were 
appealed in intermediate level courts: the first was originally decided by the Beijing Chaoyang 
District Court and appealed in the Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court (X. Chen); the 
Yan Yifan theft case was originally brought to the Guangzhou Tianhe District Court and 
appealed at the intermediate level (China Daily, “Fine for Virtual Property Thief”).  
China’s court system is heavily influenced by a variety of government stakeholders 
that operate through both formal and informal channels (Liebman). It is therefore difficult to 
outline the precise mechanisms of influence and institutional connections that may influence 
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& Martin (2013). For an account of the differences between the official and the implemented 
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outcomes, as these vary according to each case. At the highest level, influential power is 
wielded by the CCP (Lawrence & Martin 2013, 3), however influence on court outcomes is 
exerted at all levels of government. Such influence may be exercised by individuals or 
institutions in the Party, the State Council administrative departments, or other governing 
institutions. It is notable that court funding is administered by local governments; as Wang 
Yuhua and Liebman both note, this renders local courts particularly subject to their influence 
(Liebman 67; Wang Yuhua 46). Liebman has pointed out that the courts are also extremely 
vulnerable to the influence of mass media and public opinion, and that this influence may 
operate through the deliberate manipulation of government stakeholder interests in order to 
exploit their ability to directly influence court decisions (67-68).   
The above descriptions outline the institutional frameworks where the primary 
government stakeholder groups with interests in online games regulation operate. The 
Propaganda Department, the ministries and social organizations under the State Council, and 
the court systems are all key stakeholder groups in this area that fall within the realm of 
government regulators. The structural framework is still evolving, and will continue to evolve 
as government stakeholders pursue their interests in online games policy. The next sections 
consider the interests and interactions of the government stakeholders identified above as 
they relate to converged media regulation.   
Stakeholder Interests 
 This section reviews the government stakeholder interests in online games regulation 
that have been expressed through policy texts and media reports. The Interests expressed by 
central, mid-level and local levels of China's government hierarchy are explored. Central 
government stakeholders in this analysis include high level CCP institutions, offices at the 
State Council level and the National People's Congress. These are identified as “High-level” 
stakeholders in this analysis. Mid-level stakeholders are understood to consist of ministries 
and organizations directly subordinate to the State Council. The category of local government 
stakeholders incorporates provincial, city, and county levels of government.  
High-Level Stakeholder Interests 
High-level interests in online games regulation can be determined from policy 
development goals expressed by central stakeholders in official media and in policy texts. 
These tend to outline overarching goals regarding the "healthy development" of internet 
industries (including the online games industry) and the need for administrative reform in order 
to improve regulation. Some more precise goals have been outlined in policy texts; these 




Official media reports have connected the "healthy development" goal directly with the 
highest levels of the CCP, the offices of the State Council, and the National People's Congress. 
A 2012 article in the China Daily attributes this interest to the highest levels of the CCP109, 
describing how new ICT industries fit into the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. The article highlights 
“New-generation information technology” as one of seven strategic “emerging industries” that 
will receive significant subsidy from the central government (Lan). A 2011 People's Daily 
announcement attributes a similar interest to the State Council. The article quotes an 
anonymous "chief official" of the new State Council office as he describes the purpose of the 
creation of the new State Council Internet Office as part of an initiative ’to better regulate the 
Internet to ensure its healthy development' (Xinhua, “Internet Office”). Another China Daily 
article from 2012 attributes the same interest in "healthy development" to the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress. In explaining the reasoning for a 2012 decision 
issued by the NPC, the article quotes an anonymous member of the NPC Standing Committee, 
who explains: 'the move is intended...to ensure the healthy and orderly development of the 
Internet' (Xinhua, “China's Top Legislature”). An examination of development goals for internet 
industries in general sheds light on the meaning of “healthy development”. Lan's article 
describes development goals for this space that focus on central government investment in 
industrial development as a key aspect of the Five-Year Plan. A 2011 article by Xinhua 
explains that regulation to mitigate against ‘problems such as online porn, gambling and fraud, 
as well as illegal marketing tricks‘ is necessary to maintain the “health” of internet-related 
industries (Fang). Reports that relate more specifically to converged media and the online 
games industry also highlight both economic and social concerns. In August 2013, a Xinhua 
article reported industrial goals for converged technology issued by the State Council. The 
report states: 'The nation is seeking new growth engines in emerging industrial sectors...the 
government will release 4G mobile communications licenses later this year and promote the 
convergence of the telecommunication, Internet and broadcasting networks into one complete 
system' (Xinhua, “Info Sector”). Central government interest in the social aspects of healthy 
development are related directly to online games in reports about policy developments. A 
February 2011 China Daily report on the Parents' Guardian Project for Minors Playing Online 
Games describes the project as ‘the latest effort to prevent minors becoming addicted to 
Internet games’, coming from ‘eight central government departments’ (China Daily, “Parents, 
Game Operators to Control Minors”). An additional central interest reported in official media is 
the improvement of coordination between ministries involved in regulating internet-related 
media. This has generally been used as a framework for reporting structural changes, such 
as the 2011 establishment of the SIIO and the merging of the GAPP and SARFT in 2013. For 
                                                     




example, a Xinhua article in the People’s Daily introduced the SIIO in 2011, outlining its 
mandate to 'direct, coordinate and supervise online content management and...direct the 
development of online gaming, online video and online publication industries' (Xinhua, “China 
Sets Up State Internet Information Office”). The convergence of the GAPP and SARFT two 
years later is reported by Xinhua as a 'move...meant to coordinate the resources of each sector 
and promote the reform of cultural institutions'. The article connects the restructuring explicitly 
to central decisions, citing it as 'institutional reform drive set forth at the Communist Party of 
China's 18th National Congress' (N. Zhu). 
Other high level interests in converged media regulation can be determined from the 
official policy texts of high level decisions. Major relevant decisions from high level regulatory 
bodies include: a March 1997 amendment to the Criminal Law of the PRC by order of President 
Jiang Zemin, that established regulatory basis for prosecuting computer-related crimes 
(Zheng, Technological Empowerment, articles 285 & 286); a December 2000 NPC Standing 
Committee Decision on Safeguarding Internet Security [Quánguó rénmín dàibiǎo dàhuì 
chángwù wěiyuánhuì guānyú wéihù hùliánwǎng ānquán de juédìng]; and the December 2012 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Strengthening 
Network Information Protection (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强网络信息保护的决定) 
[Quánguó rénmín dàibiǎo dàhuì chángwù wěiyuánhuì guānyú jiāqiáng wǎngluò xìnxī bǎohù 
de juédìng]. The December 2000 decision expressed a central interest in preventing computer 
hacking and data security. This decision, issued ‘to promote what is beneficial and eliminate 
what is harmful’ (Creemers preamble) focused on content-related behaviour on the internet, 
such as using it in order to: spread rumours, subvert state power, interfere with state unity, 
promote ethnic hostility, or disrupt public order. The December 2012 decision focuses on 
information security and targets the development of infrastructural capabilities by formalizing 
real identity requirements into national law. Relevant central interests common to two or more 
of these texts are as follows: national security110, public interest111, societal order112; monitoring 
and prevention of illegal activity113 ; and information security114 . These interests are also 
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Criminal Law, articles 285 & 287) 
111 (Dec. 2012 decision preamble; Dec. 2000 preamble, section 6) 
112 (Dec 2012 preamble, section 11;Dec 2000 preamble, section 3) 
113 (Dec. 2012 decision; Dec. 2000 section 4 article 2, sections 6 & 7) 





expressed in the online games-related policy texts issued by the State Council Internet 
Information Office115.  
Official policy texts released by lower level government stakeholder groups pursue 
some central level interests related to converged media regulation if they are influenced by 
central authorities. Government agencies under the leadership of the CCPPD, for example, 
may reflect more central goals and interests in their policy texts than other government 
agencies. Unfortunately, given that the CCP structures that exert central level influence are 
both extremely pervasive and are still evolving in this space, it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish central level influence from the interests of a particular agency. While ministerial-
level interests may be influenced by the interests of central stakeholders, their interests are 
expressed independently. As in the case of central level media coverage, officials and 
spokespersons for specific organizations convey organizational goals through speeches or 
interviews that are reported in the media. Agency-specific interests are also expressed through 
policy texts. The next section explores the interests of ministerial level agencies.  
Mid-level Interests 
 There are a number of agencies operating at this level with interests in online games. 
The most active of these in recent years have been the Ministry of Culture and the General 
Administration of Press and Publication, however the research has also identified other 
ministerial-level organizations with interests in China's online games policy. These include: the 
Ministry of Information Industry (now Ministry of Industry and Information Technology or MIIT), 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). This section outlines interests common to multiple mid-level 
organizations and highlights some of the most relevant agency-specific priorities. 
Shared Interests 
 The "healthy development" of the online games industry and the improvement of 
regulatory coordination for online games are perhaps the most universally expressed interests 
shared by mid-level organizations 116 . These shared priorities are often expressed in the 
content of policy texts and in public statements to the press, and reflect the same overarching 
interests that have been expressed by central level government stakeholders. The policy 
analysis in Chapter II points out the manifestation of central priorities in the policy texts issued 
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by the MIIT, the MPS, the MOC, and the GAPP. These comprise the major online games 
regulatory authorities at this level, however there are also other organizations involved. Like 
the major mid-level authorities for online games, these less prominent institutions share a 
vested interest in the pursuit of the "healthy development" of the online games industry in 
China. The Ministry of Education is one such organization, having pursued primarily social 
goals in this area, through policy development that protects minors. Examples of relevant MOE 
policy initiatives include: the 2005 Notice on Further Deepening the Management of Internet 
Cafes (关于进一步深化网吧管理工作的通知), the 2007 Notice on Protecting Physical and 
Mental Well-being of Minors and Implementing Online Game Anti-addiction System (关于保护
未成年人身心健康实施网络游戏防沉迷系 统的通知), and the 2009 Green Dam Youth Escort – 
Primary and Secondary School Installation Mandate. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Finance have also supported game-related policies that work to protect minors. These 
include: the 2007 Notice on Protecting Physical and Mental Well-being of Minors mentioned 
above, supported by both ministries, the Notice Concerning the Computer Pre-installation of 
Green Internet Filtering Software 关于计算机预装绿色上网过滤软件的通, backed by the 
Ministry of Finance, and the 2011 Notice Regarding the Implementation of the Parents' 
Guardian Project for Minors Playing Online Games 关于印发《“网络游戏未成年人家长监护
工程”实施方案》的通知, endorsed by the Ministry of Health.  
 Government actors at the ministerial level have also displayed an interest in protecting 
China's economic interests in the online games industry. The Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) were the earliest 
of these actors, promulgating some of the first policies to regulate internet cafes business 
operation 117 , and forming part of the initiative that protects Chinese companies from 
international competition118. In recent years, these early actors have expanded their regulatory 
reach into virtual currency regulation. In 2009, for example, the MOFCOM joined the MOC to 
issue a Notice on Strengthening Administration of Virtual Currency in Online Games (关于加
强网络游戏虚拟货币管理工作通知). In 2007, the SAIC was an issuing organization for China's 
first virtual currency policy, which restricted the use of virtual currency outside of online games 
(Pillsbury Law 2013). The SAIC further established its interest in virtual currency regulation in 
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Standardization of Commercial Activities in “Internet Cafes” and Strengthening of Security 
Management 关于规范“网吧”经营行为加强安全管理的通知. 
118 This refers to the MOFCOM's promulgation of the 2005 Opinions on the Introduction of 




2010, promulgating a relevant policy separately from the MOC and MOFCOM119. As the use 
of virtual currency has become increasingly widespread in recent years, other financial 
regulators have also become involved in policy development relevant to the online games 
industry. One example is the People's Bank of China, which has been involved in the 
regulation of virtual currency transactions that take place in China's online games since 2007; 
it was named the primary regulating authority in this area in the section 1 article 5 of the Notice 
on Further Strengthening Internet Cafes and Online Games Management Work (关于进一步
加强网吧及网络游戏管理工作的通知). Since this declaration, the People's Bank of China 
(PBC) has demonstrated a concerted interest in the regulation of virtual currency. In December 
2013, the PBC released the On Guard Against Bitcoin Notice 关于防范比特币风险的通知, a 
policy directed toward transactions that take place outside online game environments. This 
recent policy expresses concerns about the potential financial and security risks of the 
decentralized, cross-border currency transactions facilitated by virtual currency, and 
addresses this concern by prohibiting Chinese financial institutions from trading in Bitcoin. 
Bitcoin is an example of virtual currency that is more obviously problematic for financial 
regulators and national governments, due to the decentralized way the currency is generated 
and its strong support of anonymity. Issuing and trade of Bitcoin operates outside of online 
games and is intended to directly replace traditional currency exchange120. The On Guard 
Against Bitcoin Notice signals a need for further observation and research in this area, and 
facilitates this by allowing Bitcoin transactions for personal use to take place. The policy text 
identifies the potential for this case to inform general policy development regarding trade in 
virtual goods. While this policy text relates explicitly to Bitcoin, and may therefore seem 
relevant only to cryptocurrency transactions, it highlights concerns that are relevant to the 
trade of virtual goods for real-world money, as in the practice of gold farming. It also identifies 
governing stakeholders with interests in virtual currency and virtual goods trade. These 
include: the MIIT, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, all of which jointly issued the 
Bitcoin policy along with the People's Bank of China. As stakeholders in China's virtual 
currency trade in general, these governing institutions are also likely to hold interests in the 
regulation of virtual currency trade in the context of online games. They may therefore play a 
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Services (网络商品交易及有关服务行为管理暂行办法). 
120 Bitcoin is part of a recently emerged category of currencies called “cryptocurrencies” that 
are generated automatically using encryption techniques. See Wallace for more information 




more prominent role in China's online games regulation as the policy environment continues 
to develop to accommodate new and innovative virtual economic activities.  
The above examination of policy development activity indicates a widespread 
manifestation of the central-level priority of social and economic "healthy development" among 
mid-level regulators. This is the most common of shared interests at this level and reflects the 
influential nature of key priorities established by central levels of government. Another shared 
interest among both national and mid-level governing stakeholders is the utilization of licensing 
requirements as a mechanism of control. Online games operators require licenses121, as do 
internet cafes (Xinhua 2002); ministerial-level institutions are responsible for implementing 
licensing procedures, however licensing requirements have been mandated at the national 
level 122. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most recent draft regulation issued by 
GAPP categorized online game developers and operators as "internet publishers" (Section 2, 
article 1). If this categorization is upheld by central interests, staff from these businesses may 
be required to attend the same training as journalists in order to obtain operating licenses 
(Section 9, articles 1 and 2, Provisions for the Management of Internet Publishing Services 
(Revised Draft)  (网络出版服务管理规定 (修订征求意见稿)). The ministerial-level interest in 
implementing license requirements is likely related to the potential of this method of control to 
serve as a source of income for its responsible government department. This potential for 
income is a likely a motivation for the aggressive jurisdictional claims demonstrated by the 
MOC and the GAPP.  Licensing requirements are also a popular mechanism for enforcement 
given their widespread use in other areas, such as traditional media regulation.  Licensing has 
been a key part of China's traditional media regulation for some time; extending the reach of 
an existing regulatory framework is a logical first-line approach to regulating new media.  
 While central-level interests are generally maintained and pursued by mid-level 
organizations, the individual interests of these government agencies are pursued at the same 
time. The mid-level stakeholders' interests in increasing or asserting power and in gathering 
resources is one example of this, demonstrated by the case example of jurisdictional dispute 
as the Ministry of Culture and the General Administration of Press and Publication each sought 
                                                     
121  (Interim Measures on the Administration of Online Games (网络游戏管理暂行办法); 
Provisions for the Management of Internet Publishing Services (Revised Draft)  (网络出版服
务管理规定 (修订征求意见稿))) 
122  See the September 2009 Interpretation of Certain Sections issued by the State 
Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, as well as the 2007 Notice on Protecting Physical 
and Mental Well-being of Minors and Implementing Online Game Anti-addiction System (关于




to control the games industry's regulation and licensing procedures. A closer examination of 
this case indicates that these organizations also expressed diverging, agency-specific, 
interests regarding the online games industry's future development.   
Individual Agency Interests: the MOC and the GAPP 
While the Ministry of Culture and the GAPP demonstrate similar interests in ensuring 
the "healthy development" of the industry, their policy texts and media interaction demonstrate 
emphasis on different development directions. The GAPP has demonstrated significant 
concern with the social aspects of "healthy development", at the expense of industrial growth. 
The Ministry of Culture, on the other hand, has demonstrated emphatic interest in economic 
growth and engagement with foreign industry. This disparity in priorities is conveyed by the 
content of policy texts issued by each organization, as well as a public statement by 
representatives of the Ministry of Culture. This disparity is elaborated below. 
 From the GAPP's earliest involvement with online games regulation, the policy 
initiatives issued by the organization have demonstrated significant concern for the protection 
of minors and development of "healthy" gaming habits. For example: in 2003, the 
administration mandated the inclusion of an "Advice on Healthy Gaming" advisory in all 
published online games in China123; In 2007, it was the primary issuing organization for the 
policy mandating implementation of an anti-addiction system for online games124. In 2009, the 
GAPP expanded its interests in the social aspects of "healthy development" beyond the 
protection of minors to include tightened domestic controls and a complete ban on foreign 
investment125. Its efforts to achieve these goals through policy and game shutdowns were 
referred to by official media as a 'crack down on online games operating' (Chu). Forty-five 
overseas online games that had not received prior approval from GAPP were shut down in 
this campaign126. The GAPP culminated its efforts to develop control mechanisms for the 
                                                     
123 Notice Regarding the in-game Publication of 'Advice on Healthy Gaming' 关于在游戏出版
物中登载《健康游戏忠告》的通知 
124Notice on Protecting Physical and Mental Well-being of Minors and Implementing Online 
Game Anti-addiction System 关于保护未成年人身心健康实施网络游戏防沉迷系 统的通知 
125This was reported by Xinhua (Chu) and outlined in the Notice on Implementing the 
Provisions of the State Council on “Three Determinations” and the Relevant Explanations of 
the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform and Further Strengthening the 
Administration of the Pre-approval of Online Games and Examination and Approval of 
Imported Online Games 关于贯彻落实国务院《“三定”规定》和中央编办有关解释，进一步
加强网络游戏前置审批和进口网络游戏. 




online games industry in 2012, as it declared online games subject to the same licensing 
requirements as traditional media publications127.  
The Ministry of Culture has also demonstrated commitment to the social aspects of 
"healthy development", however it has also emphasized the need for industry growth by 
remaining open to foreign investment. Interest in healthy development has been conveyed by 
promulgation of policies that work to protect both citizens and domestic industry from the 
perceived negative impacts of online games and the economic growth of the industry. These 
include policies that have worked to protect minors from the perceived dangers of internet 
addiction128, negative content129, and online gambling130, as well as those, such as the 2005 
Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capital into Cultural Industries 关于文化领域引进外资
的若干意见, that are designed to protect domestic industry from international competition. The 
policy bans foreign investment in domestic online games development and operation, however 
it demonstrates commitment to foreign investment by leaving some room for foreign 
companies to participate in the sector through joint ventures and contractual arrangements 
(Rui et al.; Wauters). The room left for foreign investment is deliberate and is highlighted in 
the text (Paragraph Three), which ends by emphasizing that China's work to attract foreign 
investment is a key commitment to the World Trade Organization (Paragraph Five). The 2005 
Opinions document was issued jointly by the MOC, the GAPP, and several other government 
agencies, and conveyed a united commitment to foreign investment among online games 
regulators that lasted until the public dispute between the MOC and the GAPP in 2009.  
During the 2009 jurisdictional dispute between the General Administration for Press 
and Publication and the Ministry of Culture, the interests of these institutions demonstrated 
different emphasis through their approaches to foreign investment policy. The GAPP moved 
to ban all foreign investment in China's online games, including investment that occurred 
through setting up wholly owned enterprises, joint ventures and cooperatives, and contractual 
                                                     
127 This refers to the requirement of online games companies to obtain journalism licenses 
outlined in the 2012 Provisions for the Management of Internet Publishing Services (Revised 
Draft)  网络出版服务管理规定 (修订征求意见稿）(Chapter III highlights the requirements in 
the comparative content analysis).  
128 Eg., Measures of the Administration of Business Sites of Internet Access Services 互联网
上网服务营业场所管理办法. 
129 Eg., Notice on Enhancing the Content Review Work of Online Game Products 关于加强 网
络游戏 产品内容审查工作的通知 (2004) 
130 The Ministry of Culture's 2010 Interim Measures on the Administration of Online Games网




arrangements 131 . This move to protect domestic industry, at the cost of the potential 
opportunities for growth that foreign capital offer, contrast starkly with the opinions on foreign 
investment expressed by the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry of Culture has taken a firm 
stance that this openness must remain as a vital element of industry growth. This was 
conveyed by the MOC's response to the GAPP's initiative, which featured a public speech by 
Tuo Zuhai (庹祖海), the deputy director of the MOC’s Cultural Market Department, directed 
toward both foreign and domestic online games companies. In his speech, transcribed by 
marketing company Web2Asia, Tuo indicates that the GAPP's approach to policy development 
is outdated and runs counter to the industrial growth envisioned by the Ministry of Culture:  
General Administration of Press and Publication must stop the surly interference in 
domestic online game enterprises. It is MOC’s duty to ensure the long-term 
development of China’s culture industry, especially the game industry. Now is the 
season when the new replace the old and the still cold weather is about to become 
warm. I believe we will certainly usher the sunny days when the dark clouds will 
definitely gone [sic] with the wind (Web2Asia).  
With this comment, the MOC explicitly contravenes the GAPP's authority to issue online 
games policy, undermining its attempt to restrict foreign investment and emphasizing the 
organization's own commitment to industry growth. Tuo further declared to foreign and 
domestic industry members that the MOC will "use other channels" to resolve this dispute, 
reassuring them that growth is a priority and that foreign participation is valued.  
 The disparity in regulatory approach conveyed by the Ministry of Culture and the 
GAPP through the above policy developments and media statements seem to indicate a 
fundamental difference in opinion about how China's online games industry should be 
developed. However this may not be the case: the agencies' emphasis on different aspects of 
the priorities approved by the central government (ie. "healthy development") may simply be 
a manifestation of each Ministry's pursuit of regulatory control over the industry. It therefore 
remains unclear whether this reflects actual difference in interests for the future of the industry, 
or whether it simply forms part of the larger jurisdictional dispute between the two ministries.  
Lower-level Stakeholder Interests 
Below ministerial levels, government stakeholder groups consist of a variety of 
regulatory agencies at the provincial, city, and county levels. The various interests and 
                                                     
131 The GAPP completely banned foreign investment in section four of the 2009 Notice on 
Implementing the "Three Determinations" Regulations and the Reform Commission 
Interpretation and Strengthening the Preapproval of Online Games and Administration of 





priorities of these local governments are expressed through practical implementation; local 
authorities (provincial, city, and below) maximize their own interests by choosing how to 
interpret and enforce central directives. Qiu & Zhou's 2005 study on local regulatory practice 
concerning internet cafes in the wake of national directives provides a prime example of this. 
The authors observed local government responses to a national-level directive to promote 
national chain-store model internet cafes. Responses were highly variable and included both 
real and superficial co-operation, as well as deliberate obstruction and refusal to co-operate 
(286). The authors also observed widespread lack of co-operation with technical requirements 
issued by the Ministry of Culture after it became the primary regulator for internet cafes in 2002 
(278). A number of factors facilitate local government autonomy such as that described by Qiu 
& Zhou; the authors note that the following factors are particularly relevant: the nascent stage 
of the national legal framework (275), the vague wording of national policy (and subsequent 
room for wide interpretation), the low risk of punishment for non-compliance, the lack of 
'sufficient administrative supervision and support' 132 , and local protectionism (276). The 
authors additionally observe the role of economic incentive in defining the interests of local 
government stakeholders; they note that 'economic profit maximization' tends to define the 
decision-making rationale of local government stakeholders as they interact both with other 
government stakeholders, and with media producers. Despite this significant disparity 
between national policy and local implementation observed by Qiu & Zhou, the authors also 
note that local-level decision-making power is not ubiquitous; central-level prioritization of 
specific issues tends to result in crackdowns and short-term local compliance (276). The 
national crackdown on illegal internet cafes since 2004 exemplifies this (267).  
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of negotiation and relationships 
between various governing regulators in determining policy outcomes. It has shown that, while 
high-level interests tend to be espoused by the lower-level regulating agencies, these lower-
ranking organizations also tend to pursue their own organization-specific interests. While the 
“healthy development” of online games as an industry remains a common priority outlined at 
the highest levels of government, for example, the Ministry of Culture and the GAPP have 
each pursued different agency-specific interests regarding the policies and implementation 
measures that should be implemented in order to achieve this common goal. Similar pursuit 
of individual agency interests has also been observed by Qiu & Zhou at local levels of 
government. The authors’ findings indicate the presence of a wide variety of agency-specific 
interests that depend on individual and local priorities. This points to a diverse landscape of 
government interests that affect China’s practical online games policy. As a whole, then, 
                                                     





China’s regulatory interest in this area depends on the precise balance of power between intra-
governmental stakeholders at any given time. The next section examines some of the 
interactions that determine this balance, using the case of the changing structure of China’s 
online games regulation in recent years.   
Interactions  
The research has described how official policy texts and official statements and 
interviews published in China’s official media are used by China’s online games regulators as 
they negotiate the balance of power between them. Examining these publicly visible 
mechanisms of interaction has allowed the research to identify some of the key governing 
stakeholders with interests in developing policy relevant to online games and converged 
media. These stakeholders have primarily consisted of ministerial-level organizations, 
however some higher-level institutional stakeholders, like the State Council Information Office 
and the NPC Standing Committee, have also issued relevant policy texts. Figure 3.11 in the 
first section of this chapter depicts the mid-level institutional stakeholders in China’s online 
games regulation within their bureaucratic context, as of early 2011. Since then, however, 
some major changes have been introduced to this institutional landscape that change the 
structural context of China’s online games regulation. The most important changes are as 
follows: in 2011 a new office responsible for converged media regulation was introduced at 
the level of the State Council, and in 2013, a new institution was created from a merger 
between the former GAPP and the SARFT. These new institutional stakeholders are called 
the State Council Internet Information Office (SIIO) and the State General Administration for 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SGAPPRFT). Since their formation, links 
between these new institutions and other regulators for online games have been forged by 
individuals holding concurrent positions in multiple organizations. This shared staff links the 
SIIO to the SCIO on a large scale, and to some of its subordinate organizations through key 
individuals. Figure 3.12 below illustrates these structural changes and the sharing of staff that 






Concurrently held positions also serve to link key ministerial-level online games regulators 
directly to the CCP Propaganda Department. A close examination of these structural changes 
sheds light on the less public ways that online games regulation may be negotiated.  
The Changing Structure of Online Games Regulation 
Examination of the policy environment surrounding emerging practice in online games 
revealed stakeholder interests at multiple levels of government. Among these, major decisions 
and interests expressed by the National People's Congress and the State Council seemed to 
guide the general direction of regulatory development133, while much of the specific decision-
making regarding online games regulation seemed to take place at the Ministerial level134 and 
                                                     
133 For example, the MOC's 2010 Interim Measures specifically draw their authority from the 
National People's Congress Standing Committee's 2000 decision on 'safeguarding the 
internet' and the State Council's  2000 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services 
134 The independent approach to policy development demonstrated by the Ministry of Culture 
(MOC) and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) dispute in 2009 (see 




below135 . Recent changes in government structure and leadership appointments indicate 
increased involvement of higher-level actors in the decision-making process. These changes 
began with the May 2011 founding of a new office of the State Council.  
The May 2011 establishment of the State Council Internet Information Office (SIIO) 
introduced a new government stakeholder interest in online games regulation. The SIIO was 
established as a high-level organization to be responsible for, among other things, 'the 
guidance of relevant departments regarding online games, online audio-visual content, 
internet publishing, and the overall planning of all areas of internet culture' [指导有关部门做好
网络游戏、网络视听、网络出版等网络文化领域业务布局规划 ] (The Establishment of the 
State Internet Information Office). The SIIO provides an institutional channel for 
communication and co-ordination between central and ministerial stakeholders in online 
games regulation. Although its founding leadership incorporates some staff from the ministries 
under its jurisdiction, the office operates at the same level as the State Council Information 
Office and in fact shares almost all of its staff (Zhang 2011). There are, however, some 
differences in staff appointments that set the new office apart from the SCIO. The positions 
unique to the SIIO are occupied by Vice Directors, many of whom hold concurrent positions in 
other institutions. Close examination of these appointed individuals and their concurrently held 
positions reveals a series of individualized connections to other key institutional stakeholders 
in China's online games regulation.  
The concurrent leadership roles occupied by the founding deputy directors of the SIIO 
immediately linked this new high-level regulator with some of the key online games 
policymakers from the ministerial level. Upon founding, exceptions to the shared staff primarily 
consisted of two Vice Directors approved by the State Council, who, according to a Xinhua 
report, were expected to hold the positions concurrently with their original ones. The new Vice 
Directors in question were Xi Guohua (奚国华) and Zhang Xinfeng (张新枫), Minister of 
Industry and Information Technology and Vice Minister of Public Security, respectively (Zhang 
2011). Together with a Director and Vice Director from the State Council Information Office, 
Wang Chen (王晨) and Qian Xiaoqian (钱小芊), they formed the leadership structure for the 
new office. The leadership structure is depicted in Figure 3.13 below:   
                                                     
135 Although the State Council Information Office was given a supervisory responsibility over 
web content with the Regulations on Internet News and Bulletin Boards, it wasn't until the 




Fig 3.13 Source: Author's depiction 
In the time since its founding, several changes within the SIIO leadership have 
established further individualized links with other government stakeholders, including State-
Owned Enterprise and the CCP Propaganda Department. Vice Director Xi Guohua now 
provides a link to government-run industry interests; he no longer operates as Vice Minister at 
the MIIT, but has assumed the role of Vice-Chairman and Party Secretary of State-owned 
China Mobile Communications Corporation (China vitae)136. Other changes in SIIO staff have 
increased the individual-level links to the CCP Propaganda Department. These include the 
May 2013 replacement of Director Wang Chen with current Director Lu Wei 鲁炜137, as well as 
some additional changes to the deputy director staff appointments. 
The convergence of staff in the SIIO that hold concurrent positions in the SCIO, MPS 
and MIIT suggests potential existing and future cooperation between them as converged 
media policy is developed138. The increased opportunity for interaction provided by this sharing 
                                                     
136 There is some discrepancy between sources regarding the current status of Xi Guohua; 
while China Vitae lists Xi as a current vice director, and the author could find no sources to 
indicate his removal from this position, the China Directory 2013 does not list Xi Guohua as a 
deputy director of the State Internet Information Office.  
137 Lu Wei is the former vice president of Xinhua News and propaganda minister of Beijing 
(CPC News Network, May 2013). 
138  The State Council's 2012 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services 
(consultation-revised draft) (互联网信息服务管理办法 (修订草案征求意见稿 )) explicitly 
describes cooperation between State Council and ministry-level organizations involved in this 
area: 'The State Internet Information Content Management Department, according to its 
obligation and responsibility to manage internet information content management, will 
coordinate with the State Council Telecommunications Bureau, the State Council Public 
Security Department, and other related departments to implement the supervision of internet 
information content' (State Council).  
State Council Internet Information Office
Director:                         Director of the State Council Information Office                      
(Wang Chen)
Vice Director:                             
Vice Director of the State 
Council Information Office                   
(Qian Xiaoqian)
Vice Director:                                                   
Vice Minister of Public 
Security                            
(Zhang Xinfeng)
Vice Director:  






of staff falls in line with China's general goals of improving communication and coordination 
between disparate internet regulators. This was articulated by SIIO Deputy Director Peng Bo 
(彭波) at a recent conference held by the Internet Association of China, where he outlined a 
government strategy to support healthy development of China's internet industries. He 
highlighted the need for Chinese internet regulators to ‘further strengthen communication with 
government departments,’ (应当进一步加强与政府部门的沟通 , [Yīng jìnyībù jiāqiáng yǔ 
zhèngfǔ bùmén de gōutōng]) and to ‘establish sound communication and coordination 
mechanisms’ (建立健全沟通协调机制) [jiànlì jiànquán gōutōng xiétiáo jīzhì] (Zhang Wei). A 
review of the first policy text released by the SIIO139 reveals the importance of these goals; 
they form part of the SIIO mandate. This is stipulated in Section 4, article 24, which states that 
the organizations responsible for internet content, telecommunications, public security, and 
other relevant departments ‘should establish systems for information sharing and 
communication’ (应当建立信息共享和信息通报制度) [Yīngdāng jiànlì xìnxī gòngxiǎng hé xìnxī 
tōngbào zhìdù].   
The changes in SIIO staff since its founding reveal that one way increased opportunity 
for communication between these departments has been created is through individual 
appointments. Changes to SIIO leadership appointments since its establishment reflect the 
continued presence of individual-level links between this organization and other institutional 
stakeholders with interests in new media regulation. Figure 3.14 below depicts the recent 
changes in SIIO leadership positions and names the concurrent positions held by each that 
link these individuals to other relevant government organizations.  
                                                     
[国家互联网信息内容主管部门依照职责负责互联网信息内容管理，协调国务院电信主管部门、
国务院公安部门及其他相关部门对互联网信息内容实施监督管理] (Section 1, Article 3, State 
Council). 






Figure 3.14. Source: Author's depiction 
Figure 3.14 above depicts several concurrently held leadership positions that demonstrate an 
apparent increase in opportunity for communication and coordination between some important 
online games regulators within this higher-level institutional context. Of particular interest are: 
Xi Guohua, who has connections both to the MIIT as its previous Minister and to commercial 
industry, as the concurrent President of China Mobile (China Vitae), and Zhang Xinfeng, who 
serves as an individual connection to the Ministry of Public Security by concurrently serving 
as its Vice-Minister (China Vitae).  
These concurrently held positions create shorter communication paths between the 
central leadership of the SIIO and its subordinate ministries by using individuals to link them. 
This can contribute to the streamlining and improved co-ordination of online games regulation 
by providing the opportunity for increased communication and cooperation between 
organizations. This does not eliminate the potential for conflict, however, as individuals will 
make implementation decisions based on their interests in both organizations. The increased 
links between MIIT, MPS, and China Mobile have been accompanied by increased individual 
connections to central organizations, and in particular the CCP Propaganda Department. The 
next section explores these connections and the pathways for communication and potential 
negotiation they create for China's major online games regulators. 
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Online Games Regulators and the Propaganda Department 
Given the near-complete sharing of staff between the SCIO and the SIIO and the 
known overlap between the SCIO and the CCP Propaganda Department 140 , the SIIO's 
founding itself indicates a clear connection to the CCPPD. It also therefore flags an increased 
interest from high-level stakeholders in policy development for online games and other 
converged media. Recent leadership changes in both the SIIO and the SCIO have solidified 
these links through key individual appointments. These begin at the level of SIIO Deputy 
Directorship, with Ren Xianliang (任贤良). 
Currently, three individuals clearly connect the SIIO to the CCPPD. These are: Ren 
Xianliang ( 任贤良 ), Vice Director of the SIIO, and Vice-President of the Propaganda 
Department's All-China Journalists' Association; Lu Wei (鲁炜), who holds leadership positions 
concurrently in the SIIO (Director) and the SCIO (Deputy Director); and Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照
), who holds leadership positions in the SCIO (Director) and in the CCP Propaganda 
Department (Deputy Director). Figure 3.15 below shows how these individuals connect these 
organizations through their concurrently held positions.  
 
Figure 3.15 Source: Author 
  
                                                     
140 As explained earlier in this chapter, the SCIO is also known as the External Propaganda 
Leading Group. Brady notes that this organization and China’s internal Propaganda 




Increased CCPPD individual-level connection to online games regulators can also be 
observed in the staff appointments that accompanied the convergence of the GAPP and the 
SARFT in April 2013. The GAPP, the SARFT, and the NCAC have all been involved in online 
games policy development, and this institutional convergence represents an increase in 
cooperation between them141 that may help these policymakers respond to the jurisdictional 
challenges of media convergence that are raised by online games and their innovative use. 
The major leadership appointments that have accompanied this merger connect the new 
ministry directly to the CCPPD through its director, Cai Fuchao (蔡赴朝). Cai Fuchao was also 
appointed the Director of the National Copyright Administration (NCAC) in 2013, along with 
his concurrent positions as Director of the SGAPPRFT and Deputy Director of the CCPPD. 
The NCAC has traditionally been a branch of the GAPP, and Cai Fuchao's appointment to 
Director of the NCAC provides a clear link between the former GAPP administration and the 
new SGAPPRFT. The concurrent positions held by Cai Fuchao mean that, as an individual, 
he serves to connect key online games policymakers (GAPP, SARFT) and provide a short 
communication pathway to media policy decision-makers at the highest levels of China's 
governing structure (China Vitae). One of these key decision-makers is Minister of Culture Cai 
Wu (蔡武), who, according to the China Directory 2013, is also a Deputy Head of the CCP 
Propaganda Department (16).  
The recent structural changes and individual staff appointments relevant to China's 
online games regulation mean that the CCPPD, at the level of its deputy directors, provides 
an institutional link and forum for negotiation of power balances between key leaders in China's 
online games regulation. These are: Cai Mingzhao, who is linked to the State Council Internet 
Information Office through his position in the SCIO; Cai Fuchao (蔡赴朝), who is responsible 
for the leadership of the newly merged GAPP and SARFT and additionally directly leads the 
NCAC; and Cai Wu, who leads the Ministry of Culture. The links between these institutions led 
by these individuals are depicted in Figure 3.16 below. 
                                                     
141 See China Vitae for a full list of SGAPPRFT vice-directors and their previous allocations in 





Figure 3.16 Source: Author 
The above examination of changes in the bureaucratic structures and staff 
appointments among China’s online games regulators reveals a number of pathways for 
negotiation that may be used to achieve future policy outcomes in this space. These align with 
some known pathways for political negotiation in China. The insertion of higher-level 
institutional stakeholders and well-connected individual actors seems to shift the power 
balance toward higher-level decision-makers. The increased individualized connections to the 
CCPPD through concurrently held positions does not indicate precisely whether or how they 
are used, however it does demonstrate opportunity for increased CCPPD activity in this space. 
The strategic placement of individual officials as leaders of multiple organizations is a known 
control mechanism employed by CCP Propaganda Department (Shambaugh; Lieberthal) and 
has been observed in this research to be in operation at the highest levels of China’s governing 
organizations. It is therefore possible that these observations may represent the early stages 
of a similar CCPPD approach to control over the online games industry.  
While the increased CCPPD involvement in converged media regulation points to 
internal channels for power negotiation led by high-level decision-makers, there is still 
significant room for disagreement and conflict between China’s online games regulators. The 
interpretation of where jurisdictional responsibilities lie and what the priorities of interest are 




stakeholders. For example, since the institutional convergence of the GAPP and the SARFT, 
the GAPP’s 2012 expanded definition of “internet publishers” to include online games under 
its jurisdictional reach has yet to be clarified, as does the potential applicability of licensing 
requirements. In addition to the varied legal texts that result from the fragmented and 
competing interests of different government agencies, the variation in approach to practical 
regulatory decision-making between central and local levels of government will continue to 
affect internal interactions between government stakeholders and factor into internal 
negotiations that take place as policy is translated into practice. This is particularly the case in 
an extremely lucrative and privatized industry like online gaming, where the interests of 
industry stakeholders will prioritize profit over compliance: regulatory implementation at local 
levels of government must not only balance central interests with specific local priorities, but 
must also face strong countervailing pressures from media producers and users.  
Internal interests play a defining role in the development and interpretation of central 
policy and work to shape the ultimate government role in the dynamic of converged media 
policy. Understanding the major government stakeholders and pathways for interaction and 
power negotiation as described above is therefore important. However, the realities of China's 
new media policy landscape are not defined solely by the internal actions of government; they 
also depend on the negotiation between government interests and those of the major 
stakeholders external to it. Consideration of the regulatory challenges raised by emerging 
practice in online games revealed that the tensions that shape converged media regulatory 
practice in China are primarily negotiated between the government, the media, and the public. 
In order to build macro-level understanding of the existing ethic as it is defined by these 
tensions, the research considers some of the primary interests and interactions that occur 
within and between the other major stakeholders.  
Media Producers/Operators  
Prior to the reform-era decentralization and commercialization of media in China, the 
structures, interests, and interactions of China's government stakeholder group were also 
those of the media stakeholder group. Today, while government stakeholders remain highly 
influential and the media sector is heavily regulated, decentralization and commercialization, 
as well as the country's more recent accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 have 
diversified ownership and interests beyond those held by the government stakeholder group. 
As private and international stakeholders have been increasingly allowed ownership within 
China's media sector, they have developed increasing influence and developed increasing 
interests and influence in China's media sector.  
Stakeholders in the production and operation of China's media pursue their own 




stakeholders. As in the government stakeholder group, stakeholders in the media category 
pursue these interests at institutional as well as individual levels. The next section explores 
the key structures, stakeholder interests, and modes of interaction that shape negotiation of 
online games regulation in the media stakeholder group. It additionally explores a major 
interaction type that takes place between the media and the government.  
Interests in China's media provision and production are held by both institutional and 
individual-level stakeholders. On an institutional level, media stakeholder interests are heavily 
influenced by ownership. The interests of government-owned institutions are likely to align with 
those of their associated government stakeholders, for example, while the interests of 
independent institutions will align with those of their owners. Many of the independent media 
institutions in China are publicly listed companies; the interests of these media organizations 
will then tend to align with the interests of the shareholders142. The interests of quasi-state 
institutions vary according to the negotiation of interests internally. Internal negotiation takes 
place, for example, between government and private shareholders, and between institutional 
and individual stakeholders. These interests are also affected by external pressures from the 
government and public stakeholder groups; examples include the regulatory demands from 
the government stakeholder group, and the market demands of public stakeholders. 
In order to discuss key stakeholder interests in this category and the ways in which 
they interact, it is first necessary to establish key institutional stakeholders and their ownership 
structures. The following section introduces the ownership structures that underpin provision 
and production of China's media, and considers the relationship between these structures and 
major stakeholder interests.  
Institutional Structures, Ownership, and Interests 
On an institutional level, stakeholders in the provision and production of media in 
China are revenue-generating companies whose primary interests are defined by their 
ownership. While the government maintains a significant ownership stake in Chinese media 
production and provision, the decentralization and commercialization of the media sector since 
the nineteen nineties have resulted in the introduction and increased participation of private 
and international stakeholders (Open Society Foundations, 2012). This has particularly been 
the case for value-added telecommunications services (VATs) such as online games; since 
China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, foreign companies have 
increasingly been able to participate in these industries through public offerings and joint 
ventures (Focusing on Value-Added Telecom Services, 2006). However, while this economic 
                                                     




"opening up" has increased the number and diversity of stakeholders in media production and 
provision, especially with regards to converged media, government ownership continues to 
dominate traditional media outlets and media infrastructure through State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and controlling ownership stakes in media enterprises. This selective privatization has 
meant that the ownership structures of media institutions in China vary along a continuum 
between one hundred percent government ownership and one hundred percent private 
ownership.  
Institutional Stakeholders 
Institutional key stakeholders involved in traditional media production and provision 
include: state-owned and quasi-state media organizations, content producers and 
broadcasters 143 ; independent media organizations and content producers 144 , publishing 
houses (print media), distributors, and suppliers. Institutional key stakeholders involved in the 
production of converged media include: Companies involved in the variable interest entity 
ownership structure (exact structure varies), content developers (foreign 145  or domestic), 
infrastructural stakeholders (ie. government-dominated telecommunications corporations), 
access point operators (ie. internet cafe operators), and equipment suppliers (ie. electronics 
vendors/manufacturers).  
Government Ownership: Central and Local, Control vs. Privatization 
Government ownership structures vary widely, from complete ownership to ownership 
of the largest stake in an enterprise (Xu, 2010). Ownership and operation occur at both central 
and local levels of government and take both direct and indirect forms. Central ownership and 
operation accounts for major infrastructural enterprises such as telecommunications operators 
and information technology companies (Mattlin, 16), and major media enterprises such as 
Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV), and China Radio International (CRI). 
Local government ownership accounts for more minor and regional media enterprises, though 
trans-regional and trans-sector co-operation has become both common practice and a 
                                                     
143  Examples of state-owned institutions include: Xinhua News Agency, China Central 
Television (CCTV), and China Radio International (CRI). Quasi-state institutions are partly 
owned by government departments; Jindun Television Cultural Center (partly owned by the 
Ministry of Public Security) and Zhongbei TV Art Center (partly owned by the Beijing All Media 
and Cultural Group) are examples of these (Liu 2010).  
144 Examples include: Caijing, The Economic Observer, Beijing Galloping Horse Film & TV 
Production, and Hairun Movie & TV (Liu 2010) 
145 Foreign content developers can only participate by licensing their product to a domestic 




centrally issued goal146 since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (Mass Media, 
China.org.cn). This has resulted in the formation of government-owned multimedia 
enterprises, the biggest of which is the State-level China Radio, Film and Television Group, a 
conglomerate of media production institutions147 under the State Administration for Radio, 
Film, and Television (SARFT) (People's Daily Online, 2001), that has fallen under the 
management of the larger SGAPPRFT as of 2013. Complete government ownership is more 
common at the central level, however partial privatization at both central and local levels has 
been a popular structure in recent years. This allows media enterprises to raise capital and 
better compete with large international media corporations (Barboza, 2009, 2012). Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang describe this partial privatization as it has been implemented by local governments:  
Since the creation of the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the early 1990s, 
with the newly gained power local governments have spun out productive assets from 
their SOEs, organized them into corporations, and then partially privatized some of 
the corporations through IPOs of minority portions of the corporate shares. Over 1,000 
companies had gone public in this way by 2001, and most of these firms remain 
majority-owned by local governments (9). 
Ownership structures for partially privatized enterprises may be direct, using one government 
agency to hold the controlling share, or indirect, holding controlling shares of a series of 
intermediary companies which Fan et al. term 'SOE-controlled pyramidal business groups'148 
(1). Fan, Wong and Zhang understand this as an attempt by local governments to 'decentralize' 
ownership of SOEs where they are legally prohibited from transferring it; they reason that due 
to its introduction of increased agency costs and inefficiency of information transmission, the 
degree of actual government control over daily activity tends to diminish as the size of the 
pyramidal business structure increases (7). Fan, Wong and Zhang's observations imply that 
there is a dilution of government control that accompanies the decentralization of ownership 
to local governments and private interests. This commercialization has resulted in increased 
local government access to private capital and an increased economic importance of local 
government-controlled enterprises. This affects the power balance of interests between 
                                                     
146  The central government established the goal of developing 'trans-regional multimedia 
newsgroups'  to 'meet competition and challenges from powerful overseas media groups' in 
2001 (Mass Media, China.org.cn) 
147 These include: CCTV, China National Radio, CRI, China Film Group Corp., China Radio 
and Transmission Network Cooperation Ltd, and China Radio and Television Web (Silverblatt 
& Zlobin, 167). 





central and local authorities and introduces private interests as a major consideration of local 
authorities.  
In China's media sector, partial and complete privatization has been implemented on 
a selective basis; key industries and central media organizations have been held under tight 
government ownership, while local level media institutions and targeted enterprise types have 
been allowed to increase the number and diversity of shareholders through complete 
privatization and joint venture partnerships (Chan, 16, 2010). In some industries, this has 
resulted in ownership structures where foreign and private stakeholder interests define those 
of the media institution. The online games industry in China exemplifies this.  
International Ownership Structures: Online Games Companies  
Many of the major online games operators in China, including: NetEase, Changyou, 
Tencent, Giant Interactive Group, The9, and Perfect World, are publicly listed on foreign stock 
exchanges. As publicly owned companies, their institutional interests are defined by those of 
their shareholders, which tend toward maximization of growth and profit. Although under 
Chinese regulation, foreign ownership may not control more than fifty percent of an online 
games company (The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski, 16), many foreign-listed companies are 
able to achieve de facto control through a series of contractual arrangements with Chinese 
nationals. These domestically-owned entities are referred to as Variable Interest Entities 
(VIEs) (The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski; Su).  
Variable Interest Entities 
Variable Interest Entities provide companies in China with a way to access foreign capital 
despite restrictions on foreign ownership and investment. The structural organization of 
companies that operate through variable interest entities tends to consist of companies at the 
following levels:  
 Foreign-listed holding companies held publicly and headquartered outside of China. 
Examples of these from the online games industry include NetEase, Inc., and 
Sohu.com. 
 China-based wholly-owned subsidiaries of the foreign-listed and foreign-
headquartered companies. These are known as Wholly Foreign-Owned Entities 
(WFOEs). 
 Chinese companies held and operated by one or more Chinese nationals (VIEs).  
In a VIE structure, the WFOE makes contractual arrangements with the domestic subsidiaries 
of the foreign-held firm that allow the foreign-listed company de facto control over revenue and 




The holding company owns the WFOE through a series of intermediary holdings. The 
domestic company and the WFOE enter into a series of structured agreements, 
including an exclusive equity option, equity pledge, voting proxy and technical licence 
and service agreements. These agreements allow the domestic company to be 
indirectly controlled by the holding company and its financial results are consolidated 
into the WFOE's financial statements, as if it were one of the company's subsidiaries 
(2012).  
An example from the 2010 Securities Exchange Commission filings of Sohu.com149 illustrates 
how variable interest entities have been implemented to allow the company to operate in China 
and to access foreign capital.This is depicted in Figure 3.17 below. 
 
Fig. 3.17 
The offshore holding companies (Sohu.com, Changyou.com) own and operate WFOEs in 
China (AmazGame, ICE Information, Beijing Changyou). These foreign-owned companies150 
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sections of company websites.  
150 Pilarowski notes that in the case of online games companies in China operating through 




enter into a set of contracts with domestically-owned VIEs (Beijing Gamease Age Digital, 
Shanghai ICE, Beijing Guanyou). These contracts allow the WFOEs to control and extract 
revenue from the VIEs; these domestically run companies are the only entities that can legally 
operate the business in China. They are often led by the original (Chinese) founder(s) of the 
company, that is to say, the original seekers of foreign capital.  
Contracts 
The precise nature of the contractual agreements that connect the wholly-owned 
foreign entities (WFOE)151 with the VIEs themselves (in this case: Beijing Gamease Age Digital 
Technology Co., Ltd, Shanghai ICE Information Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd, and Beijing 
Guanyou Gamespace Digital Technology Co., Ltd) varies with each case, however there are 
some common elements to VIE agreements for online games companies operating in China. 
These are, as Pilarowski notes: a purchase option, control rights, revenue agreements, loan 
agreements, and an equity pledge (The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski, 17).  
An analysis from The Law Offices of Pilarowski indicates the functionality of each type 
of contractual arrangement typical of VIE arrangements for online games operators in China: 
A purchase option allows the WFOE to purchase the VIE shares if and when PRC law allows. 
Control rights are designed to allow the WFOE to control the domestic company152. Revenue 
agreements 153  facilitate the transfer of revenue from the VIE to the WFOE, while loan 
agreements facilitate the transfer of capital from the WFOE to the VIE, should this be 
necessary. Loan agreements are often combined with an equity pledge, where the domestic 
VIE shareholders pledge their shares to the WFOE (17). The equity pledge may serve as a 
guarantee for the loan, or, as Pilarowski notes, simply as a guarantee of compliance with the 
revenue agreements (17). As of Changyou.com's 2012 Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings, the company held all five agreement types with its VIEs.  
China's online games operators were some of the first pioneers of VIE structure use 
in the country, beginning with Sina.com's initial public offering in 2000 (Roberts and Hall, 1). 
                                                     
shareholders, venture capital investors, and the original founders invest (The Law Offices of 
Greg Pilarowski, 16).  
151  In this case: Beijing AmazGame Age Internet Technology Co., Ltd., ICE Information 
Technology Co., Ltd., and Beijing Changyou Gamespace Software Technology Co., Ltd. 
152 These tend to operate through a proxy, a power of attorney, or a voting rights agreement 
(The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski, 17). 
153 Consulting agreements, technical service agreements, and copyright license agreements 




The company's success in circumventing foreign investment restrictions and avoiding 
government backlash popularized the structure and to date it is widely used in a number of 
industries. Currently, all foreign-listed online games operators in China use the VIE ownership 
structure154. The de facto control over VIEs allowed by the contracts with the WFOEs means 
that private and foreign stakeholders are able to shape the institutional interests of online 
games companies that operate in China. As the foreign companies tend to have access to the 
most capital resources for growth and therefore wield enormous economic power, this may 
affect the balance of power among stakeholders in China's media; they may tend to prioritize 
international shareholder interests over domestic interests. Therefore, negotiation of 
stakeholder interests in regulatory practice for this sector is likely to reflect the dominance of 
private capital. It is also likely, however, to reflect an effort to align interests between the 
foreign-owned institution and the nominee shareholders. This is because the contracts that 
ensure the flow of revenue from the VIE to the foreign shareholders may not be enforceable 
in Chinese courts.   
Contract Legality and the Future of VIEs 
The VIE ownership structure has recently been cause for concern both in China 
(Clarke, 2011) and abroad155 (Flannery; Su); the legality of the structure is in question and 
therefore its future use is unclear. Domestic stakeholders have expressed concern about 
yielding financial control of Chinese companies to foreign investors through VIEs, while foreign 
shareholders express concern about yielding control of company operations to VIEs (Clarke). 
Schindelheim (216) and The Law Offices of Greg Pilarowski note that the enforceability of the 
contracts that connect the domestically-owned companies to the wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
the foreign investors is extremely uncertain (18). They suggest that, should the contract's 
validity come into question, a Chinese court is unlikely to side with the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Entity. Pilarowski reasons this outcome because 'the control contracts do not comply with the 
spirit of the foreign ownership restrictions' (18). Schindelheim additionally observes that since 
they function as a work-around for foreign investment restrictions, they appear to contradict 
article 52 of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, which states that a contract 
is null and void if 'an illegitimate purpose is concealed under the guise of legitimate acts' (218). 
He also points out significant potential for selective and individualized enforcement of this law 
                                                     
154 As of the companies' respective 2011 NASDAQ SEC filings, this included most of the major 
online games companies in China, such as: NetEase, Inc., Changyou.com Ltd., Giant 
Interactive, Tencent, and Shanda Games. 
155 Domestic interests express concern about the media control that VIE structures yield to 
foreign investors, while foreign shareholders express concern about the control of company 




(219-20). In fact, such individualized enforcement has in fact been enacted already in other 
industry sectors; in 2011, Buddha Steel, Inc. was forced to withdraw from an initial public 
offering in the United States of America, when local government authorities in Hebei 
determined that VIE structures contravened public policy (Roberts and Hall, 6). 
 Two respondents from legal backgrounds that were interviewed for this research 
shared their perceptions of the future of VIE structures, indicating that regulators are likely to 
see VIE companies as local because the VIE shareholders ‘are local guys’ (R3; R4). This 
respondent understood the potential loss of VIE revenue to be a deterrent for regulatory 
enforcement against these companies.  
In addition to the legal risks of the VIE structure in general, its use in the online games 
industry specifically conflicts with a 2009 decree issued by the General Administration of Press 
and Publication. Article four of Decree No. 13156 'expressly prohibits foreign investors from 
using contractual or other control arrangements to gain control over domestic Internet game 
operators' (Morrison and Foerster LLP). To date, this explicit prohibition of the VIE structure 
for online games has had no effect on its continued prevalence in China's online games 
industry; as of 2012, China's online games market is still dominated by foreign-listed 
companies, all of whom use the VIE structure in order to successfully operate around 
restrictions on foreign investment. Access to capital from foreign shareholders means that 
foreign-listed online games companies in China wield significant economic power, while 
responsibilities to foreign shareholders mean that their interests align with profit maximization 
and growth. These interests may at times conflict with those of government stakeholders, who 
may selectively enforce VIE prohibition. However, enforcement of this prohibition carries with 
it a strong economic risk; significant foreign shareholder loss of VIE revenue may discourage 
both current and future foreign investment in China. Given the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the use of VIEs in China in the online games industry, the long term sustainability of this 
structure remains unclear. What is clear, is that this has introduced massive foreign economic 
interests to China's media sector that are difficult for government stakeholders to influence 
and regulate.  
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The ownership structures of media institutions in China reflect a traditional media 
sector that is heavily weighted toward government ownership, with an increasing trend toward 
partial privatization. With regards to traditional media, the negotiation of stakeholder interests 
in regulatory practice is likely to reflect the strong government presence. By contrast, 
ownership structures of newer and more highly converged media such as online games 
revealed an extremely high level of private and foreign ownership. While the exploration of 
stakeholder interests and ownership structures provides important information regarding the 
potential for alignment and conflict of interests, it provides little information about the ways in 
which these interests are negotiated.  
The negotiation of stakeholder interests in regulatory practice for online games is likely 
to reflect the dominance of private capital and the pursuit of company shareholder interests. 
Given the risk of VIE revenue loss in the case of divergent interests, however, negotiation 
efforts are also likely to reflect an effort to align the institutional interests of WFOEs with the 
individual VIE shareholders157. The same risk is also instrumental in creating incentive for 
WFOEs to remain compliant with government stakeholder demands; there is a risk of 
becoming a selected target for regulatory enforcement should there be a significant divergence 
from government stakeholder priorities. In order to further investigate how these negotiations 
take place, the next section explores case examples of important interaction types that affect 
major stakeholder interests in the media category. These primarily consist of the negotiation 
of interests between game producers and operators and government regulators, and between 
institutions and individuals.  
Interactions 
The exploration of the structures and interests of foreign-listed online games 
companies in China highlights two key points of tension where potentially divergent 
stakeholder interests must be negotiated. These points are: the intersection of private and 
foreign stakeholder institutions and government stakeholder institutions, and the intersection 
of individual and institutional interests. The outcomes of negotiations at these points have the 
potential to significantly influence the realities of new media regulation in China.   
GONGOs as Intermediaries  
There is evidence that negotiation between the strong private interests of online 
games companies and government interests is to some extent facilitated by intermediary 
organizations created by the government. The Internet society of China (ISC) is an example 
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of one such organization that is active in the negotiation of converged media policy. In recent 
years, the China Games Publishers Association, or CGIA, has emerged as an attempt by 
some regulators to model this system. The following case example explores the relevance of 
the use of intermediary organizations to the policy negotiation between government and 
private stakeholders in the online games industry.  
Case Example: social organizations and converged media regulation 
The ISC is a government-created "social organization" or what some scholars term 
'Government-Organized Non-Government Organizations (GONGOs)' (Lawrence & Martin, 
37). Established in 2001 and sponsored by the MIIT, the ISC's self-described purpose is as 
follows:  
To be a link among the community, to make efforts benefiting the whole industry, to 
push forward industry self-discipline, to strengthen communication and cooperation 
between its members, to assist and provide support for policies making, and to 
promote Internet application and public awareness (About Internet Society of China).  
The relevance of the ISC to negotiations between stakeholders in converged media policy is 
declared not only by its self-description, but by its membership. The ISC has over 400 
members, many of whom are prominent companies in converged media. These include: 
Baidu, Inc., SINA Corporation, Tencent, and NetEase. Membership is also held by 
government-owned media stakeholders158, government stakeholders in media regulation at 
both ministry and State levels 159 , research institutes, and various other members of 
government and industry. The connection between the ISC and the current leaders in internet 
policy development also exists at the level of its leadership: the Secretary General of the ISC 
is Lu Wei, who is also the current director of the State Council Internet Information Office 
(SIIO). 
The general functionality of the ISC can be inferred from its primary policy document, 
the Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry (中国
互联网行业自律公约). The document, issued the year after the ISC was established (2002), 
outlines a set of guidelines and code of ethics that uses much the same rhetoric and 
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expressing many of the same priorities160 as the Journalists Code of the All-China Journalists’ 
Association that was reviewed in Chapter II. What sets this document distinctly apart from the 
Journalists Code, however, is that it establishes a clear mechanism for intra-community 
monitoring and enforcement of its self-regulatory guidelines (articles 22 & 23). The ISC 
describes its responsibility for administering the self-regulation of its members:  
The Internet Society of China shall be responsible for organizing the implementation 
and administering this Pledge, communicating to the member organizations the 
information related to Internet laws, policies and industry self-regulation, reporting to 
the competent authority of the government the wishes and requirements of our 
members, upholding their lawful interests, organizing the implementation of Internet 
Industry self-regulation andethical conduct and supervise and inspect the 
implementation of this Pledge by our members (Article 19). 
This article of the Pledge clearly indicates the ISC's essential functionality: to create a 
community of industry stakeholders and facilitate a two-way communication and negotiation 
between the collective industry interests and those of the government. This provides 
government actors with a clear framework for collective interaction with private industry 
members; it creates a pathway for government stakeholders to implement compliance (self-
regulated but supervised by an overarching organization), while simultaneously offering 
industry interests a voice in policy development (as their 'wishes and requirements' are 
reported to 'competent authority'). While the internal pathways for communication between 
industry and government facilitated by the ISC are relatively opaque, there is one very forum 
operated by the ISC that creates significant opportunity for interaction between its industry 
members and internet regulators. This is the MIIT-sponsored China Internet Conference (中
国互联网大会) [Zhōngguó hùliánwǎng dàhuì]. While the ISC offers a forum for negotiation 
between the interests of industry and government, it requires a certain level of affinity between 
these interests as a starting point; membership is voluntary161, and the ISC's pledge to uphold 
"lawful interests" is not likely to include the interests of foreign capital162. As of the 2011 ISC 
                                                     
160  Priorities include: social welfare (article 11), national security (article 1), international 
exchange and co-operation (article 17). 
161 The degree to which membership is voluntary is likely to depend on the political climate; 
the ISC’s functionality as a platform for policy negotiation between government and industry 
means that positive government relationships are likely to depend on industry membership 
and involvement.  
162 This is due to the fact that the 'web of contracts' (Chan in Flannery) that comprise VIE 
ownership structures and enable foreign capital to control Chinese online games companies 




website update, five of the nine major Chinese online games companies were members of the 
ISC. 
Another organization has emerged in recent years that seems to function similarly to 
the ISC, as an institutional facilitator of industry-government interactions. This is the China 
Games Publishers’ Association (CGIA), a branch of the China Software Industry Association. 
The CGIA is more directly targeted to the online games industry than the ISC, and organizes 
the ChinaJoy CGDC, or China Game Developers Conference. This is attended by all two 
hundred members of the China Games Publishers Association and is sponsored and 
supported by many of China’s online games regulators. Sponsors include the GAPP, the MIIT, 
and the National Copyright Administration; supporting organizations include: the Ministry of 
Education, the Communist Youth League of China, and the Internet Society of China 
(ChinaJoy2014). The conferences held by the CGIA are designed to act, like many other social 
organizations in China, as a forum for game industry and government stakeholders to interact. 
A statement from the “About Us” section of the 2013 conference website explains this purpose: 
While showcasing new products and technologies, the expo also provides a platform 
for Chinese government agencies to convey industrial policies, access market 
information, understand the state of industrial development, and seek the views and 
recommendations from domestic and foreign enterprises, playing a positive role in 
healthy, orderly and rapid development of China’s digital interactive entertainment 
industry (ChinaJoy). 
An incident in 2009 further clarifies the intended functionality of the CGIA-organized 
conference; it is designed to operate not only as described above, but as the only interaction 
platform of its kind. The China Games Industry Association communicated this much to its 
members during a 2009 attempt to quell support for a competing conference, one which is 
sponsored by the Ministry of Culture. The Association issued a letter to all its members 
mandating their attendance at the CGIA conference and withdrawal of support for ‘similar 
events held in the country’. The reason cited for this directive is the need to ensure the 
'authoritativeness' of the CGIA conference:  
This is also an effort to ensure that CGDC is the only conference of its kind and that 
its authoritativeness and goals will be achieved. Therefore, the China Game 
Publishers Association would like to call on all member companies and organizations 
to refrain their support to any similar domestic event (China Game Publishers 
Association 2009). 
The above statement describes an attempt by CGIA supporters to ensure a monopoly over 
the framework for negotiation with outside interests. This represents a control mechanism for 
key external interest groups that is consistent with the general CCP system of mass and social 
organizations; as Saich describes in his 2000 Negotiating the State, the structures and rules 




patronage and control their activities’ (125). However, this system tends to fail as a top-down 
mechanism for control. Saich observes that its implementation does not result in 
straightforward control of the external interest group, but rather forges a symbiotic relationship. 
This is defined by compliance or feigned compliance by the interest group, and policy rewards 
exchanged for this compliance by regulators (125). This system has been observed by 
Lagerkvist to be at work in the case of social media; the Internet Society of China actively 
works to offer policy rewards for compliance and industry members worked to appear 
compliant while pursuing their own interests (2640). The CGIA is attempting to mirror this 
system in the case of online games.  
The CGIA has also clearly indicated a willingness to involve industry stakeholders in 
the policy development process, and offered economic incentive for industry members to 
support its authority. The openness to industry input is explicitly stated in the “About Us” 
statement of the 2013 CGIA conference, which indicates that government agencies will ‘seek 
the views and recommendations from domestic and foreign enterprises’ at the conference 
(Chinajoy). Economic incentives for support have been offered in the form of reducing the cost 
of conference attendance, as outlined in item 2 of the 2009 letter to CGIA members:  ‘With the 
2nd CGDC held during ChinaJoy, participants will…be able to cut their expenses’ (China 
Game Publishers Association). 
Despite its widespread support by online games regulators, the CGIA work to 
establish its conference and organization as the only forum for negotiation between industry 
and regulators has not been successful to date. The direct application of this traditional model 
is challenged both by the industry prominence of a competing conference supported by the 
Ministry of Culture163, and by the important role of conference attendance in the games 
industry as a vehicle for marketing and networking. There are a number of high-profile 
conferences around the world attended by users, industry members, and policymakers alike; 
this means that foreign games companies attend multiple conferences as common business 
practice. Attempts by the CCP-led CGIA to curtail conference attendance are therefore likely 
to be perceived as an economic threat. Given the common business practice of conference 
attendance, the CGIA is unlikely to obtain a monopoly over games conferences in China. 
However, the organization may successfully apply the social organization model for industry-
government interactions should regulating stakeholders reach an internal consensus and 
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decide on a single interaction framework. For now, however, regulator-industry interactions for 
the online games industry are not yet consolidated.  
The successful implementation of policy through social organizations depends on the 
ability and of the targeted institutions to comply and the incentive for compliant behaviour. 
While Lagerkvist notes that compliance incentive is maintained through policy rewards and 
sanction risks (2012, 2641), private institutional interests are likely to avoid thorough 
compliance with regulation if it conflicts with the interests of profit maximization. Sina.com's 
loose enforcement of the Real-Name Registration system as observed by Lagerkvist 
demonstrates this (2012, 2640), as does the loose enforcement of the 2007 online games 
fatigue system by online games companies discussed in Chapter II (Moss; Sun). These 
compliance incentives are instrumental in defining the institutional behaviour, however a fuller 
understanding of the complexities of implementation must acknowledge that the extent to 
which institutional behaviour itself defines practice is also limited. 
Negotiation of interests: institutions and individuals 
Every institution is staffed by individuals with their own set of priorities and values that 
are likely to be prioritized over institutional interests when opportunity allows. In companies, 
this translates into situations where individual managers may prioritize their personal interests 
and values over the interests and values of the company they represent. Economists refer to 
this as an agency problem. Wang and Judge explain:  
In a world filled with agency relationships, where one party (the agent) is authorized 
to act on behalf of another (the principal), an agency problem presents itself whenever 
the divergence of interests between involved parties is coupled with information 
asymmetry...Due to the divergence of interests, the agents may not put full effort into 
their delegated tasks under imperfect monitoring; they often pursue their private 
interests at the expense of the principal. This is the so-called “moral hazard” problem 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), which is the major agency problem facing China’s SOEs (483). 
While Wang and Judge describe the agency problem in terms of the internal negotiation 
between private and government interests in China's partially privatized SOEs, it is a problem 
that exists in any organization where there is a separation between ownership and control; the 
more agents there are involved in an organizational pyramid, the greater is the potential for 
distortion of original intent (Shirley & Walsh, 2001, 29-30). In economics, the resulting 
distortion is referred to as agency cost.  
Agency costs are notoriously high in China; this has been widely noted in literature on 
partial SOE privatization (eg., Bai, Lu & Tao, 2007; Shirley & Walsh 2001; Wang & Judge 
2011) but is equally a concern for private firms (Shirley & Walsh, 28). This is particularly the 
case for new media enterprises in China, where VIEs are commonly used to circumvent 




degrees of separation between ownership and management, making agency costs more likely, 
they also shift the balance of power toward the agents by conceding them the legal ownership 
of company assets (King & Wood, 2011). Individual agents may choose to take advantage of 
their relative power 'to serve their own purposes at the expense of profitability and owner 
welfare, or even to expropriate investments funds altogether' (Shirley & Walsh, 29). Individual 
interests may be defined by personal profit or values, but are also susceptible to influence by 
and pressure from regulating stakeholders. Thus, while institutional-level interests of private 
industry and government may be negotiated between institutional stakeholders through 
intermediaries like the ISC or the CGIA, they may also be negotiated at the level of individual 
agents.  
Although the interests of institutional media stakeholders tend to be defined by their 
ownership, the interpretation and implementation of these interests is performed by many 
layers of personnel, who may act according to personal or professional ideals. Individual media 
personnel in China regularly make content-related decisions that must negotiate their own 
moral and financial interests with those of their institutions. Within state-owned organizations, 
institutions are likely to expect individuals to prioritize maximizing the positive guidance of 
public opinion over content profitability164. Individual level self-censorship is one way that this 
negotiation takes place165. It is guided by the foundational training for journalists (Shirk, 43) as 
well as regular internal communication both in print and in person (Brady, 19; Shambaugh, 
29). While media personnel at independently-owned institutions receive the same guidance 
(Brady, 58), such institutions are likely to differ in their expectations of employees regarding 
individual decision-making. Publicly listed organizations like China’s online games companies, 
for example, are likely to expect individuals to prioritize profitability over strict regulatory 
compliance.  
                                                     
164 The government-issued guidance of the Journalists' Code lists the positive guidance of 
public opinion as a top priority (Articles 1,2,4,5). 
165 Self-censorship is a regulatory mechanism widely noted in the literature on Chinese media. 
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Alignment of Interests: Industries, Individuals, and Government Agencies 
China's media landscape is characterized by multiple powerful stakeholder groups 
with strong interests that exist in delicate balance. This balance is particularly delicate in the 
regulatory environment for online games, as the complex VIE ownership structures represent 
a tense reconciliation of stakeholder interests that are domestic and international, as well as 
institutional and individual in nature. Foreign investors use these structures to circumvent 
restrictions, however in doing so become highly vulnerable to changes in government 
regulation and enforcement. They also become vulnerable to the individual decision-making 
power conferred to nominee shareholders. In order to mitigate the risk of nominee shareholder 
contract breach, many companies work to align the individual interests of the VIE shareholder 
with those of the WFOE. This can be done in several ways, but often takes the form of 
investment from the VIE nominee shareholder in the WFOE, in order to ensure alignment of 
economic interests (Roberts and Hall, 10). Roberts and Hall note that while this is considered 
best practice, 'alignment of interests may not be a sufficient disincentive by itself' (10).  
The risk assumed by foreign investors that employ the VIE structure works as 
incentive for compliance (or perceived compliance) with government interests in order to 
prevent revenue loss. On the other hand, the importance of foreign capital and a positive 
international economic image to China's future economic development works as an incentive 
for government stakeholders to align decision-making with the interests of the foreign-listed 
online games operators. Government-run social organizations like the ISC and the CGIA 
facilitate negotiation of these potentially divergent interests, as do relevant industry 
conferences such as the Ministry of Culture’s GDC China. However, the lack of a consolidated 
platform for negotiation between industry members and government regulators as of yet 
means that there are likely to be less public interactions between media and government 
stakeholders where key negotiations take place.  
Less public venues for interaction between media and government stakeholders were 
described by key informants in their interview responses. Primarily, policy input was reported 
to take place through meetings that involved personal contact between key officials and game 
company business owners (R1, R3, R4, R5, R7, R8, R10). Respondent 4 reported that such 
meetings were often used by regulators to obtain information about industry issues: 
Generally [regulators] will invite some big companies... to their office and discuss 
some issues...because it is so new, they...cannot totally understand how to run a 
business and all the issues for this industry, because there are a lot of issues...some 
of the technical issues, yeah so all their information comes from the gaming 
companies. 
Following these meetings, the respondent reported, the Ministry of Culture typically 




According to Respondent 4, all the respective companies would then be expected to purchase 
the white paper as a reference document. While there is no guarantee that these meetings will 
translate into policy influence, personal relationships between game company owners and key 
decision-making officials were perceived by respondents to be an effective mechanism for 
policy influence. CEOs of large gaming companies as the most influential figures in policy 
development, second to government officials. Well-connected Government Relations 
departments were reported to be  
Opportunities for interacting with regulators that are not related to enforcement fall into 
one of two categories: policy development and policy guidance. Respondents identified policy 
development opportunities as consisting of direct requests from game companies to 
government departments. In general, this was considered unlikely to succeed unless there 
were individual social networks that could be used (R4). Other pathways that game companies 
could take in order to influence policy development consisted of applying for government 
subsidies, where further meetings related to policy development could take place. The 
respondents that identified this as an effective way to influence policy noted that receiving 
subsidies increases the opportunities for companies to be in contact with regulators. This 
would increase the opportunity to form policy through increased contact and to forge personal 
relationships.  
Policy guidance meetings were another pathway to government influence. The 
importance of policy guidance was articulated by Respondent 5, who remarked that upon 
reading policy texts, companies and their lawyers were likely to come away with more 
questions than answers. The respondent noted that in order to interpret policies so that 
regulators would be satisfied, the Government Relations (GR) department was used as a way 
to communicate with regulators. GR staff were described as not having any specific training 
but being skilled in knowing how to communicate with government officials (R3, R4). 
Respondent 3 noted that a very effective GR department would have close personal contacts 
with regulators, stating: 'if I was company I would hire somebody’s - a son or daughter of some 
government officials'. Respondents 3, 4, and 5 indicated that GR departments have regular 
contact with government departments and look to 'gather information' on unwritten policy and 
its interpretation (R4). Respondent 4 gave an example to describe how the GR department 
interacted with regulators on behalf of game companies to obtain guidance on certain practical 
issues: 
 The staff in the government relations gather information from the government 
authorities and  they will transfer information to the staff or the company...for example, 
the technical staff designs some program in the game and after they deliver to the 




Respondents 4 and 11 described direct contact with local regulators as another pathway for 
policy guidance. An example was provided regarding the taxation policy for virtual property: 
Respondent 4 described a case where policy guidance was requested by phone, first from the 
local tax bureau, and then from the state tax bureau, when the local government was unable 
to help.  
The interactions explored above examine relationships between regulators and 
industry members. However, another set of interests that affects regulatory outcomes balance 
are not directly addressed in the interaction types explored above. These are the interests of 
game users.  
Public Users 
The economic and social investments of online games players drives the ultimate 
success or failure of the online games industry. The key institutional structures, stakeholder 
interests, and modes of interaction that define negotiation of online games regulation in the 
public stakeholder group are therefore primarily those of the game players themselves. 
Secondary research on player types and interactions is still in the early stages of development; 
while relevant research has been prolific in recent years, there is still little consensus on best 
practice methodologies, and there are no widely accepted theoretical frameworks that explain 
player interaction. Bartle's player typology theory may be one exception to this statement. In 
1990 and 1996, Richard Bartle developed a theory based on first-hand analysis of text-based 
multi-user dungeons. He categorized players into four types and explored the dynamics of 
their interactions: Killers, Achievers, Socializers, and Explorers (1996). This framework 
provides a foundation for understanding some of the activity and player motivations that takes 
place in online games, however it operates on a basic assumption that players are playing for 
fun. Bartle asserts:  
Whatever it is that causes a player to come back to a virtual world time and time again, 
there must be things happening that, on the whole, they find enjoyable or personally 
rewarding. This is what they call fun. There might not be a lot of it, or there may be a 
good deal of it, but it has to be there (2004, 129). 
While this understanding of online game player motivation provides a useful description of 
motivation for game play, it is focused on understanding recreational motivations. The player 
typology based on this assumption does not account for the complex and increasing 
interaction that occurs on the blurred boundaries between game play and real-world activity, 
nor does it account for the convergent use of technology outside the game to achieve goals. 




protests, e-sports, and monetized live-streaming of game play, exemplify activity that goes 
beyond this "magic circle" understanding of online game boundaries166.  
Case examples from the previous chapter show that online games are often used to 
pursue the real economic and political interests of those that play them. Gold farming workers 
pursue straightforward economic interests by playing games professionally. The players that 
used World of Warcraft animation to create the machinima online protest video pursued both 
personal and political interests. These were renewed access to the game, as well as group 
action against continued infringement on what they perceived to be their rights as players. The 
cases of virtual property theft (and recognition from Chinese courts 167 that online games 
players own their virtual property) demonstrate that a general understanding is emerging that 
the virtual worlds of online games are no longer just games, but a platform for daily human 
interaction and activity. A thorough identification and categorization of stakeholder interests in 
the negotiation of online games regulation among online games players requires further 
fieldwork focused on the subject that is beyond the scope of the current project. The case 
examples mentioned above, as well as some additional new phenomena, however, allow for 
a preliminary identification of some major relevant sub-categories. The section begins with a 
brief overview of the institutional and structural organization of online games users. 
Institutions and structural organization 
There are some structured environments that encourage collaboration and community 
formation among online games players, however there are few formal organizations that 
represent their interests. Structured environments that contribute to community formation 
include: internet cafes, professional tournaments, websites that facilitate live streamed 
broadcasting of game play, and the games themselves. For professional players that work in 
third-party game businesses like gold farming, the primary structured environment is likely to 
be the gold farming workshop. Within the games, the institutional organization of guilds, teams, 
or clans facilitates collaboration and community formation between players. Community 
formation can also transcend these structures to involve team play in multiple locations and 
multiple game platforms.  
                                                     
166 The magic circle understanding of games is one that 'entails treating the game as a "world 
independent of the everyday world"' See Lehdonvirta (2010) for a detailed explanation of the 
magic circle concept and why it does not apply to modern Massively Multiplayer Online 
Games.  





Exploration of emerging practice in online games highlights some of the major 
divisions of interests between players of online games. One of the biggest divisions of interests 
in online games, since the introduction of gold farming, emerged between recreational and 
professional game players. Their interests in game play have historically been motivated by 
pleasure and economic gain, respectively, however there is increasing overlap between these 
interests as trade in virtual goods becomes more accessible to regular players. The section 
below describes the conflicting interests signalled in the examination of the gold farming case. 
The gold farming case study pointed to a significant conflict of interests between 
recreational and professional players 168 , primarily due to widespread perceptions among 
recreational players that the practice of gold farming interfered with a positive recreational 
gaming experience 169 . Some of this interference was related to competition for limited 
resources (Arnason 2008, Respondent). It is also likely that the discursive association of gold 
farming with "illegal" or illegitimate behaviour has contributed to this division of interests 
between the recreational and the gold farming player groups; the most direct conflicts between 
the two stakeholder groups have occurred where the use of "illegal" modifications was 
involved 170 . There is also evidence that negative perceptions of gold farming among 
recreational players relate to a perception that gold farming activity decreases the real-world 
value of the virtual assets of the recreational gamers (Arnason 2008, respondents 3 and 8).  
While recreational players as a group have had conflicting interests with professional 
players in the case of gold farming, an increasing number of them are transitioning to 
professional players themselves. Newer forms of professional game play can involve trading 
in virtual goods and services, tournament competition (e-sports), and/or live broadcasting of 
game play to a paying audience of fans171. As opportunities to monetize game play continue 
to emerge, the interests of recreational and professional players increasingly align. One 
                                                     
168 The conflict of interests between gold farmers and recreational players did not apply to the 
sub-category of elite level players, who reported collaboration toward mutual benefit between 
themselves and gold farmers. 
169 This is a major them of the research in Arnason 2008.   
170 These include the April 2010 Aion anti-bot protest mentioned in the previous chapter, as 
well as the December 2010 sentencing of a gold farming couple to prison time for 'operation 
of an unlicensed business, and...major violations of China's laws concerning Internet 
publishing and digital rights, as well as of Shanda's copyrights' (Globalvoices) 




common concern is the security and accumulation of virtual property172. This carries monetary 
value for both stakeholder sub-groups and holds additional sentimental value for many 
recreational players. Another common interest is uninterrupted access to game play. For 
socially invested recreational players, access to the game is also access to their social 
communities. For both types of players, access to the game means access to economic 
potential. This is increasingly important to users as they create new ways to earn real money 
by playing online games. 
Stakeholder interests among gamers can also be divided according to casual and elite 
level gamers; each of these sub-groups pursues different game experiences and may be upset 
if the online games company does not meet their needs. Casual game players tend to seek 
achievable tasks and facilitated social engagement. Elite level game players tend to pursue 
the opposite: membership in exclusive communities working to accomplish difficult tasks with 
high expectations of achievement. Elite level players are more likely to transition from the 
recreational to the professional stakeholder sub-group; they are typically more skilled and 
invested in the game, and success in professionalizing game play is largely dependent on skill 
and time investment. In China, the negative "internet addiction" discourse surrounding online 
games may affect the interests and decision-making of some online games players; players 
may deliberately remain in the casual/recreational category in order to avoid negative attention 
from other public stakeholders by minimizing game play. On the other hand, they may invest 
more time and energy in game play in order to successfully professionalize and thus legitimize 
their level of engagement in online games.  
The stakeholder interests among online games players can be categorized and 
identified further; each small community of gamers pursues interests within the game 
environment, in competition with the interests of other communities, and at times in 
contradiction with the interests of the game companies themselves. These communities are 
extremely loosely structured and often extend beyond the game environment itself. The 
following section discusses these communities and some of the ways they interact with each 
other, as well as with regulators and media operators.  
Interactions 
The use of games to generate real-world income means that changes in game rules 
or regulation that affect the value of virtual goods or access to game play can directly impact 
the real-world income of a user. This happened in 2007, when the game company Blizzard 
                                                     
172 The importance of this interest has been demonstrated by an increasing number of court 




made a rule change to World of Warcraft that vastly increased the supply of in-game currency. 
The change meant that game players collecting large sums of this currency for trade suffered 
a massive real-world loss of assets when its value was reduced.  
Rule changes like this that take place in the game environment are one way that online 
games companies and public users interact. The counterpoint to this type of top-down 
interaction is the use of the game environment to protest unfair practices and seek changes 
that redress them. An example of this is a 2010 protest staged by users in the game Aion 
against the use of automated software in the game173. By gathering in large numbers and 
causing server shutdowns, the users sought attention and action of the game company to 
address their complaints. While this example demonstrates the ways that users interact with 
game companies, it also demonstrates the conflict of interests that can arise between users 
with different play objectives. This can result in negative interactions between recreational and 
professional players. Most often, these interactions consist of recreational players deliberately 
interfering in the activity of professional gold farmers. This can consist of repeatedly attacking 
or killing the gold farmer's character so that their continued harvesting of resources is 
impossible or it may consist of attempting to steal their targeted resources (See Arnason 2008, 
Respondents 2 and 7). Game companies that prohibit the gold farming practice encourage 
recreational players to take recourse by reporting characters that seem to be engaged in gold 
farming activity (Ibid.). This may result in the banning of the character and a loss of resources 
for the gold farmer ("Professional Gold Farmer Tells All").  
Many players of online games play on a daily basis, and their everyday lives are thus 
significantly affected by changes in regulatory practice. This level of user commitment can be 
extremely economically beneficial to online games companies; players not only pay them to 
access games, they also regularly and willingly contribute to game development and 
improvement (Humphreys, 161), in the form of audience feedback174 to new content as well 
as free labour in the form of player-generated content175. While this contributes to profitability, 
it represents a high level of responsibility for online games companies, who must work hard to 
                                                     
173 This refers to an April 2010 protest against the use of bots in the MMOG Aion. It involved 
30,000 players and led to server shutdowns. A video capture of the event can be found on 
MMOsite.com. 
174 Feedback occurs in several forms. These include: direct complaints in-game, forum-based 
discussion, and community action.  
175  This is common practice among online games companies. Humphreys notes that 
'Production is not completed at launch, but is an ongoing process, with content produced by 
players as well as paid developers, and with social networks generated by players a source of 




manage the level of satisfaction among an emotionally and economically invested user 
demographic. Having contributed significantly to the production of a high quality game 
experience, users tend to become quickly upset when they perceive the game companies to 
have failed to meet their responsibilities. These responsibilities are generally perceived to 
include: maintaining accessibility to the game (ie. technical expertise and support), responding 
to complaints, and managing the community of gamers to maximize the enjoyment of all 
players. For example, the user base is likely to demand a high level of technical service and 
fix technical issues. They are also likely to respond passionately to anything that disrupts their 
preferences for game play. Responses may take the form of individual boycotts, protests, or 
legal action, however it is highly likely to be organized by groups. The often intensely social 
aspect of game play means that entire communities of players may decide to take action at 
once, leaving one company (game) for another.  
Responses from key informant interviews report a softening of the relationships 
between Chinese game companies and their users in recent years. While industry 
respondents remarked on a lack of transparency to users (R3; R4), another respondent 
reported that game companies had recently established user complaint websites in response 
to increasing user activism. The respondent noted that industry response also involved a 
change in the dynamic of the relationship between game companies and their user base:  
I think in the past two years or so -two or three years, the industry has - it's aware that 
these kinds of things are happening more and more. So they are finding solutions to 
it, setting up a website for complaints and also they try to be more conciliatory towards 
gamers who try to revolt…before they had this, like  "game-god" kind of attitude, not 
compromising, but now… I think in the past few years the industry, I mean the main 
firms, they grouped together and they discussed how to solve these problems and 
they've become softer towards gamers (R1). 
The above overview describes some ways that interactions that take place between 
players with both conflicting and aligning interests, and between game companies and players. 
Game players also interact with government regulators, in order to resolve disputes with game 
companies. The cases discussed in Chapter II, for example, describe how cases of disputes 
over virtual property were resolved through official legal action. These primarily occurred in 
the context of the courts, however one case was resolved through the intermediary action of 
the Sichuan branch of the China Consumers’ Association (CCA).  
Case example: the Mediating Role of the China Consumers’ Association  
The precise role of the CCA in facilitating dispute resolution is not clear from the case 
of virtual property dispute it settled; reports state simply that the game player complained to 
the Consumers’ Association of Sichuan and was granted compensation (Murray, 102). 




dispute resolution that are likely relevant to this case. Yang’s study interviewed several officials 
from the CCA about the organization’s mediation process. They reported informal mediation 
as the first method of dispute resolution, followed by two other often-used methods to ‘increase 
the effect’ of the resolution (24). When asked how the CCA resolves consumer complaints, 
one official responded as follows: ‘If we find through consumer complaints the fraudulent 
activities that violate the consumer rights, we can inform the corresponding government 
agency for administrative punishment. The second method is through media exposure’ (24). 
In the case of virtual property theft brought to the Sichuan Consumers’ Association, the 
outcome is reported as follows: The Consumers’ Association judged that, Mr. Zhao as a 
consumer, his rights should be protected and Shanda company [sic] should compensate Mr. 
Zhao. It is not known as to how much compensation was paid to Mr. Zhao (MMLC Group). 
Given the report’s statement that compensation was indeed paid and that a judgment was 
made by the Consumers’ Association, it appears likely that the CCA resolved the complaint 
by involving a relevant government agency with the legal authority to enforce payment of 
compensation.  
The analysis has briefly reviewed what is known about the institutional contexts, the 
stakeholder interests, and the interactions that involve China’s online games users. This 
overview indicates a clear need for further research on the players of China’s online games 
as the medium operates today: as a platform for national and international engagement, where 
in-game activity is influenced by motivations both in the game and outside it. As emerging 
practice and innovative use of this converged media continues to offer significant opportunities 
for collective action and for player interaction with private interests, the pathways for 
negotiating player interests will be increasingly important for China’s regulators to understand, 
should they hope to maintain influence in this sector. A thorough analysis of this stakeholder 
group requires significant further fieldwork, and this is an important matter that needs to be 
addressed in future research. 
Summary  
The investigation into China's online games policy indicated that policy outcomes in 
this space are not determined by proscriptive policy texts, but rather result from the balance 
at any given time between the competing interests of critical stakeholders. In this chapter, the 
research set out to learn more about how this balance is negotiated. To this end, it looked at 
the major stakeholders identified in the previous chapter and examined the institutional 
contexts in which they operate, as well as the major interests that guide their decision-making. 
The chapter also considered some of the primary ways that these stakeholders interact as the 




The newness of China's online games regulation as a field of scholarship meant that 
the research in this chapter was exploratory in nature, drawing on existing knowledge from 
relevant fields of scholarship and empirical knowledge from the case study of gold farming in 
order to guide the investigation. This investigation contributes knowledge about practical policy 
negotiation for online games in China by identifying and describing key factors that affect how 
competing interests are negotiated. Case examples from the previous chapter pointed to three 
broad categories of stakeholders whose competing interests must be negotiated in order to 
regulate China's online games. These were: China's government regulators, game 
producers/operators, and public users. The chapter conducted an exploratory analysis of the 
primary structures, interests, and interactions for each of these groups. 
The exploratory analysis indicated that the practical regulation of online games in 
China is deeply influenced by institutions of the public and private sector, and their competing 
interests. In the public sector, the research identified a multitude of relevant institutional 
stakeholders at many different levels of hierarchy. The hierarchical structure of media 
regulation in China fell into three broad categories: the Party, the state, and social 
organizations. While officially, the state occupies the highest position of these categories, in 
reality this role is occupied by the Chinese Communist Party. Subordinate yet overlapping with 
Party institutions were organizations of the State Council, and below this, social organizations. 
Within these macro-level structures, the specific institutions relevant to both media regulation 
in general and to the regulation of converged media and online games directly were identified 
and described. These included the CCP Propaganda department, a multitude of ministerial-
level agencies, the courts, and social organizations such as the China Consumers' 
Association.  
The examination of regulator structures found that, in recent years, the pervasive 
structures through which the CCP Propaganda Department exerts influence over media 
regulation have been adjusted to include converged media and online games. This was 
accomplished through the creation of the State Council Internet Information Office and the 
appointment of individual officials to key positions. Individuals were also found to play a key 
role more generally in linking disparate regulating institutions, by holding concurrent positions 
as officials in multiple organizations. The establishment of these mechanisms for coordination 
and control reflects an increase in higher-level involvement in this sector. This seems to 
respond to some of the challenges raised by converged media, such as jurisdictional overlap 
between ministerial-level institutions and the resulting competition between them as the 
economic importance of the online games industry continues to increase. The recent merger 
of the General Administration of Press and Publication and the State Administration for Radio, 




employed in the face of these challenges. These responses echo some of the historical 
approaches to new media in China that were reviewed in the previous chapter.  
While the structural framework for China's online games regulation reflects an 
increasing involvement of central actors in this space, the exploration of regulator interests 
indicated that ministerial-level stakeholders tend to pursue their own agency-specific goals as 
they "implement" and "interpret" central mandates. The research observed this in the case of 
the Ministry of Culture and the General Administration for Press and Publication, as each 
organization emphasized different aspects of the centrally-issued "healthy development" goal 
in their pursuit of regulatory control over the industry. While the pursuit of these different goals 
facilitated the pursuit of regulator primacy in this space, it also seems to demonstrate a schism 
among regulators regarding the policy goals for China's online games. An example was given 
where the MOC sought to remain open to foreign investment in China's online games industry, 
while the GAPP sought to ban this activity. It remains to be seen how the recent structural 
changes and increased high-level involvement may affect or change these interests.  
The research also highlighted a schism between interests of regulators operating at 
the ministerial level and those of local branches of government. Local government interests 
were heavily influenced by individual and local economic concerns, and had the potential to 
exert significant influence over decision-making in local courts. Local courts were identified as 
the first port of call for many court cases related to online games and emerging practice; the 
interests of local government stakeholders may therefore be highly relevant to determining 
practical policy and decision-making in this space. The analysis additionally indicated that 
China's financial regulators have significant and increasing interests in the regulation of online 
games due to the increasing popularity of trade in virtual currency and virtual goods.  
The analysis also observed the types of interactions that have taken place between 
China’s regulators as the online games industry has become increasingly profitable. In 
general, these reflected the nascent stage of the structures and the legal framework that 
surround the industry.  For ministerial-level agencies, interactions primarily centred around 
jurisdictional competition, as regulators sought to control the licensing for this new regulatory 
space. This was accomplished primarily through the issuing of policy texts and communication 
of key officials in public forums. Higher-level regulators engaged in interaction with subordinate 
stakeholders through structural reorganization that worked to increase pathways for 
communication and coordination. The analysis observed recently established links between 
CCP stakeholders in the Propaganda Department and the ministerial regulators directly 
involved in issuing policy texts. These links established both pathways for interaction through 




coordinate lower-level ministries, and key officials were appointed to serve concurrently in 
multiple organizations at different levels of bureaucratic hierarchy.  
Following the exploration of structures, interests, and interactions in the regulator 
category, the chapter investigated these areas as they relate to the producers and operators 
of China’s online games, as well as their public users. Investigation of the structural 
organizations of the producers/operators of online games began with a general examination 
of the structures of China’s media sector. Despite the commercialization and partial 
privatization of the media sector that has taken place since the decentralization of media in 
China, the research found that the structures of the country’s media production remained 
deeply embedded within bureaucratic structures of government in the form of State-Owned 
Enterprise and partial privatization. While the rest of the media sector is characterized by 
government ownership and control, the online games industry was highlighted as an exception 
to this rule. The structural organization of the online games sector in China is primarily defined 
by the corporate structures of its biggest companies. These complex structures span multiple 
countries. They are further complicated by measures that have been taken by these 
companies in order to circumvent restrictions on foreign investment; Variable Interest Entities, 
or VIEs, allowed foreign-held entities to control domestic game operators through a series of 
contracts with individual Chinese citizens. The chapter examined the nature and legality of 
these measures in detail, and found them to be a significant site of tension between the 
interests of game companies and Chinese regulators. The use of VIEs to list on foreign stock 
exchanges is allowed by tacit approval, however the use of these structures for this purpose 
violates China’s contract law. This creates significant opportunity for selective enforcement 
according to regulator interests, however the amount of foreign capital involved would mean 
that any enforcement would come at significant economic cost and may discourage foreign 
investment in China more generally.  
In general, China’s online games producers and operators were found to act in the 
interests of their shareholders: the maximization of growth and profit. These companies tended 
to balance pursuit of these goals with an outward compliance with regulator mandates. While 
game producers and operators were found to act this way in general, the diffuse ownership 
structures of these companies mean that there is significant potential for internal fragmentation 
of interests and individual decision-making that may act according to different priorities. This 
potential for agency cost was observed as a notorious problem in China, both in the media 
sector and in the regulatory environment in general. The potential for agency cost was 
exacerbated by the specific nature of the VIE structure. This structure necessarily relinquishes 
legal ownership of a company’s day-to-day operations in China, thereby granting significant 
potential decision-making power to local VIE shareholders. The individual interests of these 




how companies work to align the potentially divergent interests of VIE shareholders with those 
of its foreign investors.  
The Interaction between stakeholders within China’s online games companies centred 
around the tensions and potential for agency costs inherent in the VIE structure. Parent 
companies and VIE shareholders were observed to interact through contractual agreements, 
the exchange of resources for revenue, and through investment by local managers in the 
parent companies in order to align their economic interests and minimize risk. Following the 
examination of China’s regulators and game producers and operators, the chapter looked at 
some of the major ways that stakeholders from these groups interact with each other. 
The examination of VIE structures revealed that activity that surrounds them maintains 
the interests of regulators and game companies in a delicate balance. While regulators 
generally allowed the VIE structure to operate, they maintain a legal basis for cutting the 
domestic company’s ties with foreign capital at any time. This potential for selective 
enforcement provides incentive for game companies to appease regulators through outward 
compliance with their demands; thorough internal compliance was avoided where possible 
when these demands interfered with the maximization of profit. At the same time, the economic 
power wielded by foreign-held companies and their ties to the international financial system 
act as a deterrent for regulators that may want to enforce the prohibition of VIE use. Such 
action would carry with it significant economic costs, and holds the potential to damage China’s 
international reputation as an attractive target for foreign investment.  
The strong tensions between the interests of these stakeholder groups revealed by 
examination of the VIE structure highlight the need for negotiation between China’s online 
games regulators and industry members for both parties to maximize their interests. The 
analysis found two primary forums for interaction between stakeholders in these groups: social 
organizations and industry conferences. Social organizations involved in the negotiation of 
policy for new media and online games included the Internet Society of China (ISC) and the 
China Games Publishers’ Association (CGIA). For the games industry in particular, two 
conferences were highlighted as key events for negotiation with government stakeholders: the 
CGIA’s ChinaJoy China Games Developers Conference (CGDC), and the Ministry of Culture’s 
China Games Developers Conference, or GDC China.   
The chapter’s final section considered the structures, stakeholder interests, and 
interactions that take place among China’s online games users. Few formal organizations 
were found to represent or define the interests of online games users in China, however some 
structured environments were identified that contribute to community formation among the 
user population. These include: the social structures built into online games, the physical 




and entertainment. Community formation also takes place in the working environments where 
communities of players involved in third-party industries like gold farming might work.  
The interests of online games users were primarily divided according to their 
motivations for game play: professional players were interested in maximizing their profits and 
collecting virtual resources, while recreational players sought to maximize enjoyment of the 
game. Professional players primarily held economic interests in the game, while the interests 
of recreational players were found to be both emotional and financial. Significant tension 
between these groups was observed. This centred around the competition for virtual resources 
and the perceived illegitimacy of professional game play. Interactions between recreational 
and professional players observed in the case of gold farming illuminated how the interests of 
these parties conflicted. Despite the apparent conflict in interests, recent years have bridged 
the divide between the interests of these groups. The increasing professionalization of 
recreational game play and the popularization of trade in virtual goods have overlapped the 
interests of recreational and professional players, which are focused on achieving recognition 
of virtual property rights and maintaining game access.  
The final section also examined some of the interactions between users where the 
competing interests of recreational and professional players were negotiated. One way that 
recreational players pursued their interests was through cooperation toward collective action 
in the form of in-game protest. Users were also found to engage in deliberate interference with 
the activity of other users in cases of conflict. This was demonstrated with an example of 
recreational players interfering with the ability of gold farmers to effectively harvest in-game 
resources. When users felt their interests were being infringed upon, they appealed to the 
game companies for recourse through boycotts or protests. Where this interaction failed to 
satisfy their needs, users sought legal action.  
While game companies were involved in mediating disputes between users with 
competing interests, the courts and the Consumers’ Association of China were identified as 
key forums for negotiation of disputes between users and online game companies. The 
Consumers’ Association of China was identified as a mediator that had played a key role in a 
determining the outcome of a virtual property case. The precise mechanisms through which it 
operates are unclear, however there is some evidence that this social organization performs 
investigative and decision-making roles in cases of consumer rights. The results of these 
decisions are administered by government agencies.   
The online games industry has introduced powerful new stakeholders to China’s 
media sector that, for the first time, wield significant independent power to negotiate with 
government regulators. The regulation of online games in China is determined by the 




stakeholders. Overall, the results of this chapter’s exploratory analysis point to a dynamic of 
tense negotiation between the interests of government regulators, private industry, and media 
users. 
The exploration in this chapter has identified and described some foundational 
knowledge about the structures, interests, and interactions that influence the negotiation of 
regulatory practice in China's online games industry. This is helpful for bridging the gap in 
understanding the realities of regulation, however a practical understanding of policy 
development and implementation is best achieved through consultation with those who are 
involved in the process. The research undertook interviews with key informants in order to add 
first-hand knowledge of the current state of online games policy in China, and to gain expert 
opinion and insight about emerging practice is affecting and may affect this dynamic. The next 





Chapter IV: Innovation 
The Case of Gold Farming 
This chapter focuses the broad discussions of the previous chapters on the case of gold 
farming. It begins with a history and background of gold farming. First, brief history of Massively 
Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) establishes basic understanding of the technological 
platforms where gold farming takes place. This historical overview leads into discussion of 
what Real-Money Trade is, and how this practice grew along with the virtual economies of 
MMOGs. The history and background section concludes with a China-specific discussion of 
MMOGs, describing the infrastructure of Chinese online games and gold farming business 
practices both inside and outside China. This first section establishes the basis for detailed 
examination of various aspects of the gold farming industry.  
The second section examines the gold farming case in three ways. First, the author 
explores the mechanics of the gold farming industry and its mechanics of practice, examining 
key actors and mechanisms that comprise the gold farming industry’s value chain. Each of 
these members of the gold farming value chain are explored in detail, and the mechanisms by 
which they participate in gold farming are described. Members include: game developers, gold 
farming suppliers, Real-Money Trade mediating agents and consumers. Following this 
description of the industrial infrastructure and practice, the chapter then examines the gold 
farming case from a policy perspective. The policy examination begins with a description of 
the current policy environment. This leads into a discussion of practical approaches to 
regulating gold farming and other related emerging practices. This discussion of policy reveals 
an absence of clear policy mandates for gold farming. The exploration of practical regulation 
indicates that regulatory development in this area occurs most quickly in the court system, as 
judges interpret existing policy and make decisions on a case-by-case basis. This section 
concludes by identifying policy challenges for China that are raised by the gold farming case. 
In a final section, the case study on gold farming turns to a focused analysis of the key 
stakeholders in the regulation of gold farming in China and their interests in future relevant 
policy development. The chapter concludes with a summary and discussion that highlights 
some of the key findings of the case study and considers their meaning in the overall context 
of media convergence and globalization. 
History and Background 
History of Online Games 
Modern computer games have changed significantly since their inception. In contrast 




Goldsmith and Mann’s ‘Cathode-Ray Tube Amusement Device’ of 1948 and Higinbotham’s 
1958 ‘Tennis for Two’ were simple games with a maximum of two players, played on devices 
that predated the modern computer176. The advancement of computer and video display 
technology allowed for significant advancement in video game interactivity and realism. 
Although development of interactivity far outpaced any realistic graphical simulation, the 
former contributed realism where the graphics could not. The text-based games that emerged 
in the 1960s transported the player into a fictional universe, acting as a sort of interactive book. 
These could be played on early forms of computers, and included games such as Hamurabi 
(1969) and Oregon Trail (1971). The advent of the ARPANet 177  and PLATO 178  added 
interconnectivity to video games; not only could players interact with the computer program, 
they could also interact with each other. This new interconnected dimension of play made way 
for the text-based Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
MUDs combined text-based game narration with instant communication between 
players. At first, only staff and students associated with an ARPANet or PLATO-equipped 
educational institution could play these games, as access to closed networks was required. In 
1980, the University of Essex connected its ARPANet node to the internet and turned its MUD, 
MUD1, into the first internet-based role-playing game179. As the internet grew, so did access 
to and development of game play. Over the 1980s, tens of thousands of people were drawn 
to the fictional “places” of Habitat (1985), Mirrorworld (1986), and MIST (1987), among others, 
not only to play the game, but also to form real friendships and communities among fellow 
                                                     
176 Goldsmith and Mann’s ‘Cathode-Ray Tube Amusement Device’ used a cathode-ray tube, 
while Higinbotham’s ‘Tennis for Two’ was played on an oscilloscope. Although other electronic 
games, such as Ferranti International’s Nimrod computer of 1951 and A.S. Douglas’s OXO of 
1952, emerged in the same era, neither were created for the purpose of amusement. For this 
reason, they are not mentioned as video game predecessors, although they may have 
contributed to early computer game development (Brookhaven National Laboratory).  
177 The ARPANet, or Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, was the first wide-area 
packet-switching network and the predecessor to the modern internet. For more information 
on packet switching, see Teach-ICT.com. For a history of the ARPANet, see Internet Society. 
178 PLATO, or Programmed Logic for Automate Teaching Operations, was an educational 
network of computers developed by the University of Illinois in the 1960s. It pre-dated the 
internet, and was terminated after four decades of operation. PLATO hosted some of the first 
multi-user games, however these were not widely available to the public (Shahrani).  
179 Although Rheingold asserts that MUDs ‘started on a computer in a university in England in 
1980’ (Chapter Five), there are earlier text-based role-playing games such as Oubliette (1977) 
and Avatar (1979). However, these earlier games lacked persistence; when no one was 
playing, the memory was dumped and the virtual world did not exist until someone began 




players across time zones and countries. In The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier, Howard Rheingold describes this experience:  
Your character, Buffy Mojo, is crawling through a maze of tunnels in the dungeon of 
her archenemy's castle… Buffy's fate will influence the virtual lives of other characters 
who represent real friends in the material world. You are in a MUD, along with tens of 
thousands of others around the world who build fantasy worlds in the Net (Chapter 
Five). 
While MUDs were developing player interconnectivity, interactivity and increased 
realism were the focus of single and double-player console-based games180. Over the last 
three decades of the 20th century, the ‘video’ element of video games grew from Atari’s Pong, 
which was essentially Tennis for Two on a television, to the three-dimensional graphics of the 
Nintendo 64 and the Sony Playstation181. In 2002, Microsoft introduced interconnectivity to its 
console experience, allowing Xbox players to play against other subscribers over the internet 
(thegameconsole.com). Today, the Nintendo Wii and the Xbox Kinect provide additional 
interactivity; the specialized consoles allow the player to use body movement, not just buttons 
or dials, in order to play games. Although MUDs and console-based games each continued to 
develop separately, a new type of game emerged in the late 90s that converged the 
interconnectivity of MUDs with the interactivity and increasingly detailed graphics and sound 
of console-based games. This was the Massive Multiplayer Online Game, or MMOG.  
By the late 1990s, early forms of MMOGs had already existed for some time. The 
explosive technological advancement of the 1990s led to widespread ownership of personal 
computers and connection to the internet, and use of personal computers as game consoles 
became cheaper than the purchase of multiple consoles. Graphical MUDs such as Habitat 
(1985) and Neverwinter Nights (1991) presaged the modern-style MMOG; they were among 
the first to converge graphical representation with real-time virtual worlds (Wolf, 174-5). Other 
MMOG precursors included Maze Wars (1973-74), Warcraft: Orcs and Humans (1994), and 
Quake (1996). These games allowed players to interconnect 182 , and to play in three-
                                                     
180 A video game console is a specialized computer. Players must purchase the console and 
purchase game software to play using the machine. As they pre-date widespread ownership 
of personal computers, purchasing a console to use with a home television was originally less 
expensive and more practical than the purchase of a home computer.  
181 For a complete history of video game consoles, see thegameconsole.com. 
182 Maze Wars allowed multiple computers to play over ARPAnet, using terminal servers 
(World Heritage Encyclopedia). Warcraft: Orcs & Humans and Quake supported TCP/IP 




dimensional virtual environments. These environments were “instantiated”, meaning each 
game between players was an isolated instance, created specifically for that purpose. In these 
games, the virtual “world” and all its information would disappear when the game was over. 
Contrary to this, persistent183 virtual environments exist with or without player input. In these 
games, players can obtain new belongings and move to different areas of the game, and this 
data is tracked and retained when the player exits the world (Mansilla, 19; Nedelec, 6). In 
1996, the first commercial MMOG, Meridian 59, was released (Wolf 175). This was the first 
persistent three-dimensional online environment. In the following years, Ultima Online 
(1997)184 and Everquest (1999) popularized this genre. Many new MMOGs were released in 
response to this new popularity, and they continued to improve in functionality and evolve to 
allow higher levels of interconnectivity, increased channels of communication (via text, voice, 
and avatar movement) between players, and complexity of game play. The 2004 release of 
World of Warcraft marked a significant milestone in the popularity of MMOGs, and secured the 
Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) as one of the most popular online 
game sub-genres185.  
Today, MMOGs (and particularly MMORPGs) have transcended traditional definitions 
of games to become complex, persistent environments that in many ways mimic real life. They 
have been described as ‘environments that allow people to undertake various tasks, hunting, 
socializing, exploring, producing and consuming goods and generally leading a more or less 
full, rich and detailed life’ (Castronova 2003). This type of ‘socially complex’ (Lastowka 2) 
online game is now the most popular sub-genre; in October 2010, it gained previously unheard 
of popularity, with Blizzard’s World of Warcraft claiming 12 million subscribers worldwide 
(Blizzard 2010). MMORPGs have become platforms for social and economic activity on a 
massive scale. They provide an extremely effective form of communication and medium for 
social engagement; they combine the social networking capacity of Facebook, the persistence 
                                                     
183 A persistent virtual environment runs on a server or cluster of servers separately from 
player computers. Players can log on and off at will, and the environment will continue to exist 
(ie. The program continues to run and the information about the environment is stored), even 
when no one is playing. Persistence was first available in text-based games that used 
mainframe computers as a server to host the virtual environment. Persistent graphical 
environments developed later, along with the significant advancement in hardware capacity in 
the late 1990s.  
184 Ultima Online featured two-dimensional graphics, however it was the first MMOG to offer 
real-time combat in a persistent virtual environment (Wolf, 175).  
185 MMORPGs are a sub-genre of MMOG that claim roots in offline fantasy role-playing games 
such as Gygax and Arneson’s 1974 Dungeons and Dragons. They contain quests and combat, 
and are designed so that a player’s character increases in ability and prestige as more tasks 




of early MUDs and instant chat programmes and the voice connection capabilities of Skype 
with visual representation of place, avatar embodiment, team co-operation, and economic 
activity. Although economic activity has long been an aspect of MMORPG participation,186 in 
recent years this activity has extended beyond the game realms; the emergence of a practice 
called Real-Money Trade (RMT) has given real-world monetary value to in-game assets.  
Real-Money Trade 
In order to understand the mechanics of RMT, one must first understand basic 
mechanics of virtual economies. Within a MMOG, play generally involves participation in a 
virtual economy. Players can accumulate virtual assets by completing tasks, engaging in 
combat with other players, hunting, crafting and selling items, collecting valuable items found 
in the game, or exchanging and selling services. Assets accumulated in this way are used to 
improve player experience in the virtual world. In MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft, better 
quality equipment (eg., armor, weapons, magical items held in a player’s inventory) allows a 
player to progress more quickly, die less, and generally spend less time on the least enjoyable 
activities. Players with limited time to spend on game play generally want to spend it engaging 
in the most exciting tasks, however this generally requires more time than most people can 
devote. An easy solution to this dilemma was for players with limited time to pay real-world 
currency for in-game assets or services.  
The mechanics of Real-Money Trade vary according to the rules of the virtual space 
in which the assets are held. RMT that occurs with the participation of a game developer is 
the simplest form; the player pays the developer real-world currency in order to purchase in-
game property. Virtual property can be created at will by the developer, and there is no need 
in this case to employ RMT workers to play the game in order to collect property for sale. 
Games that offer this “primary market” functionality include Linden Lab’s Second Life, and 
ZTOnline (Linden Research, Martinsen). Most MMOG developers, however, forbid RMT in 
their Terms of Service (TOS) and/or End User License Agreement (EULA) (Blizzard 
Entertainment 2007; Lastowka, 2). The mechanics of “secondary market” RMT, therefore, 
often involve two external actors that replace the role of the developer. These are the 
companies and/or workers that actually collect virtual assets and perform services (commonly 
referred to as “gold farmers”) and companies that mediate between the buyers and sellers of 
virtual assets and services. These ‘RMT mediating agents’ (Lastowka) or ‘retailers’ 
(Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist), often take the form of websites, such as IGE, Itembay, and 
SwagVault, and are extremely profitable (Lastowka 2010, 23). They assume the role of 
                                                     
186  Lucasfilm’s 1985 Habitat, for example, featured an in-game currency called ‘Tokens’ 




connecting consumers and suppliers, providing an easy interface for gaming customers to pay 
for the purchase of virtual goods and services, and for ‘gold farming’ suppliers to sell them.  
The ‘gold farming’ industry accounts for a large portion of RMT; the most recent 
estimates gauge it to be worth 880 million US dollars of an estimated two billion dollar industry. 
It is additionally estimated that 80-85% of this industry operates out of China (Heeks, 12). A 
paucity of systematic primary research on the subject means that the accuracy of these 
estimates is by no means guaranteed; there is very little systematic primary field research on 
the subject. This is likely due to the emergent nature of both gold farming as a research topic 
and virtual worlds as a research platform. Research to date indicates that the industry is 
sizeable, that it operates from a number of countries including China, and that general 
consensus implies a large concentration of the industry in China. 
MMOGs in China 
China’s online gaming population is relatively isolated from the international gaming 
community. This is generally attributable to two factors: state efforts to control the MMOG 
industry in the country, and the role of the internet café as the typical venue of choice for online 
game activity. State efforts to control the MMOG industry will be covered in detail in the policy 
section of this chapter, but a brief overview of related policy, as well as discussion of its 
technical impact on MMOG functionality and on gold farming in China, follows.  
Due to governmental efforts to foster domestic development of the online gaming 
industry, foreign companies are prohibited from operating MMOGs in China or owning more 
than 50 per cent of the domestic companies that do (Rui et al.; Ström and Ernkvist, 647). 
Online games in China are therefore all domestically operated. These domestic companies 
often don’t export their services187, and therefore don’t have any customers outside of China 
to populate the virtual worlds they run. Chinese players therefore typically lack the opportunity 
to interact with players outside China.   
Internet cafés are the most popular venue for online gaming in China, as they are 
simple, inexpensive, and social. In these venues, customers purchase game time in credits at 
the café and play on its available computers. The café environment fosters community 
development both online and in the café itself; a 2008 study by Nardi describes the powerful 
bonds formed in this mixed-reality setting. The fostering of local community provided by 
internet cafés in China is equally accompanied by a diminished opportunity to forge 
                                                     
187 China’s online game exports and operations overseas are growing (Wang 2012). It remains 
unclear if this increased expansion will result in facilitated connection between China’s MMOG 




international connections; there is little to no access to the gaming community outside of 
China. There are ways for Chinese players to log on to equipment operated outside the 
country, but it is typically more expensive to do so, requiring (at least): ownership of a personal 
computer, access to an internet connection, and the specialized knowledge and expense 
involved in bypassing any technical blocks in place that restrict access. These blocks typically 
exist in the form of IP address restrictions that allow only IP addresses188 from certain countries 
to log onto the game. Such barriers are typically in place due to product localization efforts; 
MMOG developers tend to “localize” their games for release in different areas of the world, 
tailoring language input capabilities, business models, and content according to regional 
differences. Localization of foreign games in China is particularly isolating; licensing for 
domestic operation and the rigorous demands of the content approval process mean that 
foreign MMOGs are typically released much later in China than they are elsewhere. The 
promise of cutting edge game play provides incentive for those with the appropriate resources 
to try and access foreign servers on their own. For gold farmers, this incentive combines with 
the appeal of a foreign customer base. In order to conduct business with the international 
gaming community, gold farmers need to access foreign-operated servers, providing services 
for the newest games as soon as they are released abroad. Gold farming workers and 
establishments no doubt take a variety of different approaches to accessing foreign servers, 
however the barriers they face are the same.  
Obstacles faced by China-based gamers accessing foreign-operated online game 
servers can be divided into two general categories: technical and financial. Technical barriers, 
as discussed above, usually take the form of IP blocks189 (ie. a technical access obstacle that 
applies to all IP addresses from outside a certain region). There are several ways around these 
obstacles, the most popular of which is likely the establishment of a VPN or Virtual private 
network. VPNs create an encrypted “tunnel” for data across large geographical distances. It 
provides the security of a private network and the geographical flexibility of the internet. The 
encryption prevents normal filtering mechanisms (such as China’s “Golden Shield”) from being 
effective190. VPNs can be used to maneuver around IP blocks or bans by using the encrypted 
                                                     
188 An IP, or internet protocol address, is a unique set of numbers that identifies computers on 
the internet. IP addresses contain information about the computer’s geographical location, and 
can therefore be used to block certain regions from accessing certain content on the internet. 
An example of this is BBC iplayer, which is accessible only from United Kingdom IP addresses.  
189 There are other methods of filtering, however these are less directly relevant to the gold 
farming practice.  For more detail on these methods, see Open Democracy's interview with 
Jon Penney from Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet & Society, who explains them in detail 
(China Correspondent).  
190 There are reports that China's filtering mechanisms can now detect and filter encrypted 




tunnel to remotely access a server in a country whose IP addresses are not blocked by the 
game. This “proxy” server (or VPN “gateway”, as they are commonly termed) then makes the 
access request with its regionally approved IP address, allowing the remotely tunneled China-
based user to then access the game191. Access to VPN services and proxy servers are 
extremely useful, but their use may incur additional expense; although access to some (eg., 
Hotspot Shield) is free, it is usually offered as a paid service (eg., 12Vpn, VPN in China, 
StrongVPN, Astrill). The additional expense, as well as a recent government crackdown on 
corporate network access to VPNs (such as University-based internet connections)192 may 
make this option unfeasible for the common gamer. To compound this expense, additional 
financial obstacles emerge due to the alternative business models that prevail in the MMOG 
industry operating outside of China.  
The prevailing business model for MMOG operation in China involves no initial game 
purchase and no subscription. Developer and operator profit lies in either a per hour payment 
for time played (credits bought at the internet café), or RMT transactions directly between the 
operator and the player. These exchanges, referred to by economists as “primary market 
transactions” and by the gaming industry as “microtransactions”, are often used within a “free-
to-play” (commonly referred to as “F2P”) business model that relies on them as a primary 
source of revenue. Companies that use this model, such as Tencent and Shanda, provide 
small in-game bonuses (for example, equipment such as potions or magical items that help 
the player to progress more quickly through the game) in exchange for real-world currency. 
This model has been immensely successful in Asia and in China in particular, with some 
foreign developers producing microtransaction-based versions specifically for the Chinese 
market (Activision Blizzard Quarterly Earning Report, Q1, 2011). The microtransaction-driven 
model is becoming increasingly popular in other parts of the world193.  
Outside of China, most online games require an initial purchase of the game for 
installation on a home computer, and/or a monthly subscription fee. Blizzard’s World of 
                                                     
of protocol used (China Correspondent) and can therefore be circumvented by VPN services 
that change protocols regularly. 
191 See Microsoft for a detailed explanation of Virtual Private Networks.  
192 On May 10, 2011 China technology blogger William Long reported crackdowns on VPN 
access from corporate networks in China. Affected networks included Southern Medical 
University and Zhejiang University (Griffiths; Long). 
193 Examples of games operating on the free-to-play model that have enjoyed success in 
international expansion include: China-based Perfect World’s Perfect World International, as 




Warcraft, the most successful MMOG to date, requires both; the initial purchase costs upwards 
of 50 US dollars, while the subscription fee is approximately 15 US dollars per month. On top 
of this expense, “expansion packs” for World of Warcraft are released every few years. These 
are software additions to the game that increase the scope, add new locations of interest, 
increase the level cap, and make fundamental changes to game play. In China, expansion 
packs are released by the game operators for free; it simply adds more incentive to buy play 
time. However, players looking to play on foreign-operated servers must purchase the 
expansion pack themselves, at a cost of about 30 US dollars. Additional costs related to 
importation of these items may also exist. Despite the technical and financial obstacles 
present, aspiring members of the gold farming industry must overcome them in order to 
engage with their international customer base.  
Industry & Mechanics of Practice 
In order to consider the policy issues raised by the gold farming practice, it is 
necessary not only to establish a basic understanding of RMT and a comparative 
understanding of MMOG functionality in China; such consideration must begin with a detailed 
understanding of the gold farming industry itself.  Existing explanations of the industry’s 
functionality vary; definitions and terminology are still being established and available research 
varies widely in type of expertise. The following section draws on available academic sources, 
the researcher’s participant observation experience in World of Warcraft, as well as key 
informant interviews conducted with elite level World of Warcraft players in 2008, to provide a 
detailed description of this emerging industry. This will begin on a broad scale with a definition 
of gold farming and an examination of the primary actors in the gold farming supply chain.  
Following this examination is a specific description of the activity that takes place at each stage 
in the chain.  
Among academics and gamers alike, the practice of “gold farming” has been used to 
refer both broadly to any third-party RMT practice in online games194 (Arnason 2008, Appendix 
3; Dibell; Ge Jin, Chinesegoldfarmers.com; Heeks, 3; Sharaput, 19) and specifically to the 
practice of collecting either virtual currency or virtual goods in order to sell them for real-world 
currency195 (Arnason 2008, Appendix 3; Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 16; Sharaput, 20). This 
                                                     
194  RMT practice in online games includes the sale of both virtual goods (eg., currency, 
equipment) and services (eg., power leveling) and assumes they may be produced in any 
number of ways.  
195 This narrower definition excludes the sale of services such as power-leveling and often 





project uses the wider definition, as it is more inclusive and reflects the widespread association 
(among gamers and academics alike) between the gold farming industry and the sale of both 
virtual goods and services (Arnason 2008, Appendix 3; Dibbell; Ge Jin 2010).  
Supply Chain 
 Current consensus indicates that the gold farming supply chain generally contains at 
least four primary participants: the game developer, the supplier of virtual goods and/or 
services, the retailer of virtual goods and/or services, and the consumer (Arnason; Heeks; 
Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist). These primary categories may be divided still according to various 
supporting roles, for example: the developer may in fact consist of two companies, one that 
created the game and another that operates it; the retailer may employ the services of separate 
companies like Paypal in order to process real-world financial transactions (gold farmers 
part2.mov); suppliers may be individuals, or they may consist of a game studio that employs 
many individual workers to collect virtual goods and/or perform virtual services (Professional 
Chinese Gold Farmer Tells All); consumers may be individuals but may also be groups of 
individuals such as small in-game communities that decide to collectively purchase virtual 
goods or services (Arnason 2008, Respondent 5). For simplicity of explanation, the four 
primary roles will be examined, beginning with the role of the developer.  
Developer  
 The game developer is instrumental in creating the market conditions that create 
demand for virtual goods and services. Developers are also responsible for creating virtual 
goods and for general governance of the population of the virtual world they maintain 
(Humphreys). The developer’s governing role means that the approval or prohibition of RMT 
on their part is instrumental in defining the mechanics and working conditions of the gold 
farming industry. It is also instrumental in defining the market; approval and regulation of RMT 
tends to discourage gold farming, whereas its prohibition allows it to flourish.  
The market for third-party RMT services depends largely on the differences in game 
business models and developer attitude toward RMT. Where game business models include 
a primary market for virtual assets (ie. the developer offers assets for sale), as in Linden Lab’s 
Second Life and microtransaction-driven MMOGs, the market for third-party game services is 
minimal; developers are in a position to fabricate virtual assets at will, whereas third-party 
game services such as gold farming and power leveling must produce virtual assets under the 
conditions of economic scarcity programmed into the game. In MMOGs where virtual assets 
are available for sale from the developer, third-party providers find it difficult to compete. In the 
few MMOGs where third party sale of virtual goods and services are condoned by the 
developer (like Ultima Online and EvE Online) (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 19; Arnason 2008, 




within the game) creates significant entry barriers for new entrepreneurs while reducing 
potential profit (by funneling potential clientele towards approved suppliers, who, though 
potentially more expensive, eliminate the risk of account closure). Although some game 
developers that don’t participate in a primary market condone and regulate a secondary 
market of third-party gaming services (like, for example Ultima Online and EvE Online) it is far 
more common for developers to oppose participation in secondary markets (Lehdonvirta and 
Ernkvist, 17). Opposition of this practice by the virtual world’s effective governing body can 
significantly affect the mechanics and working conditions of gold farmers; Blizzard’s World of 
Warcraft provides a prime example of this influence.  
 In Blizzard’s World of Warcraft, the developer claims ownership of all virtual items, 
characters, and currency; selling any of these for real-world currency violates the EULA and 
may result in the closure of a player’s account. A player additionally violates the EULA and is 
vulnerable to account closure by sharing his or her password with others. This stipulation is a 
contractual deterrent from purchasing power leveling services. The legality and enforceability 
of these agreements are ambiguous; they are considered ‘highly one-sided’ by courts in the 
USA and Europe (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 18), and contract law applicable in the developer’s 
home country is impractical to enforce on an international player base. Although, as 
Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist maintain, ‘contractual prohibitions are not a very effective deterrent 
in practice,’ the recourses that remain available to developers do create obstacles for 
successful gold farming operation. One of these recourses is account closure; gold farmers 
work under a constant threat of having their accounts banned. This adds operational costs to 
their businesses, but is seen as an ineffective deterrent due to the low cost of accounts relative 
to potential profits (Arnason 2008, respondent 5). In order to sell virtual goods and services in 
a hostile developer environment, gold farmers must take measures to avoid detection. 
Detection is usually based on the transfer of large amounts of currency to and from a character, 
unwanted gold selling advertisements, or “spam” that originates from the account, or reports 
of gold farming activity by recreational players. Standard practice under these conditions 
involves: the use of dummy characters (characters created with an expectation of being 
banned from the game), private advertising using private chat channels or private in-game 
mail (to avoid detection by monitoring agents in public channels), and use of complex methods 
of transferring funds. One example involves the use of the auction house in World of Warcraft 
for large currency transfers. The way this works is as follows:  
1. The intended recipient of in-game currency to auction an item of extremely low value 
for an exorbitant buy-out price (eg, it is worth three copper and sold for one thousand 
gold).  




3. The consumer receives the in-game currency in the same way he or she would receive 
the profits of any auction; delivery through the in-game mail system.  
As this method is commonly used by recreational players to transfer funds between characters 
of different factions196, detection of its specific use for gold farming activity is difficult. 
 Perhaps the most effective deterrent of gold farming activity in a MMOG to date has 
been interference on the part of the developer with the value of virtual currency. Maintaining 
and balancing the in-game economy is a key role of the developer in World of Warcraft; 
Blizzard asserts, in fact, that the reason gold farming is prohibited is because it negatively 
affects the virtual economy; under its Exploitation Policy for World of Warcraft, the company 
lists RMT of any kind under 'Abuse of the Economy' (Blizzard Entertainment). In 2007, the 
developer used its role as economic regulator to abruptly and significantly decrease the value 
of its in-game currency by vastly increasing supply. As a result, the Burning Crusade 
expansion pack that contained this change resulted in a devaluation of assets held by gold 
farming operations. One informant describes: ‘The primary product of the gold sellers is, well, 
gold/so blizzard just made it much easier to aquire gold. This…effectively directly hit the 
bottom line for many gold farming operations’ (Arnason 2008, respondent 5). Despite this 
countermeasure, the market for virtual goods did not disappear. One informant reports: 
It’s not like [developer countermeasures] were 100% effective/far from it/they just 
pushed it under the surface mostly/or sold different products, like leveling/honor 
grinding services/as long as someone values their $ less then their in game time, I 
doubt farmers will go away’ (Arnason 2008, respondent 5). 
Hostile developer environments, then, typically don’t discourage gold farming activity, but they 
do affect its mechanics.   
Negative developer attitudes toward gold farming also tend to foster negative working 
conditions for gold farmers. They are labeled illegitimate players and rule-breakers, and the 
countermeasures implemented by the developer may inspire individual countermeasures in 
the form of harassment. Harassment of gold farmers has been noted as racially loaded 
(Nakamura) and inspired by racist motivation (Arnason, respondent 5). Harrassment may be 
verbal, or may consist of interference. This latter form of harassment is known as “griefing”; it 
consists of either killing the player repeatedly (thus making continued play impossible), or 
                                                     
196 In World of Warcraft, players can choose to participate in one of two factions: the Alliance, 
or the Horde. These are akin to separate teams, and they are often pitted against each other 
in player-versus-player activity. Members of opposing factions cannot communicate except 




“tagging” (striking the first blow to) the player’s targeted mobs197 before the player himself can 
manage it. This prevents the player from collecting items from mob corpses, and therefore, 
when targeted at a gold farmer, prevents him or her from doing his or her job. Gold farmers 
lack the same recourse for harassment as recreational players, as such recourse consists of 
reporting abusive behavior to the developer. Since the developers consider gold farmers 
illegitimate players, they are more likely to ban the gold farming account than the account of 
the recreational player. An examination of production modes used by gold farmers provides a 
more detailed picture of how these working conditions affect gold farming suppliers. 
Gold farming Suppliers & Production Methods 
There are several ways that gold farming production typically occurs 198 : through 
manual collection (wherein people engage in in-game activity that generates virtual assets), 
automatic collection with the help of computer programs or “bots” (computer programs are 
programmed to guide a character to perform asset collection in the game), and hacking199 
(people hack into the game accounts of recreational players and steal their virtual assets). In 
Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy, Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist identify these three modes 
of virtual asset production as “gold farming”, “bot farms”, and “hacking groups” (17). Although 
the identification of these separate production modes of virtual assets is valuable, the definition 
of gold farming as solely associated with manual collection is erroneous; gold farming is 
commonly associated with all three identified modes of production (manual, automatic, and 
hacking)200. Having categorized gold farming as ‘only a small part of the production sector in 
the third-party gaming services industry’ (16) (the other seventy percent accounted for by the 
apparently separate ‘bot farms’ and ‘hacker groups’), Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist also fail to 
                                                     
197 “Mobs” are computer-generated enemies (Author). 
198 Respondents 3 and 4 referred to human-driven labour activities as “dajin” (打金) and 
automated labour as“shuaqian” (刷钱), respectively. 
199 Account hacking is often accomplished through the use of keylogging programs. These are 
generally distributed by embedding them in other programs associated with game play (such 
as World of Warcraft addons) that will be installed on a user’s computer (WoW Account Hacked: 
Destroyed my Life - An Addicted Gamer's Sad Tale), or, according to one key informant, by 
embedding them in websites associated with the game, such as virtual goods retailers 
(Personal communication between author and informant, May 24, 2011).  
200 The prevalence of perceived association between the practice of gold farming and the use 
of: “hacks” (performance-enhancing computer programs whose use is prohibited by the 
developer), “bots”, and account hacking, can be observed in online forum discussions such as 
(Wowhead and Riftgame), first-hand video accounts of the practice (see Gold Farmer Hacks 
While GM Observes, Paiid’s Back: Hacked by WoW Gold Sellers), and has been reported by 





account for the significant and widespread association between the gold farming industry and 
power leveling services (Ge Jin; Arnason 2008, respondent 3). Another important point is that 
an alternate use of the term “hacking” is also widely associated with gold farming practice; it 
refers to the use of unapproved performance-enhancing programs in online games. 
The collection of virtual assets may include a number of activities, but (with the 
exception of account hacking) this activity tends to mimic the act of hunting and gathering. 
Gathering activity generally consists of running around the virtual environment searching for 
and collecting various natural resources (such as plants or minerals) that appear or “spawn” 
in the game. These can be sold or used to make more valuable items (such as potions or 
armor). Hunting activity generally consists of repetitive killing of antagonistic computer-
generated characters, or “mobs”. These might be animals in a forest, zombies in a cemetery, 
or any number of fictional characters. When a player kills the mobs, he or she can often loot 
their corpses and collect anything of value that is “dropped” by the corpse for future use or 
sale to another player. This “loot” typically consists of small amounts of in-game currency 
and/or various items of low value. Occasionally, however, a high value item will “drop” from a 
mob corpse. Certain types of mobs will drop certain valuable items, however, it might take 
many hours of killing said mobs in order to produce the item of value. This repetitive activity is 
not enjoyed by most players and as a result, it is a job particularly well-suited to gold farmers; 
a twelve hour shift may only consist of staying in an area known to produce a certain item of 
value and repeatedly killing the mobs (gold farmers part2.mov). This type of focused 
accumulation of resources from a single location is often called "farming", however when 
"farming" is efficient, it excludes the possibility of other players killing the same mobs. This 
behaviour constitutes a domination of resources and is called "camping"201 a single area. It is 
considered typical of gold farmers (Arnason, Respondent 9) and the author has personally 
encountered it many times. "Camping" can interfere with the ability of recreational players to 
accomplish quests or to farm resources recreationally in that area202. For this reason, is often 
a cause of contention within the player community203. One interview respondent describes the 
behaviour as follows:  
                                                     
201 This behaviour has been recorded by a number of players and is available for observation 
on Youtube. See Following a gold farmer bot in WoW for an example. 
202  This is because many quests involve killing specific mobs. If these mobs are being 
"camped", recreational players cannot complete their quests, or gather the same resources 
for sale. 
203 This contention is articulated in Ni Hao: a Gold Farmer's Story (Nyhm) and has also been 




Professional gold farmers will go to great lengths to make sure they get every mob, 
node, herb in an area...For mobs, they will do something called "ninja tap" in which in 
order for a character in wow to have rights to loot a dead mob they must do first 
damage to it. You can be clearly charging into a mob and they will do anythign to make 
sure they get that tap. For Nodes and Herbs, they will attempt and usually succeed in 
spamming the node with their gathering profession to get a "charge" of ore from.. 
(Arnason, respondent 9) 
 
Particularly well-equipped gold farms may use “bots” or computer programs to perform 
the repetitive activity of "camping" specific spots (Dibbell; Arnason, respondent 9). According 
to one respondent, bots are programs that command a character to ‘run in a loop and kill 
preset mobs’ (Arnason 2008, respondent 5). Advanced bots can also command a character 
to perform specific activities in response to environmental triggers, allowing them to engage in 
more complex activities and accumulate more valuable goods. One World of Warcraft player 
has documented, for example, a bot that accumulates points for player-versus-player 
activity 204  (World of Warcraft Battleground Bots). Bots can be extremely advanced and 
profitable; multiple instances of a game can be run on one computer (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 
16), with human intermediaries required only to maintain the equipment, see to the smooth 
operation of the bot programs, and transfer the assets from the bot-controlled “toon”, or 
character, to a different toon that stores the assets until they are sold (Arnason 2008, 
respondent 5).  
Manual collection of virtual assets can include activity beyond simple hunting and 
gathering; power leveling is also a lucrative form of RMT. Here, the assets sold are status 
improvements that cannot be separated from the “toon” or character with which they are 
gained. These status improvements may be simple attainment of a higher level, or may consist 
of more complex activity such as honor or faction gain in World of Warcraft205. Achievement 
of honor or faction in this MMOG allows a character to purchase particularly unique and 
valuable equipment, and awards the character with titles visible to other players. Another form 
of power leveling involves obtaining difficult-to-obtain equipment that cannot be traded from 
another toon. Such equipment often drops from the most difficult mobs (called “bosses”) in 
elite-level dungeons. Its possession is a status symbol within the game, marking the owner as 
                                                     
204 This would allow the bot to accumulate honor points, which was, according to Respondent 
5 in Arnason 2008, a highly traded commodity following the devaluation of World of Warcraft's 
in-game currency in 2010.  
205 In World of Warcraft, honor is gained from successful player-versus-player combat. Faction 
is a measure of a player’s reputation among a certain group of NPCs. It can be gained through 




a skilled player that is trusted by others206. In MMOGs that lack a primary market, these highly 
coveted items are purchased with significant risk; in order to attach the equipment to the 
consumer’s character, a third party must log into their account. This comes with high security 
risks, from simply the stealing of virtual assets, to the re-sale of the account for use by other 
gold farmers. This has real-world value to gold farmers because, as discussed earlier, their 
biggest markets exist in hostile developer environments and are therefore subject to developer 
countermeasures such as the banning of accounts suspected of involvement in gold farming 
activity.  
Outside their in-game work environments, Gold farming workers may work as 
individuals or may work in a game studio207. Given the high start-up costs (ie. initial purchase, 
game subscription, additional accounts if banned, VPN service if needed), it is easier to work 
in a game studio, though perhaps less profitable long term; Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist estimate 
that, although gold farming suppliers retain 60-70% of transaction revenue, individual workers 
in game studios earn only a small percentage of this (21, Fig 3). The authors additionally 
maintain that typical game studios are companies in suburban China that employ ‘young males 
with disadvantaged backgrounds and no occupational skills’ (17). One interview respondent 
reported that these studios are often deliberately set up by local governments to encourage 
employment of underemployed youths. The informant shared their first-hand experience 
interviewing members of the industry:  
I’ve interviewed gold farming bosses and…they say that some of the operations were 
set up by local governments inviting these gold farming entrepreneurs there to run the 
gold farm. So, organising employment for the local village or small town. And it’s easy 
to set up, just buy some computers from the used market. 
At the studio level, gold farming workers are typically ill-equipped to deal with a foreign 
customer base, marketing, and international financial transactions 208 , and therefore their 
business is dependent on an intermediary company which will take a large cut but provide the 
                                                     
206 In order to kill elite level boss mobs, it is often necessary to collaborate with other skilled 
players. In order to obtain rare pieces of armor dropped by these mobs, it is implied that the 
character was trusted enough to be included in the fight. 
207 Ge Jin has documented both types of gold farming work. 
208 Ge Jin documents a business partnership between an American gamer and a Chinese gold 
farming workshop whereby the workshop paid the gamer in in-game currency in exchange for 




necessary services. The following section examines the role of these ‘RMT mediating agents’ 
(Lastowka 2).  
RMT Mediating Agents 
While, according to Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, gold farming suppliers or “producers” 
are typically located in Chinese suburbs, they suggest that typical RMT mediating agents or 
“retailers” operate from the country’s regional capitals (16). The primary function of these 
agents is that of marketing and financial intermediary; they eliminate the suppliers’ need to 
develop marketing and capacity for financial transactions while providing a trusted brand and 
easy interface for consumers. China was not always a typical location for mediating agents; 
originally, mediators were located in ‘wealthy gaming nations’ (eg, the United States and 
Korea) (16) and sourced virtual assets locally, both from professionals and from recreational 
players trading their virtual surplus for real-world currency209. As the industry expanded, local 
sourcing gave way to outsourcing in order to take advantage of the low cost of labour in 
countries such as China and Vietnam. During this phase, the role of mediator became even 
more defined; in exchange for their low-cost labour, foreign RMT workers were provided with 
access to high-value markets, product marketing and capacity for international financial 
transactions. Over time, as Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist point out, entrepreneurs in the industry’s 
former production countries gained the skills and resources necessary to operate mediating 
agents themselves. As a result of this as well as increasing legal pressure from game 
developers in the United States, the typical RMT mediating agent today operates from 
countries with low labour costs that are relatively insulated from developer-side legal pressure 
to cease operation.210  
Another transformation of the RMT mediating industry reported by Lehdonvirta and 
Ernkvist is a trend toward consolidation; the authors suggest that today’s virtual asset retail 
websites (numbering in the hundreds) are in fact operated by a small number of mediating 
companies. RMT Transactions are distributed first to a small number of mediating agents, and 
the agents then distribute sourcing work among networks of thousands of suppliers 
(Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 16). This differential in number of transactions processed accounts 
for the fact that, while mediating agents have typically been the largest profit-making 
                                                     
209 A key informant described this as a common practice in World of Warcraft before ‘blizzard 
cracked down on that pretty hard’. He notes, ‘most people stopped selling to gold vendors for 
fear of being banned’ (Arnason 2008, respondent 5).   
210 The well-known mediating agent IGE provides a prime example of this shift in venue; the 
company was incorporated in the United States in 2003, and in 2007, operations were moved 




enterprises in the gold farming industry (Huhh 1-2; Lastowka 2010, 23), producers (gold 
farming suppliers and labourers) have the bigger revenue share on a per-transaction basis; 
informant estimates reported by Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist set the annual revenue of the eight 
largest Chinese mediating agents above $10 million US dollars, with ‘an additional 50-60 firms 
with over $1 million in revenues’ (16). By contrast, the authors estimate that approximately 
100,000 workers divided into game studios of about 10-20 employees comprise the production 
sector of the industry (41-2). The Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist analysis of the industry indicates 
the following distribution of revenue shares for a typical gold farming transaction, indicated in 
Fig. 4.0 below:  
 
Fig. 4.0 Source: Author’s combination of data from Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, Figures 3 and 7. 
These estimates are rough at best, given the data from which they are derived; a survey 
conducted on a non-representative sample of gaming studio workers, for which key data such 
as game studio operation costs, was only indicated by 3 respondents. Despite the small 
sample size (N=26), the survey is the first to be published in the field and therefore comprises 
a sizable portion of the small amount of primary data available on the gold farming industry.   
Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist report that RMT mediating agents typically consist of about 
500 reasonably well-educated employees; they estimate that ‘the retail and management 
functions of the industry directly employ perhaps a few tens of thousands of skilled workers 
(customer service staff, studio managers, IT support, and accounting)’ (42). The services 
provided by these skilled workers include: sourcing of virtual goods from suppliers, marketing 
to consumers, interacting with external financial agents such as Paypal, customer service, and 
in-game transfer of virtual goods. Due to the closed-door nature of the industry, little is known 














between RMT mediators, however the following description outlines what is known of standard 
practice for these activities (sourcing, marketing, and transferring). The research draws on 
public knowledge to date, first-hand experience, and key informant interviews.  
Sourcing 
Mediating agents source virtual goods from suppliers211 based on demand at a given 
point in time. They may accomplish this in any number of ways. Some of the most typical 
methods of mediator interaction with suppliers are listed below: 
1. Interaction through what Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist term ‘“buy” sites’ (16), which are 
‘extranet’212 (16) websites listing orders which can be fulfilled by any supplier.   
2. Interaction through instant messaging services such as Tencent’s QQ  
3. Interaction with “wholesalers”, an additional company that sometimes enters the gold 
farming supply chain by ‘dealing with fluctuations in demand’ (Lehdonvirta and 
Ernkvist 16), purchasing virtual goods when prices are low and selling them when high.  
Marketing 
Since most gold farming transactions take place in MMOG environments where the 
developer opposes third-party RMT, opportunities for in-game marketing are limited. 
Marketing efforts by mediators attempting to gain exposure within this difficult environment are 
responsible for much animosity from the recreational player population. The most popular 
advertising technique by far is what gamers refer to as “spamming” chat channels. This 
involves characters (usually dummy characters, as these are the most likely to be banned) 
logging into the game and either announcing the advertisement in a highly visible general chat 
channel (which is likely to cause the fastest account banning), or privately messaging 
individual players with ads. The latter form of advertising is sustainable until the character is 
reported as a gold farming spam agent, and the account subsequently banned. As Lehdonvirta 
and Ernkvist remark, this is perceived as a detraction from the game experience and ‘both 
gamers and operators detest it’ (16). This researcher’s informants indicated similar animosity 
toward this practice, as well as other forms of in-game marketing. These might include sending 
ads through the in-game mail system or creating visual ads within the game through placement 
of in-game objects. One commonly reported tactic employs corpse placement to spell out the 
addresses of gold vending websites (Doctorow, 2007). Out-of-game marketing tactics 
                                                     
211 Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist suggest that typical mediator networks include ‘thousands of 
small gaming studios’ (16).  





employed by RMT mediating agents can be equally as reviled; many Search Engine 
Optimization tactics can be underhanded and include frowned upon activity such as the 
purchase of links from high-ranking websites and other tactics that can be viewed as a form 
of “cheating” the system. On the other hand, marketing tactics outside MMOGs have also 
served to build brand credibility and key relationships in the industry. In a 2008 article in Wired 
magazine, Julian Dibbell describes early marketing tactics by Brock Pierce as essential to the 
success of RMT mediating agent IGE. Dibbell reports full-page ads in respected gaming 
magazines, participation in academic conferences such as Game On as key steps toward 
establishment of the company’s credibility, while Google AdWords and search engine 
optimization provided competitive edge over the competition (Dibbell 2008). Unsolicited email 
advertisements or “spam” directed toward previous customers are another key advertising 
engine; after a one-time virtual asset purchase in 2005, the researcher receives an average 
of fifty unsolicited advertisements for World of Warcraft gold.  
Transfers 
RMT mediating agents not only deal with sourcing virtual assets and marketing them 
to potential customers; they also attend to the logistics of international financial transactions 
from the consumer, as well as the in-game transfer of virtual assets from RMT industry-held 
game accounts to the account held by the consumer. International financial transactions are 
typically dealt with through specialized companies such as Paypal. These companies are 
commonly used for financial transactions on the internet, and provide brand names that 
consumers are willing to trust with their financial details. While it is difficult for gold farming 
labourers to set up accounts with these organizations, RMT mediating agents tend to be large 
corporations with an international presence. This presence tends to include both countries with 
low labour costs, where acceptance of international financial transactions may be difficult 
(Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 43), and countries where labour sourcing may not be practical, but 
international financial transactions are easily accepted. IGE’s presence in both China, a 
primary source of gold farming labour, as well as in Vanuatu, a country with a reputation for 
friendly financial policies, is a prime example of this tactic. The mediating agency, operating in 
both countries, can accept funds in the country with friendly financial policies, transfer funds 
within its own organization in order to cross the necessary national borders, and pay local 
workers in the primary source company the necessary wages.  
In-game transfers of virtual assets are typically much simpler, although they do require 
significant presence in the virtual world. In a typical MMOG, liberal flows of assets are only 
permitted within a given server or “realm”.  As a result, RMT agents must source virtual assets 
for each individual realm of a MMOG. Technically, this means that gold farming activity must 




for virtual assets, RMT agents will call in the assets necessary from the suppliers, and transfer 
them to the consumer in the game. This can be done in several ways:  
1. “Face-to-face”: the retailer and consumer avatars meet and physically trade the 
assets  
2. Via in-game mail system: the retailer mails the assets to the consumer 
3. Through an in-game Auction House (see 4.1.1) 
There is significant risk involved in the transfer of virtual assets; significant fund transfers serve 
as flags for developers who can intercede and confiscate the assets and ban the accounts 
involved in the trade. In Julian Dibbell’s Wired article describing the history of IGE, he quotes 
one company executive as reporting a change in infrastructure wherein the gold farming 
workers assume the risk involved: ‘what happens now is that the risk has been pushed further 
up the supply chain. Retailers often don't even touch the gold; they don't even have accounts 
anymore. It's the farmer that holds the gold and risks the banning’ (James Clarke in Dibbell 
2008).  
In order to broaden understanding of the industry and the deeper mechanics of the 
RMT mediating agents within it, this section presents a case example that documents the 
growth of the most well-known RMT mediating agent to date. Due to the grey-market nature 
of their work and the location of most RMT mediator headquarters in developing countries, 
detailed information about their activity is not widely available. IGE, or Internet Gaming 
Entertainment has been chosen as the subject for this case study due to the significant public 
attention it has received; as a controversial industry pioneer, it has merited close attention and 
its activity is therefore the most publicly documented among RMT mediating agents. The 
following case example draws on documentation by members of the MMOG community (eg., 
The Rise and Fall of IGE), the internet archives of the IGE website, and news reports in order 
to document the growth stages of the company from a single secondary market website to an 
industry giant.  
Development stages of a RMT mediating agent: the Case of Internet Gaming 
Entertainment (IGE) 
IGE, or Internet Gaming Entertainment, was founded in 2001 by two EverQuest 
players: Brock Pierce and Alan Debonneville. They began operation with a single website, 
Eqnetgaming.com, and an incorporation as Internet Gaming Entertainment SL in Spain (The 
Rise and Fall of IGE; Eqnetgaming.com, November 2001). By November 2001, according to 
the internet archives, the company already operated several “Netgaming.com” websites that 
traded virtual assets from various MMOGs for real currency. In 2003, the company expanded 
internationally; IGE Inc. was incorporated in the United States and Internet Gaming 




newly created IGE, Inc. in Hong Kong. By this time, the primary website of operation had 
become ige.com, however as its August 2003 archive states, the website was ‘part of an 
overall network of Interactive Entertainment services’. In 2004, IGE, Inc. acquired its biggest 
rival, Yantis Enterprises, Inc., which dominated the RMT market at the time (Dibbell 2008). 
Yantis Enterprises ran the MMOG secondary market website MySuperSales.com, among a 
number of others; the company had followed a path of website acquisition since its inception 
(Dibbell 2008). After the Yantis acquisition, IGE claimed a monopoly on MMOG secondary 
market trade (The Rise and Fall of IGE). By 2005, the company owned ‘four ebay-style trading 
platforms, and 40 content websites’ (CNN.com, November 2005). IGE continued its acquisition 
trend with a new target in mind; MMOG fan websites. L2Orphus.com, Ogaming, Thottbot, 
Allakhazam and Wowhead were purchased under the name of RPG Holdings LLC213, together 
forming a network of websites in a position to collect user-submitted data about MMOGs214. 
This set of content-driven websites was called the ZAM Network, and catered to demographics 
in both the United States and China (Zelfden, 2007). RPG Holdings, LLC changed its name to 
Affinity Media and was publicized as owner of the ZAM Network. It was later discovered (with 
much controversy) that Affinity was still associated with IGE (The Rise and Fall of IGE). Affinity 
media continued the industry trend toward consolidation, acquiring the Korea-based auction 
site Itemmania in 2006. Under Affinity’s management, however, IGE’s popularity and stability 
declined significantly; by this point, most of the early founders of the company had resigned215 
or been bought out216, and according to IGE’s website, ‘the company was losing hundreds of 
thousands of dollars a month and its worldwide RMT operations, with the exception of Item 
Mania, were struggling’ (ige.com). When anti-RMT regulation affected its Korean operations 
and the grey-market status of its primary activity (Yoon, 40) prevented its ability to go public 
(and thereby acquire investors), Affinity Media was in dire straits (The Rise and Fall of IGE). 
Heavy spending on acquisitions and shareholder buyouts had reduced available capital, while 
                                                     
213 In order to maintain minimal association of the IGE brand with new acquisitions, RPG 
Holdings LLC was created as a wholly owned subsidiary of IGE US LLC, and new purchases 
were acquired under the new name (ige.com).  
214 User-submitted data on these websites contained a significant amount of data about mob 
and natural resource location at various times. This information can be exploited by gold 
farmers who will then “camp” the resource-rich areas. Additional exploitable data submitted by 
users includes equipment inventories and could be used to flag asset-rich players for potential 
account hacking purposes. The player community discovered an association between the 
acquisitions and IGE, raising concern that user-submitted information game could be exploited 
by the gold farming industry. 
215 Debonneville left the company in Spring of 2006 (Dibbell, 2008). 
216 Yantis was reportedly bought out for $1 million US dollars per month over a period of 22 




increased competition from China-based retailers SwagVault, Itemrate, and Thsale 
compounded financial difficulties. It was rumoured that the company was millions of US dollars 
in debt to gold farming suppliers, and that ‘trouble was mounting, especially at the back-end 
operation site in China’217 (The Rise and Fall of IGE). Goldman Sachs had reportedly invested 
a large sum of money (60 million US dollars in 2006) which it then asked to be returned (Dibbell 
2008). By 2007, the company was reportedly losing a half million US dollars per month. With 
Affinity unable to honour the agreement with Yantis, the latter was released from his 
noncompete agreement (Dibbell 2008). 
In 2007, The Atlas Technology Group, reportedly formed by previously bought out 
shareholders of IGE (headlined by original owner of Yantis Enterprises Jonathan Yantis) 
acquired the IGE trademark in 2007. This was described by industry experts as a move by 
Yantis to buy back IGE (Dibbell 2008; Zelfden 2007). The acquisition did not include all of 
Affinity Media (particularly not the United States incorporation of IGE), but only the IGE domain 
name and trademark, as well as the back-end servers and supplier networks (ige.com). This 
protected Atlas Technology Group twofold: it separated the IGE trademark and domain name 
from the US incorporation which, at the time, was under lawsuit, and it additionally prevented 
Atlas from being subject to repayment of Affinity’s reportedly significant debts. The new parent 
company was incorporated in tax and e-business haven Vanuatu, avoiding legal recourse by 
developers as well as any necessity of reporting earnings or paying tax (OMPI). Today, Atlas 
Technology Group is the RMT mediating agent with the largest share in the market, according 
to the IGE website. The company has overhauled its image, and now markets itself as ‘leading 
an effort to clean up the industry’ with ‘ethical sourcing’ practices and efforts to combat fraud 
and in-game spam (ige.com). Having re-cultivated its original brand value, IGE is again looking 
to expand; the website cites provision of secondary market trade services for Aion Online, Star 
Wars: The Old Republic, and ‘other new MMOGs’ as part of its plans for the future (ige.com).  
 The RMT mediating agent or “retailer” plays perhaps the most controversial role in the 
gold farming supply chain. Whereas consumers might be excused for being short on time, gold 
farmers might be excused as desperate for employment, and game operators certainly don’t 
condone the practice, the RMT mediating agents make a tidy profit from the labour of others. 
Game operators like Blizzard insist that they are selling a product that does not belong to them. 
Recreational players complain about the means; account hacking, use of bots, and in-game 
advertising are said to decrease the enjoyability of the game (Hernandez in Dibbell 2008; 
                                                     
217 According to Julian Dibbell’s 2008 Wired article on the subject, IGE back-end operations 
centred around its operations in Shanghai, which were said to stabilize the supply chain. It’s 
reported that during IGE’s era of financial crisis, an unpaid gold farming employee stormed 




Arnason). Without these retailers, however, the bridge between the world of cheap supply and 
high demand would crumble. As controversial and morally ambiguous as they are, there is no 
doubt that RMT mediating agents provide a service for which there is demand. The central 
role of RMT mediating agents in the gold farming supply chain means that understanding the 
mechanics of their operation is essential to the identification of key stakeholders in the 
industry, and to understanding how policy changes may impact them. The last key player in a 
typical gold farming transaction is that of the consumer. The following section examines this 
role and the segmentation of player populations that define the gold farming market.  
Consumer 
 The consumer role in the gold farming industry (as in any industry) consists of shaping 
demand. Demand for virtual assets in MMOGs is shaped by the demands of both the casual 
player and of the elite, with the casual player demand comprising the larger sector of the 
market. Casual player demands tend toward currency or items that can quickly increase a 
player’s ability to progress through the game. These players typically play less than the elite 
level players, although official categorization tends to measure level of commitment rather than 
simply time played (see Tobold; MMOChampion). The typical casual player has a real-world 
job and likes to play MMOGs for entertainment during his or her spare time. The idea of high-
level play tends to appeal to casual players, yet the reality of the necessary time commitment 
is impractical. Since the time they are able to devote is not sufficient to attain high level status, 
this status may be sought in other ways. The purchase of in-game currency or high-level 
characters allows a player to appear more devoted to or skilled at game play than they really 
are.  As one informant remarked, it also can simply be a way to progress through the game 
more quickly (Arnason 2008, respondent 5).  
In order to deepen understanding of the consumer as a stakeholder in gold farming 
activity, examination of a gold farming transaction from the consumer’s perspective follows. 
The following auto-ethnographic account from the author's participant observation in World of 
Warcraft provides a detailed first-hand account of buying gold in Azeroth218.   
In the Spring of 2005, I had been playing World of Warcraft for a few months. I 
was a member of a supportive leveling guild, and had transitioned from the status of 
total noob to what I thought was a relatively experienced player. I had many friends in 
the game, as I was always eager to lend a hand where I could. I was an herbalist and 
an alchemist, and found pleasure in giving away the potions I made with the herbs 
                                                     





that I picked. I spent time helping others accomplish quests, and I gathered items of 
value to give to other members of my guild. I soon found, however, that this generosity 
was not economically sustainable. The epiphany came when I found my character 
about to reach level 40 and unable to afford to buy a mount. The mount was essential 
to my success in the game; it allows a player to travel throughout Azeroth at a 40% 
increase in speed. The quests from here on would be designed to be accomplished 
more quickly, it would slow down my ability to collaborate with others in the game, and 
(perhaps most importantly) not having one would mean that I was a noob. At the time, 
a mount cost 100 gold. This was unfathomable to me; I had at most ever managed to 
keep 10 gold in my inventory. I asked around, and no one in my guild was able to help 
me. Two guild members, however, did offer me some advice. They had gone to a 
website called IGE and bought gold a couple of times when they really needed it. It 
was a legitimate site, they said, and so my account wasn’t likely to get banned. 
Desperate, I decided this was the only way forward. The website, claimed to offer gold 
on every server in World of Warcraft, including mine. This was a valuable service: 
World of Warcraft was divided into 200 servers or “realms”, which were clones of the 
same virtual environment, each with a capacity of a few thousand players. Transfer 
between realms was impossible at the time, though Blizzard introduced it for a fee in 
2006. In order to purchase gold in a given realm, then, said gold had to be 
accumulated on the same realm. That meant that in order to provide this service, IGE 
had access to gold farmers systematically accumulating virtual assets on 200 realms.  
The purchase itself was simple: I used the paypal interface on the IGE website to 
transfer real-world currency to IGE. I was told to expect the payment through the in-
game mail system, wherein players can mail items or in-game currency to each other. 
I received payment from a dummy character clearly created solely for the purpose of 
transferring currency. This was obviously an attempt to avoid retribution in the form of 
a banned account from the game developer, since the sale of virtual assets for real-
world currency is against World of Warcraft’s End User License Agreement. The 
purchase was a success; the only lingering reminder of the purchase is the guilt of 
knowing I couldn’t play well enough to find the in-game money for the mount on my 
own. That, and the continuous stream of unwelcome adverts to my email inbox, trying 




The above description reveals the perspective of a casual level player of World of 
Warcraft219. On the opposite end of the spectrum lies the elite type of MMOG player, whose 
demands and motivations are much different; they consist largely of consumable equipment 
necessary for elite level play. A typical elite level schedule in World of Warcraft involves 
collaborative activity called “raiding” for many hours every evening, with one day off per week. 
This activity requires significant equipment preparation; specific potions, reagents, bandages, 
and various other virtual consumables are required in order to even begin an attempt at 
accomplishing an elite level goal. If the player has a nine-to-five job in the real world, this 
leaves little time for collecting consumables220. This situation is generally unsustainable, and 
that’s where the gold farming industry provides what some elite level players consider an 
essential service:  
Most everyone I’ve known that bought gold (suppose I should mention I never did), 
did so from a time perspective/they didn’t have the time to farm the $ they needed for 
raiding or to play 16 hrs of bgs a day for HW221 (which is similar but different to gold 
farming)…I never found it difficult to raise sufficient funds for whatever I wanted/but 
then again I played a lot, and didn’t have a job/wife/kids / would have been a very 
different story if I did…gold farmers were a key part of raiding/not that they sold gold/ 
but they sold the mats to a lot of things we used in large quantities/elemental fire, etc 
etc …so in many ways, the farmers made the early raid game possible (Arnason 2008, 
respondent 5).  
Another informant supported this claim about the gold farming industry’s contribution to end-
game play, claiming: ‘as a raider I would think 60% of the consumables are indirectly purchase 
from farmers. So I think they enhance my gaming experience’ (Arnason 2008, respondent 7). 
The consumer role is the final link in the gold farming industry supply chain. Having reviewed 
the intricacies of industry, we can now turn to consideration of the policy environment. The 
next section examines the policy environment that surrounds the gold farming practice. 
                                                     
219 Note: this account describes an event that occurred within the first year of the author's time 
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Policy & Practice 
Current Policy Environment 
 Policy development related to the gold farming industry in China is in a nascent stage; 
it appears that no policy development efforts in China to date have been specifically directed 
at this industry. Potentially relevant policy, such as the limits on virtual currency trade 
introduced in the 2007 Notice on Further Strengthening Internet Cafes and Online Games 
Management Work (关于进一步加强网吧及网络游戏管理工作的通知), has mainly targeted 
illegal activity such as online gambling and money laundering rather than the gold farming 
industry (Claburn; Xinhua 2009). A China Daily article in 2009 asserted that illegal activity was 
the target of the new regulation, because ‘current trading volume [for RMT] is still too small to 
shake the nation’s entire financial system’ (Xinhua 2009). The article described official 
concern, however, that ‘as the trade expanded steadily, with increasing conversions between 
virtual and real money, there would be an impact on the financial system’ (Cui Hua in Xinhua 
2009). Besides the 2009 limit on use of virtual currency, the only other relevant policy to date 
appears to be a section of the 2010 Interim Measures on Administration of Internet Commodity 
Trading and Related Services (网络商品交易及有关服务行为管理暂行办法) that obliges 
businesses operating online games or businesses using virtual currency to apply to the MOC 
for an operating license (Wang et al.). Additionally, these Interim Measures establish certain 
operating requirements for licensed online game businesses. According to article ten, they 
must comply with certain administrative requirements such as record-keeping of virtual 
currency transactions and filing ‘the types, the price, and the amount of virtual currency’ at the 
provincial branches of the cultural administration (Win & King 2010; State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce, 2010). According to this text, the businesses should also have a 
registered capital base of at least 10 million yuan in order to obtain a license. This requirement 
may signal certain directions for policy development in this area. The provision of substantial 
capital may be an attempt to limit new entry into online games-related businesses, thereby 
limiting the number of private stakeholders and restricting profit to players already established 
in this sector. The licensing requirement itself seems to be a vague attempt at governmental 
regulation of this sector, however the development of effective regulation will require 
significantly more legal detail, as well as strategies for identifying third-party business 
operators within online games. The first steps toward RMT regulation seen in the Interim 
Measures may signal a license-based approach to regulation of gold farming operations in the 
future.  
Policy Development in Practice 
Lastowka has observed that the absence of comprehensive legal frameworks for activity 




to this new space (70). Once enough cases on a new issue become the focus of public 
attention, policy-makers are forced to make decisions regarding official stances on the issue. 
The case example below demonstrates how how the legal status of virtual property in China 
has evolved through this process.  
Case Example: Virtual Property  
 The 2003 case of Li Hongchen’s lawsuit against the makers of a game called 
“Hongyue” or “Red Moon” was perhaps the first public case of a virtual property dispute. Li 
sued the game developers for the return of his virtual property that had been stolen by a hacker 
(Lyman). Despite the lack of legal clarity in the matter, the Beijing Chaoyang District People’s 
Court awarded Li virtual compensation for the virtual theft; the decision decided fault for lack 
of adequate security lay with the game developer and ordered the company to restore the 
virtual property to Li (Lyman). Despite this seemingly official acknowledgment of virtual 
property’s value and ownership, the 2005 case of Qiu Chengwei demonstrates a different 
understanding; in 2005, Qiu reported the theft of his virtual sword to police who ‘were of the 
opinion that a Dragon Saber in Legend of Mir was not legal property’ and told Qiu there was 
nothing they could do (Lastowka, 20). This case became highly publicized due to Qiu’s 
reaction, which was the murder of his friend. Qiu’s case was perhaps the first to publicize the 
real-world monetary value of virtual items; it came to light that the murdered friend had sold 
the sword he stole for a sizable real-world sum (20). Another Legend of Mir case was brought 
forth in 2005 by a Mr. Zhao in Chengdu (MMLC Group); having discovered the disappearance 
of his painstakingly accumulated virtual assets, he complained to the game operator (Shanda 
Networking) who refused to help. He consulted a lawyer, who advised him to complain to the 
Consumer’s Association in Sichuan. The Consumer’s Association decided that Mr. Zhao’s 
consumer rights had been breached according to Article 44 of the ‘Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests’ and granted him 
compensation (MMLC Group). More recent court cases began to recognize the real-world 
value of virtual property; in 2006, Yan Yifan of Guangzhou was convicted of virtual property 
theft after hacking into thirty accounts in the game Dahua Xiyou and selling their virtual assets 
for real-world currency (Q. Liang); in 2009, four men in Shenyang were sentenced to prison 
for extortion of virtual currency (Deng 2009). With the mounting number of property disputes222, 
the need for a policy response became clear. External interest groups, including academics 
(see Beijing Review, 2004), gamer activist groups (see Chew), and consumer rights 
organizations (such as the Consumer’s Association of Sichuan) took a public interest in the 
issue. According to Chew, game operators began to respond immediately (in 2005) to the 
                                                     




customer demand for protection from virtual theft, and in 2007, five game companies jointly 
issued a ‘declaration on cooperative tackling of internet theft and protection of healthy 
development of the industry’ (Wei in Chew, 9). Governmental regulatory response has been 
slower; it was not until the policy initiatives of 2009 and 2010223 that government-initiated 
construction began for a legal framework equipped to deal with virtual property issues.  
One interview respondent for this research pointed to a policy text that explicitly 
protects the virtual property rights of online games players in China. Respondent 11 described 
this text to be very new at the time of interview. Respondent 8 did not explicitly name the 
document but reported that China’s law was in the process of being amended to provide users 
with a legal basis to prosecute the theft of virtual assets. The policy document is entitled the 
People’s Republic of China Virtual Property Protection Law (Draft) (中华人民共和国虚拟财产
保护法(草案)). It can be viewed online, however it is not associated with the website of a 
specific institution. Its official legal status remains unclear. 
The lack of clarity regarding virtual property rights was reported by key informants to 
be in the process of improvement. Respondents with policy backgrounds expected it to 
develop toward the protection of user interests, while respondents with industry and legal 
backgrounds reported that official legal acknowledgment of user virtual property rights would 
pose practical difficulties. Respondent 5 noted that 'if a user actually has an ownership interest 
in any item that exists within your game, then you would technically need to keep that game 
going. But that just doesn’t work from a commercial perspective'. 
The case of policy development related to virtual property illuminates a complex 
process that includes an increasing number of actors and seems to reflect an increase in 
economic interests and public participation. Examination of this process highlights the 
multiplicity of stakeholders and interests in online game-related policy development. The 
resulting policies and practices seem to depend on the power balances of the various 
stakeholders as they negotiate the tensions that arise from their competing interests.  
The first-hand experience of key informants reported in the interviews for this case 
study indicate that competing stakeholder interests are also instrumental in determining how 
the gold farming industry is regulated on a day-to-day basis. The responses highlighted a 
contrast between the interests of regulators and industry that results in opposing activity in the 
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gold farming industry: according to informants, local governments tend to promote and protect 
the industry (R1), while game companies work with local enforcement agencies to shut down 
game studios (R11).  
Informants that worked as legal counsel (R3; R4; R11) reported that in practice, the 
gold farming industry only receives negative regulatory attention when it contravenes specific 
regulations about online games. Specifically, if a gold farmer was under 18, or if illegal software 
such as bots or other plug-ins were being used to facilitate the gold farming activities (R3; R4). 
However, according to these respondents, game companies want to eliminate this activity 
because it interferes with the virtual economy (R4). These respondents indicated that game 
companies claim legal ownership of virtual property in games and that End-User License 
Agreements should make this legal according to contract law. However, regulators are not 
interested in enforcing their ownership claim. In the absence of official support for 
enforcement, companies were reported to have developed cooperative relationships with local 
branches of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). These branches would shut down 
particularly aggravating operations on request in return for the seized assets seized from the 
shut-down to the local MPS branch (R11).  
With one major exception, most informants indicated that the practice of gold farming, 
if performed by adults and without help from software programs, would not be illegal in China. 
Respondents 3 and 4 explained this de facto legality as general business practice, saying if a 
certain activity is not explicitly prohibited, it is interpreted as legal. They remarked: ‘I think the 
general principle if the government or the law didn’t say you cannot do that, then basically you 
can do this’.  
The current regulatory environment for gold farming appears to be fragmented, at 
times contradictory, and subject to change. One respondent believed this to be intentional 
(R1), while others considered it a result of gold farming’s low priority level compared to other 
regulatory issues (R5; R8). While the low priority for regulatory attention may be a contributing 
factor in the speed of regulatory progress, a taxation mandate for virtual property trade issued 
by the State Administration for Taxation seems to suggest that at least some regulators 
recognize that some elements of gold farming, such as virtual property trade and the practice 
of gold farming, may be worth regulatory attention. The next section examines the challenge 
posed by the taxation mandate and discusses other policy development challenges that are 
raised by the gold farming industry in China.  
Policy Challenges 
 Gold farming raises a number of issues for regulatory concern for China’s government. 




level, the gold farming industry is problematic for China’s regulatory agencies, as its 
development simultaneously aligns and conflicts with the regulatory interests demonstrated 
by China’s online gaming policy to date. Economically, the practice seems to align with the 
official agenda toward informatization of the economy224; as Heeks observes, the gold farming 
practice seems to promote economic development with the need for minimal resources (5). 
Additionally, the industry has been observed to provide employment opportunities for 
uneducated people with limited alternative job prospects (Jin 2006). Findings from the key 
informant interviews support this data. Respondents for the case study reported that gold 
farming resulted in economic advantages for local economies. One respondent reported that 
local governments sometimes invite gold farming entrepreneurs to run gold farms in rural 
areas, thereby ‘organizing employment for the local village or small town’ (R1). The economic 
benefits of gold farming were globally acknowledged in 2009 by a report from The World Bank; 
Ström and Ernkvist estimated that gold farming and similar grey-market225 virtual economic 
activity account for a 3 billion US dollar market (6). Infodev’s226 program manager Valerie 
D’Costa describes the practice as an opportunity (given the low entry barriers) for developing 
countries to become producers, rather than users or consumers, in the digital world (in 
Doctorow, 2011).  
While the gold farming industry seems to offer potential for economic growth and 
development, the practice also seems to conflict with governmental concerns regarding public 
health and protection of minors; standard practice in the industry consists of twelve-hour shifts 
of game play (Dibbell), an amount that exceeds by far the two hours a week of game play 
officially recommended for children (Fay, 2011). Although one might argue that gold farming 
employees are not children, the current indefinite legal status of the industry means that this 
is not necessarily the case; a lack of direct regulation means that the business provides ample 
opportunity for exploitation of vulnerable people for profit. In 2011, an article in The Guardian 
reported exactly this; the article contains a detailed account of prisoner exploitation in the gold 
farming industry in China (Vincent 2011). Exploitation of gold farming workers was also 
reported directly by some of the interview respondents in this case study. Respondents  
reported: that no one in the gold farming industry cares about labour laws or banking 
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regulations (R11); that gold farming was just part of a larger trend of cross-border exploitation 
of Chinese labour; and that in underground industries like gold farming, 'Anything can happen 
there, like rip-offs, exploitation, and like owing salaries...there are no laws protecting these 
kind of people' (R1). If the gold farming industry is to be promoted, it must also be directly 
regulated in order to protect vulnerable parties and ensure fair business practice.  
Another domestic policy issue raised by the gold farming industry is the need for 
industry taxation. However, in order to implement taxation, a way to measure the profits of 
various gold farming agents (the workers, the agencies, and the mediating agents) must first 
be established. This demand brings the policy issue into the international arena, raising issues 
that need to be addressed by international regulation and agreements.  
Taxation of the gold farming industry is complicated due to the basic issue of location 
on which much taxation law is based227. Gold farming activity typically occurs in a virtual 
environment that is hosted in a different location than the gold farming worker him/herself. The 
real-world currency might be transferred internationally any number of ways, but is often 
transferred initially through an intermediary company that may be hosted in yet another 
location, including countries with legislation that exempts their operations from taxation (such 
as, for example, IGE228). In the international arena, policy issues regarding fair business 
practice also arise, particularly with respect to the governing power currently held by game 
developers and operators. The fact that game developers control the software code, or the 
technical information that records all virtual activity and items, means that they also control 
what Lessig equates with Law in the virtual world (6).  
Lastowka points out that this creates considerable risk for gold farming workers (70); 
by controlling the virtual economy, the game developer has the power to abruptly devalue the 
assets of gold farming workers229. This raises issues regarding international agreements 
regarding national treatment and market access, however issues regarding their enforceability 
and the legality of End User License agreements (EULAs)230 may also play a role. Future 
policy development will require interaction with international regulatory bodies such as the 
WTO and the International Labor Organization. In order to engage internationally however, 
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domestic regulation must be established that clarifies jurisdictional authority and legal status 
of the industry.  
 Given the regulatory challenges involved in implementation of regulation, the unclear 
legal environment, jurisdictional competition and confusion, and the rapidly developing 
innovative practices and uses of this new medium, the government of China is facing a 
momentous task to determine future policy related to online games and their emerging 
practice. While there appears to be minimal interest in regulating the gold farming industry 
directly, related innovative practice is quickly attracting regulatory attention. The rate of change 
in the evolution of this technology and its uses seems to be accelerating economic 
development while simultaneously outpacing China’s policy development strategies. 
Respondents thought it was likely to remain unregulated, unless it grows to affect 
more of the general population, or if the game industry lobbies against it. Respondents 1, 6, 7, 
and 10 thought that the number of workshops in operation were not sufficient to merit 
significant regulatory attention. Respondents generally acknowledged that the lack of industry 
regulation created significant potential for exploitation of workers (R1, R2, R14), with 
Respondent 1 describing specific cases where this had happened. However, most informants 
perceived this to be standard for any manufacturing industry in China, however, and did not 
think regulators would want to address it in any way. Respondent 2 was the only one that 
thought this should and could be addressed by regulators, and suggested that the formation 
of international labour unions could be a productive option. The informant remarked that in 
order for the gold farming industry to benefit from such a measure, however, perceptions would 
have to shift such that gold farming work was perceived as labour rather than recreational play 
(R2). 
The consideration of the gold farming case in terms of its history and background, 
industry and mechanics of practice, and evolving policy environment in China offers some 
insight into the wider regulatory dynamic how it is responding to the challenges raised by media 
convergence and user innovation. The investigation in this chapter has shed light on current 
processes of regulatory development, and key stakeholders and interests that are and that 
may be involved in developing regulation for the gold farming industry. The next section 
identifies these stakeholders and discusses their interests in regulatory development. 
Examination of Stakeholders and Interests 
A list of government regulators with interests relevant to the gold farming industry has 
been compiled from relevant policy texts that have been released to date. A list of these 
stakeholders and their associated policies can be found in Appendix I. In Chapter II, the 




emerged. As new media technology developed, China’s economic opening-up resulted in 
partial privatization of telecoms and the introduction of quasi-governmental and private 
stakeholders in future regulatory development. With these categories in mind, this examination 
begins by identifying quasi-governmental and private stakeholders with interests in regulation 
of the gold farming industry. These include:  
 Government-subsidized game developers and operators (listed according to 
size of subsidies according to iChinaStock report): 
o Shanda Games 
o Giant Interactive 
o The9 
o Zqgame 
o Perfect World 
o Kong 
 Government-subsidized research institutes and government-associated 
“think tanks”, including (but not limited to):  
o China Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
o China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
o China Development Institute (CDI) 
o Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC) 
o Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 
The interests of quasi-governmental stakeholders are often demonstrated with overt 
compliance. They are likely to publicly align their interests with those of the central government 
in order to demonstrate compliance and to maintain governmental support. In practice, 
however, economic self-interest may be prioritized. This has been demonstrated by game 
operators231, but may not be an issue for “think tank” stakeholders, who are not part of the 
private sector. Proliferation of foreign investment in the online games industry means that 
many private sector stakeholders have emerged whose interests may significantly diverge 
from those of the Chinese central government. Private game industry stakeholders include 
foreign stakeholders in the game industry, such as foreign game developers and investors in 
game companies, as well as private stakeholders in the gold farming industry specifically. 
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Foreign game developers from France (Ubisoft), the US (Activision Blizzard, Electronic Arts), 
and South Korea (NCSoft) are some of the primary foreign stakeholders in this category. 
Private stakeholders in the gold farming industry itself include:  
 RMT mediating agents (list of primary stakeholders) 232: 
o Avatarbank   
o Bank of WoW   




o Goblins4hire  
o Goldmonger   
o Guy4Game   
o IGE 
o InGameDelivery   
o Koala Credits    
o OffGamers  
o OgPal   
o Playerauctions  
o MOGS   
o MooGold 
o MySuperSales   
o SSegames 
o  Swagvault 
o Time2WoW  
o USfine  
o WGTOnline (cheapergold.co.uk) 
o  Woowmart 
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 Game studios 
 Gold farming agents 
RMT mediating agents are likely to favour either no regulation of the gold farming industry in 
China, or regulation that does not favour the industry. The logic behind this conclusion is that 
the economic self-interest of mediating agents favours a grey or black market regulatory 
environment; they occupy an exclusive position in providing China’s gold farming suppliers 
with access to the lucrative foreign RMT market. If the industry is regulated, the exclusivity of 
this position is jeopardized; China’s regulators, seeing a large portion of potential domestic 
income going to the foreign-based mediating agents, may see fit to compete by allowing or 
encouraging the development of domestic-based mediation services, or otherwise reduce the 
profit margins of foreign mediating agents and increase domestic supplier and agent profits.   
 Game studio interests regarding regulation of the gold farming industry may either 
favour or counter regulatory development; government standardization of the industry may 
increase their profit margins by decreasing the margins taken by foreign RMT mediators, 
however it may also disrupt normal business operation. If the industry is regulated, exploitation 
of vulnerable workers (which increases profits) will be more difficult. Additionally, the 
development of labour standards may result in extra business operation costs, such as hiring 
more workers to compensate for mandated shorter shifts, and the building costs of standard-
compliant work facilities (such as, for example, well-ventilated work environments and 
appropriate worker living accommodations). Smaller game studios233 and exploitative venues 
will be less likely to favour regulatory development, whereas larger studios may see regulation 
as an opportunity for increased long-term profit 234 . Current data indicates that there is 
significant variation in the nature of game studios. Until June 2011, most reports placed them 
in suburban or rural areas of China. Recent reports indicate that the practice is taking place in 
Chinese labour camps, specifically the Jixi labour camp. This case introduces another 
stakeholder, ie. the local profiteer. In the case of the Jixi labour camp, the local profiteer took 
the form of ‘prison bosses’ (Vincent 2011). Interview respondents reported that these local 
profiteers are likely to be members of local governments. Respondent 1 perceived the report 
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on the Jixi labour camp as ‘another example where Chinese government is involved in gold 
farming’. 
 Gold farming agents, like game studios, are also likely to demonstrate conflicting 
interests in regulatory development of the gold farming industry. Where regulatory efforts may 
improve their working conditions and compensation, any increase in domestic profit margin is 
likely to be kept by the larger players in the supply chain, such as the game studios, who 
already take a large percent of the workers’ potential profits (Ström and Ernkvist, 2010). This 
limits the potential benefits of regulation toward the improvement of working conditions. This 
potential benefit may not offset the risk of increased regulation enough to make gold farming 
agents favour regulatory development. Risks include: government crackdowns on improperly 
operated studios, which may result in worker unemployment, and potential requirements for 
official registration of workers, which could be problematic for migrant workers235.  
 Other significant stakeholders in gold farming industry regulation consist of 
recreational players. Within this stakeholder category there are smaller stakeholder groups 
with conflicting interests. These include:  
 Casual players and guilds 
 Elite players and guilds 
 Gamer activist groups 
Casual game players and guilds are likely to favour regulation that bans the practice of gold 
farming, but to oppose regulation that acknowledges it as a legal industry. This stems from 
widespread views among casual players about the gold farming industry, including236:  
1) The gold farming industry disrupts the in-game economy and other elements of 
normal game play. 
2) The gold farming industry promotes the practice of virtual theft 
3) The gold farming industry promotes the use of bots and other ‘illegal’ programs 
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4) The gold farming practice itself is illegal (due to its violation of End User License 
Agreements) and therefore members of the gold farming industry are criminals 
Gamer activist groups in China are likely to express similar regulatory interests due to the 
widespread anti-bot sentiment amid the gaming population (MMOsite 2010). Game operator 
association of bot use with gold farming activity (as reported in a 2010 case by 
Globalvoicesonline.org), may contribute to this perception. The association between gold 
farming and bot use is likely to result in substantial negative views about gold farming by 
recreational game players, given the extreme opposition to bot use among players of online 
games in China. The case example of in-game protests that caused server crashes in Aion 
was centred around the key issue of user frustration due to widespread use of bots. In 
response to a perceived lack of effort by game companies to eliminate bot use, users have 
even been reported to engage in violent protest; Respondent one reported that user protest 
had reached instances of violent protest and occupation of game company offices. 
  Elite level game players and guilds are likely to favour regulation of the industry that 
would improve working conditions, but, unlike casual players, are not likely to display a strong 
interest in banning the gold farming practice. The author’s interviews with elite level players of 
World of Warcraft indicated that many high-level players and guilds in fact form symbiotic 
relationships with gold farming workers. Interviewees reported that some elite raiding guilds 
use gold farmers as a way to fund the resource-heavy raiding activity; in exchange for large 
sums of in-game currency, the elite guild will allow a gold farming worker to accompany them 
on a raid in order to gain access to otherwise inaccessible gear that will increase their working 
productivity (informants 5 and 7). Other opinions expressed in the interviews indicated elite 
player concern for the real-life working conditions of gold farmers (informants 4, 5 & 7). This 
indicates that elite player interest in regulation of the gold farming industry may favour 
regulatory development that would improve working conditions for gold farming agents. These 
respondents consisted of players on a US-based server; interests of elite players and guilds 
on China-based servers may demonstrate different interests.  
International regulatory bodies are also key governmental stakeholders in gold 
farming regulation. Key stakeholders in this category are primarily those with a focus on 
international economic activity and trade, as well as internet governance more generally. 




activity in recent years. The United Nations Internet Governance Forum237 recently highlighted 
the importance of trade in virtual goods in a workshop report, which stated that the forum had 
worked to identify emerging issues in this area and 'bring them to the attention of the 'Ninth 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference (Bali, Indonesia, 3-6 December 
2013), to help ensure that no country/stakeholder group is disadvantaged from the trade in 
virtual goods and the opportunities of emergent digital trading hubs' (Workshop #160 Report). 
This is an indication that both the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
are recognizing this activity as important to future policy development and to international 
cooperation. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Bank have also expressed interest in gold farming and virtual currency trade in online 
games, and their potential positive and negative impacts. The World Bank, for example, has 
investigated the potential of gold farming as a development tool (Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist), and 
the Financial Task Force of the OECD has highlighted the trade of virtual goods in online 
games as a potential vehicle for money-laundering (2010). The regulatory interests of these 
international organizations will vary according to their particular focus, but are likely to 
generally promote regulatory development that aligns with their purposes and mandates. 
These include: economic development, economic fairness, standardization of financial activity 
for the purposes of taxation and global collaboration, and general fairness in the conduct of 
affairs relevant to the international community. Relevant issues raised by the gold farming 
industry that will require international cooperation in order to address include: the strong 
potential use of gold farming and other ICT-based industries for economic development, the 
control of market access by RMT mediating agents, the current and potential future control of 
currency valuation by game developers and operators, the need to develop infrastructure and 
regulatory frameworks that support taxation of virtual goods, transactions, and related income, 
the regulation of business operations in the industry toward the protection of vulnerable 
workers, and other general issues related to fair governance of virtual worlds. Security and 
defense organizations around the world also have a keen interest in this space and must be 
considered key stakeholders in its future regulation. The gold farming industry demonstrates 
an opportunity for making unmonitored and unregulated international monetary transfers 
through highly converged media such as online games. This opportunity is ripe for criminal 
exploitation of many kinds. The development of systems that can monitor and regulate this 
activity is likely to be of high priority to these security and defense organizations. The interview 
research for this case indicates that defense organizations in China may already be involved: 
a respondent legal expert perceived there to be a strong likelihood that the People’s Liberation 
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Army is monitoring activity in online games for defence purposes and for illegal behaviour such 
as money-laundering (R6). 
There are some factors that may contravene the interests of the international 
organization stakeholders mentioned above. These include: the lack of law-maker 
understanding of the new technology and ways in which it can be regulated, economic 
advantages that certain countries enjoy as a direct result of the industry’s grey-market status 
(such as, for example, tax haven countries in which large RMT mediating agents may be 
headquartered), and opposition from powerful stakeholders from the private sector (for 
example, large game companies such as Activision Blizzard) who also benefit from a lack of 
regulation in this space, currently holding powers of governance by default.  
 Relative to the online games industry alone, gold farming demonstrates a further 
increase in the number and variety of stakeholder interests in policy development. This 
expansion of stakeholders can be seen among government regulators, media producers, and 
game users. The international nature of the gold farming industry has meant the expansion of 
regulating stakeholder interests to increasingly include international regulatory bodies as well 
as national governments. Another example of stakeholder pluralization in the gold farming 
case is that game users have expanded beyond recreational game players to include 
professional gold farming workers as well. This has happened as market demand for virtual 
goods and currency created by recreational users has provided economic incentive that 
attracts virtual workers. The pluralization of policy stakeholders additionally includes the 
introduction of new stakeholders from both domestic and international third-party businesses; 
these include RMT mediating agents and smaller stakeholders in the gold farming supply 
chain.  
In China, the number of regulating stakeholders with interests in online games is 
increasing as the market for virtual goods and virtual currencies continue to grow. The 
regulation of virtual currencies in online games has attracted the attention of some of China's 
financial regulators. The Ministry of Commerce and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce have both participated as issuing authorities for policy texts that govern virtual 
currency trade relevant to online games238 . Should gold farming and other RMT activity 
continue to grow, the stakeholders with current interests in virtual currency regulation are likely 
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to also express interest and claim increased jurisdictional authority in the online games policy 
environment.  
As game companies outside of China increasingly expand their scope into virtual 
goods trade and RMT, the number of international regulatory stakeholders interested in 
regulating this space is also likely to increase. An example of this activity can be observed in 
Blizzard's 2012 attempt to replace the role of RMT mediating agents: the company launched 
a user-to-user real money trading platform in its popular game Diablo III. While the RMT 
platform has been flagged for shut down in 2014, the expansion of Blizzard into the realm of 
sanctioned international trade platforms reflects a strong economic incentive that is likely to 
draw similar attempts by game companies in the future. This expands the scope of regulating 
stakeholder interests in online games to finance and international trade.  
The gold farming case study showed that stakeholders in gold farming policy 
development seemed to represent an expansion of the stakeholders in China's online games 
policy more generally. This expansion was both domestic and international. Domestically, gold 
farming has expanded online games activity to include recreational players and professional 
virtual workers. It has facilitated international trade which is increasingly drawing the attention 
of international and financial regulators. It has also directly linked the financial interests of third-
party international businesses like RMT mediating agents, to the domestic and international 
policy development in this space; domestic policy may affect a company like IGE's ability to 
supply virtual goods, while international policy may impose tax, affect their market access, or 
at least require transaction recording and archiving.  
The examination of the gold farming case, along with the discussion of policy 
challenges for online games regulation more generally in Chapter II, show that the innovative 
uses of online games are currently outpacing the ability of China's regulators to create 
regulatory frameworks that can accommodate and monitor this emerging activity. Emerging 
practice is also outpacing regulatory development on an international level; virtual currency 
trading has only really begun to receive attention from international regulatory bodies as more 
obvious and immediately understandable trading platforms for RMT, such as Bitcoin, draw 
attention to the issue. As policy is being developed, it faces many implementation difficulties 
related to negotiating stakeholder interests in this area. The research showed that users and 
media producers are increasingly powerful stakeholders in this process. There are extremely 
large economic interests in this area for media producers and for public users, both of whom 
are likely to circumvent regulation that counteracts their interests. Circumvention efforts by 
these stakeholders are likely to evolve faster than regulating infrastructure. Producers and 
users are already intimately familiar with the technology, and therefore their knowledge levels 




concerns and interests of non-regulator stakeholders will be a major challenge for regulatory 
development.  
Conclusion 
 The chapter looked at the technicalities of online games and emerging practice by 
exploring the infrastructure, supply chains, and business models involved in the practice of 
gold farming. The research found that, in general, China has managed to exert an 
infrastructure-level control over most of its online games activity that is reminiscent of its 
control over and, as Diebert refers to it, territorialization of, the wider internet (147). This is 
primarily effected through economic incentives that encourage Chinese players to access 
online games through internet cafes rather than face the expenses of independent access. It 
is further supported by policy measures that forbid foreign companies from operating online 
games in China and mandate that China's online games operators locate their servers in 
China239 (Section 2, Article 3). The gold farming industry and its complex international supply 
chain were found to contrast starkly with this domestic model of online gaming in China. Not 
only do gold farming workers access games independently, they use foreign game 
subscription cards and technology like Virtual Private Networks to access the international 
game servers. For China's game users involved in gold farming, the economic incentives of 
Real-Money Trade encourage workers and entrepreneurs to do business on international 
online games platforms, as they accumulate virtual goods on foreign servers to sell to the 
foreign market. While the technology for blocking international access through VPNs is being 
developed by the Chinese government, new ways of circumventing technical blocks are 
constantly being developed (Mozur). As long as there is economic incentive to do so, 
businesses that can profit from new circumvention measures are likely to invest in the 
continued development of workarounds. The opportunities offered by gold farming and RMT 
to exchange labour internationally mean that economic incentive to engage in this type of 
activity is likely to grow unless there is a cooperative and concerted international effort to 
prevent it. The perceived balance of positive and negative impacts of this growth will determine 
whether the international community seeks to diminish or to encourage it.  
 Gold farming and other third-party gaming services that take place on online games 
servers outside of China offer China's domestic companies and workers easy access to the 
international labour market. This virtual access to international labour demand could potentially 
be quite profitable and helpful to local economies. Its minimal entry requirements (internet 
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connection, computer, game cards to play on foreign servers) mean that businesses can 
operate in remote locations, where labour costs are low. This can both reduce operating costs 
for businesses and provide new employment opportunities to local communities.  
 Heeks and Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist consider gold farming a potential tool for 
economic growth; they investigate it as an example of virtual work with great potential to offer 
new development opportunities for struggling economies. With its location flexibility and 
minimal training requirements, there is little doubt that gold farming and similar RMT practices 
can offer increased economic opportunity in underdeveloped areas. However, its current 
success is likely associated, at least in part, with its ability to exchange funds outside the reach 
of current local and international regulatory frameworks240. This aspect of the gold farming 
industry offers some clear advantages for local economic development: a lack of licensing or 
minimum wage requirements mean that entry barriers are minimized, while the absence of a 
taxation burden helps small local businesses to thrive.  
 The lack of regulatory framework also exposes workers and customers to a series of 
risks that could negatively affect the industry's growth. These include, among others, worker 
exploitation and associated negative potential impact due to bad publicity, and significant 
opportunity for consumer exploitation due to the absence of any industry standards, official 
supervision, or accountability. On an international level, the opportunities for both worker and 
customer exploitation are increased.  
 Without adequate international regulatory infrastructure, gold farming companies are 
able to operate without the burdens of taxation, adherence to international labour laws, or in 
fact without being subject to legal scrutiny of any kind. Intermediary companies such as RMT 
mediating agents are able to distribute different parts of their operations such that national 
laws align with maximization of profit. On the surface, this appears to be no different than any 
other multi-national corporation, and in many ways the situation is the same. The primary 
difference, however, is that the entire RMT industry provides a new method of exchanging 
funds internationally that circumvents the entire international banking system as well as all of 
its associated regulation.  
 This is a point of immense opportunity that is also accompanied by immense 
challenges. Under the current reach of regulation, virtual workers in developing economies are 
able to effectively circumvent existing financial and legal restrictions on the international 
                                                     





exchange of labour. Gold farming is no exception. In Ge Jin's 2006 documentary, one owner 
of a gold farming workshop comments on this aspect of the business. He states: 
 When I was studying in America, I found everything, from a meal to a haircut, is 8 
times more expensive than in China. But you cannot transmit a meal to America. Nor 
can you transmit Chinese labor to America, otherwise it's easy to make money. But I 
suddenly realized that selling virtual goods online is the same as transmitting Chinese 
labor, virtually. I was very excited when I came up with that idea (Tie Tou in gold 
farmers part2.mov).  
 The potential for work that, like gold farming, involves the exchange of virtual goods 
and currencies to help economies develop depends on how its relationship with regulation 
evolves. The recent reactions of national governments to the increasing exchange of virtual 
currency do not seem promising for future regulatory development; virtual currencies are 
perceived as posing risks of loss to consumers (People's Bank of China; Schwartzkopff & 
Levring), as a potential threat to national currencies (Elwell et al., 5; People's Bank of China), 
and a vehicle for criminal activity (Elwell et al.; Reuters). While much of this negative reaction 
has been focused on Bitcoin and other straightforward virtual currencies, gold farming and the 
exchange of virtual goods in online games has not escaped negative attention from 
regulators241. There is a possibility, however, that gold farming and other less obvious forms 
of unregulated exchange may remain somewhat distanced from the wider virtual currency 
scare. Their lower media profile may lower their priority as a regulatory target, and the industry 
has an established capacity to circumvent constantly improving technical restrictions242. The 
ability to do so may be the key to the industry's ability to succeed and to provide growth 
opportunities to local economies
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Chapter V: Change 
Conclusion 
This project explored how new media regulation in China is changing in response to the new 
challenges raised by media convergence. The research focused on the case of gold farming, 
and explored its surrounding contexts in detail. The thesis has examined the history, 
challenges, and current state of the policy environment for online games in China, and has 
investigated the realities of China’s practical online games regulation from both macro-level 
and micro-level perspectives. The exploratory analysis in Chapter III took a macro-level 
approach to investigation, using micro-level case research to build broader understanding of 
the regulatory dynamic and the tensions that shape it. While this research draws from and 
contributes to scholarship in a number of fields, it primarily builds knowledge in three key areas 
of study: new media in China, policy studies of China, and media convergence. Following a 
summary of key insights from each chapter, this final chapter highlights how the findings 
contribute new knowledge in these areas. 
Policy   
 Chapter II explored the policy environment that surrounds China's online games 
industry, and found it to be complex, fragmented, and characterized by numerous regulatory 
challenges. The research found that China's online games policy consists of a number of 
disparate, sometimes conflicting, texts issued by a variety of government agencies. The 
research in Chapter II examined some of the major challenges that face policymakers in China 
as the online games challenge policy making efforts with jurisdictional overlap and innovative 
practices. Major challenges consisted of: conflict between government agencies that compete 
for jurisdiction over this profitable industry, legal confusion stemming from a lack of regulator 
familiarity with the technology and its new uses, and innovative uses of online games that 
challenge existing policy. The nature of these challenges is fully explored in the gold farming 
case study in Chapter IV.  
 The investigation in this chapter also revealed that some of the current regulatory 
challenges currently faced by China's online games policy environment are similar to those 
that China's media regulators have faced in the past. The chapter found that the approaches 
to policy development that have been adopted in response to these new challenges are similar 
to those that have been used in China to regulate new media over the last century: efforts to 
grow new media industries were consistently balanced with regulatory measures designed to 
maintain government control over the new media and to mitigate any perceived negative 




revealed as consistently used methods of clarifying confusion and reducing conflict between 
regulatory agencies.  
 Another result of this chapter’s analysis is a list of major policy documents that are 
relevant to China’s online games industry. The list includes information about the release 
dates, the document titles, and the various government agencies that released them. These 
are presented, along with brief notes on the content of the documents, in Appendix I. Given 
the paucity of research on this subject and that this environment is quickly evolving, the list of 
policy documents that are intended to regulate this industry contributes important knowledge 
for future scholarship in this area. 
Practice 
 The examination of regulatory challenges revealed that policy texts could not be 
understood to describe practical regulation. Policy texts had been used in the case examples 
as vehicles for assertion of power and claiming of jurisdictional territory, however they revealed 
little about everyday regulatory practice. The policy environment surrounding innovative uses 
and emerging practice like gold farming was found to be even less developed. Policy texts that 
were directly relevant to emerging practice were scarce, and the legal status of virtual property 
and its trade unclear. Policy development was found to be taking place in the courts on a case-
by-case basis. In light of the inability of policy texts to illuminate practical regulation of online 
games, and the early stages of policy development related to innovative uses of the 
technology, the research worked to better understand existing regulation by examining how it 
is practiced. Overall, the investigations in Chapter III indicated that current regulatory practice 
for both online games and their innovative uses is determined by the negotiation of interests 
between key policy stakeholders. Chapter IV engaged in a closer examination of the factors 
and processes that affect this negotiation.  
 Chapter III featured an exploratory analysis of the regulatory dynamic that shapes the 
everyday practice of online games regulation in China. The analysis began by observing how 
strong tensions between and among regulators, producers/operators, and users of online 
games in China emerge through their actions and interactions as they pursue their interests in 
regulatory outcomes for online games. This section analyzed the tensions observed in the 
case examples from Chapter II and from the Chapter IV case study and provided a 
visualization of the micro level interactions that were observed between and among these 
stakeholder groups. The visualization provided an initial framework for understanding these 
interactions on a broader level as interrelationships between key stakeholders groups in 
China's online games regulation. This broad, relational understanding of stakeholders and 




factors that shape how the competing interests of stakeholders in China's online games 
regulation are negotiated. Using an investigative framework adapted from policy and political 
science research, the analysis in Chapter III explored three key aspects of the regulatory 
dynamic. For each major stakeholder category, the structural context, stakeholder interests, 
and pathways for negotiation of interests were examined.  
 The examination of regulator structures outlined the complex bureaucratic framework 
that surrounds media regulation in China, and described the general roles of its major 
regulating institutions. Party, State, and Social Organizations were identified as general 
institutional categories, and the specific institutions that are relevant to the regulation of online 
games were positioned within this broader hierarchical structure. The structural framework for 
online games regulation was found to have changed in recent years, from ministerial-level 
decision making toward an increase in involvement of high-level State and Party institutions. 
This was accomplished through institutional convergence and through the appointment of key 
individuals to concurrent positions in institutions at different levels of government. The chapter 
demonstrated a network of individual links that have been recently established between key 
ministerial-level stakeholders in online games regulation and central-level government 
institutions. A number of stakeholders in online games regulation were identified by the 
research, at all levels of government bureaucracy. In general, there seemed to be trends in 
the types of interests pursued at different levels of government. High-level organizations with 
close ties to the central CCP government expressed interests in online games regulation that 
are consistent with the long-standing ideology of China's media regulators: to promote 
economic development while mitigating any perceived negative effects of the industry's 
growth. This ideological balance was found to be reflected in the language of "healthy 
development" which is used in policy texts to describe regulatory goals regarding the online 
games industry. Policies issued at the ministerial level tended to operate within this same 
discourse of "healthy development," however the interpretation of this discourse was adjusted 
to suit the interests of the individual ministerial organizations. The interests expressed in 
ministry-issued policy texts tended to prioritize one side or another of the "healthy 
development" ideology, focusing on industrial development or protection of minors and the 
public interest. Lower-level regulators were found to prioritize local and individual interests 
over central interests, as evidenced by practical outcomes. Social organizations and their 
associated industry conferences were identified to be key platforms for interaction between 
regulators and game companies. The courts and branches of the Chinese Consumer 
Organizations were identified as key platforms for interaction between regulators and users of 
online games.  
 The exploration of game producers and operators began with a focus on the structural 




of traditional media companies through State-Owned Enterprises, the online games industry 
has been allowed to operate as a completely privatized sector. As a result, China's online 
games companies have been free to seek capital through overseas investment, and many of 
the biggest companies are listed on foreign stock exchanges. The impact of overseas listing 
has been complex ownership structures that span multiple countries and involve stakeholders 
with potentially divergent interests. The research identified the Variable Interest Entity as a 
focal point for a number of strong tensions. These took place both within a single game 
company and between game companies and regulators. Within a game company, there was 
significant potential for agency costs to affect company activities on a local level, should the 
individual owners of domestic operations choose to divert revenue from the parent company. 
The structure additionally puts the companies in a precarious legal position, because the use 
of the VIE structure in this way violates Chinese law. Overall, the chapter demonstrated that 
privatization and Internationalization of China's online games industry are changing the power 
dynamic of China's media sector, as the economic contributions of private and international 
stakeholders increase the cost to China's economy of enforcing compliance.  
 The final section of the Chapter III explored the structures, interests, and interactions 
of online games users. The analysis of game users revealed tensions between professional 
and recreational players, and pointed to an increase in professional game play, as new ways 
of monetizing play such as e-sports and streaming, have gained popularity. Gold farming 
workers, along with other players that earn money from play243, were found to constitute a 
group of professional online game players whose interests in play are economically driven. 
These economic interests were found to be motivating factors for circumventing regulation.   
Innovation 
Chapter IV presented a focused discussion of the gold farming case, beginning with 
a history and background and proceeding to examine the case from three perspectives. These 
were: the underlying technological and commercial infrastructure and the mechanics of 
practice; the regulatory policy and practice relevant to the gold farming case; and the key 
stakeholders and interests in related regulatory development. The history and background 
described the technology and business models that shape China's online games industry in 
general, and then focused on the practicalities of Real-Money Trade and the gold farming 
industry. It then examined key elements of the gold farming industry value chain. This section 
examined the process of gold farming both inside and outside the game, and included 
                                                     





descriptions of the process of virtual property trade that occurs within the games, as well as 
the commercial mechanisms that facilitate the translation of virtual assets into real currency.  
The policy discussion in this chapter indicated that the current regulatory approach to 
regulating innovative uses of online games generally tolerates new and developing behaviour 
until it crosses a threshold of acceptability or, as in the case of virtual property disputes, until 
the issue is raised in a court environment. The legal status of gold farming lacked clarity and 
game studios were caught between the competing interests of supportive local governments 
and game companies seeking to shut them down. Respondents perceived this lack of legal 
clarity to be intentional and perceived the gold farming industry to be of low priority for 
regulatory development compared to other issues. Whatever the regulatory priority of the gold 
farming industry may be, discussion of the policy challenges raised by gold farming highlighted 
the need for these challenges to be addressed by policymakers in the near future: the lack of 
legal and technological infrastructure equipped to deal with trade in virtual goods prevents 
regulators from levying tax on this trade and leaves significant room for further exploitation of 
this venue for criminal activity. The final section of Chapter IV identified key stakeholders that 
have interests in future regulatory development in China that relates to the gold farming 
industry. This section examined the interests of each major stakeholder group and looked at 
some of the larger issues that the case raises about the future of media convergence. 
The gold farming case study demonstrated how the gold farming industry circumvents 
the existing infrastructure designed to regulate international financial transactions and trade. 
The research noted that gold farming was not unique in this practice, and concluded that gold 
farming appeared to be an example of a larger trend toward an unfettered exchange of 
international labour, facilitated by virtual environments. The peer-to-peer labour markets 
operated by Odesk and Elance were highlighted as examples of this larger trend. While Odesk 
and Elance operate somewhat differently to the gold farming industry, the labour exchange 
they represent is larger in scale and evokes questions that also apply to the gold farming case. 
Whose labour laws should apply to transnational labour? Should there be a minimum wage? 
How can regulation provide for the protection of vulnerable workers, and how could such a 
thing be implemented? The research in Chapter II and in the case study of gold farming 
revealed that before these international policy issues can be approached, a number of 
challenges to effective regulation in national contexts must be addressed. 
Change 
The findings of this research contribute to existing understandings of new media in 
China. The investigation showed a major shift in the power dynamic between China’s new 




over regulatory compliance. It showed how this power shift had taken place, beginning with 
the introduction of international and private stakeholders that was facilitated by the Variable 
Interest Entity ownership structure. As these companies experienced enormous economic 
success and expanded to multiple media sectors, the industry as a whole has become an 
important part of China’s economy. This has made it extremely difficult for regulators to 
achieve policy compliance, as the potential cost to regulators of shutting down company 
operations has become a deterrent. The speed of technological development and 
convergence also puts regulators at a relative disadvantage compared to industry, in terms of 
technological expertise and infrastructural control. In the absence of expertise and funds to 
operate infrastructure of their own, China’s regulators depend on industry to cooperate with 
policy directives and take charge of substantial amounts of policy implementation. This leaves 
significant opportunity for non-compliance. 
In response to this shift in relative power between new media industries and its 
regulators, government agencies have had to depart from the tried and true methods of policy 
development and implementation for new media and introduce new methods of pursuing 
compliance. This research has shown that in the case of online games, regulatory 
stakeholders had focused on incentive-based compliance and increased efforts to encourage 
negotiation between companies and regulators. The case study also revealed some of the 
ways in which media convergence has changed the way people use new media in China. The 
exploration of the regulatory dynamic for online games in China revealed significant user 
investment in the games they were playing, and pointed to many ways that users can generate 
income from online games platforms. As online games and other converged media 
increasingly become platforms for economic activity, the absence of coherent regulatory 
frameworks may become more of an immediate concern.   
The investigation also contributes to existing understandings of the nature of media 
convergence and what it means for regulators in China and in the international community. 
The case study of gold farming demonstrated that the traditional methods of addressing 
challenges raised by media convergence are not working: the new uses of converged media 
and degree of international engagement have opened a pathway for the international transfer 
of funds that circumvents the regulatory framework of the international financial system. The 
research identified policy challenges raised by media convergence that must be addressed by 
China and the international community in the coming years. The investigation highlights the 
need for governments to mitigate the increasing power of companies that own and operate 
converged media platforms, in order to address their infrastructure-level control, multi-national 




The examination of online games regulation in China has contributed to 
understandings of new media in China and the nature of media convergence as described 
above; it also contributes to knowledge about policy studies of China. One contribution the 
research makes by demonstrating that some phenomena and mechanisms of practice that 
have been observed elsewhere in China’s policy landscape are also active in the regulatory 
dynamic of China’s online games regulation. This research has shown that the interests of 
China’s online games regulators fragment along both horizontal (interagency) and vertical 
(central-local) lines. Horizontal fragmentation of interests, between government agencies at 
equal levels, was demonstrated in the Chapter II case example of the jurisdictional competition 
between the Ministry of Culture and the General Administration of Press and Publication244 
that resulted in the 2009 suspension of Blizzard’s World of Warcraft. This divergence of 
interests was further explored in the comparative content analysis of policy texts issued by 
these same agencies. The research also highlighted the divergence of interests between 
central and local regulators, citing local government protection of gold farming game studios 
and local government influence over low-level courts. A related insight that this research yields 
is that there is a large gap between the content of policy texts that relate to online games and 
their practical implementation. In fact, the investigation found that, for online games policy 
texts, the texts themselves were often unclear and aspirational, mandating activity that could 
not be implemented with the current state of infrastructure. This gap between policy and 
practice has been observed elsewhere, and this research simply demonstrates that it is readily 
observed in the policy and practice of online games regulation in China.  
Perhaps the most important contribution to policy studies in this research is the 
exploratory analysis of the regulatory dynamic in Chapter III. The literature review in the 
introduction to this project indicated that, to date, macro-level studies of China’s media 
regulation tend to not be informed by microanalysis. The exploratory analysis presented in this 
research begins to fill this gap by building macro-level understanding of the institutions, 
stakeholder interests, and pathways for interaction that can be observed in the case study. 
The information presented in this case study was based on the exploration of the gold farming 
case specifically, and therefore can only be conclusive in the context of this specific case. 
However, the contextual research about this case has the potential to be widely applicable. 
Further case-oriented explorations into the regulatory dynamics that shape regulatory practice 
for new media in China could enhance understanding of how negotiations take place and work 
to identify trends that may be common to multiple cases. Case-informed understanding of 
regulatory dynamics can be used to help both China and the international community to work 
                                                     





toward developing effective regulatory measures that account for the complex tensions, 






Appendix I: Major Regulations Related to Online Gaming in China 
Date Regulation Released By Notes 














of] illegal cases’ (in 
Zheng 2008, 59).  









State Council  Obligates all internet 
users (individual and 
organizations) to 
obey state laws and 
follow the State 
Secrecy System, 
outlaws information 
that is harmful to 
public security or 
pornographic (in 
Zheng 2008). 
Mar. 1997 Article 285 of the 
Criminal Law: ‘Crime on 
illegal access to state 
computer information 










Establishes a legal 
basis for punishing 
various computer-
related crimes (in 
Zheng 2008). 
May 1997 Interim Regulations on 





Leading Group of 
the State Council 
Mandates the 
registration of all 
internet users with 
the CNNIC, and 
acceptance of their 
guidelines (in Zheng 
2008). 
Jun. 1997 Rules and Regulations 
on Implementation of 
URL Registration 
CNNIC Implements the 
Interim regulations 







Dec. 1997 Computer Information 







The State Council  States that all ISPs 
and other internet 
access points are 
responsible to the 
Public Security 
Bureau (PSB) and 









Notice Concerning the 
Standardization of 
Commercial Activities in 



















Jan. 2000 State Secrets 
Protection Regulations 
for Computer 






Prohibits release of 
‘state secrets’ online 









keeping of ISPs 
(Zheng 2008).  




the PRC  
中华人民共和国电信条
例 
State Council Indicates that 
Internet Cultural 
Operation Entities 
engaging in online 
game operational 







Services License.  
Nov. 2000 Regulations on Internet 




MII and SCIO Restriction on 






web portals and that 
content must comply 
with their guidelines. 















the overthrow of the 
government or 
division of the 
country on the 
internet (Zheng 
2008).  
Jan. 2001 The Death Penalty for 
Offenses Related to 




possibility of death 
sentence for 
‘especially serious 
harm’ over the 
internet (Zheng 
2008) 
April 3, 2001 Measures of the 
Administration of 





MII, MPS, MOC, 
SAIC, branch 
offices at the 
provincial, 
municipal & county 
levels, coordinated 




March 26, 2002 Public Pledge of Self-
Regulation and 
Professional Ethics for 
China Internet Industry 
中国互联网行业自律公
约 
Internet Society of 
China 
 
Aug. 1, 2002 
(effective) 
Interim Measures for 
Administration of 














Aug. 1, 2002 
(effective Sept. 
30, 2002) 





MII Requires increased 
monitoring of 
internet use by 
Internet Service 
Providers, including 
the use of specialty 
software. Mandates 
reporting to MII, 
MPS and SSB 
Sept. 29, 2002 Rules on the 
Administration of  






MOC, MPS, SAIC, 
MII, branch offices 
at provincial, 
municipal & county 
levels, coordinated 
by MOC and 
provincial subunits 
Obliges internet café 
operators to install 




to state security’, 
related to ‘heretical 
organizations’, and  
violence and 
pornography 
Feb. 21, 2003 
(promulgated) 























MII  Obliging all 
organizations that 
provide domain 
services in China to 
register with the MII, 
and only those 
meeting the Nov. 
2002 Regulations 
can continue to 
provide them.  
(Zheng 2008) 













Interim Provisions on 
the Administration of 
Internet Culture  
互联网文化管理暂行规
定 
Ministry of Culture  
2003 Notice Regarding the 
in-game Publication of 





GAPP Stipulates that all 
game publishers 
must post 'advice on 
healthy gaming'. 
February 26, 2004 Some Opinions on 
further strengthening 
and improving the 
moral and ideological 








software, threats of 
international 
influences  
May 2004 Notice on Enhancing 
the Content Review 




Ministry of Culture Establishes the 
online game content 
review committee, 
establishing MOC as 
content review 
authority 
Sept. 9, 2004 
(effective Dec. 20, 
2004) 




MII Revised version of 
2002. Consists of 
regulations that 
integrate new rules 
with the 2003 Notice 
on improvement of 
Domain 
Management 
Feb. 2005 Regulations on Non-




MII Requires the 
registration of all 
non-profit ISPs with 




March 28, 2005 Notice on Further 
Deepening the 






















30 April, 2005 
(effective 30 May 
2005) 
Measures on the 
Administrative 








June 9, 2005 Notice on the Work of 
Purifying Online Games 
关于净化网络游戏工作
的通知 











Outlines the positive 
role of online games 












sports) amid a list of 
things that should be 
banned 
June 16, 2005 
(updated February 
2010) 











July 6, 2005 
(effective) 
Opinions on the 
Introduction of Foreign 
Capital into Cultural 
Industry  
Ministry of Culture, 
State 
Administration of 


















July 12, 2005 Opinions on the 
Development and 













August, 2005  Notice on the 
development of the 




Issued by the 
largest game 








Sept. 2005 Measures on the 
Administration of 
Internet News 
Information Services  
互联网信息服务管理办
法 
SCIO and MII Adds further 
categories of 







gatherings to disturb 
social order’ and 
‘information 
released in the 
name of illegal civil 
organizations’ 
(Zheng 2008). 
March 1, 2006 Cultural Market 
Administrative Law 
Enforcement 
Management Measures  
文化市场行政执法管理
办法 





specific types of 
violation  
February 15, 2007 Notice on Further 
Strengthening Internet 
Cafes and Online 
Ministry of Culture, 
State 
Administration for 












Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry 
of Information 




of Health, Ministry 
of Supervision, 
People's Bank of 
China, State 





Affairs Office  
outside the online 
gaming context 
April 15, 2007 
(effective) 
Notice on Protecting 
Physical and Mental 
Well-being of Minors 
and Implementing 
Online Game Anti-
addiction System  
关于保护未成年人身心
健康实施网络游戏防沉





of the GAPP, the 
Ministry of 
Education, Ministry 












According to Wang 
et al.,’requires that 
online game users 
must submit their 
personal information 
to complete 
registration in order 
to identify which 
players are minors 




to have technical 
measures to be 
implemented by 
online game 
operators that would 




or game functions, 
but also be useful in 
resolving disputes 
arising out of online 
games’. 
Jan. 1, 2009 Special Action to 
Actively Carry Out the 








April 24, 2009 Announcement on 
Regulating Applications 
for Content Review for 





April 2009 Notice on Performing 
Installation of Green 
Dam Filtering Software 







of Finance, and 
the State Council 
Information Office 





monitoring software  
June 4, 2009 The Notice on 
Strengthening 
Administration of Virtual 
Currency in Online 
Games   
关于加强网络游戏虚拟
货币管理工作通知 
the Ministry of 






money trading and 
issuing of virtual 
currency (Section 1, 
article 2) 
Sept. 7, 2009 
(Issued) 
Notice on the Issuing of 
the Interpretation of the 
State Commission 
Office for Public Sector 
Reform on Several 




Enforcement in Culture 










Office for Public 
Sector Reform 
 
Sept. 26, 2009 Cultural Industry 
Promotion Plan  
文化产业振兴规划 
State Council  States that 
government 
investment in the 
cultural industries 
should be increased, 




be trained. States 
that taxation and 
financial policies, as 
well as the legal and 
commercial 
environment should 
be improved to 
support 
development.  
Sept. 28, 2009 
(Issued) 
Notice on Implementing 
the Provisions of the 
State Council on “Three 
Determinations” and 
the Relevant 
Explanations of the 
State Commission 
Office for Public Sector 
Reform and Further 
Strengthening the 
Administration of the 
Pre-approval of Online 
Games and 
Examination and 




















investment and VIE 
structures 
May 31, 2010 
(Promulgated)  
July 1, 2010 
(Effective)   
Interim Measures on 
Administration of 
Internet Commodity 










limitations on virtual 
currency trade 
March 17, 2010 
(effective August 
1, 2010) 
Interim Measures on 
the Administration of 
Online Games  
网络游戏管理暂行办法  
Ministry of Culture Claims MOC 




of agencies & 
                                                     






February 17, 2011 
(effective April 1, 
2011) 
Interim Provisions on 
the Administration of 
Internet Culture 




March 1, 2011 (full 
implementation) 
Notice Regarding the 
Implementation of the 
Parents' Guardian 
Project for Minors 




The Ministry of 
Culture (MOC), the 
Central Civilization 
Office, the Ministry 
of Education, the 
Ministry of Industry 
and Information 
Technology (MIIT), 
Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS), 










for Real ID system 
will be developed,  
implementing a 
system for checking 
ID numbers against 
the government 
database 
March 18, 2011 Notice on the 
Implementation of the 
Newly Revised "Interim 












providers for the 
operation of Internet 
culture businesses 
that are not online 
music businesses 





General Office of 




Office (SIIO) as the 
guiding authority for 






June 2011 Measures for Managing 
Internet Information 
Services (consultation-




















December 2012  
(Effective 2013, 







Provisions for the 
Management of Internet 
Publishing Services 
(Revised Draft)  
 网络出版服务管理规定
(修订征求意见稿） 







December 3, 2013  Notice on Precautions 




The People’s Bank 
















Appendix II: Interaction Types from Case Study (Chapter IV) & Case Examples 
(Chapters II-IV)
Interaction Type
Case Example: World of Warcraft 
Suspension
Case Example: Online 
Protest
Case Example: Gold 
Farming
Within Group: Producers
Interaction between foreign game 
company (Blizzard), and local 
operators (The9 & NetEase)
Interaction between 
game developers and 
game operators to 
prevent bots & ban 
accounts
Within Group: Regulators
Interaction between government 
stakeholders in jurisdiction 




stakeholders (MOC & 
MOFCOM) to regulate 
virtual currency trade 
(The Notice on 
Strengthening 







Interaction and collaboration 
between individual users to protest 
the World of Warcraft suspension
Interaction and 
collaboration between 
individual users to 
produce the machinima 
video. Creation of 
stakeholder subgroup: 
"Oil Tiger Machinima 
Team"
Interaction between 
recreational players and 




Between Groups: Regulators & 
Users
Regulators attempt to 
implement  regulation 
(Green Dam software) 
which affects users on a 
large scale. Users react 
through machinima video 
in protest against 
regulators.
Interaction between 
courts and users seeking 
redress for virtual 
property theft
Between Groups: Regulators & 
Producers
Regulators demand licensing 
procedures and content changes from 
Producers; Producers interact with 
disparate stakeholders in regulator 
group to obtain compliance and 
resume operation
Interaction between 
game operators and 
courts (eg., court ruling 
against bot-assisted gold 
farming in response to 
Shanda  complaint 
(Globalvoicesonline ))
Between Groups: Users & 
Producers
Users interact with 
producers through game 
play while producing  
machinima video
Interaction between 
gold farming agents and 
game 
developers/operators 
(ie. game play, account 
banning)
Between Groups: All 
Interaction between 
courts, games 
companies and users in 
2009 trial of bot-
assisted gold farming 
(Globalvoicesonline; Lin 
T.). Trials prosecuting 
virtual property theft in 
gold farming cases (eg., 





Appendix III: Interview Structure 
Current State of Online Games Policy & Practice 
1. How would you describe the current state of media policy in China? 
2. What about policy regarding the internet and online games? 
3. What do you see as the most important issues related to media 
convergence? 
4. What areas need policy development/regulation? 
5. Who would you think might be the main stakeholders in China’s new media 
policy? 
6. Do you know of any connections between these stakeholders and key 
policymakers in the government? 
Issues Relevant to Emerging Practice 
7. With media convergence (eg., multiple forms of media use on single 
platforms), some people are starting to identify some arising issues that may 
be important for future regulation. One example of this is the market and 
jurisdictional overlap between telephone and internet regulation; VOIP 
technology has allowed internet service providers to provide telephone 
services, and increasingly, internet access is being provided by telephone 
companies (via 3G & 4G technology. Are there any issues raised by this 
general trend of media convergence or specifically by the convergent media 
of online games, that you see as potentially important for future regulation? 
8. Are you familiar with the practice of Real-Money trading? Do you see any 
potential regulatory issues for China that this practice may raise? 
9. Gold farming is a popular form of RMT and reputed to be widely practiced in 
China. Are you familiar with this practice? What have you heard about/what 
is your take on this issue? 
10. What do you see as the potential benefits of economic activity in the virtual 
space? 
11. To what extent do you think that the economic benefits of gold farming 
activity might be beneficial to local economies in China? 
12. What do you see as potential drawbacks of economic activity in the virtual 
space? 
Directions for Policy Development  
13. Are you aware of any policies that either are in place, or are being planned 
in relation to these types of issues? 
14. Are you aware of any other issues related to this area that may require 
policy responses? 
15. What can you tell me about the potential use of online games for political 
activity/activism, and the current or potential policy responses to such 
activity? 
16. What do you see as China’s interests in this type of policy development? 
17. What type of online gaming policy is likely to emerge in the international 
arena in the coming years? What do you see as China’s interests in this 




Appendix IV: Table of Results 
 
 Regulators Media Producers Users 
Structures  Ministry of Culture and GAPP are 
primary regulators of online games in 
China (All respondents), with MIIT 
(nearly all respondents), SAIC (R3, 2;9) 
 The jurisdictional dispute between the 
MOC and GAPP was resolved with the 
MOC as the primary authority in charge 
of online games: ‘the way I see it is they 
kind of agreed to disagree, they said, 
‘Ok, well this department is really in 
charge and you can have this piece’ (R1, 
11). 
 Only one or two people inside the MOC 
office are responsible for online game 
regulations   
 The central bank was involved in the 
disruption of the Alibaba VIE structure.   
 Technically the NPC should be the most 
powerful department in China, but the 
Party is above it (R3, 9). 
 Variable Interest Entity (VIE) 
structures are generally used 
(R3, 3).  
 VIE shareholders are 
Chinese nationals (R3, 4). 
 Game companies have 
special “Government 
Relations” (GR) departments 
for interacting with 
regulators. They are not 
specially trained but ‘know 
how to deal with the relation 
with the government 
officers’ (R4, 11).  
 One way to ensure the GR 
department knows how to 
deal with officials is to hire 
blood relations: 
‘If I was a company I would hire 
somebody’s – a son or daughter of 
 The international 
community and non-
gamers are important 
stakeholders in China's 
online games policy (R1, 
9) 
 Some gold farms are 
dormitory-style 
workshops (R1, 10).  
 Two categories of 
behaviour related to gold 
farming: “dajin” 打金 and 
“shuaqian”刷钱. Dajin is 
just hiring someone to 
play for you, shuaqian 
uses bots to gather virtual 





 Just one department in the MOC is 
relevant to online games: the 
Department of Cultural Market (R3, 
10).This is also the department in 
charge of in-game activity like gold 
farming (R9, 4). 
  ‘A completely independent non-
government official background 
organization cannot exist in China’. This 
is one reason a rating system like the 
ESRB cannot exist in China 
 Dedicated enforcement teams exist for 
online games. These are:  
1) The police, under the Ministry 
of Public Security (R3 & R4, 13) 
2) A special team under the 
Ministry of Culture called the  
“文化执法大队” (R4, 12; R3, 
13) 
 Within the small departments in 
charge, one or two individual people 
are in charge of decision-making (R3, 
11). 
 The officials in charge of day-to-day 
decision-making in the MOC and GAPP 
are not necessarily the official bosses of 
those departments: 
some government officials’ (R3, 
11).  
 Virtual goods trade occurs 
on platforms that are 
separate from online games 
companies, because Chinese 
law prevents online trade 
platforms from holding 
licenses to issue virtual 
currency. 
 Technical department of 
game companies responsible 
for addressing gold farming 
issues and plugins (R4, 7). 
 The most popular trading 
platform for virtual items is 
www.5173.com (R3) 
 Game developers, game 
operators, and shareholders 
are important stakeholders 
in the VIE structure. An 
example of shareholders 
suing Yahoo in the Alibaba 
case with Ma Yun was given 
(R3 & R4).  
 MOC grants licenses to 




‘it’s the vice-director or the vice-deputy 
director’ (R3, 11).   
 Gold farming would be regulated by the 
MOC enforcement team and the 
Ministry of Public Security (R3, 13). 
 So-called non-governmental 
organizations, including software 
associations and consumer 
associations, are actually the 
government:  
‘Basically they have the same government 
people who are in charge of this area and 
they call themselves non-government 
organizations’  
 Regulatory structure has improved 
since 2009: it is clear the MOC is the 
main authority, but that the GAPP also 
must issue a license (R3, 19). 
 The State Tax Bureau and the Local Tax 
Bureau(s) are officially designated to 
collect 20% income tax from virtual 
property sales (R3&R4) (R2, 18). 
trading platforms and virtual 
currency issuers separately; 
one company cannot hold 





 Virtual property sales tax applies for 
businesses, but not for individual 
players (R2, 19).  
 The central government, not local, is 
likely to be responsible for the technical 
blocking of access to foreign online 
games servers without a VPN (R3, 32). 
 Once a game is in operation, it is no 
longer the responsibility of the GAPP 
(R2, 11).  
 The responsibilities of MOC and GAPP 
overlap because they are both 
responsible for content censorship (R2, 
14). 
 The State Internet Information Office is 
a key policymaker in this area, as 
outlined in Document No. 24 (R2, 14). 
 The heads of the MPS, Propaganda 
Department and News, and MIIT have 
been incorporated into the State 
Council Internet Office because they 
are the three most important players in 
this area among the whole Chinese 
governance regime (R2, 16).  
 The telecommunication carriers have 
already become national enterprises, 




interest and becoming the real 
monopolies in China (R2, 39). 
 MIIT is involved in the licensing process, 
but ‘that’s not the entity that anybody 
worries about, everybody’s always very 
concerned what’s the policy stance at 
MOC, what’s the policy stance at GAPP’ 
(R5, 2). 
 Within the MIIT, the Office of 
Informatization leads the development 
of the internet (R6, 7).  
 The Ministry of Commerce is involved 
(R6, 3), but is lower-ranking than the 
other players in this area (R2). 
 The government sets up means to 
control users on the internet:  
1) The ten commandments of user 
behaviour 
2) Encourage users to report 
violations of these rules 
3) Inform the users they bear 
liability for saying or sending 
anything that violates these 
rules (R6, 4-5) 
 The web police are used to enforce user 
behaviour on the internet (R6, 5) 
 Interest groups like the Internet Society 




not belong to law and regulation but is 
quite influential of internet society’ (R6, 
7). 
 The PLA is definitely likely to be making 
use of online games to carry out 
monitoring activities. They use a model 
to predict new situations (R6, 13). 
 The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the Ministry of 
Commerce are key stakeholders in the 
future of online games regulation 
(Deutsche bank analysis excerpt 
provided by R13). 
 The Wumaodang246 (五毛党）is a 
group of people hired by the state to 
monitor different forums in China, but 
it is unlikely they do this for games 
because it is likely to stretch the 
workforce too thin (R1, 16). 
 The China Consumers' Association may 
be involved in the new complaint 
resolution website that has been 
established to mitigate against violent 
                                                     
246 Note: This term means 5 mao or Fifty-cent Party and is a derogatory term used to refer to the state employees that monitor and manipulate the content 




real-life user protest against game 
companies (R1, 14). 
 The People's Bank of China is newly 
concerned with policy in this area 
because of real-money trade (R8, 3). 
 The firewall grants China a form of 
border control over the internet (R5, 
10).  
 There is no infrastructure available to 
enforce games regulation where 
players act in servers outside their 
country: 
The rules, to the extent that there are any, 
are going to be jurisdiction-bound. But, if the 
operator itself is not within that jurisdiction, 
then…how does the authority in that 
jurisdiction exercise any power over that 
operator? If the servers aren’t in China, and 
somebody’s operating WoW servers in 
simplified Chinese characters from Laos, 
and they don’t have an anti-fatigue system 
baked into the game, as required by GAPP, 




down to the Laotian border and go invade? 




 Regulators need to protect domestic 
industry (R3, 3)  
 Many authorities want to be involved in 
this industry because it produces a lot 
of revenue (R3, 20) (R2, 10). 
 Many authorities want to be named as 
issuing parties to notices relevant to 
this industry because it declares their 
authority and gives them power to 
potentially shut down these operations, 
and potential profit: 
‘It’s quite often that you see fourteen different 
government departments issue one 
notice…the first, the second, the third, and 
the last three are completely useless so the 
only thing effective is maybe just five or 
six…if they issue this notice and somebody 
do violate this notice, they have the power 
 Chinese game companies 
are driven to make deals 
quickly 
 Local VIE holders are 
interested in compliance 
with regulators, 
demonstrated by Ma Yun’s 
decision to sever connection 
with parent WFOE (R3, 5). 
 Online game companies are 
concerned with the 
following user behaviour: 
manual gold farming (打金) , 
machine-assisted gold 
farming (刷钱), creation and 
operation of private servers. 
 Game companies have 
limited capacity for action 
against user activity that 
contravenes its interests, so 
they need to gather the 
support of government 
regulators (R4, 17). 
 In-game protests are 
definitely a potential 
threat to the government 
(R2, 13). 
 Users are interested in 
virtual property 
protection and this has 
gained traction in recent 
years as society attitudes 
about online games 
slowly change (R6, 11).  
 Gold farms are sometimes 
run directly by local 
governments: 
'Local governments are 
really the bosses of a lot of these 
gold farms. Maybe not in the 
majority, but some of them' (R1, 
4). 
 Young people are willing 




maybe to shut you down. So you have to say 
“oh I’m sorry” so that’s power’ (R3, 20). 
‘I think the only reason is profit’ (R4, 21). 
 VIE structure usage is well-known public 
information, so regulators know it is 
used. 
 VIE structures are a legal grey area:  
‘there’s a conflict here, the law says you 
cannot use that way, but the practice is that 
all the companies use this’ (R4, 4). 
 Government stakeholders will not stop 
the VIE structure use because the 
companies that use it produce a lot of 
revenue for China:  
‘If they totally ban this structure, then these 
companies will die, it’s quite obvious so the 
Chinese government says “well if you want 
to do this, we just don’t care” ’ (R3, 4). 
 Game companies face the 
same problems and have the 
same interests, but because 
they are competitors, this 
limits their cooperation (R4, 
18). 
 Game companies will 
generally create EULAs that 
claim they own virtual 
property (R4, 26) (R2, 24), 
however this is just a 
measure to protect the 
company and does not have 
very good support from PRC 
law (R4, 26) 
 Game companies have ‘got 
to find a fast way to balance 
the legal and the practice’ 
when it comes to virtual 
property trading & selling 
among players (R4, 27). 
 The approval process for 
licensing is too slow for 
online games companies  
 Industry has more incentive 
to implement the real-name 
system than the government  
because it creates an 
because it is just gaming 
(R1, 7).  
 Most gold farmers don't 
perceive gold farming as a 
permanent job due to the 
low salary and lack of 
opportunity for 
advancement (R1, 9).  
 Some organizations seem 
to be involved in 
spreading their ideology 
in online games. A case 
example of participant 
observation was given 
where a racist 
organization was trying to 
influence World of 
Warcraft players (R1, 15).  
 Underground stakeholder 
interests include those of 
plug-in developers and 
sales people, gold farming 
workshops, and private 
servers (R11, 2). 
 Gold farming is strictly 
profit-driven, no one 




Another reason is that the VIE 
shareholders are Chinese nationals (R3, 
4). 
 Public statements of key officials are 
important: 
 ‘if you want to know online game regulations 
sometimes you need to understand what 
these government officials say in public’ (R4, 
10). 
However, these statements may 
also be inaccurate, by failing to deliver 
on stated goals. An example was given 
involving the announcement of a game 
rating system in development that was 
never realized (R3, 12). 
 Local government agencies will often 
not shut down an unlicensed game if 
they can profit from it (R4, 13). 
 Regulators would only shut down gold 
farming activity if the gold farmer was 
under 18 or if plugins were involved. 
economic advantage (R2, 
34).  
 Chinese game operators are 
interested in exporting 
games. The most successful 
places for them seem to be 
South East Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and Russia (R5, 
1)(R10,3).  
 Media producers exist in an 
environment of legal 
uncertainty due to conflict 
between regulators 
(R5, )(R12, 2) and therefore 
must adjust to different 
pressure points to succeed 
(R12, 2). 
 Industry is concerned about 
the risk factors posed by 
VIEs (R13). 
 Pirating is more of a priority 
for game companies in China 
than gold farming activity. 
This is because the 
companies can mitigate gold 
farming in-game, but can 
only take legal measures 
or banking regulations 
(R11, 6).  
 Gold farming may provide 
an opportunity to make 
money, but because it has 
no social status it will not 
be considered a good 
career (R8, 7).  
 Gold farming has a 
positive impact on local 
economies because 
usually gold farmers are in 
backward locations (R10, 
2).  
 There is a generation gap 
in technology use:  




o Adults are still 
interested in 
watching TV 
This causes opposition 
within the family (R9, 1). 
 Parents are concerned 




Otherwise gold farming is not illegal (R3 
& R4, 13-14): 
‘[One] Should say it’s not illegal’ (‘应该说不
是违法的) (R3, 13) 
 Deciding how industry profits will be 
divided between the central 
government and the other government 
agencies is a cause of conflict (R3, 21).  
 The Chinese government is concerned 
that virtual currency will affect the real 
currency, because of the potentially 
unlimited supply that game companies 
can provide (R3, 27-28). 
 Virtual currency is an issue not only in 
China but worldwide (R4, 28).  
 The State Tax Bureau wants to tax 
virtual property sales, but this is not yet 
enforceable (R4, 29)(R8, 3). 
 The government will work to simplify 
the approval process for licenses 
because it is too slow (R3, 31).  
 The major concern for online games 
regulation is content censorship (R2, 
12).  
against pirate servers (R7, 
13).  
 Online companies only 
consider how to maximize 
profits (R11, 2). 
 PC hardware and software 
vendors are additional 
stakeholders in this area 
(R11, 2).  
 The virtual economy and 
real-money trade benefit 
developers because it 
establishes an independent 
economic network where 
the government is helpless 
to intervene (R10, 2).  
 The game industry does not 
want users to have legal 
rights to virtual property in 
their games because this 
would require them to keep 
the game going, legally: 
If a user actually has an ownership 
interest in any item that exists 
within your game, then you would 
technically need to keep that 
too much time on online 
games and not enough on 
academic learning 
(R1)(R9, 2) (R5, 3).This 
contradicts with the 
simultaneous recognition 
that technical industry 
growth is valuable to the 





 The whole policy is still propaganda-
oriented, not just economic-oriented 
(R2, 17). 
 There are some worries about anti-trust 
for cross-subsidiary companies like 
Tencent, because it is difficult to 
calculate their market share since they 
compete in so many markets: 
‘In traditional companies…the proportion of 
the market share could be calculated. But 
among [cross-subsidiary companies] they 
have many, many markets, so it’s hard to see 
whether such a company is a monopolist’ 
(R2, 21).  
 The government does not want QQ to 
be exchanged for real money because it 
could produce unlimited coins (R2, 24). 
 The government wants to create more 
and more cultural products with so-
called socialist ideology. (R2, 35). 
 The government has no productive goal 
to achieve besides a vague idea that it 
should improve the cultural industry: 
game going. But that just doesn’t 
work from a commercial 
perspective, you have to be able 
to shut down a game if it’s not 
profitable. You can’t keep running 
these servers to keep somebody’s 
property interests alive (R5, 9).  
Game operators 
would therefore try to take 
the position that virtual 
property rights are a matter 
of contract law (R5, 9).  
 Chinese online game 
developers are short-sighted 
and impatient, so big 
international games will 
continue to emerge from 





‘So it can only follow a political logic, it can 
only ban to prohibit something, but it cannot 
propose something’ (R2, 37). 
 Government discussion around policy 
development in this area is focused on 
virtual property rights and whether 
they should be protected (R6, 5).  
 The government would be very 
interested and sensitive about protests 
in online games (R6, R5): 
‘The state simply needs to be very careful 
about minor events. Some small events can 
lead to big turbulence’ (R6, 12).  
 Within the central government there 
are different policy approaches: 
‘The foreign ministry and the foreign trade 
department are always more dove-ish 
towards the United States. And the central 
Propaganda Department and the military are 




 The government is concerned primarily 
with overt compliance (R12, 1). 
 The MIIT interest in online games 
regulation is not administrative, but 
they have vital economic and political 
interest in this industry (R12, 2). 
 The Provincial Propaganda 
Departments are motivated to do a 
good job because if they don’t, they will 
be politically responsible. However, 
they are allied strongly with the  
telecommunications operators, whose 
interests are economic: 
‘it boils down to a conflict, you know, the 
tension between economic development and 
political control. Just like in everything, that’s 
really the source of tension in China. You 
have to use the new media to enhance 
economic development. On the other hand, 
if it’s only direct to the economy that’s fine. 
But, what about political ramifications’ (R12, 
2).  
 The CSRC’s apparent interest in banning 




to the State Council is likely related to 
its underlying interest in augmenting its 
authority ‘both over China’s overseas 
listed internet names, and more broadly 
within China’s government ministerial 
ranks’ (Deutsche Bank analysis, R13). 
 The Ministry of Commerce is reluctant 
to dismantle the VIE structure because 
doing so would entail great economic 
risk, including damage to ‘China’s 
employment ranks, to one of its most 
generous corporate tax bases, to 
China’s accomplishments in 
internationalizing its financial markets’ 
(Deutsche Bank analysis, R13).  
 Major measures to change VIE structure 
usage are likely to be delayed and 
watered down (Deutsche Bank analysis, 
R13). 
 The central state is not really concerned 
about gold farming: 
'There still aren't any policies on gold 
farming but there are policies on virtual 
currencies. So I guess it really reflects the 




state; they are not really concerned about gold 
farming' (R1, 4). 
 Local governments support gold farms 
because they provide jobs and because 
it is semi-legal: 
'Nobody thinks that they are in danger of 
being closed down or whatever because local 
governments are either protecting them or a few 
that are receiving money from them or even 
think they benefit the local economy...  
I guess it's not accidental that there's no 
policies on gold farming; they might want to 
keep it that way' (R1,4-5).  
 Some leaders of non-profit 
organizations have an impact on the 
game industry (R8, 3).  
 The government is not interested in 
developing regulations for something 
that will not have a big impact. A case 
example was given about access to the 
American version of Second Life (R8, 5).   
 Policymakers are generally not even 




they just know there are some big 
enterprises and they are willing to 
support their development (R8). 
 It is technically difficult to regulate 
virtual property trade for real money 
because there is a large amount of data 
needed and this would need many 
people (R10, 1). 
 China’s general interests for online 
games policy are on one hand to 
encourage its overall healthy 
development, on the other to limit the 
use of online games by children (R9, 1).  
 Policymakers are focused on limiting 
game play for young people and 
controlling all content, in part because 
the rating system is underdeveloped 
(R9, 2).  
 One policymaker says that gold farming 
is very damaging to health and that it is 
prohibited by financial regulation and in 
some general regulations (R1, 3). The 
respondent reported that the income 
was too little to be worth the cost to 
health (R9, 3).  
 Social stability is a key concern because 




main reason for the focus on internet 
content management (R9, 3).  
 The content review process means the 
state acts instead of parents to ensure 
health of young people: 
‘Somewhat like parents, since family 
supervision has still not fully kept up, [the 
state] needs to carefully consider the 
physical and mental health of young people’ 
(有点像家长，因为家庭管理还没有完全跟得
上，需要谨慎考虑青少年的身体和精神健康) 
(R9, 6).   
 Regulators need to balance the 
contradiction of societal interests, 
between developing valuable technical 
industry and protecting the minds of 
young people (R5, 3). 
 Regulators have so much to worry 
about, Real-money trade is unlikely to 
be a priority (R5, 6).  
 As a general policy, China is trying to 
move up the value chain from 




This could influence policy decisions 
relevant to gold farming (R5, 9).  
 The online games industry is important 
for China's development because it 
relieves the pressure on resources but 
develops many income opportunities 






 Laws that restrict VIEs have existed for 
ten years or so, but are not enforced 
(R4, 4).  
 There has been one high profile 
exception to the tacit approval of VIE 
use: the case of Ma Yun and Alipay. This 
case example was described.  
 Two pathways for enforcement:  
 Dedicated enforcement team(s) (R3 & 
R4, 12-13).  
 Contact between relevant individuals, 
ie. officials and employees or high-level 
managers. An example was given from 
the Alipay case (R3, 5). 
 General procedure for involving online 
games companies is that some of the 
big companies are invited directly to 
the office of the MOC cultural market 
 Two styles of legal 
operation:  
o American style:  





legal, design, tax). 
This complicates and 
prolongs the process 
for making deals 
(R4, 2). 
o Chinese style: Very 
little attention to 
detail. Companies 
transition from IT to 
the online games 
business quickly. 
 Users accept the End User 
License Agreement (EULA) 
when they play online 
games, thereby agreeing 
to not trade outside the 
game (R3, 14).  
 Gold farming transactions 
occur on the trading 
platforms, not within 
online games.  
 There is often a large 
mark-up for virtual items 
that are rare (R4, 15).  
 Should online protests 




department to discuss some issues (R4, 
10)(R7, 3): 
‘Because it is so new, they…cannot totally 
understand how to run a business and all the 
issues for this industry, because there are a 
lot of issues…some of the technical issues, 
yeah so all their information comes from the 
local gaming companies‘ (R4, 10) 
 Game companies are called to meet 
with regulators in 2 situations:  
1. A new issue needs to be 
addressed and a policy needs to 
be adopted. The government 
will call the companies in and 
raise the issue to say it’s not 
going well, convey guidance. 
2. To provide guidance on 
implementation of a policy (R7, 
3).  
 Pathways for communication with 
industry:  
1. In person through meetings 
(R4, 10) 
Companies cannot 
afford to pay 
attention to details 
or they will lose 
deals (R4, 2).  
 VIEs comply with foreign 
investment restriction laws, 
but violate others (R4, 4). 
However, the regulations 
they violate are not 
enforced. 
 Conflict between game 
developers and operators 
can occur in response to 
user behaviour (eg., blame 
for leak of source code that 
allowed users to operate 
private server for the Legend 
of Mir (传奇) (R3, 8) 
 Game companies are heavily 
involved in policy 
development (R3, 8)(R7, 
2)(R5, 3).  
 Cooperation between game 
companies does happen, but 
usually takes place 
unofficially, eg., between 
individuals in smaller 
‘can easily order all the 
operators to shut down’ (R2, 
13). (R6) (R4) 
 Gold farming companies 
communicate with 
customers through email, 
telephone, or QQ:  
‘They will leave an email, or 
leave a QQ number, or 
telephone; if you want to trade 
such items, you will contact 
them’ (R2, 23).  
 Both individuals and 
enterprises have trading 
rights for audio, video, 
and cultural products, 
since a 2004 revision to 
foreign trade law. This 
may be relevant to 
international  virtual 
property and real-money 




2. Through publications, eg., a 
White Paper issued by the MOC 
annually (R4, 10). 
 Government actors are unlikely to 
enforce the EULA that restricts gold 
farming unless game companies lobby 
for action: 
‘I think only in the situation that gold farmers 
affect the interests of the gaming company 
and the gaming company will raise this 
problem to the government, then the 
government will do something’ (R4, 17). 
 If the State Council Internet Information 
Office wants to issue a notice related to 
online games, it cannot issue it itself, it 
will be issued under the name of one of 
the ministries. This makes it difficult to 
accomplish anything substantial 
because coordinating different 
ministries is difficult (R3, 20).  
 Processing time for online games 
approvals is delayed by lack of 
manpower. The process is described as 
follows:  
departments who are 
friends (R3 & R4, 18). 
 Different licensing standards 
of practice give domestic 
games an advantage over 
foreign games:  
o Local games can 
operate with only 
the GAPP license 
and apply for a local 
MOC license 
afterward (R4, 19).  
o Foreign games need 
both licenses. This 
delays operation by 
half a year. 
 When companies do not 
know how to deal with 
something, they will ask the 
local authority (R4, 29).  
 Some regulations lack 
infrastructure for 
implementation. The virtual 
property sales tax is one of 
these (R4, 29) (R1, 17) (R5): 
'Everybody knows that it 
can't be really administered' (R1, 17). 
 Many gold farms in China 
shut down in response to 
Blizzard's attempt to deal 
with them in the 2007 
expansion pack. Those 
that remained turned to 
the domestic market 
because the virtual goods 
had become less valuable 
in the international 
market (R1, 1). 
 Gold farm entrepreneurs 
arrange for protection 
from local governments 
(R1, 4). 
 It is likely that the reports 
of gold farm labour in 
prisons are true, and this 
is an example of how the 
state is involved in gold 
farming: 
'I'm sure it's true...you 
expect these kinds of things to 
happen in China and it's much less 
shocking than things like forcing 




‘First…the central government try to control 
everything, like the one department like 
MOC, later on it finds it just doesn’t have the 
manpower…will issue some new notice and 
authorize the local department to do this…he 
will say “well, you need to approve first, then 
the final approval will come from me”. So 
that’s some trouble, you need to get approval 
for about half a year’ (R3, 21). 
 The SIIO cannot issue its own notice for 
online games, it must do this through 
the ministerial-level organizations. The 
lack of ability for these organizations to 
co-ordinate means it is difficult for the 
central government to accomplish 
anything big (R3, 20). 
 In response to in-game protest, the 
government would just shut down the 
servers and communication. An 
example from an online protest outside 
of games was given: 
‘Everything that has something to do with 
[the protest] would just be deleted or just find 
 Lots of virtual property trade 
is occurring because they do 
not need to pay tax (R4, 30).  
 Industry technology is used 
as an enforcement 
mechanism to compensate 
for lack of government 
infrastructure (R2, 2).  
 Companies use End-User 
License Agreements to avoid 
liability for virtual property 
(R4)(R2, 25) (R5). 
 Lawyers must have close 
contacts in government in 
order to advocate for client 
interests (R5, 3).  
 Internet company operators 
use three legal means to try 
and control users:  
o Outline user 
behaviour with 
several rules called 
the Ten 
Commandments 
o Encourage people to 
report if they find 
rule violations 
I am sure it's going to happen...I 
take this as another example 
where Chinese government is 
involved in gold farming' (R1, 6).  
 The salary for gold 
farming plummeted 
between 2005-2008: 
'it's like a race to the 
bottom sort of industry. So the 
salary was kind of decent, really 
big, in '05, '04, but then by '08 it's 
like factory workers' kind of wage' 
(R1, 9).  
 There have been 
instances of real-life 
violent protest by users to 
the game companies. An 
example was given from 
an unpublished paper:  
'Chinese gamers organize 
themselves for activist cause 




a way to crash it…that activity caused Baidu 
to shut down their server and forbid the 
chatting function for several hours’  (R3 & 
R4, 22).  
 While some game companies that 
operate without a license are shut 
down, most are allowed to operate 
despite not having the required licenses 
(R3, 23). There are three reasons for 
this:  
1. MOC and GAPP don't care 
2. They are still in the queue, the 
agencies don’t have the 
manpower to deal with them all 
(R4, 23). 
3. Game expansions are not 
noticed by the government and 
the companies do not inform 
them (R3, 23). 
 Information about requirements for 
game companies that is not listed in the 
policy texts is transmitted from the 
State Council level through the 
Government Relations Department. The 
GR staff will then transmit the 
information to the company staff: 
o Inform the users 
that they bear some 
liability for seeing 
violations: 
‘So some rules are clearly you can 
see that strict liability will be there, 
and you can frighten people not to 
surf on the internet’ (R6, 5).  
 Games operators in China 
use software to technically 
censor key words in user 
conversations that occur in 
online games (R13) (R1, 15). 
 Some games companies in 
China have people monitor 
data for abnormal activity to 
prevent in-game protests or 
similar activity (R7, 11). 
 The general approach taken 
by game companies in China 
is that if it is not forbidden, 
they will do it (R7, 1).  
 In response to real-life 
violent protest by users, 
game companies have 
adjusted to be more 
the game companies. And it used 
to be-they are violent. There were 
violent instances and then 
occupation of the offices' (R1, 13).  
 Users may be reluctant to 
use games to organize 
illegal political activity 
because the key word 
censorship alerts them to 
the fact that games are 
monitored already just 
like the rest of the 
internet (R1, 16).  
 Virtual property sales 
occur outside of the gold 
farming industry: 
recreational players 
sometimes organize raids 
and sell the equipment. 
These "gold raid" were 
likely comprised of elite 
players from various 
guilds (R1, 18).  
 Users purchase in-game 
items without knowing 
exactly what they will do 




‘For example, the technical staff designs 
some program in the game and after they 
deliver to the authority and the authority say 
“no no you cannot do that”’ (R4, 24). 
 The government cannot find a fast way 
to deal with the jurisdictional issues 
raised by media convergence (R3 & R4, 
25-26). 
 The government cannot enforce the 
taxation of virtual property sales 
because no one knows how to find both 
the original price and the selling price 
to be able to measure the profit. A first-
hand account was given where both the 
local authorities and the State Tax 
Bureau, when asked for 
implementation advice by a game 
company (through phone calls), 
apologized and said they don’t know 
how to do this (R4, 29).  
 The government strategy for online 
games is to control it without 
destroying it (R2, 12). 
 High-level instructions to coordinate 
new ministries have been issued in the 
form of internal documents which are 
conciliatory toward users 
that try and revolt, and to 
establish alternate forums 
for complaints, such as 
complaints websites (R1, 
13).  
 Game companies that 
operate in China keep the 
details about in-game 
equipment secret from the 
players, which stands in 
stark contrast to Western 
servers. The respondent 
remarked that users 
accepted this but it 
impacted the game dynamic 
significantly (R1, 22).  
 Game companies have very 
little opportunity for policy 
input, but must often 
enforce unreasonable 
policies created by those 
that do not understand the 
games (R11, 3). 
 Some game companies 
eliminate specific problems 
with gold farming (using 
bots or not) by contacting 
the local public security and 
 Users can access foreign 
games in Chinese internet 
cafes if they have 
American accounts (R8, 
4).  
 Virtual property claims 
can be very difficult to 
pursue because the game 
companies can decide 
everything (R10, 2).  
 Both gold farm workers 
and game players are 
being exploited for 
labour: 
‘The results are the same. They 
are like the bees. The honey will 
be taken away’ (R2, 30).  
 Gold farming is likely to 
help the economy (R8, 7).  
 After 2008, gold farming 
has moved out somewhat 
from China to places like 






issued to every level of government, 
each with its own version. These are 
very detailed documents (More than 10 
pages) (R2).  
 The most recent internal document was 
issued in 2010 and contains detailed 
instructions about the division of labour 
among different government 
departments. Within these instructions, 
the creation of the State Internet 
Information Office is outlined (R2, 16). 
 The SIIO was designed to be a 
coordinating body between the central 
government and the ministries below it 
(R2, 16).  
 The government subsidizes the 
production of Red Games. These use 
socialist ideology because it is safe  
content that is safely different from 
Western culture: 
‘The government’s intention is that it wants to 
develop more and more cultural products 
with the so-called socialist ideology. But 
nobody knows what kind of ideology it 
is…They believe that the real practice will be 
back to the …revolution tradition. That’s 
asking them to shut down 
the studio involved. The 
illicit money is all given to 
the public security 
authorities and the studio is 
no longer a problem for the 
game (R11, 5): 
Our company's boss gets in a 
bad mood, sends someone to contact 
the local public security and shut 
down the underground studio; we 
give all the stolen money to the public 
security the studio doesn't influence 




了) (R11, 5). 
 The fact that underground 
workshops do not pay tax 
puts them at risk for being 








ironic, actually. Because normally, on the 
one hand, nobody believes that…but the 
CCP …is not currently able to reproduce a 
new kind of culture which is much different 
from Western culture or from revolution 
culture.  So they will not do it’ (R2, 25). 
 High-level involvement is likely the only 
way the dispute between MOC and 
GAPP can be resolved (R5, 2).  
 Interest groups like the Internet Society 
of China are officially independent but 
are in fact closely connected to 
government: 
‘The chairman of the society or whatever is 
possibly some retired officials’ (R6, 7).  
Informal relationships with current 
regulators possibly exist: 
‘We can still see some kind of current people 
still work on some things for interest groups’ 
(R6, 8).  
'In China, paying taxes is 
legitimate and someone will 
protect you. If you don't pay taxes, 
this is illegal, business activities 
cannot go on' (在中国，交了税
就是合法的，会有人保护你。
不交税就是非法的，商业活动
做不下去的) (R11, 5) 
 Game companies can 
develop successful policy 
input through the following 
paths:  
o Through the 
relationships forged 
between the owners 
of large game 




o Apply for 
preferential 




 Self-regulation is one relevant means of 
policy development, which allows 
interest groups like the Internet Society 
of China to function as issuers of policy:  
‘In China they also believe in self-regulation. 
So I think the Internet Society of China and 
also individual groups, they’re also able to 
make some kind of new rules’ (R6, 7).  
 The courts are officially independent, 
but inevitably is subject to external 
influence (R6, 8). 
 The CCP always uses moralistic terms as 
a pretext for action: 
‘The Communist Party being a very 
moralistic, at least, rhetorically moralistic 
regime, always trying to clamp down on 
something like [online protest] in the name of 
protecting the children. And you can always 
use that as a pretext’ (R12, 2). 
A case example from was given 
where moral pretext was used to 
subsidy. This would 
increase the 
opportunity to be in 





in this process (R8, 
3). 





meetings (R8, 3).  
 Interaction between the 
regulator and the companies 
is the process for creation of 
rules that make sense (R5, 
4).  
 Game companies try to 
create as direct access to the 
regulators as possible. This 
access is based on personal 
contacts. This is  because the 





punish a media executive from the 
Southern Metro Daily. 
 In general, demonstrations are 
managed to take advantage of 
supportive sentiments while preventing 
protests from turning inwards against 
the authorities (R12, 1).  
 Policy for emerging media is kept very 
general in order to not leave any 
uncovered holes in the regulation as 
new issues emerge (R7, 1).  
 Some local governments actually set up 
gold farms and recruit entrepreneurs to 
run them in order to generate local 
economic benefits. The respondent 
described interviewing gold farming 
bosses and others familiar with the 
industry: 
'Some of the operations were set up by 
local governments inviting these gold farming 
entrepreneurs there to run the gold farm. So, 
organizing employment for the local village or 
small town' (R1, 7).  
‘When you’re looking at your 
average regulatory documents or 
notice or whatever it is for the 
regulator, it might raise more 
questions than answers, or there 
might be rules in the book that  no 
one pays any attention to, or there 
might be a rule somewhere that’s 
just not written down anywhere’ 
(R5, 5).   
 Game companies ‘draft their 
terms of service and their 
End User License 
Agreements in such a way 
that it lets them do whatever 
they want to do, for the 
most part’ (R5, 7).  
 The development of games 
in China that operate 
primarily on 
microtransactions 
represents a co-opting of 




 The 执法 department has ultimate 
capacity to force game companies to 
implement policies (R11, 3). 
 Court rulings about virtual property 
rights supported gamer interests over 
game company interests initially 
because the games industry did not 
have very good connections to the 
Chinese government. Now they do, but 
they are hesitant to let cases go to 
court in case there is a ruling against 
them (R1, 21). 
 Political problems on the internet can 
now be solved through technical 
control. A case example was given 
where technology was used by the USA 
to find Osama Bin Laden (R8, 9).  
 Corporate influence on China is limited 
by two key factors:  
1. The institutional set-up of 
China’s government 
2. Intense market competition 
prevents the industry 
cooperation necessary for 
successful lobbying (R9, 4).  
 State-sponsored organizations like 
game industry groups ‘serve as a way 
for the industry companies to 
'In places like China, the 
game publishers and 
designers...would think about ways 
to incorporate the gold farming 
industry into their own design...that's 
exactly what they did, you know, for 
a lot of Chinese games, domestic 
games. So why not sell virtual 
property directly to gamers? Why do 
they have to go through a middle 
man...So, a lot of games did that and 
then there's this term "Asian games"' 
(R1, 21).  
 Some of the profit made by 
the VIE are not transmitted 
to the Wholly Foreign-
Owned Entities (WFOEs). 
This is because some of the 
revenue must be kept inside 





communicate with the state and try to 
come up with policy’ (R5, 4).  
 Self-regulatory initiatives are 
government-driven (R5, 4). 
 The drafting process for regulation does 
not permit for much feedback from 
stakeholders (R5, 5).  
 Policy texts are only part of the legal 
framework:  
‘The legal system is not, for lack of a better 
word, as legalistic as the Western system 
where the rules are written down in a very 
clear fashion’ (R5, 5). 
 There are many internal documents at 
all the different regulators and 
government organizations that are not 
shared with the outside world (R5).  
 The GAPP power over online games 
depends on the definition of 
publication. This is very vague because 
of media convergence. Shanda was 
identified as an example of a games 
company that overlaps into other 





‘It operates the online games and it also 
operates the literacy website…So you 
cannot clearly define what kind of behaviour 






 Gold farming may technically be illegal because the gold farmers have agreed to the EULA, which applies to them 
through the “governing law” where the agreement was made. If this is on an American server, this is American law 
(R3, 15).  
 The regulations for virtual currency do not strictly apply to gold farming. This is because the text does not include, in 
its definition of “virtual currency”, the currency that is accumulated in and traded by players in online games. The 
regulations instead define “virtual currency” to only be the currency that is bought with real PRC renminbi and that 
can only be used to purchase in-game items or services (R3, 29).  
 The lack of capacity for enforcement is not always a legal issue, sometimes it’s a technical issue (R3, 31).  
 The incorporation of enterprise and government may happen in the case of big companies like QQ and Baidu, just as 
it happened with telecommunications corporations. This would steer the government in the direction of economic 
over political logic, which is dangerous: 
‘All their information and their lives will be controlled by the [only] companies. That’s the most – and people are 




 Decision-makers for online games policy in China are old and do not understand the essence of online games or 
their user base. As a result, they do not think carefully about the game policies but just want to encourage economic 
development while preventing children from playing:  
China's decision-makers in this area are 40 or 50 years of age, their children are in middle school, they could all easily 
be going to play online games, so they don't think carefully about the laws of these games, they just want to allow the game 
companies to make money - it's useful for economic development, they want to allow the game companies to make money, 
but they don't want a lot of students to go and play, they think students still need to go to school, so they want to restrict the 
groups that play the games' (中国做决策的这部分人都是 40 或 50 岁的人，他们的小孩都在上中学，都很容易去玩网络
游戏，所以他们并不会仔细思考这个游戏的规律，他们只是又想让游戏公司赚钱----对经济发展还是有好处的，他们
希望让游戏公司赚钱，但是他们又不希望有很多学生去玩，认为学生还是要上学，又想限制玩游戏的群体。) (R8). 
 It is very difficult to understand the size of the gold farming industry (R8).  
 The amount of data needed to regulate real-money trade of virtual property is large, so this presents a regulatory 
challenge (R10, 1).  
 Taxing the virtual economy presents a challenge because each company has its own tax model (R10, 1).  
 It is technically much too difficult to regulate the virtual economy, nationally or internationally. Critical issues 
include:  
1. The tax rate: each developer has its own tax model for transactions, different countries have different 
business models (ie. free-to-play vs. subscription-based) 
2. Some companies are licensed, but some (like gold farms) are not, so there is no way to implement taxation 
The respondent noted: 





 Research is needed to determine how to solve problems of social unrest, as games are a likely venue for future 
popular unrest. This is difficult because researchers are told to focus on government problems rather than social 
problems: 
 There is a generational division of opinion on online games that currently prevents it from becoming a technology 
that, like tv, newspapers, and reading, can become something that brings families together. The use of internet 
cafes exacerbates this problem: 
 One respondent directly involved in policy development saw online games as the latest in a teleology of media that 
brings family together (R1, 1): 
Just like television, it's at an early stage and also as a matter of fact influences family relationships. In the past, 
the whole family would read, read the newspaper, and chat together; Later on, television became the centre of 
family communication. Currently games are still not able to do this, children play in the house themselves while 
adults watch television. I think this is the future development direction for games.  (就像电视，它早期实际上也
是影响家庭关系的。以前，全家人一起读书、看报、聊天；后来，电视成为家人沟通的内容。游戏现在还做不
到，孩子关在屋里自己玩，大人看电视。我觉得这是游戏未来的发展方向) (R9, 1).  
 The current problem facing the Chinese government is how to adapt to a more effective and rational use of the 
internet (R9, 3).  
 There is currently no legal basis for how to handle virtual assets in China. A case example was given about splitting 
virtual assets in the case of divorce. There is therefore no legal basis for the potential development of international 
agreements related to virtual assets (R9, 5).   
 International agreement use to regulate something as large as the virtual economy would be very difficult because 
multi-lateral cooperation is difficult to enforce. Challenges to the use of international agreements to regulate this 




1. There is no way to enforce them short of military enforcement, or an elaborate framework like the WTO. 
But even then, the ‘enforcement mechanism …ultimately still comes down to nation-states themselves’ (R5, 
11).  
2. Harmonization would be very difficult because the view taken towards the internet in different jurisdictions 
is vastly different. An example was given contrasting the US and China: 
America is supporting transparency and the freedom of information and action, and China is recognizing the 
economic utility of the internet, but still wanting to maintain control over the means of disseminating information on 
a mass scale. That’s a pretty different approach. So…what would be the scope for cooperation on harmonizing the 
internet regulatory policies between China and the US? (R5, 12). 
 The jurisdictional issues raised by cross-border real-money transactions like gold farming are significant and highly 
complex.  
 A secondary reason the ESRB rating system cannot exist is because competitors are not willing to cooperate with 
each other to be voluntarily subject to such a system.  
 Should QQ decide to engage in Real-Money Trade, the government may not have the technical capacity to prevent it 
(R2, 23).  
 The server-side control of online games means that the power and control is moving from the end-user to the 
centralized control of media companies. This raises critical issues as media convergence causes information to be 
centralized and controlled in one place: 
Respondent: What if the game industry is combined with other areas like news, e-banks, instant message? ..and 
that’s like cloud computing. And people only need, only like a QQ account. They will log into the central server. Then, 





Interviewer: And then use it to design games that will get you more addicted? 
Respondent: Yes, that’s the ideal picture (R2, 32). 
 The online games industry creates many derivative industries, companies and jobs, so it has a great effect on the 
economy. Gold farming is one of these (R8, 8).  
 Game companies face two primary issues when navigating the regulatory landscape:  
1. What is going to cause friction 
2. What are the priorities of the person behind the rules (R5, 3).  
 Success for Chinese game companies in foreign markets is difficult due to the impatience and short-sightedness of 
Chinese developers (R11, 8). 
 Cognitive capitalism: online games and other new media companies exploit the labour of users to make money and 
do not compensate them. The players enjoy the game, but their enjoyment utility is highly disproportionate to the 
profits enjoyed by the game companies due to their time and their energy: 
‘There’s an analogy…that the game players are like bees: they produce honey, but finally the honey is taken away’ 
(R2, 26).  
 An international labour union is very necessary to regulate cross-border virtual work (R2, 29). 
 There is a need for more theoretical research to provide solutions to cross-border labour exploitation (R2, 41). 
 There are no clear rules that allow for user property rights over virtual assets. Case examples of conflicting 
judgments over virtual property rights were given: in one case, virtual property rights were recognized, in the other, 
a spouse was unable to inherit virtual assets (R6).  
 Academic understanding of the issues needs to understand the economics, policies and communities (R1, 7).  
 The gold farming industry does not seem to be growing like other industries (eg., data entry), and therefore policy 
development may not be as important (R1, 7).  
 The gold farming industry is an ideal model for ICT development 'because it's self-financing, self-sustaining 




 "The main social issue of gaming in China is different from that in the States of in the UK or in Europe...all games 
affect children's school work' (R1, 9) 
 Gold farming poses a labour exploitation problem because it is unregulated: 
'Anything can happen there, like rip-offs, exploitation, and like owing salaries. A lot of them when they closed 
down...the boss would disappear owing months of [salary]...There are no laws protecting these kind of people' (R1, 12) 
 There are real life social and political implications of user activity in online games and these are not regulated. A 
case example of the deliberate spread of racist ideology was given. A second case example of real-life violent protest 
against game companies was given (R1, 15).  
 The only party that can advocate on behalf of the user regarding the contracts with games companies (and 
therefore the legality of gold farming) is the government. Market forces keep these contracts in check to some 
degree because the game companies don’t want to upset their customers (R5, 8). 
 One tax issue raised by the gold farming issue is that the party that does the hiring in China is paid offshore (R5, 8). 
There would likely be the same kind of tariffs applied to any ‘service industry that is happening cross-border where 
there is not actually manufactured products that are going across’ (R5, 9).   
 People in authority in China, both state and non-state actors, have different instincts about transparency and 
participation than in the United States. This creates a challenge for potential collaboration for international 
regulation (R5, 5). 
 Virtual property rights in China are leaning toward company rights (R6, 11). 
 There are no enforceable regulations to tax gold farming transactions because evaluating income is impossible, since 
many of the companies are not registered or licensed (R5) (R10, 2).  
 Key decision-makers are not even aware of the gold farming industry (R8, 12).  
 Real-money trading outside the game rules allows the rich to do whatever they want in the games; this way, the 
government, businessmen, plug-in users and underground studios will benefit: 
'Game culture is a microcosm of Chinese society ' (游戏文化其实就是中国社会的缩影)(R11, 5). 




 The primary stakeholders in gold farming are: 
‘The public sector, the government departments, and the private sector, the online game companies, and the users, 
I believe…these three players are involved’ (R2, 8). 
 There is legal confusion surrounding the legality of gold farming. Most respondents said it was not prohibited 
explicitly, so therefore it was not illegal, however one respondent directly involved with policy stipulates that gold 











 Essentially, the gold farming business model is an outsourcing model (R5, 6) and would likely fall under the same law 
as any other outsourcing or manufacturing operation in China (8). Gold farming just forms part of the wider trend 
toward globalization of labour (R14).   





1. The government controls the network infrastructure and can know all information necessary through this 
channel, even with use of VPN. 
2. The government can  hire many people to monitor online games and to learn and understand the 
colloquialisms and abbreviations used. 
3. When new software is used, the government will develop new software to manage it, the process is a 
technology race (R8). 
 The government does not have the ability to detect gold farming, because it’s all underground, and therefore very 
difficult to detect or evaluate (R2, 27-29). 
 One respondent directly involved in policymaking saw online games as the latest in a teleology of media that brings 
family together (R1, 1): 
Just like television, it's at an early stage and also as a matter of fact influences family relationships. In the past, 
the whole family would read, read the newspaper, and chat together; Later on, television became the centre of 
family communication. Currently games are still not able to do this, children play in the house themselves while 
adults watch television. I think this is the future development direction for games.  (就像电视，它早期实际上也
是影响家庭关系的。以前，全家人一起读书、看报、聊天；后来，电视成为家人沟通的内容。游戏现在还做不
到，孩子关在屋里自己玩，大人看电视。我觉得这是游戏未来的发展方向) (R9, 1).  
 Gold farming will never be illegal (R1, 28).  
 If large industries emerge based on real-money trade, the zhifa will intervene and tax them accordingly (R11, 4).  
 User activity in games will not affect policy development, because this can be address by the game companies and 
technical enforcement (R11, 7). 
 The future of online games development prospects will be like international stock or commodity exchanges. We 
must change the rules so that everyone converges. But because the whole world's online games development is not 




 The government should work to change the social stigma of careers related to online games play because it can be 
an economic revolution similar to the Stock Exchange, without any means of production that consumes no energy 
while creating unlimited value (R8, 9).  
 The government will not work to replace RMT mediating agents because they perform a function the government 
doesn't have the capacity for (R8, 12).  
 R3&4: likely to tend toward simplification and shortening of the license approval process 
 R2: Likely to try to maintain control without destroying the industry. Eventually, government seems to be moving 
more toward becoming corporatized and is likely to adopt corporate business models that centralize people’s 
information. This is dangerous. But for now, it’s still more propaganda-oriented and that is a good thing. 
 Political activity in online games is likely to be very closely supervised (R6) 
 An international approach will be more useful in the future (R6) 
 Second Life and other similar games will not be allowed in China:  
‘It’s very easy to organize protests in some virtual environments, so I think the government will not allow such a 
possibility’ (R2, 43). 
 Policy should work to keep political logic separate from commercial logic in order to prevent the corporatization of 
government. Currently, revolutionary ideology is the only weapon currently available to the Chinese government: 
‘I believe that China is still a magic nation, a magic country. And it has many possibilities in the future…[a new 
socialist] theoretical tradition could provide some weapons to …provide some answers to questions like cross-border 
labour exploitation’ (R2, 41). 
A new theoretical framework must be developed, more research is needed. This research must take place 







 The uncertainty about regulatory control is a characteristic of many areas of the developing economy in China (R5, 
2). 
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